IR 05000272/1981004

IE Insp Repts 50-272/81-04 & 50-311/81-05 on 810201-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Ie Bulletins & Circulars,Plant Operations,Conformance W/Tech Specs & Operating Parameters

ML18086A412
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/27/1981
From:	Greenman E, Hill W, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18086A408	List: IR 05000272/1981004 ML18086A406
References
50-272-81-04, 50-272-81-4, 50-311-81-05, 50-311-81-5, NUDOCS 8105060042
Download: ML18086A412 (18)

Text

Report No Docket No License No Licensee:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-272/81-04 50-311/81-05 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75

REGION I

050272-801002 050272-801016 050272-801029 050272-801107 050272-801028 050272-801008 050272-801204 050272-801204 050272-801207 050272-801126 050272-801214 050272-810201 050272-810206 050272-810211 050272-810223 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 050311-801230 Faci 1 i ty Name : ___

s_a l_em __

Nu_c_l_ea_r_G_en_e_r_a_t1_* n

..... g._St_a_t_i_on_-_u_n_i_t_s_l_a_nd_2 __ _

Inspection A t: ___

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1981 Inspectors:

_..E~~.L!:2!.~..A..t===-------- ~/lv/?1 L. J N rrholm, Senior Resident Inspector

' date

~~

m./M,).

3/1z/11 W. M. Hill, Jr., Resident Reactor Inspector date Approved By:

~w/l/l..,....,....,

a/21feJ E. G. Greenman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2A,

'"date Projects Branch No. 2, DRPI Inspection Summary:

.

Inspections on February 1 - February 28, 1981 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/81-04 and 50-311/81-05)

.

Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations including tours of the facility; conformance with technical specifi-cations and operating parameters; log and record review; review of licensee events; IE Bulletins and Circulars; and followup on previous inspection items *

. The inspection involved 80 inspector-hours by the resident inspector Results:

No items of noncompliance were identifie Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; license requirements and technical specifications; IE Bulletin and Circulars; followup on licensee events; and, followup on previous inspection items. The inspection involved 45 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:

No items of noncompliance were identifie *

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted J. Driscoll, Chief Engineer L. Fry, Station Operating Engineer J. Gallagher, Assistant Maintenance Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer Midura~ Manager - Salem Generating Station L. Miller, Station Perfonnance Engineer J. Nichols, Reactor Engineer F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer R. Swetnam, Radiation Protection Engineer The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical,*

maintenance, operations, perfonnance and quality assurance personne. Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80~07-08) Steam Generator feedwater line snubber failures. Supplemental LER 79-54/0lX-2 was submitted on February 19, 1981 and details subsequent testing and analysis conducted in an attempt to detennine the cause of snubber failur The snubbers were instrumented and monitored for a four week period which included a number of plant transient No loading.

of a magnitude expected to cause failure was note Some vibra-tion problems possibly related to a malfunction in valve 14BF19 were identifie No conclusive cause for snubber failure was given:; however, the test program noted no excessive loading and no piping failur No subsequent snubber failures in this appli-cation have been identifie (Closed)

Open item (272/80-06-06) Assurance that instrumentation used in calorimetric calculation has current calibration. The inspector reviewed Inspection Order 402309 and confirmed that a monthly calibration interval has been established. Additionally, the IO has been re-designated as 11Surveillance 11 rather than "Inspection" which should establish appropriate priority for ensuring that it is completed on tim The fospector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Noncompliance (272/80-20-01 and 311/80-16-01) Failures to follow procedures in logkeeping and tagging. Licensee corrective action for this item is described in correspondence to NRC Region 1 dated October 10, 1980. The inspector confinned the following preventive measures; Inspection Order 100624 has been initiated and is in use to perform periodic audits of outstanding tagging requests, operators have been cautioned on the requirement to log Action Statements, and Design Change Request 1 SC 444 has been initiated to provide a level alann to indicate proximity to the Technical Specification minimum for the AFS The inspector had no further questions at this time. However, it is noted that a similar item relative to logkeeping is identified in Inspection Report 50-272/81-01 and 50-311/81-0 *

(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-11-02) Acceptance criteria for instru-mentation channel checks. The inspector reviewed new operating logs instituted in February 1981 which now include acceptable ranges for channel checks of protective instrumentation conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications. For each protection system parameter, a unique acceptable range for instruments reading the same variable is provided on the log itself. The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-21-03) Supplemental Licensee Event Report for loss of ENS telephone system. The licensee submitted a sup-plement to LER 80-40/0lX on February 4, 198 Based on continuing investigation by the FBI and NJ State Police, no perpetrators of the apparently malicious act have been identified, nor are they likely to be. Additional means of non-landline communications are available at the sit (Closed)

Noncompliance (272/79-19-01) Qualification cards not in individual training folder (Reference. item 272/80-14-02_below)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/79-27-01) Define us~ of simulator in operator training program. (Reference item 272/80~14-02-below)

(Open)

Noncompliance (272/80-14-02) Failure to document simulator trainin All three of these items relate to the central issue of providing

~dequate definition for the use of a simulator in emergency pro-cedure training and documentation of such training. The inspector reviewed records of recent simulator training received by licensed operators and reviewed the recent draft to TP-10, NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Training Progra The inspector had no questions relative to training received and documente However, the governing procedure, which is effectively in use for adminis-tering the program, has not been issued formally. This item rem-ains open pending prompt issuance of TP-10 and verification that the areas of concern identified above are adequately addressed in the issued procedur (Closed)

Unresolved Item (272/79-19-03) Formal method to review station design changes in training program. (Reference item 272/80-14-01 below)

(Open)

Noncompliance (272/80-14-01) Failure to review station design changes. The inspector confirmed that information relative to significant station design changes is transmitted to operating personnel. This has been typically accomplished by memorandum from the Operating Engineer. The inspector also reviewed a draft of TP-11, Design Change Review, which outlines a program to achieve dissemination of design change information directly to operators and to incorporate such information into the.requalifi-cation program. The practices detailed in this draft procedure appear to be in place, however the procedure has not yet been issued. This item remains open pending prompt issuance of TP-11 and verification that the areas of concern have been addressed and continued flow of design change information is maintaine *

(Open)

SITE

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Follow Items (272/80-14-03 and 272/80-14-04) Completion of Unit 1/Unit 2 differences lesson plan and marking of lesson plans to indicate unit applicability. A systematic program of revising lesson plans to include a section on unit differences is in place. This item remains open until all lesson plans are com-plete or a standard lesson plan format has been promulgated which will include the differences sectio.

Shift Logs and Operating Records a. The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 10, May 21, 1980; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980;

.

Operations Directive Manual; and, AP-15, Safety Tagging Program, Revision 1, November 21, 1980.

Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:

Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration; Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with T~chnical Specification requirements; Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a above *

• *

c. The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed with licensee personnel:

Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, February 1-28, 1981 Log No. 6 - Primary Plant Log, February 1-28, 1981 Log. No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, February 1-28, 1981 Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equipment Status Log, February 1-28, 1981 Night Orders, February 1-26, 1981 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log - All active entries Nonconf ormance Reports for January 1981 Incident Reports 81-13, 18, 22-24, 26-27, 30-57, 59, 62, 64 During a routine review of operating logs, the inspector identified a Secondary Plant Log entry on February 21, 1981 which indicated that Fire Pump Diesel Day Tank 1 evel s were both 30

• The minimum level specified by Technical Specifications corresponds to approximately 30.5 11 and this value is provided as the minimum on the log shee No corrective action was indicated on the log. The log had been subse-quently reviewed by the Control Operator, Shift Supervisor, and Shift Technical -Adviso No evidence of recognition or initiation of cor-rective actions was presented to the inspector. This finding is identical to a situation identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/.

81-01 and contributes to an apparent item of noncompliance in that report. Effe9tivene$S of corre9tive a~tion will b~ reviewed during a-subsequent 1ns~ect1on tfo11ow1ng rev1ew of the 11censee 1s response to Inspection 50-272/81-01).

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Tha*;inspector had no further questions relative to logs reviewed during this inspection perio Plant Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, including the following; (1) Control Room (daily)

(2)

Relay Rooms (3) Auxiliary Building (4) Vital Switchgear Rooms

{ 5) Turbine Building (6)

Yard Areas (7) Radwaste Building (8) Penetration Areas

(9) * Control Point (10) Site Perimeter

(11)

Fuel Handling Building (12) Containment (13)

Guard House The following determinations were made:

Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limits *

. Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode. This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Charging/

Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Containment Spray Systems).

Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe Plant housekeeping cond~tions. Observations relative to plant house-keeping identified no unsatisfactory condition Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identi-fied by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no.adverse conditions were note Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions were identified except as noted in paragraph EquiJinent tagging. The inspector selected *plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipnent in the condition specifie By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector veri-fied that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k}

and the Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed snift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appro-priate documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent release *

Fire protection. The inspector verified that selected fire ex-tinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alann stations were inspected on schedule, that fire alann stations were unobstructed and that cardox systems were operabl Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observa-tions during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operatio The following parameters were sampled frequently:

RWST level, BAST level and temperature, containment temperature, boration flow path, shutdown margin, offsite powe In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of electrical switchboards to confirm avail ability of safeguards equii:xnen *

Security. During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area. security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin Na unaccepta~le conditions were identifie c. Control room annunciators. During control room inspections with Unit 1 at 100 % power, the inspector noted that consistently 12 to 17 over-head annunciators are illuminated. Approximately half of these are transitory and indicative of valid operational problems or situation A number of the alarms are not valid problem indicators. Specifically, the following were identified as not relevant; CFCU low air flow alanns when the unit is running in low speed, CFCU low.service water flow alarms when the unit is secured, and as many as six auxiliary alarm typewriter al arms which do not have refl ash capability resulting in continual alann indication with a single point out of specificatio The licensee stated that a program to eliminate all overhead alarms through correction of indicated problems or appropriate design changes has.b.een undertaken. Programmatic responsibilitr*for resolution has been asslgned.to.the Operations Departmen This item wi*l1 be-followed through th.e rout1ne 1,nspecti,on program to assess* the effectiveness of the 1icensee 1 s program (272/80-04-05).

• * *

• *

d~ The following acceptance criteria were used for the above items:

Technical Specifications Operation Directives Manual Inspector Judgement The inspector had no further questions relative to tours made during this inspectio.

IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The IE Bulletin discussed below was reviewed to verify that:

Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representatives *

Information discussed in the licensee's reply was supported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl *

• *

The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of itans discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated Decanber 2, 1980, the licensee responded for both units to IE Bulletin 80-21, Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundr Only Anchor Darling is identified as a valve supplier who used Malcolm Foundry during the period late 1974 to early 1975. All valves at Salem were received prior to this time fram The inspector also reviewed procuranent records to verify that no replacanent or spare valves had been obtained which may be impacted by the Bulleti No such parts were identified. The inspector had no further questions on this Bulleti c. By correspondence dated December 12, 1980, the licensee responded for both units to IE Bulletin 80-23, Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation. The licensee responded that no Valcor solenoid valves are used at Salen. The inspector confirmed this assertion through a review of procurement folio records and sampling field inspectio The inspector had no further questions on this Bulleti By correspondence dated July 25, 1980 the licensee responded for both units to IE Bulletin 80-16, Potential Misapplication of Rosemount, Inc.,

Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters With Either 11A 11 or 11D 11 Output Code The licensee stated an intent to install Model 1152 transmitters but the intended service range was such that the problems identified in the Bulletin were not expected. The transmitters were to be used in independent measurements of steam generator level and pressure and Pressur-izer level and pressure as part of the fire protection system hot shut-down capability with independence of the relay roo Subsequent changes in the design package deleted use of the Model 1152 transmitters. Accordingly, as stated in the evaluation of accompanying IE Circular 80-16, no Rosanount Model 1152 transmitters are in use at Sal a Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

a. In office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clear1y reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following LERs were reviewed:

UNIT 1

• -- 80-53/03L - Inadvertent Dilution of Reactor Coolant System During Hydro-la:zing While in Mode 6

• -- 80-54/0lT - Both Fire Suppression Water Systans Inoperable

• -- 80-55/0lT - Linear Discontinuity in No. 13 Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle to Elbow Weld

• -- 80-56/0lT - Masonry Walls in Auxiliary Building at Elevations 122

and 100

• -- 80-57/03L - Loss of Containment Integrity in Mode 6

-- 80-58/03L - Boric Acid Flowpath Blocked Due To Failed Motor Operator

-- 80-59/03L - Loss of Audio Count Rate Signal Due to Broken Card Holder

• -- 80-60/03L - All Diesel Generators Inoperable Due to Misaligned Valve Position Indicator

• -- 80-61/0lT - Both Fire Suppression Water Systems Inoperable

• -- 80-62/03L - Initial Containment Type C Leak Rate Test Results Exceeded Technical Specification Requirement

• -- 80-63/0lT - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Manual Trip During Safeguards Equipment Control System Operation

• -- 80-64/03L - Containment Spray System Failed to Meet Surveillance Requirement

-- 80-65/03L - CVCS Letdown System Piping Failure

• -- 80-66/03L - Exceeded Time Limit for Technical Specification Surveillance of Fire Det~ction Instruments

• -- 80-67/03L - Safety Injection System Check Valve Failure

-- 80-68/03L - Containnent Air Lock 100' Elevation Inoperable

-- 80-69/03L - No. 13 Steam Generator Channel II Steam Flow Failed High UNIT 2

• -- 80-31/03L - 28 Diesel Camshaft Failure b. Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in detail Paragraph 6.a), the inspector verified that the reporting re-quirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by AP-4, 6, and 7, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The following findings relate to the LERs reviewed on site:

80-53/03L - Part of the corrective action specified for this event is develoµnent of a procedure for decontamination which will include monitoring of RCS boron concentration. The inspector reviewed a draft of RP.7.031, Steam Generator Channel Decon, which has not yet been issued. The in-spector had no* questions relative to the monitoring aspects of the procedure as proposed. This iten is open pending approval and issuance of the procedure {272/80-04-01).

80-54/0lT - On October 12, 1980, Number 1 diesel fire pump sustained 80-61/0lT a failure which destroyed the engine block. The pump was out of service until December 20, 1980. These two LERs detail outages of Number 2 pump due to voltage regulator and alternator problems which affected the automatic start feature. The inspectors verified during these outages of both pumps that either the Hope Creek system was cross connected or that an operator was de-tailed to start the operable pum Both pumps were operable in the automatic mode prior to unit startu /0lT - This event is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/

80-2 /0lT - This event is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/

80-32. Required modifications to masonry walls were completed prior to unit return to servic /03L - The inspector confirmed that this event had been reviewed with cognizant personnel, including the maintenance de-partmen /0JL - This event occurred with the plant in cold shutdown and one service water header shut down for maintenanc The indicator on the service water valve in question was corrected to show proper position *

80-62/03L - The inspector confinned that valves which leaked in excess of-measurement capability were identified in this report, were repaired, and were successully re-teste /0lT - The inspector confinned that the circuitry was modified to preclude pump shutdown under SEC control and that a retest was conducted to verify correct operation of pump controls. A similar design change is being perfonned on Unit 2 to correct the control circuit /03L - This event is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/

80-32, Paragraph /0JL - In an effort to preclude recurrence of these types of events, all fire protection has been placed under Operating Department cognizanc In addition, current surveillance documents are now maintained in the control roo /03L - To ensure continued operability of high pressure/low pressure interface check valves, the licensee stated that confinnation of valve seated position will be made when-ever flow through the valve has occurred. This is con-sistent with Unit 2 proposed Technical Specification requirements. This is an open item pending inclusion of check valve position verification in an appropriate pro-cedure (272/81-04-02).

UNIT 2 80-31/03L - The inspector confinned that inspections of the. re-maining di es els on site had revealed no evidence of similar problems. The diesel was test run following repair to the cam shaft. The LER is insufficiently detailed in outlining these corrective actions. This item is unresolved pending receipt of a complete sup-plement to the LER (311/81-05-01). Of the reports reviewed,~the following LER details an event which required corrective actions under the license or Technical Specifications:

50-272/80-66/03L The inspector had no further questions relative to LERs reviewe.

Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pur-suant to Technical Specifications 6.9.l and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspecto *

This review included the following considerations:

The report included the infonnation required to be reported by NRC requirements; Test results and/or supporting infonnation were consistent with design predictions and perfonnance specifications; Planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems; and, Detennination whether any infonnation in the report should be classi-fied as an abnormal occurrenc Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:

Unit l Monthly Operating Report - December 1980 through January 1981 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - December 1980 through January 1981 The inspector noted that Unit 2 reports now include significant maintenance on Unit 2 which was not previously included in the monthly report The inspector had-no questions relative to the above *

12 Operational Events a. At 6:33 AM on February 1, Unit-1 tripped from 52% power due to low steam generator level caused by a malfunction of No. 12 Steam Generator Feed Pum Pump speed control shifted to manual and ran down to minimum speed. Operator control of speed in manual was lost. Subsequent check-out of the speed controls identified no reason for the shift or loss of control. Operation during the restart was nonnal. The unit was critical at 9:06 AM and synchronized at 11:06 AM on February 1. At 6:00 AM on February 2, the plant was at 95% power with both Steam Generator Feed Pumps in service and functioning normall b. Unit 1 tripped from 100 percent power at 2:45 p.m. on February Following a series of in-service condenser shifts, a rapid increase in condensate suction strainer differential pressure resulted in a trip of No. 12 Condensate Pump which caused a loss of No. 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump due to low suction pressure. The reactor tripped on the subsequent low-low level in No. 13 Steam Generator. All systans func-tioned nonnally during and after the tri The reactor was critical at 8:04 p.m., and the unit synchronized at 10:09 p.m. on February 6. At 5:07 a.m. on February 7, the unit was taken -off line and the reactor shutdown to investigate failed rod position indication for control rod 201. Following repair work and a successful calibration check, the reactor was taken critical at 7:00 a.m. and the unit synchronized at 11:46 a.m. on February At 7:30 p.m. on February 7, rod 201 position indication again failed. As authorized by Technical Specification 3.1.3.4.a, plant operation con-tinued with in-core flux maps being taken every eight hours to confirm rod position. The unit was at 85 percent rated thermal power. at 7:00 a.m. on February _

c. Salen unit 1 tripped from 96% power at 2:15 p.m. on February 11 due to low low level in No. 14 Steam Generator. Loss-of service water to the turbine building had caused the station control air compressor to tri The r~sul ting perturbation-in the control air pressure prior to the start of the Emergency Control Air Compressors appears to have caused main steam isolation valve (14 MS 167) to trip shut, shrinking level below the low low level set point and tripping the reactor and turbin Service water was lost in the turbine building (control air compressors)

when a safety injection (SI) was initiated in Unit 2 (mode 5) at 2:09 p.m. The SI was initiated from a low pressurizer pressure which is*

normally blocked in mode 5. Testing of pressurizer pressure instrumen-tation, channel 3, was in progress. Starting of the medium and high head SI pumps is operationally inhibited in mode Both RHR pumps were already runr.in *

Subsequent investigation and review of alarm typewriter printouts in-dicated that spurious unblocking of the Channel 1 pressure signal was being experienced. Apparently, the two pressure signals were available simultaneously, resulting in the valid safety injection signa *

Relative to Unit 1 response, the decrease in control air system pressure resulted in a shiftover to a newly installed redundant air suppl This modification had been completed during the recent refueling outag However,. it was later determined that the isolation valve to the back-up air header had not been opene As a result, when the system shifted to the backup supply, air on the MS 167 valve bled off and caused the valve to go shu The inspector expressed his concern that adequate controls over system aligrunent had not been applied to preclude safety system challenges as a result of this type of event. This item is unresolved pending further inspection review of main steam and control air system procedures and practices (272/81-04-03).

Unit 1 was critical at 1:08 AM on February 12 and synchronized to the grid at 5:42 A On February 23, the licensee began testing mechanical snubbers as re- -

• quired by IE Bulletin 81-01. A total of 26 INC mechanical snubbers are installed at Units 1 and 2 (Unit 2 RHR Pumps - 4, Unit 1 RHR Pumps - 3, and Unit 1 Pressurizer - 19). The failure rate experienced on the accessible RHR snubbers*requires a shutdown within thirty days of February 23 to inspect the inaccessible snubbers on the pressurize This will also require a cooldown of the pressurizer. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the outage was scheduled for late Marc A trip from 100 % power on March 1 resulted in a decision to extend the outage to conduct the inspection. This item will be discussed further in review of the Licensee Event Report and Bulletin respons The inspector had no further questions relative to operating events during this perio.

Full Power License Conditions On January 14, 1981, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on the status

. of Sal em Unit 2 and the proposed 1 icensing action to authorize operation in excess of 5% rated thennal powe Included in the briefing were the draft license and Technical Specifications. The draft license includes conditions relating to actions responsive to staff concerns, NUREG-0694 and NUREG-073 The inspector reviewed a number of these items to deter-mine status of implementatio b. The following are draft license conditions reviewed during this inspec-tio.C. (10) (a) Procedural modifications due to environmental qual i-fication review. The inspector selected components described in the licensee's submittals in response to IE Bulletin 79-0l For each selected component which required compensating procedural steps due to lack of qualifications data, the inspector confirmed that appropriate cautions or procedural steps to prevent mis-operation had been provided. The licensee stated that all compensating procedural modifications had been mad The inspector had no further questions on this ite *

--

2.C.(12) (b)

2.C(22)(a)

and. (b)

Modification of containment pressure-vacuum relief valve stroke to limit open position to 60°. These valves were so modified by the valve vendor. This was confinned and is documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-311/79-37 and 80-0 Sump performanc Procedures to monitor residual heat removal capability and low-pressure injection perfonnance following an accident. The inspector reviewed Emergency Procedure EP-I-13, Revision 13, Post Accident Low Pressure Performance Monitorin This procedure establishes monitoring requirements, data sheets, acceptance criteria, and assigns re-sponsibility for post accident monitoring of low pressure injection system operation. The procedure includes the Charging, Safety Injection, and Residual Heat Removal Pump The inspector had no further

• questions on this i ter.C.(24)(b)

Modifications to Category I masonry walls. The inspector confinned by observation that, with the exception of cosmetic items, modifications initiated by design change 2EC-1049 to strengthen masonry walls as described in licensee correspondence dated December 10, 1980,have been completed. The licensee confirmed this in correspondence to NRR dated January 29, 1981.

None of the modifications made appear to preclude further remedial actions which may be dictated by NRC staff. The inspector had no further questions on this ite.C.(25)(e)

Training in mitigating core damag By review of records and discussions with personnel, the inspector confirmed that all licensed individuals with the exception of one Reactor Operator, have completed training in this area as outlined in correspondence dated April 1, 1980. Training was accomplished in classroom sessions, augmented by written information sent to each operator, such that all committed topic areas of this training had been completed. The re-maining operator will receive the requisite training in the near future. The licensee stated that this operator will not be assigned to Unit 2 in operating modes 1-4 until the training is complete. The inspector had no further questions on this ite. Lessons Learned (NUREG-0737)

A number of itans detailed in NUREG-0737, Clarification of Action Plan requirements, were required to be in place on January 1, 198 The inspector confinned that selected items had been implemented in a manner consistent with NRC documented requirements in each area. The following task itans were reviewed during this inspection:

I.A. I. I.C.6

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Shift Technical Advisor Long Term Staffing. During 1980, six graduate engineers completed a 36 week training course for qualification as Shift Technical Advisors. These individuals were assigned to operating shifts by January 1, 198 In reviewing training records for these individuals, the inspector noted that no qualification criteria nor any indicator of acceptable perfonnance had been established. Final grades for some individuals were less than 80%, but no evaluation by management as to acceptability of this perfonnance had been mad Following the in-spector's expressed concern in this area, the licensee made an evaluation and concluded that 5 of the 6 individuals had satisfactorily qualified as Shift Technical Advisors, although additional training in some areas would be provided during the coming yea The sixth individual was detennined not to have qualified and was removed from duty as a Shift Tech-nica.1 Advisor *. Established.qua:lification*:cri:teria will be_ evaluated during.any subsequent STA: training progra Procedures for operating experience feedbac The basic licensee procedure addressing this area is EPDN-16.8, Review of Significant Licensee Event Re-ports or Operating Incident Reports, Revision O, dated May 13, 1980. The inspector had observed that this procedure provides a mechanism for disseminating infonnation through the corporate offices to all in-dividuals, including operators, who may benefit from the infonnation. During the course of the review, however, the inspector noted that several other prac-tices are employed to direct such information to operator As a result, the feedback system is not effective since it results in duplication and dilution of the effort. A licensee representative stated that EPDN 16.8 is being revised to reflect a more coherent system of information feedbac No failure to provide significant operating information to operating personnel was idenfified by the inspector. This item will be re-viewed during a subsequent inspection following reissue of EPDN 16.8 (272/81-04-04). The inspector had no further questions at this tim Verification of operating activities. The following aspects of this item were reviewed; control by shift supervision, second verification during removal and and return to service of equiJlllent, and control-room operator cognizanc In aggregate, the following licensee procedures address the above concerns and provide an adequate basis for controlling and verifying the correct performance of operating activities; Administrative Procedure-AP-15, Safety Tagging Program, Revision 1, Operating Depar'bnent Memorandum-19, In-dependent Valve Lineups and Verifications, dated January 19, 1981, and Information Letter IL-80/06, Performance of Valve Lineups, dated May 16, 198 The inspector had no questions on this ite Subject to the comments documented above, the inspector found these items acceptable at the conclusion of this revie *. Maintenance/Surveillance a. The Technical Specifications require two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems to be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of a specified arrangement of various pumps and heat ex-changers. These requirements are effective for plant modes 1, 2, and 3. Surveillance requirements are specified to demonstrate that the system is OPERABL These requirements include verifications of valve positions, visual inspections, tests of interlocks and automatic actuation features, component operation and periodic test For unit 1 in mode 1, the inspector verified that the licensee's pro-cedures were adequate to demonstrate operability of the ECCS subsystem Additionally, a review of the most recent results of these procedures was conducted to insure satisfactory equiµnent performance and compliance with the surveillance requirements of the Technical Specifications. *

The following documents were reviewed:

SP(O) 4.5.2(b)

ECCS SUBSYSTEM SP(O) 4.5.2(c)

ECCS SUBSYSTEM SP(.O) 4.5.2(dl)

ECCS SUBSYSTEM SP(O) 4.0.5 V Category E Valves Mode 1-6 In review of the SP(O) 4.0.5 V valve lineup, the inspector observed that the "desired position" for the throttle valves, SJ' s 16, in the Safety Injection lines did not reflect the required position of the valve status log, SJ Valve Lineup and Deviation Checkoff Sheet 4.2. Surveillance Pro-cedure 4.0.5 required the valve to be locked open, LO, while the valve status log required the valve to be locked in the specified throttle position.. The actual position of these valves recorded in the procedures were the same and indicated that the valves were in the correct throttled position. The actual position indicated on the SP(O) 4.0.5 V valve line-up had been recorded only as locked open during the perfonnance of the procedure on January 5, 1981, and the actual throttle position recorded in pencil sometime afterwards. The inspector concluded that the valves were in the correct position, but the direction provided by the two valve lineups was inconsistent. This item is related to an occurrence cited as a previous item of noncompliance {NRC Inspection Report 272/

81-01). Corrective action will be examined during a review of the licensee's response to that ite With an individual rod position indicator inoperable, continued operation above 50% power is permitted provided certain requirements are satisfie Technical Specification 3.1.3.2.a permits the 1 icensee to determine the position of the affected rod by the performance of an incore flux ma After the rod position indication system for 201 became inoperable on February 7, the inspector observed the performance of an incore flux ma The data from the flux map was evaluated and recorded for trend analysi The flux map, data, and trend analysis satisfied the requirements of the Technical Specification. The inspector identified no unacceptable item *

c. The inspector observed the retest of No. 21 Charging Pump after main-tenance involving the replacement of the pump internals. The no load (low flow) tests indicated satisfactory discharge pressure; however, the results of the full flow test indicated less than desired discharge pressure compared with the manufacturer's pump performance curve. The licensee intends to install additional instrumentation and retest the pump under full flow conditions prior to required operability of the pump in Mode 3. The inspector will examine the results of the subsequent retest. This is an inspector follow item (311/81-05-02).

12. Design Changes and Modifications

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Amendment No. 33 (February 2, 1981) to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 and Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 (April 18, 1980) permit increased capacity of each spent fuel pool for units 1 and 2 respectively. The in-crease was not to exceed 1170 assemblies for each uni The inspectors verified that procedures had been prepared to accomplish these modifications. The procedure contained appropriate hold points for Quality Assurance inspection and verification. A licensee contractor had written the procedures and was performing the modification. The contractor's supervisor had previous experience on a similiar job at another sit QA coverage was provided by the licensee. The inspector observed that work had started for unit 2 and QA personnel were providing inspection coverag The inspector identified no problems relative to the technical adequacy of the procedure nor any of the work already performe Inspection coverage will be provided periodically during the modificatio. Management Control Technical Specifications {Chapter 6) state that the offsite organization for facility management and technical support shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-The inspector visited the corporate offices to confirm that the-1 organization was established as shown in the technical specification The line diagram shows the Fire Protection Support is under the cognizance of the Manager - Emergency Preparedness. The inspector identified no person who was anployed specifically for this tas I.n response to the inspector's request, the Manager - Emergency Preparedness provided a copy of the job description (Personnel Requisition) which delineates the position responsibilities. The position description/requisition was in routing for corporate approval. After approval, the job would be filled as soon as possible. The licensee representative stated that the responsibilities for FIRE PROTECTION SUPPORT were being performed jointly by persons re-sponsible to the Manager-Nuclear Operations Support and the Manager-Emergency Preparedness. This item is an inspector fol low item (272/81-04-06) until the position is fille The inspector had no further question regarding the remainder of the corporate organization *

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14. Unresolved !tans Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 6 and 8 of this repor. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.