IR 05000280/1992014
| ML18153D084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1992 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153D083 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR 50-280-92-14, 50-281-92-14, IEB-92-001, IEB-92-1, NUDOCS 9208110054 | |
| Download: ML18153D084 (14) | |
Text
UNITED STATES*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No /92-14 and 50-281/92-14 Licensee:
Virglnia El~ctric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 7 through July 4, 1992 Inspectors:
M. M~eni~ident Inspector D~~~
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P. E. Fredrickson, Secticffi~ief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the area of operations, maintenance, surveillance, action on previous inspection items, quality verification and safety assessment review, unresolved safety issue A~46, and NRC Bulletin No. 92-0 Additionally, in the corporate office a review of electrical engineering interface with the nonnuclear electrical engineering group that develops electrical protective setpoints was performe During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's backshifts or weekend operations on June 11, 17, 18, 21, 25, 28, and 29, and July Results:
In the operations area, the following items were noted:
Review of the preliminary results of an operations audit showed no immediate action problems (paragraph 3.a).
9208110054 920729 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
- Review of operations shift relief check list OC-03 revealed that the charging pump alignments were not updated in the instructioh This was identified as a weakness (paragraph 3.b).
Observed that the.response to a potential fire in a transformer.
cooling fan was prompt and adequate (paragraph 3.c).
One ex amp 1 e of a poor qua 1 ity Techn i ca 1 Procedu-re Upgrade Program procedure was identified (paragraph 4.d).
- Several plant material.conditions hindered the evolution of filli~g the.low head iafety injection pump seal head tank, but the tank was able to be filled per the procedure {paragraph 5.c).
In the maintenance/surveillance functional area, the following items were noted:.
Specific post-maintenance tests were thorough and comP,lete (paragraph 4).
Control room ventilation system testing was accomplished in accordance with the procedure, but was hampered by the breaching of control room envelope openings during the test {paragraph 4.a).
During the removal of one channel of the new resistance temperature detectors (RTD) i~ the C loop hot leg of Unit 1, the instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians were very thorough,.
and had the support rif the system engineer at the work site
{paragraph 4.b).
Two periodic tests that did not overlap resulted in an untested portion of the RWST low level initiation of the refueling mode *
transfer {RMT) function (paragraph 5.b).
- The licensee did not have a program to routinely test the control room envelope bottled air system (paragraph 5.c).
In the safety a_ssessment/quality verification area, the* following item was noted:
Station Nuclear Safety Operating Committee normal procedure review process evaluates the procedure's overall purpose and ensures that it conforms to the stations policies and that the plant is not adversely effected. This review is not a detailed technical -
review; however, in some cases, the committee does perform detailed technical reviews of procedures (paragraph 4.d).
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Engineering
- 8. Bryant, Licensing Engineer D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of-Maintenance M. Holdsworth, Supervisor, Security
- M. Kansler, Station Manager A. Keagy, Superintendent of Materials
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations A. Meekings, supervisor, Administrative Services
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager -
- R. Saunders, Assistant Vi~e President, Nuclear Operations NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Seriior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
- last paragrap * Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operatio The unit was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 59 of continuous operatio Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operatio The unit was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 199 of continuous operation.
- Operational Safety Verification {71707, 42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedyre The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify operations safety and compliance with TSs and to maintain awarene~s of the*overall operation of the facility.* Instrumentation and ECCS lineups ~ere periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection program implementation, radiological work practices, plant security and housekeepin Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safetj concerns were properly addressed and r~porte QA Aud it of Operations On June 9, the inspectors attended the entrance meeting foi the biannual QA audit for operations {Audit No. 92-11).
Discussions were held with the auditors and a review of the audit plan and check-list was performe Areas as~essed included: organization, facilities and equipment, procedures and logs, conduct of operations, plant status controls, and maintenance of.record The audit addressed previously identified NRC, INPO, and.QA issue Performance was evaluated through observation~ of various routine operational activities, shift turnovers, ~nd test contro The inspectors discussed the preliminary audit results and noted that no immediate concerns were identified. The final audit exit for Surry will be conducted on July 2 Review of Shift Relief Checklist
- During the backshift on June 20, the inspectors reviewed several of the completed CRO shift relief checklists (OC-03) dated February 25, 1992, th~t had be.en performed for the mid-shift turnove The review indicated that. the checklist had been completed as require However, the inspectors noted a problem with the checklist as it applied to the required number of charging pumps for power operations. Specifically, item 16 of the *
checklist for required charging pu~ps contained a note that stated that no more than two out of the three charging pumps can be out of PtL position and capable of providing flow oh safeguards actuatio The actual charging pump configuration as required by the procedure changes directed by DCP 91-021 were for all three charging pumps to be out of the PTL position~
At the time the inspectors discovered the checklist problem all three pumps were out of the PTL positio *
When questioned by the inspectors, the operators could not explain why they were signing the checklist when the actual configutation was different from that specified. The inspector contacted the SS who indicated that the checklist was in*error arid would be correcte The inspectors discussed the item with the Operations
- _Superintendent and also verified that the checklist was changed to specify that all three pumps should pe normally out of PT The -
Operations Superintendent could not explain why the operatots:were signing the checklist, but he did add that their review indicated that the practice to qua 1 ify checklist s i gnoff was not wel 1
und~rstood and may have contributed to a signoff of an item that was not in accordance with the actual configuratio The Operations Superintendent also indicated that they were reviewing the overall checklist practice. Since the checklists are not considered procedures, they do not receive the same indepth review of an operations procedur They also are not tied to the design change process and would not automatically get updated when affected by a modification~
Proper charging pump configuration was maintained at all times and was cont_rolled by approved procedure However, not recognizing the need to update the checklist when the DCP was implemented and the operators signing the checklist without stopping to get the checklist corrected is considered a weaknes Checklists, if properly utilized, could prevent an unacceptable configuration-from going unnoticed for extended periods of tim Response t'o Fire in Unit 2 Emergency Switch Gear Room At 1:14 pm on June 26 a fire watch in the Unit 2 switch gear room reported the smell of smok Two minutes later an operator
, confirmed the smell of smoke coming from transformer 2H-The fire team was dispatched and abnormal procedure O-AP-48.00, Ffre Protection-Operations Response, dated December 5, 1991, was enteie No visible smoke was noted and the electricians removed the panels from*the transformer so that a visual inspection could be performe One of *the three cooling fans for the transformer was found not operatin * The inspectors observed the response of the iicensee's team and was at the fire scene when some of the team arrive The response of the team was prompt and adequat The leads td the suspect fan were lifted at 2:10 pm and no further characteristics of a*
-potential fire were note The inspectors discussed the loss of the cooling fan with an elettrical design superiisor and were told that the transformer was designed to run, if necessary, with all three cooling fans inoperable.. Operations TPUP Review On May 17, 1992, DR S-92-0894 was written against an-upgraded procedure for being technically incorrect. Section 5.6 of l/2-0P-CH-004, Charging Pump C Operations, dated December-19, 1991, provided instructions for the transfer of chafging pump C from its normal power supply to its alternate power supply. The procedure placed charging pump A in service and charging 'pumps B and C in PT On a loss of offsite power concurrent with SI
- initiation in this configuration, charging pump A would have trippe Manual operator action would be required to start a charging pum Operators realized that the procedure was incorrect and initiated the D After the DR was initiated, the procedure was revised by disablirg the undervoltage trip interlock
- on the A charging pump prior to placing the C charging pwnp in the PTL positio The inspectors reviewed the original copy of l/2-0P-CH-004 and agreed that Section 5.6 of the procedure improperly configured the charging pump As discussed in previous !Rs, the quality of TPUP procedures has been good, however-procedure 1/2-0P-CH-OO~ is one example of a poor quality TPUP procedur The inspectors *
questioned the SNSOC Chaiiman concerning SNSOC approval and were informed that procedures normally do not get a technkal review -
during the SNSOC approval proces SNSOC looks at the procedure's overall purpose and ensures that it conforms to the station's policies and that the plant is not adversely effected. However, in some cases, SNSOC does perform a *detailed procedure review, if determined necessar DR S-92-0894 also stated that this problem was originally identified in December, 199 The inspectors questioned why the pfocedure was not corrected when ori9inally identified and were informed that other problems with the procedure were identified and corrected but.this problem was ho The inspectors were also informed that station management was aware of the procedural problems identified in December and directed that the procedure be revised at that tim The inspectors reviewed TPUP procedure, 1-0P-CH~OOl, eves Operations, dated December 19, 1991. This procedure required a major revision prior to its initial performanc The majority of *
the changes in the revision were to valve line-up sh~ets that, changed the designated location of valves in the containmen The inspectors were informed that when the procedure wa~ issued, the unit was operating and the system could not be walked down.. After the unit was shutdown, a walk-dowri of the system was conducted and the procedure was revised accordingly. The licensee's procedure process requires that operational procedures be validated b operations personnel prior to issuance. During the validation process, systems are walked down if practicabl Within the ireas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703) (42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenan~e activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures.
.5 The following maintenance activities were reviewed: tontrol Room Ventilation Fan Flow Adjustment Following the drive belt replacement on control room ventilation fan, 2-VS-F-41, the fan was tested in accordance with PT 32.5, Control Room Filter Flow Test, dated March 29, 1989~
The test failed because the flow rate of air through the fan was too lo The fan was retested and during this test, the flow rate was too*
hig The fan was tested a third time and the flow rate was too*
high. Adjustments were made to decrease the fan's flow rate. The reason for the initially low fan flow rate was not eviden The inspectors monitored this maintenance activity and subsequent testing. The maintenance was accomplished in accordance with WO*
128267 and pfocedure MCM-0205~1~ Belt Replacement, Adjustment and Tightening, dated March 26, *199 The fan is driven by a motor via a drive belt. The fan's flow rate is proportional to the speed of the fan which can be adjusted by changing the diameter of the p~lley. A Maintenance Engineering Transmittal was utilized for providing the specifications for increasing the diameter of the pulley in order to decrease the-fan spee The inspect6rs reviewed the maintenance package which included the PMT retjuirement No discrepancies were identified. Subsequent testing indicated that proper flow rates were achieved, and is discussed in paragraph Troubleshooting High Delta T Protection-Unit l On June 20 at 0856 an annunciator alarm was received in the control room that a delta T deviation existed. Channel~ for the over pressure over temperature delta temperature was declared inoperable and placed in trip. The C loop,delta Twas fluxuating appfoximately four percent and the over temperature delta temperature set point was erratic.* A low level amplifier and a failed module were replaced but.failed*to correct the proble Further analysis by the I&C technicians revealed that RTD l-RC-TE-432Pl and the spare RTD were failed lo The two RTDs had low megger readings and the.output of the active element had decreased significantly indicating a cable or RTD failure. * The*
system has three T-hot RTDs in the C loop. The three ~ignals are fed into a "divide by 3" summator to give a T-hot average. A review of the*safety evaluation shows that the design of the system allows the removal of a failed RTD and a subsequent change to a "divide by 2" summator*versus the "divide by 3
- The licensee decided to remove the RTDs using temporary modification No. Sl-92-31 and to issue a work request to repair them during the next outage. The inspectors observed th~ I&C technicians removing the two leads and the summing resistor. A system engineer was also present during this maintenanc No discrepancies were identifie *
6 Troubleshooting Unit 2 LHSI Pump Seal Head Tank Alarm On July 1, pump 2-SI-P-lB was operated for ten* minutes in order to perform testing. Approximately two hour~ after securing the pump, the seal head tank low level alarm actuated. The seal tank also had a high level indicating light that was lit showing that th tank wa~_ful Because there were conflicting indications of seal head tank level, operators declared the pump inoperable, entered the appropriate TS LCO, notified the system engineer, and
initiated a D The seal head tank was filled and the low level alarm cleared. It was determined that the tank's high leve light indication was malfunctioning, and the pump was declared operable because the level of the seal head tank.was know Troubleshooting was initiated on the tank's high level limit switche On July 2, the inspectors witnessed the troubleshooting of the pump 2-SI-P-lB seal head tank level switches. This maintenance was accomplished in accordance*with procedure O-TOP-4051, LHSI and OSRS Seal Head Tank Level Setting Verification, dated July 2, 1992 and OP 7.3.4, Filling LHSI and OSRS Seal Head Tanks, dat~d May 29, 199 The troubleshooting revealed that the high level limit switch was out of adjustment. The switch was adjusted and the tank was drained and filled in order to verify proper switch operation. The inspectors reviewed the PMT requirements for this maintenance and considered them correct. The procedures for this evolution were adequate and were foll6wed~
The inspecttirs noted several material conditions that hindered the evolution of filling the seal head tank. These material conditions included broken pressure gages on th~ pressure regulator that was used to fill the tank,.and a pressure regulator that was difficult to adjus Because the seal* head tank cooling coils were horizontal in lieu of vertical, rapid valve manipulations were required to prevent air from being trapped in the.system. A work request was initiated to repair the regulator and gage The problem with the cooling coils has been previously identified and modifications are scheduled for a future RF The inspectors noted that during this maintenance the system engineer and assistant shift supervi~or were present to provide assistance to maintenance and operations
. personnel involved with this evolutio The inspectors consider that the corrective actions associated with 2~s1-P-lB seal head tank alarm on July 1 and 2 were satisfactor Within* the are*as inspected, no violations were identified.* Surveillance Inspections (61726) (42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate proced~re and TS requirement *
The following surveillance activity was reviewed: Control Room Filtration Flow Test On June 12, the inspectors witnessed the testing of control room ventilation fan, 2-VS-F-41, in accordance with PT 3 Once the fans was started, the velocity of air passing through the fan was measured with an anemomete The inspectors noted that the test was able to be accomplished in accordance with the procedure but was hampered by the breaching of control room envelope opening during the te~ PT 32.5 required a ten minute stabilization period after the fan was started. However, during the test, personnel would enter and exit tha control room envelope which caused the fan's flow rate to oscillate. The operator measuring_
the flow rate had t~ continuously monitor fl~w rates and determine when the contro*1 room envelope doors were shut and fl ow rates restabilize,
Refueling Water Storage Tank Level-RMT During review of procedural changes necessary to support a TS change, a deficiency was discovered in the surveillance testing for the RWST low level*initiation of the RMT syste An untested area was discovered on June 29, when the licensee identified that two periodic tests (PT-2.19 and PT 8.6), which are used to test this circuitry, did not overlap. Consequently, a six hour LCO to cold shut down (TS 3.01) was entered at 2:20 pm on June 2 The licensee modified PT-2.19, Refueling Water Storage Tank Lev~l, dated May 21, 1992, for each of the units so that the nontested area of the circuitry would be teste The inspectors observed the te$ting from the emergency switchgear room and the control roo The periodic tests were successful and the licensee exited the LCO at 5:18 pm for Unit I and 4:49 for Unit 2. A supplement to an existing LER will be writte No discrepancies were noted during the testin Control Room Envelope Compressed Bottled Air System Testing The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for testing the active components in the control room envelope.compressed bottled air syste The control room, control room annex, Units 1 and 2 ESGRs, and MER 3 make. up the control room envelop Upon receipt of an SI signal from either unit, th~ control room envelope's air supply and exhaust automatically isolate and the compressed bottled air banks located in MER 3 and Unit I cable vault automatically begin to depressuriz The two*bottled air banks are redundant and designed such that actuation of a single air bank will maintain the control room envelope pressure higher than atmospheric pressure for one hou *
Dampers 1-VS-M0D-103A, control room envelope exhaust, and 1-VS-MOD-1038, control room envelope supply, shut on an SI signa The closure of 1-VS-MOD-103A initiates the depressurization of the MER 3 air bank and the closure of 1-VS-MOD-1038 initiates the depresstirization -0f the cable vault air bank. The.inspectors reviewed procedures l-OPT-ZZ-001, ESF'Actuation With Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage lH-Bus, dated February 27, 1992, and 2-0PT-ZZ-002, ESF Actuation With Delayed Undervoltage 2J-Bus, dated August 29, 1991, and verified that the circuitry up to and including these dampers were_properly teste The inspectors reviewed PT 33.1, Control Room Leakage, Bottled Air, dated June 27, 1989 and concluded that the licensee did not have a-program to routinely test the circuitry and components that actuate upon the closure of 1-VS-MOD-103A and These.components include SOVs, pressure regulating valves and their associated electrical circuitry. The licensee did have a program, PT 33.1, to routinely verify that control room envelope leakage was not excessiv PT 33.1 allowed the use of the air bank in MER 3 or in the Unit 1 cable vault as a pressure source when pressurizing the control room envelop When performing this test, the circuitry
.and components that actuate to pressurize the control ~oom envelope are properly tested for the air bank used during the test. This test was performed on.November 29, 1990, utilizing the air bank in MER 3 as a pressure source. This testing was performed on May 19, 1991, and April 15, 1992, utilizing the air bank in the Unit 1 cable vault as a pressure sourc At the end of the inspection period, approximately 19 months has elapsed without testing the MER 3 air bank component PT 33.1 is cur-rently scheduled to be performed in the first half of 1~93 during -
the ~nit 1 RF Section 9.13.3.6 of the UFSAR states that automatic closure of the dampers causes an automatic discharge of the control room bottled air system. The inspectors reviewed TSs and concluded that they did not contain a requirement to test the components that automatically actuate to pressurize the control room envelop Item 15 of TS Table 4.1-2A requires each refueling interval *that the control room ventilation syste~ be tested for the ability to_
maintain a positive pressure for one hour using a volume of air equivalent to or less than that stored in the bottled air supply.-
This TS requirement was added by Amendmen_ts Nos. 72. and 73 which were approved by SER dated April 24, 198 The inspectors *
reviewed the SER and concluded that additional test requirements were not specified for the bottled air.syste The inspectors teviewed the 1ST tequirements for bottled air system ptessure
- regulating valves and concluded that there were no requirements to periodically exercise the valve The licensee agreed with the inspectors that the components associated with the automatic initiation of the bottled air system should be routinely tested. At the end.of the inspection period
the licensee was in the process of revising procedures to ensure routine testing. Also, the licensee was evaluating the need to test the MER 3 air bank components prior to the upcoming RF Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Action On Previous Inspection Items (92701) (92702)
(Closed) VIO 280,281/91-14-02, Failure to Identify and Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality.* This issue involved inadequate corrective actions associated with LHSl and OSRS seal head tank alarm The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated August 7, 1991. In that letter, the licensee stated that annunciator response procedures were revised to provide guidance to operators on receipt of a low level alarm and enhance seal tank cooling -fill procedures to ensure the air is vented from the syste The inspectors reviewed the annunciator response for the seal head tank low level alarm and considered that adequate guidance was provide The seal head tank fill procedures were reviewed and discussed in paragraph Within.the areas inspected, no violations were identifie. -
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500)
- During.the inspection period, the Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve, 2-RC-SV-2551A, began to leak excessively by the seat creating operational.problems.. In an attempt to reduce the leakage the licensee temporarily modified the ventilation in the pressurizer cubicle to lower the ambient temperature. The ventilation system was modified by*
installing a temporary duct at a ventilation header to direct cooling air into the cubicle. This was accomplished in accordance with Jemporary Modification S2-92-09, dated June 16, 199 The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation that accompanied the temporary modification and concluded that the safety evaluation was adequat The safety evaluation properly addressed the effect the change of ambi-en temperature had on valve set point and loop seal temperatur Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Engineering Activity Review {37828) Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 On June 17, the inspecto~s received an update on the licensee's_
status on_unresolved safety issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plant The update was thorough and informativ The licensee must respond in writing to the NRC by September 21, 1992, to Generic Letter 87-02 concerning this unresolved safety issu. Review of Interface Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Electrical Engineering On June 23, the inspectors performed an engineering inlerface review at the licensee's corporate office. The purpose of the review was, in part, to evaluate the type of controls that NEE had over the safety-related power distribution protection setpoint design work performed by the Grayland Avenue Substation and System Protection Engineering grou The inspectors reviewed the required personnel qualificationJ and output reviews that were specified in.the interface procedure NDCIM-14 revision 2 dated January 15, 199 The inspectors determin~d that SS&SP was the design authority for transmission and distribution equipment arid was responsible for the review and approval ~f protective relaying for medium and high voltage systems (4160 volts and above).
The interface procedure-required that when safety-related equipment was involved, the NEE group would review the calculation ( outputs) and that the NDCM applie The procedure also required that trained and qualified personnel be assigned to the work performed, and that the nuclear design change process must be used for changes associated with setpoint The interface procedure also invokes lOCFR 21 and lOCFR 50 appendix B requirement for the safety-related work performed by SS&S The inspectors reviewed the lOCFR appendix B requirements associated with personnel qualifications and determined that TS 5.1.B and QA Topical requirement for personnel qualification allow both degreed and non~degreed personnel to fill the position of engineer. This requirement would apply to both NEE and SS&SP engineers performing safety-related wor The irispe~trirs also interviewed NEE per~onnel associated wtth the review of SS&SP outputs and verified that the NEE revi~wer was-well experienced and qualified for the position. The inspectors review concent~ated on the controls that are currently in place and have been in place since Janurary 1991 and did not review past controls methods in this are *
Within the areas inspected, no violation was identifie.
NRC Bulletin No. 92-01 On June 25, the inspectors discussed with the licensee NRC Bulletin No. 92-01, Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damag The bulletin required in part that immediately upon receipt, the licensee should determine the areas of the plant where this material was used and evaluate the consequences. A detailed discu~sion was held between the licensee and NRC personne The inspectors reviewed*
justification for continued operation No. C-92-005 which contained
11.
compensatory measures for the Thermo-lag ffre barriers. The licensee is-required to respond*to the bulletin within 30 day.
Exit.Interview The inspection scope and results were sunvnarized.on July 8, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
_ Item Number Status Description Failure to Identify and Correct
- Conditions Adverse to* Qualit VIO 280,281/91:14-02 Closed (Paragraph 6)
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms CRO eves -
-
IR IST LCO LHSI NDCM MER NEE NRC OP
- OSRS
-
SER SI-SNSOC-CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATION INSPECTION REPORT INSERVICE TEST LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION NUCLEAR DESIGN CONTROL MANUAL MECHANCIAL EQUIPMENT ROOM NUCLEAR ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATING PROCEDURE OUTSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM POST MAINTENANCE TEST PULL TO_LOCK QUALITY ASSURANCE REFUELING OUTAGE REFUELING MODE TRANSFER RESISTENCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR REFEULlNG WATER STORAGE TANK SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SAFETY INJECTION STATION NUCLEAR AND SAFETY OPEATING COMMITTEE
sov ss SS&PP-TS
. TPUP -
UFSAR-VIO WO
SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SHIFT SUPERVISOR*
SUBSTATION AND SYSTEM PROTECTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS*
TECHNICAL PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT VIOLATION WORK ORDER