IR 05000280/1982008
| ML20052G086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1982 |
| From: | Burke D, Marlone Davis, Hardin A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G071 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-82-08, 50-280-82-8, 50-281-82-08, 50-281-82-8, IEB-79-28, NUDOCS 8205140295 | |
| Download: ML20052G086 (7) | |
Text
.
.
/
UNITED STATES
1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$
E REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SUITE 3100 g
-
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 s
Report Nos. 50-280/82-08 and 50-281/82-08 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company l
Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2
.
Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia
[/a!bda MUN Inspectors:
D. J. Burke b
Date Signed hl$ MW<m
&
c//73 /32.
it. J. Davis
&
Date Signed Approved by:
,d/
< d~
VM 2 /JL A. K. Hardin, Acting Sxtion Chief, Division of Date Signed Project and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on March 1-31, 1982 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 215 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, IE Bulletin Followup, licensee event reports, and plant security.
Results In the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
i 8205140295 920423
,
PDRAD00K05000g i
o L
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent
- D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Health Physics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift supervisors, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection period.
During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Uait 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
Specific ' areas of inspection and review included the following:
a.
Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the pl ant, b.
On March 25,1982, at 10:35 a.m., Unit 1 experienced a reactor coolant pump trip followed by a reactor trip and safety injection.
Testing of safety injection logic circuitry was being conducted.
The reactor coolant pump trip occurred while checks of hot and cold leg stop valve
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
.
_
signal inputs to the safeguards logic was being conducted. A limit switch on M0V-1590, 'A' loop hot leg stop valve, was supplying an erroneous not full open indication to train A.
When train B logic was tested the 'A' loop reactor coolant pump tripped causing a reactor trip. An increase in steam flow occurred in the unaffected loops after the reactor coolant pump tripped, to compensate for the reduced steam flow from the affected loop.
This increased flow, combined with the low average coolant temperature, led to a safety injection some 27 seconds after the trip. All safety systems functioned normally. The low T ave was due to the addition of excess feedwater to the steam generators (slow controller response) and auxiliary and f1SR steam loads.
Following the SI and FW isolation, a FW steam leak developed on a pipe flange to main FW pump A; the leak was isolated and repaired.
During the recovery on March 25, 1958 hours0.0227 days <br />0.544 hours <br />0.00324 weeks <br />7.45019e-4 months <br />, Unit 1 experienced a safety injection from 8.7% power from a spurious main steam line header to line pressure differential.
Erratic movement of the governor valves is believed to have caused the momentary pressure differential which resulted in the SI.
The Unit returned to criticality at 2312 on llarch 25.
The reactor coolant dose equivalent Iodine -131 activity peaked at some 7.5 uci/cc after the trip from full power.
c.
Followup was conducted on the Ventilation Vent System radiation monitors which were found inoperable on March 11, 1982. The Venti-lation Vent System pulls normal ventilation air from the fuel, decon, safeguards and auxiliary buildings, and discharges the air to the plant stack, where the effluent activities and flow rates are measured.
Technical Specification 4.9.c requires that the gross activities of all gaseous and airborne particulate effluents released from the Venti-lation Vent System shall be measured and recorded continuously while being discharged.
However, on March 11, 1982, the effluents being released through the normal Ventilation Vent System were not being measured or recorded while being discharged from the plant stack, apparently due to modifications perfonned on liarch 9,1982.
Design Change 80-64A placed radiation monitors Ril-VG-109 and 110 in operation in place of the normal Ventilation Vent System (stack) monitors R!1-VG-103 and 104; however, RM-VG-109 and 110 were aligned to monitor the fuel building effluent, not the plant stack.
The Design Change (80-64A) did not specify which of the 8 sample channels was to be in service to monitor the stack. The spare channel (8) was utilized for the modification, but was not selected, leaving the plant stack unmonitored. Although Periodic Test 26.1 was performed on llarch 9, 1982, following the modification and daily thereafter, to verify operability of the radiation monitors, sample pumps, and air flow-rates, the misalignment was not identified until llarch 11, 1982.
The inspector reviewed the daily air sample logs for the auxiliary building and other areas; no unusual air activities were noted for the periods of March 9-12, 1982 -- the activities were well below i1PC.
In addition, the process vent system and monitors were operable during this period to monitor gas releases from potentially high activity systems.
The licensee identified, reported, and is taking corrective action to prevent recurrence of this item.
__
_ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
a
.
.
d.
While following up on the above item (5.c.), the inspector noted that the Ventilation Vent System interim high range (shielded) radiation monitor installed in accordance with NUREG 0737. Item II.F.1(1), was disconnected when Design Change 80-64A was completed to install the 'new (long-term) Karman high range monitors. However, the new high range monitors were being calibrated and tested, and were not operable. The licensee implemented a field change to the DC 80-64A package to route the Ventilation Vent monitoring system to RM-VG-103 and 104 and the interim high range monitor until the Karman system is operable; the field change was completed on March 13, 1982.
6.
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection period.
The inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control roam and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, maintenance and testing were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedures. Within the areas 3.1spected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Specific areas of inspection and review included the following:
a.
Review of alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plant, during operations.
b.
On March 11, 1982, routine chemistry samples indicated that the Unit 2 Boron Injection Tank (BIT) boron concentration was below the Technical Specification (low) limit of 11.5%.
Investigation revealed no BIT'
recirculation flow with the BA Storage Tank, and no boric acid flow through the blender. The suction valve from 'C' Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) was found shut. The valve had not been reopened following a batching evolution the previous evening.
The valve was opened and boric acid flow through the blender was verified.
However the BIT recirculation line was plugged and a unit rampdown was commenced; an ususual event was declared. During the rampdown, the unit experienced a turbine trip and reactor trip from 15% power on 6A feedwater heater high high level caused by the leakage in the heater.
Fullowing repairs to the BIT recirculation -line, the unit was returned to operation on liarch 12.
Subsequent operation has been limited to 96% power with the SA and 6A feedwater heaters isolated.
c.
On Itarch 20,1982, at 0545, with Unit 2 operating at 96% Power, a continuous turbine runback and manual reactor trip occurred when an EHC system relief failed to open.
The relief valve was cleaned, tested, and returned to service. The unit was returned to power operation later that day.
7.
IE Bulletin Followup IE Bulletin 79-28 concerned failures of NAMC0 Model EA 180 stem mounted limit switches due to defective top cover gaskets. The licensee replaced the top cover gaskets per manufacturer's instructions on the six limit
.
switches on site.
None have been installed in any safety-related equipment.
IE Bulletin 79-28 is closed for Surry Units 1 and 2.
8.
The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determined the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planned.
Certain LER's were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determined compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements.
The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff members.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
LER 280/81-19 cwerned inoperable control rods during low power physics testing.
The r cds were inoperable due to a blown fuse in a power cabinet.
The unit was maintained critical for greater than the TS 3.12 two hour limit, but within TS 3.0 six hour limit.
Corrective action included replacement of the blown fuse and revision of the annunciator procedure to reference the applicable TS section.
This LER is closed.
LER 280/81-43 concerned the failure to flow test fire hydrants every three years as required by Technical Specifications.
PT 24.20 the three year flow test of the fire protection system, was perfonned December 3,1981. This LER is closed.
LER 280/81-48 and 280/81-52 concerned steam flow transmitter failure due to moisture entering the electronic section of the transmitter.
The Unit 1 Fisher Porter transmitters were replaced with Rosemount transmitters that are environmentally qualified.
The electrical conduit to the transmitters was also modified to restrict moisture. These LERs were closed.
LER 280/81-73 concerned a containment pressure comparator which failed due to a faulty printed circuit board. The comparator was replaced, the replacement comparator was calibrated, and the channel returned to service.
This LER is closed.
!
LER 280/81-77 concerned the malfunction of 110V-1867A due to shaft binding caused by tight packing.
The packing was loosened and the valve test sa ti sfac torily. This LER is closed.
LER 280/81-81 concerned containment vacuum pumps 1-CV-P-1A and 1B being inoperable due to binding of the sliding vanes in the pump's rotor.
Condensation and entrained particulates resulted in the vanes binding in their slots. A spare pump replaced one inoperable pump.
The second was rebuilt and replaced.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-04 concerned a reactor trip breaker failure to open during RPS
'
logic testing due to failure of the undervoltage tripping device.
The failure of a small retaining clip had allowed a bushing to be dislodged, creating excessive play in the mechanical linkage of the UV device. The reactor trip breaker was replaced and tested.
The UV device was replace,
.
-
Electrical Maintenance Procedures were revised to include inspection of the retaining devices.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-36 concerned water contamination in an underground diesel fuel oil storage tank due to inadequate procedures for sampling and removing water from the above ground tank. The water was drained from the transfer pump suctions, the wall tank drains, and the manometer connection for the underground tank. A sampling procedure was developed and a sampling frequency established for the above ground tank.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-39 concerned high RWST chloride concentration due to leakage through MOV-CS-202A and B from the chemical addition tank.
The valves were subsequently repaired. This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-42 concerned low Chemical Addition Tank level due to leakage past MOV-CS-202 B which was subsequently repaired.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-58 concerned loss of power to the smoke detector panel when an electrician replacing the system's battery removed the line fuse not realizing that this disabled the smoke detector panel.
The fuse was replaced and a label was added to caution against removing fuses. This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-69 concerned high bearing temperature on RilR Pump 2-RH-P-1B due to a lack of lubrication to the motor upper thrust bearing. The pump was secured, the upper bearing assembly was replaced, the oil supply was renewed and the pump tested and returned to service.
The RilR operability test was changed to add the requirement to check the upper motor bearing oil level prior to starting the pump.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-73 concerned MOV-SW-204A which failed to close during testing. A maintenance request was initiated.
Subsequent operation of the control room switch resulted in normal valve operation.
Preventative maintenance was performed on the valve motor and control circuits with satisfactory results.
This LER is.losed.
LER 281/81-75 concerned TV-MS-201B failure to close on a Train A actuation signal during perfonnance of the CLS functional test.
The CLS logic and the valve's pneumatic closure system were subsequently proven operable. The controlling SOV was replaced as a precaution.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-76 concerned MOV-SW-203C which failed to fully open during testing. The valve was removed from the system for cleaning and inspection.
The mechanic:1 components of the valve were inspected.
The valve motor was inspected, including limit and torque switches.
The valve was subsequently reassembled and tested without any failures.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-81 concerned a containment isolation valve, 2-VA-1, that was found unlocked, open and unattended during unit startup.
The valve was inadevertently signed off on the Containment Integrity Checklist on the midnight shift. The assistant shif t supervisor, recognizing this valve was
T
.
..
required to be open for filling and venting of the 'C' reactor coolant loop, marked through and initialed the signoff.
Later when the loop was returned to service and containment integrity set, the supervisors reviewing the checklist did not recognize that the checkoff had been marked through and the valve reopened.
The checklist was signed off as canpleted. The valve was subsequently closed and locked. Operations personnel have been reinstructed on this occurrence concerning the proper use of procedures.
This LER is closed.
LER 281/81-83 concerned the isolation of liS flow instruments, FI 474 on ' A'
HS line and FI-485 on 'B' MS line, during unit startup. The immediate corrective action was to place the affected instrumentation in the trip mode and subsequently to unisolate the affected steamline flow instruments.
Unisolation of the steanline flow instruments is now required to be verified prior to reactor startup from the cold shutdown condition.
This LER is closed.
9.
Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observations:
a.
Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attended, b.
Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed.
c.
Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.
No vioiations were identified.
,
_