IR 05000275/1982034
| ML20028C131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1982 |
| From: | Fish R, Medonca M, Scown K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028C126 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-82-34, NUDOCS 8301070094 | |
| Download: ML20028C131 (6) | |
Text
.
.
,
.
U. S. !!UCLEAR RECUL\\ TORY COMMISSIO I S.'.
REGIO!T V
.d3
'
'
Report !!o. 50-275/82-34 Docket ;o.
50-275 License ;o.
DPR-76 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility !! ace:
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection conducted: October 19-22, 1982 Ins pec t.a rs :
(
_
_
/J2./Wh2 R. F. Fish, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, fiKt, Date Signed i'"#$h w/m /em M. Me do a, Kesiaent inspector 06te signed c
.
_
_
.
.
/0 L
.
K. '5'cown, Keactor inspector triuclear tngineerl
/ Date Signed F.21
- 6.5 Approved by: G. 5. 5 pencer, virecto'r, vivision of Kaaiologicai Date Signed Safety and Safeguards Programs
.
Summary:
Inspection on October 19-22, 1982 (Report No. 50-275/82-34)
Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency plan exercise and associated critiques.
The inspection involved about 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> onsite by four (4) NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or significant deficiencies were identified.
...
(,
RV Form 219 (2)
8301070094 821222 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G
PDR J
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted PG&E Personnel
- J. D. Shiffer, Manager, Nuclear Flant Operations
- J. D. Townsend, Superviring N, clear Generation Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Engineering
- W. J. Fujimoto, Supervising Nuclear Generation Engineer, Personnel and Environmental Safety
- T. A. Mack, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer, Emergency Planning and Waste Management
- R. C. Thornberry, Plant Manager
- J. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations
- J. M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer
- J. V. Boots, Supervisor of C hmistry and Radiation Protection M. W. Mak, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Analyst R. Thuillier, Senior Meteorologist Other Personnel
- R. Wester, Lead Controller, EDS Nuclear
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Emergency Preparedness E urcise Plan Although the Corporate Staff has the responsibility for development and control of the exercise plan, the development and control of the plan was actually accomplished by EDS Nuclear under a contract.
The exercise objectives were established as the result of discussions and meetings involving representatives from San Luis Obispo County, the State of California, PG&E, FEMA and the NRC. The plan document included the objectives and guidelines, the exercise scenario, the information messages used during the exercise, the initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological and radiological data, controller /
observer instructions and controller / observer evaluation sheets and instructions.
The exercise plan document was controlled by EDS Nuclear and PG&E and distribution was limited to persons having a specific need, onsite and offsite controllers /
observers and members of the Federal organizations (NRC and FEMA) evaluating the exercise. This emergency plan exercise was intended to meet the requirement for a full-scale exercise required by IV F.1(a) of Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50.
The exercise scenario started with an event classified as a " Notification of Unusual Event" and escalated ultimately to a " General" emergency condition.
The initiating event was the tripping of the operating auxiliary salt water pump with a low flow on the startup of the automatic standby pump. Other
)
.
.
-2-significant events in the scenario included a small pipe break in the reactor coolant system, a massive steam generator tube rupture as the safety relief valves lift subsequent to a turbine trip, a loss of offsite power, a fire involving power to some plant safety components, loss of feedwater flow and a safety relief valve stuck in the open position. The stuck-open relief valve provided a path for the release of activity to the environment. The meteorological conditions were changed during the period of the release
so that the intended offsite jurisdictions could participate in the exercise.
3.
Observers The exercise was observed and evaluated by several organizations. Controllers /
observers were provided at all onsite areas where exercise activities took place by EDS Nuclear and PG&E. EDS Nuclear also provided observers at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Unified Dose Assessment Center, the offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams and the Company Incident Response Center in San Francisco. Some observers also performed as controllers whose function was to provide data at the appropriate times or as needed.
If necessary, the controller could alter the course of the exercise. However, controls were established to govern any such changes. The participating offsite jurisdictions provided observers for their portions of the exercise.
Observers from the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Region IX were also present during the exercise. The FEMA team of observers were evaluating the partions of the exercise that involved local and State agencies as well as the interfaces occurring at the E0F. The NRC observed activities at the Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center, the Unified Dose Assessment Center and the EOF. The NRC also observed the activities of teams dispatched into the plant to take actions to evaluate or mitigate the conditions related to the exercise situation.
On October 19, 1982 two meetings related to the exercise were held. EDS Nuclear met with the PC&E site personnel who were to function as observers for the purpose of discussing their responsibilities. The session also covered the schedule of activities, the evaluations to be performed and other related matters. These observers were also provided with copies of the exercise plan document. A meeting was also held with key participating PG&E site personnel. This meeting, chaired by a PG&E Headquarters person who was involved in the exercise planning and implementation, was for the purpose of explaining the objectives, ground rules and limitations associated with the exercise.
4.
Exercise The exercise was initiated at about 9:00 a.m. on October 20 and continued until about 3:00 p.m.
The exercise involved the following locations described in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Plan: Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and E0F. Offsite areas, including the E0F, that were observed by the FEMA team will be described in a report issued by that agency. The exercise included sending teams into the plant
_]
. - -
-
.
.
.
.
-
>
1-
-3-i
-
to simulate repair activities and' fighting the fire. Onsite and offsite radiation monitoring activities were also conducted as part of the exercise.
5.
Critique Immediately following the termination of the exercise each~ area held a discussion to review the' exercise and identify problems or items needing improvement.
On October 21 key members of the licensee's Headquarters and Plant staffs met to discuss the exercise findings and possible corrective actions. There was a general conclusion that all objectives from the licensee's standpoint had been met and no significant improvements were needed. There were a few areas where changes could be made to improve the emergency response.
The following represent the' types of suggestions made.
-
.
a.
Maintenance teams not led by a foreman should be provided with more specific guidance.or briefings prior to their dispatch into the plant
~
to perform evaluation or corrective actions.
i
,
b.
The notification process should provide a means for identifying the recipient of the notification to the offsite agency (ies).
j
!
c.
The Control Room should be kept better informed of status of maintenance activities.
d.
The transmission of radiological data via the appropriate status forms from the EOF to the Unified Dose Assessment Center needs to be. improved.
'
e.
The composition of the field monitoring teams needs to be reexamined.
I f.
The dressing of the maintenance team members in protective clothing
'
and equipment needs more attention.
The findings of the licensee's evaluation of the exercise, including proposed changes for improving the emergency response, will be formally documented.
The assigned Headquarter's group will be responsible for assuring the necessary
'
changes are implemented.
6.
Exercise Summary
.i On Friday, October 22, a summary of the exercise findings was presented to the participants at a meeting called by San Luis Obispo County. Representatives of the County, State of California, the NRC and FEMA made short presentations.
i
.A public meeting was held in the auditorium at Cuesta College (the Media Center) in the afternoon of October 22. Representatives of the following organizations summarized the exercise findings from their standpoint:
FEMA Region IX, NRC Region V, San Luis Obispo County, State of California and PG&E.
,
i i
- -.,.. -, -,
- -. ~. - - - -
,.
-
-r---
,,
-
w
.
.
.
'k-4-7.
Exit Interview On October 21, following the licensee's exercist critique session, an exit interview was-held to discuss the NRC findings. PG&E personnel attending this meeting have been identified in paragraph 1.
In addition the PG&E personnel shown in the attachment were also present. The NRC was represented by the following persons:
R. Fish, Team Leader; J. Carlson, Senior Resident Inspector; M. Mendonca, Resident Inspector; K. Scown, Reactor Inspector (Nuclear Engineer); L. Ivey, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator; E. Garcia, Radiation Specialist. The licensee was informed that no items of noncompliance or significant deficiencies were identified. The following NRC observations, none of which were considered significant, were discussed during this meeting.
a.
The need for extremity exposure devices, addressed in Procedure No.
RB-2 (Emergency Exposure Guides), should be~ considered when maintenance personnel are sent into the plant during emergency situations.
-
b.
The information to be provided during the emergency notification process should be reexamined to assure it is not excessive but does provide the minimum necessary information to the recipient.
c.
The fire response could not be properly evaluated because there was too much simulation.
d.
The telephone-numbers provided the Control Room should be checked to assure contact with appropriate personnel at the other emergency response facilities.
'
e.
Of the items identified by the licensee during the earlier critique (see paragraph 5-above), only the item pertaining to the need for additional attention to the dressing of the maintenance personnel in protective clothing and equipment was emphasized during the exit interview.
J
.
-
,
a
.
ATTACHMENT
i R. Patterson, Plant Superintendent
'
.
W. B. Kaefer,-Technical Assistant to the Plant Mariager
!
W. J. Keyworth, Senior Power Production Engineer
-
D. B. Miklush, Senior Power Production Engineer 8. W. Giffin, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer j
W. Sprout, Recorder
!
I i
!
.
!
!
.
-