IR 05000275/2019010

Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000275/2019010 and 05000323/2019010

ML19214A263
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/01/2019
From:	Jeffrey Josey NRC Region 4
To:	Welsch J Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR 2019010
Download: ML19214A263 (22)

Text

ust 1, 2019

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2019010 AND 05000323/2019010

Dear Mr. Welsch:

On June 27, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Diablo Canyon.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Diablo Canyon.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Br A Docket Nos.: 05000275 and 05000323 License Nos.: DPR-80 and DPR-82

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000275 and 05000323 License Numbers: DPR-80 and DPR-82 Report Numbers: 05000275/2019010 and 05000323/2019010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0039 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant Location: Avila Beach, CA Inspection Dates: June 9, 2019 to June 29, 2019 Inspectors: G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Corujo-Sandin, Reactor Inspector N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector W. Smith, Health Physicist S. Gardner, Contractor M. Yeminy, Contractor Approved By: Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Br A Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Improper Sequencing of Maintenance of 4160 Vac Sulfur Hexaflouride Circuit Breakers Prior to As-Found Tests Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000275/2019010-01 and 05000323/2019010-01 Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XI, Test Control. Specifically, the licensees preventive maintenance procedures for safety-related 4160 Vac sulfur hexaflouride (SF6) breakers failed to incorporate completion of as-found contact resistance tests prior to cycling of the 4160 Vac circuit breakers during maintenance.

Failure to Establish Procedural Steps that Ensure 480 Volt Switchgear Room Ventilation Remained Functional Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000275/2019010-02 and Challenge the 05000323/2019010-02 Unknown Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to establish, implement, and maintain maintenance procedures as recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and maintain maintenance procedures that ensured exhaust damper blades of the 480 V switchgear room ventilation system would be in the correct design function configuration.

Additional Tracking Items None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) ===

From June 10, 2019, to June 28, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following large-early-release-frequency component.

(1) Unit 1, Control Room HVAC Supply Fan S-35 and SV-5019

• Component walkdown, maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation.

• Calculations for control room heat gain during accident conditions

• Preventive maintenance bases to ensure activities conform to vendor requirements

• Completed surveillance tests to ensure acceptance criteria have been met

• Abnormal and emergency operating procedures Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)

(6 Samples)

From June 10, 2019, to June 28, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following components and listed applicable attributes.

(1) Unit 1, 4.16 kV to 480 V Transformer 1H and Switchgear Bus HH 480V

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for protection and cable sizing with focus on room temperature range

• Procedures for testing and maintenance to determine consistency between FSAR, calculations, and testing acceptance criteria

(2) Unit 1, Fire Dampers to Room 1H, DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-FD-1, DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-FD-7

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation.

• Maintenance activities required for maintaining equipment in their design condition.

• Maintenance frequency

• Design of fire dampers, including damper drawings

• Equipment specifications

• Vendor manual for fire dampers

(3) Unit 1, Circuit Breakers 52HH13, 52HH14, 52HG14 and 52HF14

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for sizing and timing of equipment actuation for the protected loads and systems

• Procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Corrective actions associated with a circuit breakers as preventive maintenance failure documented in the work orders

(4) Unit 2, Component Cooling Pump 11 and Water Heat Exchanger

• Component walkdown, maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for net positive suction head, and heat removal requirements

• Calculations for surge tank pressurization, in-service testing and setpoint calculations for safety and relief valves

• Comprehensive pump test results and procedures for validating valve positions

• Verification of minimum flow recirculation valves and piping

• Completed surveillance tests to ensure acceptance criteria have been met

• Abnormal and emergency operating procedures

(5) Unit 2, Train A SSPS Master and Slave Relays

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Vendor Technical Bulletins to verify licensee response to known issues

• Catalytic capacitor program to compare site practices for the SSPS against industry guidance

• Procedures for inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against vendor guidance

• Current status of partially implemented design modifications to assure configuration control

(6) Unit 2, 480 V Switchgear Ventilation Systems

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for heat gain, heat removal capacity, flow rates

• Maintenance activities required for maintaining equipment in their design condition

• Maintenance frequency

• Design of fans and dampers, flow rates and system pressures

• Walk down of equipment to verify material conditions

• Design drawings

• Equipment specifications

• Vendor pressure drop curves

• Vendor manual for centrifugal fans

• Vendor manual for backdraft dampers Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions Related to Components and Permanent Modifications From June 10, 2019, to June 28, 2019, the inspectors observed the following operator actions associated with selected components and modifications.

• Control room operator actions resulting from an anticipated transient without scram with a total failure of the solid state protection system. This required operators to manually trip the reactor. Following the failure of the solid state protection system, operators were required to manually initiate the engineered safety features equipment within 10 minutes using emergency operating procedures.

• Control room and in-plant operator actions to limit cooldown and prevent steam generators from overfilling following a station blackout. Control room operators were required to recognize the auxiliary feedwater system needed to be controlled to limit the cooldown and prevent steam generators from overfilling. Once the condition was recognized, non-licensed operators were required to be dispatched in order to take local manual control of auxiliary feedwater control valves.

• Control room operator actions to limit cavitation of one auxiliary saltwater pump following a tsunami as described in the updated final safety analysis report. The simulated plant was arranged such that ocean conditions and maintenance of one auxiliary saltwater pump necessitated two component cooling water heat exchangers being cooled by one auxiliary saltwater pump.

Control room operators were required to recognize that the tsunami drawdown would cause the one operating ASW pump to experience pump cavitation, then take action to isolate one of the two component cooling water heat exchangers to resolve the pump cavitation.

• In-plant operator actions to restore cooling to 480 V switchgear rooms following a loss of ventilation. Operators were required to establish a cooling flow path, using doors and portable ventilation equipment.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)

From June 10 to 28, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following permanent modifications.

(1) Design Change Package 1000025262, "U1 DEG 12 Control Upgrade"

(2) Design Change Package 1000025448, DDN for DMN 01000025448, "4kV Switchgear Ventilation HELB Impact"

(3) Design Change Package 1000025435, "Unit 1 Main Generator Loss of Field Relay"

(4) Design Change Package 10000254459, "DCO: CCW Pressure Switch Auto Start Non Functional" Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

From June 10, 2019, to June 28, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following operating experience issues.

(1) WCAP-12476, "Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 Operation for Westinghouse NSSS"

(2) NRC Information Notice 2016-01, "Recent Issues Related to the Commercial Dedication of Allen-Bradley 700-RTC Relays"

INSPECTION RESULTS

Improper Sequencing of Maintenance of 4160 Vac Sulfur Hexaflouride Circuit Breakers Prior to As-Found Tests Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2019010-01 Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control. Specifically, the licensees preventive maintenance procedures for safety-related 4160 Vac sulfur hexaflouride (SF6) breakers failed to incorporate recording of as-found contact resistance prior to performing maintenance to demonstrate that the breakers will perform satisfactorily in service.

Description:

The inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance procedures for the safety-related 4160 Vac circuit breakers. During the review, the inspectors identified that the performance of procedure MP E-63.6A, Maintenance of SF6 4kV Breakers, would not record as-found contact resistance tests of the main contact, prior to performing maintenance, of the safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 circuit breakers. High contact resistance can lead to damage of the breaker by causing arcing, losing phase, or fire in the electrical bus. Additionally, high contact resistance can lead to a high-voltage drop in the electrical distribution system which would prevent the design function of safety-related pumps on the electrical bus.

For example, Procedure MP E-63.6A, Section 7.2, As Found Tests, Step 7.2.3 directed maintenance personnel to test and record the trip coil voltage and closing coil minimum pick-up voltage by cycling the breaker. In section 7.3, Maintenance and Inspections, maintenance personnel are directed to cycle the breaker several more times to test primary and secondary insulation resistances. Then, in section 7.4, "As-Left Tests," the breaker is cycled at least twice before the first main contact resistance measurement is recorded in step 7.4.3. In step 7.4.3, if the contact resistance does not meet the acceptance criteria, step 7.4.3.a.1 directs the maintenance personnel to cycle the breaker up to 20 times to restore the average resistance for any phase to expected results. Finally, the contact resistance is recorded in Table 4 of the procedure only after returning the contact resistance to within acceptance criteria.

A note included with this step states, A powder of SF6 gas generated inside the bottles can accumulate on the contacts causing resistance to increase. This note is in accordance with advice given by the vendor based on a 2011 contact resistance test failure associated with the Unit 2 52HH13 breaker. The vendor advised, the most likely cause is that a byproduct of SF6 gas that is generated inside the SF6 gas bottles has accumulated on the contacts causing the contact resistance to increase, a lesser likely cause would be oxidation of the contacts. The vendor suggested cycling the breaker 20 times to restore the contact resistance within acceptance criteria.

For example, in May 2016, the licensee performed procedure MP E-63.6A on the Unit 2 52 HH13 breaker, under Work Order 64073767. The licensee identified that the contact resistance could not be restored with acceptable limits. The final contact resistance was recorded as 252 microohms which exceeded the 215 microohm acceptance criteria.

However, the data recorded was obtained following the breaker being cycled over 100 times and the as-found contact resistance was never recorded. Prior to the addition of cycling in procedure, MP E-63.6A, maintenance history of the SF6 breaker showed contact resistance readings of 450 microohms prior to cycling.

Because cycling the breaker will affect the contact resistance of the main contact, the inspectors determined that not recording an as-found contact resistance value of the main contact, prior to cycling the breaker, would conceal potential high contact resistance.

Concealing high contact resistance would cause the licensee to miss an opportunity to identify, evaluate, and resolve an adverse condition that has the potential to prevent the safety-related breakers to perform their intended design function during a design bases event.

Corrective Actions: This finding has been entered into licensees corrective action program to add criteria to record as-found contact resistance data prior to cycling of the breakers. This condition does not represent an immediate safety concern.

Corrective Action References: Notification 51034799 and 51034885

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that failure to establish a test program which incorporates completion of contact resistance testing prior to performing maintenance of safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 circuit breakers was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to perform contact resistance tests prior to maintenance was a significant programmatic deficiency which would have the potential to cause unacceptable or degraded conditions to go undetected.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states, in part, A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.

Contrary to the above, prior to June 28, 2019, the licensee failed to establish a test program that assured that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporated the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the licensees preventive maintenance procedure MP E-63.6A, Maintenance of SF6 4kV Breakers failed to incorporate recording of as-found contact resistance prior to performing maintenance of the safety-related SF6 4160 Vac circuit breakers to demonstrate that the breakers will perform satisfactorily in service.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Establish Procedural Steps that Ensure 480 Volt Switchgear Room Ventilation Remained Functional Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2019010-02 Challenge the Closed Unknown The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to establish, implement, and maintain maintenance procedures as recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and maintain maintenance procedures that ensured exhaust damper blades of the 480 V switchgear room ventilation system would be in the correct design function configuration.

Description:

On June 10, 2019, the inspectors observed the operation of exhaust fan E-45 as a part of their inspection of the Unit 2, 480 V switchgear room ventilation system. During the observance, the inspectors identified that two of the six blades on the exhaust backdraft damper for exhaust fan E-45 were in the closed position. Additionally, the inspectors identified that a third blade was stuck in a slightly 10 degrees open position. While in operation, the damper blades should have all been in an open position. The licensee entered this condition in the corrective action program to investigate and correct the condition.

The following day the operating trains were switched to observe movement of the fan E-45 exhaust backdraft dampers. To verify that the damper blades were free to move, the licensee established work order instructions to open each damper using its own counterweight and determining how much force (finger tap, one hand, or both hands) was necessary to move the counterweight. The inspectors observed the licensee's maintenance personnel using a significant force (two hands) to free movement of two blades which were stuck in the closed position. The third blade, which was identified as stuck in 10 degrees open position, was freed using one hand.

The following day, operations restored exhaust fan E-45 as the operating ventilation train.

The inspectors observed that the blade previously identified as stuck in a slightly 10 degrees open position, which was freed the previous day, became stuck again in the 10 degrees open position while trying to open. The other damper blades were observed as moving freely.

The inspectors reviewed recent notifications entered the corrective action program which document blades sticking or in a closed position during operation. They include the following:

• On December 18, 2017, Notification 51034357 identified blades of the backdraft damper E-45 were found stuck open. A review of operating procedure OP H-10 noted there is no step in the procedure instructing the operator to verify the idle fan exhaust backdraft dampers are closed following the fan switch.

• On June 10, 2019, Notification 51033547 documented the degraded condition of the E-45 damper blades identified by the inspectors.

• On June 12, 2019, Notification 51033724 documented that the bearings are degraded based on 17 years service time in an outdoor environment.

• On June 19, 2019, Notifications 51034354 and 51034357 documented the identification, by the licensee, of additional stuck or closed damper blades on Unit 1 exhaust fan E-44 and Unit 2 exhaust fan E-46.

The inspectors reviewed the 480 V switchgear room ventilation system maintenance procedures and work orders to determine whether the licensee's procedure would identify and correct these conditions to ensure that the system met its required design function. The inspectors determined that maintenance procedure MP-23-FAN.4, "Preventive Maintenance of Ventilation Fans with Dampers and Inlet Vanes," Revision 10, and Order E-45/VAC-2-BDD-45, "Clean/Lube/Inspect," did not provide sufficient instructions or sufficient maintenance frequency to maintain the exhaust backdraft damper blades' design function to open. Order E-45/VAC-2-BDD-45, step 5.2.5, directs maintenance to "inspect bearings and bearing shafts for corrosion or signs of degradation and document condition; however, the bearings of the blades of this damper are sealed such that it is not possible to identify degradation. Step 7.5 directs the maintenance to stroke the blades by moving the counterweights to ensure free movement. The inspectors identified that stroking the blades will temporarily release them. However, since the dampers are in a marine environment, they may stick at a later time. Additionally, the procedures do not direct personnel to investigate the cause of the stuck blade once found in a stuck position.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the degraded conditions and procedure issues into the corrective action program. The licensee immediately corrected the degraded conditions by exercising all damper blades to ensure they would move freely. The licensee established work instructions to verify the design function position of the damper blades following ventilation train swaps on a weekly basis. Additionally, the licensee created a work order to inspect and replace exhaust damper blade bearings in the next outage.

Corrective Action References: Notifications 51033547, 51034354, and 51035004

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish, implement, and maintain procedures as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance," was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to establish and maintain sufficient procedures in the ventilation damper maintenance procedure adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of the 480V switchgear room ventilation system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Tech Spec Trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for >24 hrs.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, individuals failed to stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition and resolve the condition prior to continuing work activities.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance," states, "Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.

Contrary to the above, prior to June 10, 2019, the licensee failed to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and maintain written maintenance procedures that were appropriate to ensure exhaust damper blades of the 480 V switchgear room ventilation system would freely move to adjust to the appropriate position during design bases events.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 27, 2019, the inspectors presented the Design Basis Assurance (Teams)inspection results to James M. Welsch and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.21M Corrective Action Notifications A0539619, A0540385, A0540396, A0640888, A0616504,

Documents A0662487, A0604782, A0668966, 50035584, 50311497,

50398592, 50433892, 50433892, 50698514, 50702104,

50836358, 50836374, 50839137, 50839242, 50849663,

50849788, 50849788, 50853112, 50853113, 50853117,

50866440, 50888976, 50915969, 50916091, 50916092,

50916093, 50916425, 50916763, 50916765, 50916766,

50940158, 50955220, 50960259, 50965471, 50979208,

50985033, 50985034, 50986108, 51032864, 51034416,

Corrective Action Notifications 51033472, 51033547, 51033662, 51033669, 51033670,

Documents from 51033690, 51033691, 51033724, 51033730, 51033785,

This Inspection 51033813, 51033819, 51033893, 51033894, 51033895,

51033897, 51033900, 51033901, 51033904, 51033914,

51034158, 51034354, 51034357, 51034703, 51034721,

51034727, 51034792, 51034799 , 51034855, 51034881,

51034885, 51034886, 51034889, 51934982, 51034902,

51035004, 51035007, 51035027

Calculations 100A-DC ESF Motor Stator Temperature Rise for Operation above 1-0

Nameplate Horsepower

114-DC Protection Relays Setting for 4.16KV Class 1 E Buses and 8

Feeders

170-DC Basler Class 1E 4kV Motor Overcurrent Relay Setpoints 16

196C-DC Cable Ampacity Verification for 480V System 2

254-DC Loss of Field Relay and Minimum Excitation Limiter Set 3A

points

357A-DC 12kV / 4kV / 480V Electrical Distribution System 14

2-08 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System 7

9000017656 Determination of Outdoor Design Temperature 0

9000017738 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System 11

9000018368-002- 480V Switchgear Room Ventilation System 1

9000025218-037 Seismic Qualification of the New MPU installed at EDGs 3

9000039758 Fire Protection HVAC Interactions for Room Heat Up Due to 0

Loss of HVAC

CALC-0322- Gothic Analysis Model AB Electrical Rooms & CR 1

0032-003

CN-CRA-06-54 Diablo Canyon Steamline Break Mass/Energy Release 1

Summary for RSG Project

HVAC-83-05 Temperature in Mechanical Equipment Room 1

HVAC-83-14 Control Room Complex Cooling Load Calculation 19

HVAC-91-03 Control Room Supply Fans S-35, S-36, S-37 & S-38 0

Maximum Design/Operating Pressure

M-0999 CCW Surge Tank Pressurization Nitrogen System 0

Components (Nitrogen Bottles, Pressure Regulators, RV-45)

Capacities

M-1005 CCW System Pressurization Capability of Surge Tank 2

M-1017 CCW System Flow Balances 2

M-1141 Maximum Emergency Diesel Generator Mechanical Loading 2

M-1185 CCW Flow Balance using FATHOM 0

M-272 CCW Surge Tank External Pressure 0

M-855 Component Cooling Water System 0

M-953 Determination if Adequate NPSH is Available for ASW Pump

Operation

SC-L-23-170 Instrument Scaling Calculation Aux Building Switchgear 2

Room Fans Discharge Flow Switches

WCAP-12526 Auxiliary Salt Water and Component Cooling Water Flow and 1

Temperature Study for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

WCAP-14282 Evaluation of Peak CCW Temperature Scenarios for Diablo 1

Canyon Units 1 and 2

Drawings CF7.ID4 Ruskin Model CBS8 Backdraft Damper 2

FF-18583 Joy Technologies Fan Drawing Final Assembly Model 42-26- 3

1770

DAF-P-5171 Multi-Blade UL Fire Damper Model No. DAF-P-5171 A

0107D8652, Sh. Indoor-Outdoor Bus Duct ARRG

T., 5 & 15KV - 1200A, 0

2000A, & 2530A2250A

2028 Sht. 25 Component Cooling Water 18

106710 Sheet 2 OVIDS - Residual Heat Removal 43

106714 Sheet 2 OVIDS - Component Cooling Water Pumps 56

106717 Sheet 7 OVIDS - Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps 198

106717 Sheet 8 OVIDS - Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps 209

437519 Single Line 12/4.16 kV System 27

437518, Sh. 1 Single Line Diagram For Station Auxiliaries 41

437518, Sh. 1 Single Line Diagram 12/4.16 KV System 27

437529, Sh. 1 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Generation Excitation 49

Main & Auxiliary Transformers

437530, Sh. 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 12KV Start-up System 40

437543 Single Line 480V System Bus Section H 52

437548, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Generator & Main Transformer 45

437557, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Generator Control 39

437621, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Stand-By, Start-Up Transformer No, 12 26

and Associated Circuit Breakers

437627, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram 4160V Bus Section H Automatic 38

Transfer

437660, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Stand-By, Start-Up Transformer No, 21 23

and Associated Circuit Breakers

441228 4160 V System Bus Section D & E 16

441229 4160 V System Bus Section F DG 23 20

441230, Sh. 1 4160 V System Bus Section G & H DG 21 & 22 33

441340, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram, Potential & Synchronizing Diagram 31

4160V Bus Section F, G, & H

441344 Schematic Design Stand-By Start-Up Transformer 22 and 10

Associated Circuit Breakers

441570, Sh. 1 Wiring Diagram 4KV Switchgear Bus, Section F Cell 12 19

445390 Single Line 120V Instrument AC System 25

451352, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram 4160 Volt Bus Section F Automatic 26

Transfer

455125 Electrical Schematic Diagram Ventilation Fan Motors 8

458865, Sh. 1 Logic Diagram 4160 Volt Bus Section H Automatic Transfer 15

494433 Electrical Auxiliary Building Switchgear Room Supply Fans 6

S-45 and S-46

2110, sh. 1 Single line Diagram, 500/230/25/12/4.16KV System 21

503089 Schematic Diagram SSPS Train A Output Relays 19

663332, Sh. 3 Section View 5KV Metal Clad Switchgear Bus Section D, 5

E, F, G & H

663340 General Layout of Metal 4KV/12KV Standby, Startup 6

Transformer

663339, Sh. 8 Arrangement Layout, Indoor/Outdoor Bus Duct Arrangement 9

& 15 KV

Procedures AD9 Procurement Control 4B

AD9.DC2 Purchase Classification and Documentation Requirement 9

AD9.ID1 Procurement of Items and Related Services 13

AD9.ID18 Material Repair and Refurbishment 1

AD9.ID4 Establishing Procurement Technical and Quality 16

Requirement

AD9-ID7 Recipient Inspection and Acceptance Testing 9

AR PK 15-09 Annunciator Response - Electrical Rooms Temperature 33

Monitor

AR PK01-07 CCW System Surge Tank Level/Makeup 6B

AR PK01-14 CCW Surge Tank Pressure 11

AR PK02-18 Alarm Response U2, SSPS Gnrl Warn Train A 5

AR PK15-06 Annunciator Response Control Room Vent 21

AR PK15-09 Alarm Response Electrical Rooms Temperature Monitor 33

CF3.ID13 Replacement Part Evaluation and CITE 31

CP M-5 Response to Tsunami Warning 17

DCM S-63 Design Criteria Memorandum S-63 20

EOP E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 45D

EOP ECA-0.0 Loss of Vital AC Power 33

MP E 52. XFMR Transformer Maintenance 11

MP E-101A Infrared Thermography Inspection 8

MP E-21.GOV Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Governor 1

Maintenance

MP E-50.42 Westinghouse Type KLF-1 Loss of Field Relay 10

Maintenance

MP E-61.9A Isolated Phase Bus and Motor Operated Disconnect 23A

Maintenance

MP E-63.3A Instruction for Assembly and Insulation of 4 and 12KV 8

MP E-63.3B Potential Transformer Drawer Maintenance 13

MP E-63.3C Maintenance of 4 and 12 KV Switchgear 30A

MP E-63.3C-SHH Maintenance of 4KV Switchgear - Bus H 1

MP E-63.3D-SHH Bus Connection Resistance Test - 4KV Bus H 0

MP E-63.6A Maintenance of SF6 4kV Circuit Breakers 26

MP E-64.1B Molded Case Circuit Breaker Exercise and Maintenance 19

MP I-1.27-7 Acceptance Testing of SSPS and DRPI Power Supplies 10

MP I-2.29-0 Electrolytic Capacitor PM Program 1

MP I-23-F5001 Aux Building Exhaust and Supply Fan Discharge Flow 2

Switch Calibration

MP M-23-FAN.4 Preventive Maintenance of Ventilation Fans with dampers 10

and Inlet Vanes

MP-E-63.3D 4 & 12KV Switchgear Bus Connection Resistance Test 3

OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 39

OP AP-24 Shutdown LOCA 13

OP B-2:IV RHR - Remove From Service During Plant Heatup 23

OP H-10:V Auxiliary Building General Ventilation - Off Normal Operation 9

OP J-2:VIII Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service For DCPP 32

OP L-1 Plant Heatup From Shutdown to Hot Standby 97

OP1.ID2 Time Critical Operator Action 11

PEP 18-04 OP H-5:V and OP H-10: Temporary Ventilation Equipment 6

Test

PEP M-234 CCW Heat Exchanger Performance Test 18

STP 1-38-A.2 SSPS Train A SI Reset Timer and Slave Relay K602 Test in 12A

Modes 1,2,3,&4

STP 1-38-A.4 SSPS Train A SI Reset Timer and Slave Relay K602 Test in 7

Modes 5,6 or Defueled

STP M-130 Leak Rate Testing of the CCW Surge Tank Pressurization 3

System

STP M-13H 4kV Bus H Non-SI Auto-transfer Test 48

STP M-15 Integrated Test of Engineered Safeguards and Diesel 71

Generator

STP M-16C Operation of Train A Slave Relay K608 (Safety Injection) 42

STP M-26 ASW System Flow Monitoring 32

STP M-75H 4KV Vital Bus H Undervoltage Relay Calibration 7

STP M-77 Safety and Relief Valve Testing 40

STP M-91 Diesel Generator Start and Load Tracking 28

STP M-9A2 Diesel Engine Generator 12 Routine Surveillance Test 12A

STP M-9D1 Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test 26

STP M-9D2 Diesel Generator Partial Load Rejection Test 27

STP P-CCW-A21 Comprehensive Pump Test of Component Cooling 4

Water Pump 2-1

STP V-3H12 Exercising Valve RCV-16, CCW Surge Tank Vent Valve 0

TS5.ID1 System Engineering Program 29A

Work Order Order R0242681, R0201061, R0242767, 60090715, 60104073,

64007360, 64009151, 64009154, 64012875, 64013401,

64014575, 64014590, 64017056, 64024643, 64034141,

64061651, 64063414, 64064004, 64073767, 64073783,

64073783, 64090199, 64090590, 64091416, 64092108,

64108362, 64123968, 64125856, 64131681, 64133367,

64133880, 64134541, 64134541, 64134625, 64135605,

64135814, 64135830, 64135830, 64136367, 64136367,

64138153, 64138222, 64177878, 64192915, 64207621,

68053873, 68053873, 68053881

Other 6009838-204 GE Type AM-4.16 SF6 Conversion 1

6011156-4 Westinghouse F-Frame Molded Case Circuit Breaker 1

663082-422 Woodward 2301A Electronic Load Sharing and Speed 1

Control

663082-423 Digital Reference Unit A

663231-161 Westinghouse Electric Corp SSPS Vendor Manual 30

663336-6-1 Westinghouse Type ASL Core Form Power Center 5

Transformer

DC 6000364-26-2 Joy Manufacturing Installation and Maintenance Manual 04/14/1993

Series 2000 Axivane Fans Adjustable Pitch

DCP 1000000354 Replacement of SSPS printed circuit boards 06/07/2010

DDN 2000001912 4kV Switchgear Room Ventilation System Modification 0

NEMA MG 1 Motors and Generators 2009

PHIP 2005-S064- Program to Replace 480V MCC Breakers on Vital and Non- 01/15/2006

004 Vital Switchgear

PWROG-16030- Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program Standard 1

NP

System Health 480V Vital and Non-Vital Q2-2019

Report

System Health 4kV Vital and Non-Vital Q2-2019

Report

TR-107136 EPRI Nuclear Emergency Diesel Generator Governing 09/1997

System Upgrades

WCAP-7672 SSPS 06/1971

WTB 01-03 Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, Safeguards Driver Board 08/02/2001

(SSPS)

WTB 05-04 Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, Potential Tin Whiskers on 2

Printed Circuit Board Components

WTB 06-02 Aging Issues and Subsequent Operating Issues for Breakers 03/24/2006

that are at their 20 Year Design/Qualified Lives

WTB 77-11 Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, Periodic Testing of Safety 07/21/1977

Injection Reset Timer Circuit

ZHEAW3 Operator Fails to Prevent SG Overfill During a Loss of Power 11/06/18

(DC Available)

ZHEOS1 Operators Fail to Manually Actuate ESF Equipment with 02/05/19

SSPS Failures

ZHERT1 Operators Fail to Manually Trip the Reactor 06/21/14

ZHESV4 Operators Fail to Combat High Temperature in 480V 02/06/19

Switchgear Rooms

7