IR 05000280/1992011
| ML18153D038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1992 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153D037 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-92-11, 50-281-92-11, NUDOCS 9206240432 | |
| Download: ML18153D038 (11) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION*
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/92-11 and 50-281/92-11 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Dotket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 5 through May 9, 1992 Inspectors: ~
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c~ Senior Resident Inspector J.if~iafnrfn::pector S. ~~~dent Inspector Approved by:
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Scope:
P.. Fre r1c son, Section C Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of operations, maintenance, surveillance, safety assessment and quality verifica-tion, strike plans, and action on previous inspection item During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's backshift or weekend operations on April 5, 8, 12, 17, 18, and May 3, 199 Results:
In the operations area the following items were noted:
Operator performance during the two Unit 1 startups was considered excellent (paragraph 3.b).
Operator's response to the May 7 Unit 1 trip was good (paragraph 3.c).
. A non-cited violation was identified as a result of a fire watch's inattentiveness to duties (paragraph 3.d).
9206240432 920608 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
- In the maintenance/surveillance area, the following items were noted:
The lack of control of contractor maintenance activities resulted in a trip of Unit 1 and was considered a weakness (paragraph 3.c).
During the Integrated Leak rate Test, several minor weaknesses associated with procedural use and instructions occurred (paragraph 5.a).
In the Safety Assessment/Quality Verification area, the following items were noted:
The Unit 1 startup assessment adequately evaluated items for deferral and mode change Management involvement in this process was evident, and the startup assessment was effective in ensuring safe operation of the unit following the refueling outage (paragraph 6.a).
- The Unit 1 post trip review was goQd and demonstrated a positive safety attitude (paragraph 6.b).
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Allen, Superintendent of Operations (Acting)
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Station Procedures
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning A. Fletcher, Assistant Superintendent of Engineering
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager A. Keagy, Superintendent of Materials
- J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager (Acting)
J. McGinnis, Human Performance Evaluation System Coordinator
- J. O'Hanlon, Vice President - Nuclear, Corporate A. Price, Assistant Station Manager R. F. Saunders, Assistant Vice President-Nuclear, Corporate
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering G. Woodzell, Senior Instructor NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Resident Inspector Accompanying NRC Inspector J.L. Shackelford, Reactor Inspector
- Attended exit intervie Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initial isms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status Unit I began the reporting period in a refueling outag The outage was completed on schedule and the unit was restarted on May 1. After physics testing, the unit operated until the turbine trip/re~ctor trip on May *
The unit was restarted on the same day and was at 98.5% at the end of the inspection perio Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operatio The unit was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 143 of continuous operatio.
Operational Safety Verification (71707,42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedure The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify operations safety and compliance with TSs and to maintain awareness of the overall operation of the facility. Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection programs, radiologi-cal work practices, plant security programs and housekeepin Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were properly addressed and reporte Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports On May 7, at 10:06 a.m. the licensee reported to the NRC that Unit 1 experienced a turbine trip/reactor trip from 78% powe Contract maintenance personnel were attempting to stop an oil leak on the thrust bearing test valve. A nut on the bonnet of the test valve was loosened allowing oil to leak by the valve that resulted in thrust bearing high pressure, and subsequently a turbine trip. This event is further discussed in paragraph Unit l Startup On May 3, the inspectors observed from the control room, the Unit 1 startup from 2% to 30% reactor power. Procedure l-GOP-1.5, 2% reactor power to 25%-30% reactor power, dated April 25, 1992 was used for this evolutio Operator performance was excellent during the startup. Communications were good, procedures were followed, and evolutions were well coordinate Several times during the startup, just prior to commencing a difficult task, operators would conduct a prejob briefing to ensure that all parties involved were aware of their dutie The inspectors reviewed *upgraded-procedure 1-GOP-1.5, which was used during the startup, and cone l uded that it was a qua l i ty produc Startup was accomplished without requiring any changes to the procedure and * operators were able to eas i 1 y adhere to its requirement The procedure, which was classified as "complex test" or "infrequently conducted", required senior operations management oversight in addition to the normal shift supervisor oversight. This additional level of management involvement ~as an aid to the safe operation of the unit during the startu. *
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With the exception of the A FRV bypass valve, plant equipment operated satisfactorily. At approximately 15% power, SG feedwater control was transferred from manual to automatic mod During this evolution, operators were challenged when operation of the A FRV bypass valve became sluggis As a result, level in the A SG*
increased to 67%.
Operator action was taken before SG level reached 75% which would have automatically tripped the unit. The A FRV bypass valve controller was replaced and the valve operated satisfactorily thereafte Later in the startup, a rod control problem occurred which is discussed in paragraph *
Unit 1 May 7 turbine trip/reactor tri At 10:06 a.m. on May 7, Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 78 percent power when the turbine was tripped during maintenance activities. A contractor employee was attempting to stop an oil leak on the thrust bearing trip test valv When the bonnet nut was loosened, the valve stem moved which allowed the valve to slightly open. Oil leakage past the valve.allowed the sensing mechanism to see a thrust bearing high pressure condition that resulted in a turbine tri The work that was being performed was not controlled by any work order or procedure and the only worker instructions were to stop the oil leak. Procedure VPAP-801, Maintenance Program, dated December 31, 1991, paragraph 6.18 covers the performance of maintenance by outside organizations. The performance objectives are to ensure that maintenance performed by outside organizations is controlled and contractor and other nonplant personnel are properly supervised and work under the same controls, procedures and standards as station maintenance personne This failure to control maintenance being performed by an outside organization is identified as a weaknes The operators response to the event was observed by the inspectors and good procedural adherence was noted. One problem was noted in that a procedure was not used. Operators were instructed by the operations superintendent to borate the reactor to ensure comp l i ance with TS 3.12.A.4 for shutdown margin. Whenever the reactor is subcritical, except for physics tests, the critical rod position, i.e., the rod position at which criticality would be achieved if the control rod assemblies were withdrawn in normal sequence with no other reactivity changes, is required to be above the insertion limit for zero powe The inspectors questioned the licensee as to why the EDP, 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, did not contain instructions to borate for the conditions observed. At the end of the inspection period the licensee was evaluating the nee.d to change this procedur The inspector observed that plant equipment responded well to the transien However, the inspectors did note that the TDAFW time response appeared to be slow. The licensee's review of post trip data determined that fl ow to the SGs from the TDAFW pump occurred 58 seconds after the low SG level signal was received. * The licensee's post trip review team evaluated the as found time response of the TDAFW*pump and found it to be acceptable. This was confirmed through
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discussions with the nuclear analysis group who indicated that 60 seconds was used in the accident analysis. The licensee will continue to evaluate the actual ti me response of the system s i nee the 58 second-flow initiation does not provide much of a margin from the value used in the accident analysi Inattentive Fire Watch Each EDG room has a carbon dioxide fire suppression system which must be initiated manually if a fire occurs. Outside of each EDG room there is a panel that alarms if a fire occurs inside the room (red flashing light) and alarms if a fault occurs (yellow flashing light)
in the carbon dioxide system electrical circuitr On April 26, the No. 3 EDG carbon dioxide system panel yellow light began to flash on and off indicating a fault in the circui In this condition, operators were unable to verify that the circuit was operable and a continuous fire watch was stationed in the No. 3 EDG room in accordance with TS On May 3, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the inspectors discovered that the fire watch stationed in the No. 3 EDG room was inattentive in that he was not monitoring for a fire. The inspectors immediately reported this to the assistant shift supervisor and the fire watch was replaced. Step 3.2.3.2 of SUADM-ADM-20, Special Processes Involving Ignition Sources, requires that fire watches look for fires and if one occurs, sound an alarm and extinguish the fire if possibl The failure to monitor for a fire in accordance with SUADM-ADM-201990 was identified as NCV 280,281/92-11-01, Failure of Fire to Follow Procedure. This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie Subsequent licensee investigation of the carbon-diox.ide panel flashing light indicated that the fault did not effect the function of the system in that the system would have properly operated when manually initiate Temporary Waiver of Compliance On April 24, the NRC granted a Temporary Waiver of Compliance to TS 4.17.C.6. The waiver applied to Unit 1 and was for one time use onl During the RFO, three snubbers did not meet the acceptance criteria specified in TS 4.17.E and therefore, this required that additional snubbers be tested. Granting of this waiver eliminated the require-ment to test additional snubber The granting of the waiver was based on the premise that the three snubbers in question were fully operable and that the acceptance criteria in TS 4.17. E was not applicable to the type of snubber installed at Surry. When discussing this issue, the licensee stated a TS amendment would be submitted to correct this discrepanc On May 5, the NRC granted a Temporary Waiver of Comp l i ance to TS 3.12. The waiver was for a one time use and applied to Unit 1 only. * Once on May 3 and twice on May 5 the rod urgent failure alarm
the unit is required to enter TS 3.12.C.3 which provides two hours for troubleshooting and repair prior to requiring that the unit be brought to hot shutdown in six hour The urgent failures were diagnosed by the licensee as a circuitry problem in a cabinet of the control rod drive system. Granting of this waiver allowed additional time (up to 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />) to effect thorough troubleshooting and repair The granting of the*waiver was based on the fact that the affected control rod assemblies remain trippable (see paragraph 4.b for repair details).
Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703, 42700,)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure The following maintenance activity was reviewe Repair of Pressurizer Pressure Channel - Unit 1 On April 30, annunciator EH4, low pressurizer pressure/reactor trip, displayed an erratic indication in the control roo The inspectors noted the annunciator and decided to follow the trouble shooting and repai Station deviation Report No. S-92-0797 was written and WO No. 3800126663 was used by the l&C technician to perform the wor Two comparators were replaced and perodic test No. 1-PT-2.4A (P-1-457), Pressurizer Pressure Protection, dated February 20, 1992, was used to return the instrumentation to servic Part of the mainte-nance was observed by the inspectors in the ESGR area and no discrep-ancies ~ere note Repair of Unit I Power Cabinet 2AC On May 3, an annunciator alarm GA6, Rod Control Urgent Failure, was activated, indicating a problem in Unit I rod control cabinet 2A The l&C personnel, after consulting with Westinghouse on the proper steps to use for trouble shooting the system, removed the failure detection cards, compared voltage readings between this cabinet and a second trouble free cabine No differences in voltage were noted and the cards were placed back into the cabine The al arm was reset and the. annunciator cl eare Perodic test l-PT-6.0, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, dated April 25, 1991, was used to return the system to servic However, On May 5, at 5:38 am, the same annunciator, GA6, alarmed agai The l&C technicians determined that one of the firing cards needed to be replace First the annunciator alarm was cleared using the technique discussed previousl The techni-cians were to use the DC hold bus to prevent the group C rods from dropping while replacing the firing card but a fuse was blown and trouble shooting had to be accomplished in this cabinet first (see par. 4.c).
Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> later, the
- first {see par. 4.c).
Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> later, the annunciator came in a third time when the I&C group was repairing the DC hold cabinet. This time, the alarm would not clear and the licensee decided to request the temporary waiver of compli-ance discussed in paragraph The technicians replaced the firing card and then received a group C multiplex error which, after extensive troubleshooting, was cleare The inspectors were present when a telephone conference was held on May 6 between Westinghouse, station management, and the I&C techni-cians, during which a conclusion was reached that the problem had been solved. After repairs, the TS clock was exited within the time frame granted in the Temporary Waiver of Complianc Repair of Unit 1 DC Hold Cabinet On May 5, while attempting to repair the problem with a rod control cabinet described in the previous paragraph, a problem with the DC hold cabinet was discovered {fuses were blowing).
The inspectors observed the I&C personnel methodically taking data and trouble shooting the proble The technicians used WO No. 3800126838 and procedure IMP-C-EPCR-46, Maintenance of Rod Control System, dated June 26, 1989, to accomplish the tas A blown fuse on one of the electrical phases supplying power to the cabinet was diagnose The fuse was replaced and no further problems occurre No problems were identified by the inspector.
Surveillance Inspections {61726, 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure and TS requirement The inspectors observed part of the Unit 1 type A containment test that was performed using procedure l-NPT-CT-101, Reactor Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate Test {Type A Containment Testing), dated April 10, 1992. This test was completed satisfactorily within TS limit. During the test, several procedural and administrative weaknesses were identified and and are indicated below:
Atmospheric pressure is needed to calculate the containment pressur The atmospheric pressure was not recorded in the procedure; however, the licensee was able to retrieve sufficient information from installed test equipmen Atmospheric pressure is needed to calculate the containment pressur Test procedure does not specify that containment pressure must remain*
above the calculated value of test pressure throughout the duration of the test {this requirement was adhered to during the testing).
- Pen and ink changes were made to the test procedure, based on discussions with the vendor, which modified required suction pressure and discharge oil pressures on the dryer panel which is non-safety relate Procedure VPAP-0502, Procedure Process Control, contains guidance which requires that a PAR be issued for this type of chang These deficiencies were identified on deviation report No. S-92-0732. *
In general, the conduct of the test was good and the personnel involved with the test were knowledgeabl The test was satisfactorily completed with acceptable result.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500) Unit I Startup Assessment The inspectors reviewed the Unit I RFO Startup Assessmen The licensee does not have an admi ni strati ve procedure that specifies startup assessment requirements, but one is being developed. Startup assessments are directed by the SNSOC and MRB, who identify what must be evaluated for a startup following a RF They also approve items that can be deferred until after startup or later. Examples of items evaluated prior to the Unit I startup were periodic or special tests, uncompleted DCPs and EWRs, insulation and scaffolding, deferred commitments, deferred corrective and preventive maintenance WOs, open station deviations, JCOs, reactivity management issues, PPRs, temporary power supplies, EOP and startup procedures, and post maintenance tests. The startup assessment also identifies items that must be completed prior to changing plant modes of operatio Each department is required to identify the outstanding startup assessment i terns in their area and ensure that the i terns that cannot be defer.red are completed as require The inspectors attended several startup assessment meetings, reviewed the completed Unit I RFO Startup Assessment, dated April 26, 1992, and reviewed the deferred corrective maintenance work orders and open station deviation The inspectors concluded that the startup assessment adequately evaluated items for deferral and mode change Management involvement in this process was evident, and the startup assessment was effective in ensuring safe operation of the unit following the RF Unit I Post Trip Review On May 7, the inspectors attended the post trip review for the Unit I automatic reactor trip, which occurred earlier in the da Prior to a unit restart, a post trip review is held to ensure that the cause of the trip was known and that the equipment operated satisfactorily during the transien The post trip review was performed in accor-dance with SUADM-0-02, Post Trip Review, dated June 2, 198 During the post trip review the cause of the trip was thoroughly discussed and understood. Also, several minor equipment problems were discussed
that were to be repaired prior to restar The post trip review concluded that all major equipment operated satisfactorily during trip and subsequent plant transient and that the unit could be restarte The inspectors concluded that this post trip review demonstrated a positive safety attitud.
Licensee Plans for Coping With Strikes (92709)
During this inspection period, the possibility existed for a strike at both the Surry and North Anna Nuclear Pl ant The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan at Surry for coping with the strik The plans were reviewed for the fo 11 owing:
The minimum number of qualified and proficient personnel were available thereby ensuring plant operation and safet Plant security was to be maintained at a level consistent with proper plant integrity and operatio The contents of the plant strike plans are consistent with regulatory requirements and that these requirements are me The strike contingency plans supplemented with additional discussions with licensee security management was reviewed by the regional safeguards inspection staff. It was concluded that the plans were adequat On May 9, licensee management and the IBEW union reached a tentative agreement on a new three year contract. The proposed contract will require approval by union member.
Action On Previous Inspection Items URI 280,281/88-04-02, Licensee Evaluation of Steam Flow Indication at Lower Power Levels From a Design, Safety Analysis, and Operator Action Point of View, involved steam flow indication not being available for operator information until the indicated power level reached approximately 18%.
When this URI was initially identified, the licensee concluded that waiting until about 25% power level to verify operability of instrumenta-tion would have no impact on the existing safety analysis. This issue was then referred to NRC management for further review. This URI was closed in IR 280,281/91-0 The basis for closure was that the issue was being considered for multiplant -implications and that any concerns would be addressed when the review was complete. The NRC has reviewed this issue and concluded that the accident analysis was bounded and that waiting until 25%
power to conduct channel checks was acceptabl During this review, the staff noted that Westinghouse Electric Corporation evaluated this issue for their plants and concluded that there is a potential for an ambiguity or incompleteness in the FSAR. This may not completely identify the implicit credit taken for diverse trips/functions that are required to ensure that the accident analyses presented by the FSAR remain val id and boundin Westinghouse recommended to the affected licensee's that the FSARs for 31 plants, including Surry, be reviewed to ascertain if changes are required J
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to clarify operability and use of the associated function The licensee has received the letter and has prepared a FSAR change to clarify this issu The FSAR change was being reviewed by the 1 icensee as the inspection period ended. After the review is completed, the change will be incorporated into the FSA.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 15, with those i ndi vi dua 1 s i dent i fi ed by an asterisk in paragraph The fo 11 owing summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exi Item number NCV 280,281/92-11-01 Closed Closed Index of Acronyms and Initialisms Description and Reference Failure of Fire Watch to Follow Procedure (paragraph 3.d)
CFR CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS DC DIRECT CURRENT DCP DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE ECCS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM EDG EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EOP EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ESGR EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM EWR ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST FRV FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FSAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT GL GENERIC LETTER
!BEW INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS l&C INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS IR INSPECTION REPORT JCO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION MRB MANAGEMENT REVIEW BOARD MS MAIN STEAM NCV NON-CITED VIOLATION NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PPR POTENTIAL PROBLEM REPORT RFO REFUELING OUTAGE SG STEAM GENERATOR SNSOC STATION NUCLEAR AND SAFETY OPERATING COMMITTEE*
TDAFW TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION URI UNRESOLVED ITEM WO WORK ORDER