IR 05000272/1981005
| ML18086A716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1981 |
| From: | Greenman E, Hill W, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18086A714 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-81-05, 50-272-81-5, 50-311-81-06, 50-311-81-6, NUDOCS 8106240132 | |
| Download: ML18086A716 (15) | |
Text
Report No Docket No U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-272/81-05 50-311/81-06 50-272 50-311 DPR-70
REGION I
- License No DPR-75
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Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 050272-810301 050272-810306 050272-810311 050272-810322 050272-810328 050311-810314 Fae i 1 i ty Name: ___
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Inspection Conducted:
March 1 - March 31, 1981
~ Inspectors:
?J( ?n * JM A -6,'-\\.
L. J. Norrholm, 7Seni~Resident Inspector 2 2 APR 1981 date
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- ....,,._/_. ___________ 2 2 APR 1981 W. M. Hill, Jr.~ Resident Reactor Inspector date Approved By:
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APR 2 4 198?
E.G. Gr~al'l:ci'iief,ReaCtOr Projects Section No. 2A, date Projects Branch No. 2, DRPI Inspection Summary:
Inspections on March 1 - March 31, 1981 (Canbined Report Numbers 50-272/81-05 and 50-311/81-06)
Unit 1 Areas Ins2ected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations including tours of the facility; confonnance with technical specifi-cations and operating parameters; log and record review; review of licensee events; IE Bulletins; and followup on previous inspection items. The inspection involved 95 inspector-hours by the resident inspector Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Failure to establish procedures, Detail 6).
- Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; license requirements and technical specifications; IE Bulletins; followup on licensee events; and, followup on previous inspection item The insp~ction involved 53 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:* No items of noncompliance were identifie.
DETAILS Persons Contacted G. Connor, Station Operating Engineer J. Driscoll, Chief Engineer L. Fry, Station Operating Engineer J. Gallagher, Assistant Maintenance Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station L. Miller, Station Performance Engineer J. Nichols, Reactor Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer R. Swetnam, Radiation Protection Engineer The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, performance and quality assurance personne. Status of Previous Inspection Items SITE (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-04-02) Testing of ECCS check valv By letter dated March 25, 1981, the licensee submitted supplemental LER 80-67/03X-1 which documents a comm'itment ta retest check valve 11SJ139 whenever flow through the valve may have been initiated and the potential for unseating exists. The inspector reviewed temporary on-the-spot change T-1 to OI I-3.3 which specifies such retest prior to return to power operatio The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-04-03) System alignment procedures for redundant air supply to Main Steam Isolation Valves. Subsequent review by the inspectors identified no procedural controls over these valves. This finding resolves the issue as apparent non-compliance with Technical Specification 6. (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/81-05-01) Supplemental report describing corrective actions on LER 80-3 By letter dated March 17, 1981, the licensee submitted supplemental LER 80-31/03X-2 which describes the retest performed on the diesel generator ana inspections con-ducted on the remaining five diesels on sit No other problems witn diesel camshafts were identified. The inspector had no further questions on this ite. Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 10, May 21, 1980; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980; Operations Directive Manual; and, AP-15, Safety Tagging Program, Revision 1, November 21, 198 b. Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnonnal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration; Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a abov c. The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed with licensee personnel:
Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, March 1-31, 1981 Log No. 6 - Primary Plant Log, March 1-31, 1981 Log No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, March 1-31, 1981 Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equi!JTlent Status Log, March 1-31, 1981 Night Orders, February 27 - March 30, 1981 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log - All active Nonconfonnance Reports for February 1981 Incident Reports 81-25, 28-29, 58, 60-61, 63, 65-82, 86-88, 90 No unacceptable conditions were identifie * *
Plant Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, including the following; (1) Control Room (daily)
(2) Relay Rooms (3) Auxiliary Building (4) Vital Switchgear Rooms (5) Turbine Building (6)
Yard Areas (7)
Radwaste Building (8) Penetration Areas (9) Control Point (10) Site Perimeter (11) Fuel Handling Building (12) Containment (13) Guard House The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mod This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Charging/
Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Containment Spray Systems).
Radiation Control The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant house-keeping identified no unsatisfactory condition Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identi-fied by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were note *
Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions were identifie Equipment tagging. The* inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector veri-fied that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k)
and the Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appro-priate documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent release Fire protection. The inspector verified that selected fire ex-tinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alann stations were inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed and that cardox systems were operabl Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observa-tions during tours, the inspector-verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The following parameters were sampled frequently:
RWST level, BAST level and temperature, containment temperature, boration flow path, leak rates, tank_ boron concentration, heat trace, shutdown margin, offsite powe In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of electrical switchboards to confirm availability of safeguards equipmen Security. During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin No notable conditions were identifie Interviews The inspector interviewed a female licensee employee who was currently in the training program for reactor operator In view of her apparent pregnancy, the inspector confinned that she was aware of the occupational exposure limitation of 0.5 rem and the requirement to inform her super-visor of her prenatal condition. The inspector confirmed that her supervisor was aware of her dose limitation. The inspector also con-finned through interview with Radiation Protection personnel that licensee procedures had been followed pursuant to this circumstance. The female employee's film badge and record had been suspended *
Personnel access control to the radiological areas is maintained at the Control Point. Since her film badge is not available for issuance, she would not be permitted past,the Control Point. Based on interviews, and personal observations, the inspector determined that the licensee's procedures and employee actions were consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and Regulatory Guide 8.13, Instructions Concerning Prenatal Radiation Exposur The inspector had no further question The following acceptance criteria were used for the above items:
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Technical Specifications Operation Directives Manual Inspector Judgement e. The inspector had no further questions relative to tours made during this inspectio.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.l and 6.9.2 are reviewed by the inspecto This review includes the following considerations:
The report includes the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; Test results and/or supporting information are consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; Planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; and, Determination whether any information in the report should be classi-fied as an abnormal occurrenc Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - February 1981 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - February 1981 No unacceptable conditions were identifie *
6. Operational Events During the course of this inspection, the following events were reviewe a. Unit 1 tripped from 100% power at 1:01 p.m. on March 1 due to steam generator low-low level caused by loss of No. 11 Steam Generator Feed Pum The feed pump trip is believed to have been caused by fluctua-tions in heater drain pump controls resulting in low feed pump suction pressur The licensee elected to remain out of service to complete G inaccessible mechanical snubber inspections required by IE Bulletin 81-01. The plant was in cold shutdown at 5:50 a.m. on March 2. All systems functioned normally on the trip. Of 19 INC snubbers inspected on the pressurizer, no failures were foun Plant heat up to Mode 3 was completed at 8:25 p.m. on March Unit 1 was critical at 9:18 a.m. on March At approximately 2:30 p.m., overheating of pressurizer heater cables was observed. These cable runs, located in the penetration area external to the containment, had been wrapped with a fire retardant mineral wool as part of the fire protection progra The insulating effect of the mineral wool did not permit heat dissipation from the energized heater cables. The insula-tion was removed and visual inspection and electrical checks identified no damage to the cables. Through subsequent discussion with engineering personnel, the inspector learn~d that heat loading due to power cables in this section of cable tray had not been considered in the desig No similar oversight was identified and resolution of the problem indicated that wrapping of the section in question was not required in order to meet fire protection criteri During the above sequence of events, operators attempted to shift pres-surizer heater power supplies to the emergency vital sourc Once this was accomplished, pressure control could not be adequately maintained at normal operating pressure and stabilized at approximately 2000 psi Review of the design basis for emergency heater capability indicated that the intent was to have sufficient heater capability (150 kw) to support natural circulation with no reactor coolant pumps runnin The inspector expressed his concern that steps to shut down the reactor had not been initiated during the few minutes that adequate heater capacity was unavailable. The inspector stated his position that, with insufficient heater capacity to maintain normal operating pressure, the pressurizer should be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.4. Heater capability was restored within the time specified. A licensee representative stated that definitive guidance will be provided to operators concerning pressurizer operability as a function of avail-able heater capacity. This item is unresolved (272/81-05-02).
Unit 1 entered Mode 1 at 5:50 p.m. on March 6, synchronized to the grid at 7:14 p.m. and was at 100% power at 7:15 p.m. on March 7, 198 c. During the evening of March 10-11, 1981, elevated airborne radioactivity concentrations in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building were experienced. This activity was first indicated by personnel exiting the building at the control point with short lived contamination of their clothing. Four contaminated individuals exited between 6:45 and 9:30 p.m. on March 10, 198 The presence of short-lived Rb-88 on their clothing alerted radiation protection personnel and shift operators to possible airborne contaminatio Increasing readings on continuous air monitors at elevation 64' and a midnight air sample confinned a level of 1.53E~7 uCi/m The principal isotope was Rb-88 at 27% of the Maximum Permissible Concentratio While the levels did not present an irranediate hazard -to -personnel in the building, access was restricted and protective clothing with respirators was specified for operations and health physics personnel involved in locating the source of the activity. A series of equipment changes, including securing of waste gas compressors, was initiated to attempt isolation of the source of the apparent leakage. Shutdown of No. 11 Waste Gas Compressor at 10:15 p.m. had no effect on the air activity, nor did the shutdown of No. 12 at approximately 3:00 a.m. Additionally, at about 3:00 a.m., valve 1 WG 73, a boric acid evaporator vent condenser connection to the waste gas system, was found open and was closed. Sub-sequent sampling of the air at approximately 6:30 a m. indicated no significant changes, with activity remaining at 10-7 UCi/m During this period of time, the plant vent monitor, 1R16, ranged from 2500 to 20,000 cou'nts, and did not alar The Senior Shift Supervisor stated that he was aware of the Emergency Plan action level {Alert) which stated, "Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate severe degradation in the control of radio-active material (i.e. radiation measurements increase by a factor of 1000).
He did not consider the elevated, but consistent, airborne levels as indicative of severe degradation in control and regarded the factor of 1000 as relating to direct radiation levels, which had not change signi-ficantly during these events. It is further noted that the plant vent monitor was not significantly different from readings obtained during routine operations and had not reached the warning alann point. Previous experience with leaks inside the auxiliary building had demonstrated that elevated airborne activity was to be expecte Activity levels at 10-7 persisted at 8:00 a.m., at which time station management, interpreting the "factor of 1000 11 statement to include measurements of airborne activity, elected to implement the Emergency Plan at the Alert stage and make the appropriate notifications to NRC and state authorities. The Alert was declared at 8:20 a.m. Subsequent efforts to isolate the cause detennined that the No. 12 Waste Gas Com-pressor seal was leaking even with the unit shutdow Once the Compressor was isolatedA airborne activity levels returned to nonnal levels at approx-imately 10-lu uCi/ml. A contributing factor to high airborne activity from the leaking seal was the VCT degassing valve, 1CV243, which was found ope I
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The valve, operated from the control console, vents the VCT to the vent header which, in turn, is the suction for the waste gas compresso It was not determined how long the valve was open, however, it could account for higher than usual short lived activity in the vent header. It is noted that the use of this valve to control VCT pressure is not addressed in licensee procedures, although the practice exists based on interviews with operator Subsequent inspection of No. 12 Waste Gas Compressor also identified that the separator tank, which provides seal water for the compressor, was empty. Apparently, continuing problems with the automatic level control and level indicating system had resulted in a situation wherein field operators manually controlled level by use of manual valves 1DR97 and 1DR9 The manual valve to No. 12 Compressor was found closed. The valves are not included in station valve lineup Once the apparent source of airborne activity was isolated and decreasing levels were confirmed by sampling, the Alert was terminated at 11:14 on March 11, 198 The inspector had no further questions relative to licensee response in this situation. However, failure to provide adequate procedural coverage for the use of valves 1CV243, 1DR97 and 1DR98 constitutes an apparent item of noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 and the implemen-tation of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A (272/81-05-01). At 1:40 a.m. on March 14, an authorized release of No. 2 Waste Monitor Holdup Tank was"tenninated and the lineup shifted to release No. 22 CVCS Monitor Tan No 22 CVCSMT had been processed and recirculated in preparation for release. It had not been sample The error was dis-covered and the release halted at 1:50 The licensee elected to enter the emergency plan and made notifications of an Unusual Event about 3:00 The tank was later sampled and released. About 600 gallons were released before samplin The total activity is estimated at 3.6E-5 Ci. Appropriate monitoring and dilution flow were in effect during the releas LER 50-311/81-03 will be submitte e. Increasing vibration of the No. 1 and 8 bearings, associated with No. 13 Low Pressure Turbine was experienced early on the morning of March 2 Electrical load was reduced and the turbine taken off-line at 5:22 The reactor was shut down normally at 6:05 The licensee elected to remain shut down until the cause of vibration can be investigated and repaired. Estimated duration is several week The reactor was brought to cold shutdown at 6:12 a.m. on March 2 Except as noted above, the inspector had no further questions relative to events reviewe.
Lessons Learned (NUREG-0737)
A number of items tletailed in NUREG-0737, Clarification of Action Plan re-quirements, were required to be in place on January 1, 198 The inspector confinned that selected items had been implemented in a manner consistent with NRC documented requirements tn each are The following task items were reviewed during this inspection:
I.A.2.1 - Upgrading of Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Trainin As a result of NRC re-examination of all Unit 1 licensed operators seeking a Unit 2 license during 1980, upgrading of training has occurred. Additional modifications to the Operator Requalifica-tions Program are described in licensee correspondence to NRR dated December 31, 198 These modifications indicate an increased em-phasis on thennal/hydraulic effects and factors in mitigating core damag Discussions with personnel indicated that these features are included in the currently on-going requalification cycl *
II.B.4 - Training for mitigating core damag This training was required as a condition of the Unit 2 license. Accomplishment was verified and documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/80-20 and 50-272/
81-0 As stated above, these items have been incorporated into the requalification training cycl II.K.3 - B & 0 Task Force Item 9 - PIO Controller. The inspector reviewed completed design change package l-EC-534 and calibration data for both units to confinn that modifications to controls for PORV's on both units have been mad The modification raises the pressure interlock value to 2350 psia, resulting in no controller integral functio The valves will not lift until the interlock setting is reache II.F.l - Instrumentation for Monitoring Accident Conditions - High level release calculations. Licensee interim methods for quantifying high noble gas concentrations and iodine are discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/80-11 and 50-272/80-20, and are appli-cable to both unit No unacceptable conditions were identified relative to the abov.
Full Power License Conditions On January 14, 1981, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on the status of Salem Unit 2 and the proposed licensing action to authorize operation in excess of 5% rated thermal powe Included in the briefing were the draft license and Technical Specification The draft license includes conditions relating to actions responsive to staff concerns, NUREG-0694 and NUREG-073 The inspector reviewed a number of these items to deter-mine status of implementatio *
11 The following draft license condition was reviewed and found acceptable during this inspectio.C(25):f)(2) Auxiliary feedwater surveillance and operating pro-cedures detailed in Section 22.2, II.E.1.1 of Supple-ment 5 to the Safety Evaluation Repor The inspector reviewed Revision 2, dated March 4, 1981, to OI III-10.3.1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operatio The procedure now specifies once per shift surveillance of the elevation 64' and 84' switchgear rooms when-ever the alternate suction to auxiliary feedwater is lined u This completes the surveillance and operating procedure modifications directed by the auxiliary feedwater revie No unacceptable conditions were identifie. Surveillance On March 22, 1981, while conducting testing in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, valve 11 SJ 40 (Safety Injection Hot Leg Discharge)
would not open when operated from the control roo Subsequent investi-gation revealed that one wire in the control circuit had not been made u A temporary jumper was installed to restore operability of the valv It was later determined that follow up work on the design change to provide control room power lockouts for ECCS valves had been completed during the March 1-6, 1981 outag No documented retest of the valves after completion of the additional work could be identified. Technical Specification 4.5.2.a requires that valve 11 SJ 40 be closed, power
removed, and that this condition be verified every 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The valve would be required to be opened 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> following the DBA and could be operated locally at the switchgear in the penetration area. Until com-pletion of the recent design change to provide remote power lockouts, power was removed at the switchgear and a 11 Do Not Operate" tag applie The inspector acknowledged that the situation did not violate consid-erations of Technical Specifications or the safety analysis. However, the lack of control over modifications and subsequent retest was in-dicative of a more general problem required to be addressed and resolve The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and stated that a 30 day LER will be submitted providing a detailed analysis and action to preclude recurrence. This item is unresolved pending further review and receipt of the written report (272/81-05-03).
The inspector observed routine surveillances on the following equipment:
March 18 21 Charging pump SP(O) 4.0.5 p performance test SP(O) 4.5.2. full fl ow test 22 Charging pump SP(O) 4.0.5 p performance test March 24 16 Service water pump SP(O) 4.0.5 p performance test
- The inspector verified that testing was perfonned in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, and removal and restoration of the affected components were made where appropriate. With respect to the above tests, the inspector noted the following comment Charging pump failed its full flow test (SP(O) 4.5.2.H.2).
The pump had been previously identified as a potential proble The internals (rotor) had not been supplied with a manufacturer's certification nor a specific pump perfonnance curve. The licensee has been unable to successfully test the rotating assembly for this particular pum Since there is a long lead time to procure, manufacture, install, and test a new pump, the licensee has decided to replace the pump elements on the rotor shaft. This was in progress at the close of this inspection perio The results of the flow test of No. 16 Service Water Pump, as determined from the measured differential pressure and a clamp-on flow meter, indicated that the pump was operating below the design pump head curve {approximately 15%).
A Test Deficiency Report, (M 585) dated January 10, 1981, noted an unsatisfactory low flow condition. Subsequent Work Orders, WO 947496 and 947687, exchanged #16 and #25 Service Water Pump The original test data from #25 indicated satisfactory perfonnance of that pum After the exchange of pumps, satisfactory operation was still not obtained with the replacement pum Another Work Order, 944655 (dated March 12, 1981) was issued to."investigate cavitation (for) 16 Service Water Pump (and) measure pump to wall clearances."
Liaison between the maintenance and engineering departments is being performed to effect a satisfactory resolutio Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 addresses the operation of the service water header which can be supplied from any one of three different pumps (14, 15, or 16).
As long as operability of the service water header can be demonstrated with any pump, entry into an action statement (Limiting Condition of Operation) is not required. The inspector confirmed that 14 and 15 SW pump had demonstrated satisfactory perfonnance. The inspector will monitor the status of 16 SW pump through the routine inspection progra The inspector had no further questions in this area at this tim.
IE Bulletin Followup a. The IE Bulletin discussed below was reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representative Information discussed in the licensee's reply was supported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit *
Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated January 2, 1981 and March 4, 1981, the licensee responded for both units to IE Bulletin 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to wa*ter Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980, Indian Point 2 Event).
The response provided pertinent data requested by the Bulletin and included such items as system descriptions and operation, type of materials and history of repairs for the piping and coolers, and descrip-tions of the sump alarms and level indicating system The licensee stated that the piping to the coolers is cement lined carbon steel~ The high erosion piping sections will be replaced with 316 stain-less steel. The cooler tubes are currently 90/10 CuNi and will be replaced with AL6X tubing. The licensee stated that replacement of this material will be completed during the next refueling outage for each unit. This item is unresolved (UNR 272/81-05-06) pending replacement of this materia The licensee stated that the reactor (cavity) sump has pump start-stop times and the sump high level alar Both inputs are derived from one instrument (Magnetrol} and susceptible to a common mode failure. A licensee representative stated that design change requests,(Unit 1) l-SC-0525 and (Unit 2) 2-SC-0526, dated April 12, 1981, were submitted to provide inde-pendent functions. This item is unresolved (UNR 272/81-05-05) and will be examined when methods have been established to provide independent level indications in the reactor cavity sum The licensee stated that an auxiliary annunciator alarm summary is initiated and evaluated at least once per shift. The inspector reviewed OI II-1. (Reactor Coolant Leak Detection) and the enclosed worksheet for the reactor coolant drain tank, containment sump, and reactor vessel sump leak rate workshee The inspector confirmed that the procedure required action if the leak rate increased above a specified leve Periodic operation of the reactor cavity pump would indicate satisfactory system performance and serve as a surveillance channel chec However, appropriate action is not specified if normal system operation is not periodically observed. The licensee stated that the adequacy of the surveillance would be examined. This item is unresolved (UNR 272/81-05-04) pending review of the evaluation performed by the license The inspector had no further questions relative to the licensee's ability to detect service water leaks in containment as described in the Bulletin respons. Spent Fuel Storage Racks Installation of high density storage racks into the Spent Fuel Storage Pool was in progress during the inspection. At the conclusion of the inspection period, three racks had been installed in unit 2 spent fuel pool. The in-spector reviewed the licensee's contract (77-E-503) for purchase of twenty-four (24) increased capacity spent fuel storage racks, serial numbers A-1 through A-12 and B-1 through B-12, ninety {90) plate surveillance samples, and ten cell surveillance sample The inspector reviewed the contract to confinn that adequate guidance was specified for the manufacture of the new racks. The contract referenced two technical specifications which were developed for the manufacturing of the condensed fuel storage rack XN-NS-S-008 was the technical specification for the neutron absorber spent fuel storage cell. XN-NS-S-009 was the technical specification for the spent fuel storage module. Appropriate reference was made to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1977 Edition for material specifications (Section II), Subsection NF - Component Supports (Section III), Nondestructive Examination (Section V), and Welding Qualifications (Section IX).
The in-spector noted that the modules (racks) were not technically ASME III com-ponent supports and guidance for Code Authorization, Certification, Inspection, Stamping and Quality Control/Assurance of Section III was contained in Technical Specification XN-NS-S-009. Technical Specification, XN-NS-S-009, stipulated that the BORAL sandwich would have a continuous distribution of boron carbide such that the minimum2weight of boron-10 per unit area of the sheet material would be 0.020 gm/cm.
The inspector visually examined modules B-5 and B-6. There were no unsatis-factory conditions noted on the external surfaces of these module The
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internal elements were not accessible for inspection. The inspector visually examined three wall restrains, BlB, B4B, and B4C which had been welded and were ready for installation. The inspector discussed the welding procedures and qualification required with the individual performing the welding. There were no unsatisfactory items identifie. Maintenance The inspector observed maintenance activities for the following items:
Overhead Annunciator B-4 (RMS Area High Radiation)
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Axial Flux Difference Console Strip Chart Recorder Maintenance on the circuit for overhead annunciator B-4, RMS Area High Radiation, was being perfonned per work order, W.O. 94789, dated March 28, 198 The inspector discussed the equipment problem, trouble shooting pro-cedures, and corrective maintenanc The corrective action identified a defective printed circuit board (PCB) which was replace The technician was using licensee drawing 222581-B-9554 Revision 4, dated June 11, 1976, No. 1 Unit Overhead Annunciator Cabinet 11 The drawing was obtained from the Technical Document Room (TDR) and was appropriately stamped, "Issued for Construction *.* Issued March 24, 1981 *** Void after March 31, 1981,"
as required by Administrative Procedure No. Based on an initial wire check of the cabinet, the technician discovered that outstanding design changes were issued against the drawin Based on a discussion with the technician and a TDR supervisor, it was unclear to the inspector who was responsible for insuring that the drawing accurately reflected the current status of design changes. This item has been identified in previous NRC inspection reports (50-272/80-04 and 50-272/81-03) and will be examined during a review of the licensee's response to the latter repor The inspector.had no further questions regarding maintenance on the overhead annunciator cabine The inspector observed maintenance actions being perfonned on the Reactor Protection and Process Control System Axial Flux Difference Monitor Syste The strip chart recorder located on the operator's console was indicating incorrectly. The meters mounted on the console were indicating correctly and the flux differences were within the required limits. The technician explained the trouble shooting procedure using a drawing (#220095 B 9538-2)
which had been posted to provide ready reference. The drawing diagramed system interconnections. The technician had a copy of the perfonnance department test procedure, 1 PD-16.1.007 Axial Flux Difference Monitor, revision 4, dated November 20, 1980, which would be used to test the system after maintenance was complete After a brief explanation of the trouble shooting procedure by the technician, the inspector had no further questions regarding maintenance on the Axial Flux Difference Monitoring Syste.
Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to detennine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 6, 9 and 10 of this repor.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.