IR 05000269/1992030
| ML16148A736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1993 |
| From: | Belisle G, Binoy Desai, Harmon P, Poertner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A735 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-92-30, 50-270-92-30, 50-287-92-30, NUDOCS 9302020353 | |
| Download: ML16148A736 (17) | |
Text
fpdF REGb UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:, 50-269/92-30, 50-270/92-30 and 50-287/92-30 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242-0001 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-4 License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: November 29, 1992 - January 2, 1993 Inspector:.
P. E. trmon, Seni r Resident Inspector Date digned B. B. (9sai, Resi dnt Inspector
- D1te Signed
93 C K. <trtner, Re'sident Inspector D te Signed Approved by:
G.. Belis e*,-Stion Chief D te Sfgned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, Keowee issues, inspection of open items, and review of licensee event report Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie One unresolved item was identified concerning inadequate high pressure service water flow to the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump oil cooler (paragraph 3.b).
9302020353 930121 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee.Employees
- H. Barron, Station Manager
- S. Benesole, Safety Review D. Coyle, Systems Engineering
- J. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager B. Dolan, Manager, Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering (Design)
W. Foster, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site D. Hubbard, Component Engineering
- 0. Kohler, Regulatory Compliance C. Little, Superintendent, Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
- M. Patrick, Performance.Engineer
- B. Peele, Engineering Manager
- S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance G. Rothenberger, Work Control Superintendent R. Sweigert, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors
- P Harmon
- W Poertner
- B Desai
- Attended exit intervie.
Plant Operations (71707) General The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification log and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument &.electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during weekdays and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover, performance. Actions observed were conducted as required by the
licensee's Administrative.Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were conducted throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included tIe following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building CCW Intake Structure Independent Spent Fuel Storage Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Room Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Rooms Station Yard Zone Within the Protected Area Standby -Shutdown Facility Keowee Hydro Station During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Within the areas reviewed, the licensee's activities were satisfactor Plant Status Unit I shutdown on December 3, 1992, for a scheduled End-of-Cycle 14 Refueling outage. The Unit remained shutdown for the remainder of.the reporting perio Unit 2 operated at power the entire reporting perio Unit 3 operated at power the entire reporting perio Unit 1 Midloop Operations (TI 2515/103)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions with regard to reducing reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory for midloop operations. Unit 1 entered midloop operating conditions at approximately 11:20 p.m., on December 9, 199 RCS level was increased above midloop operating conditions at approximately 11:45 a.m., on December 11, 1992. The licensee's requirements for midloop operations are contained in Operating Procedure OP/1/A/1103/11, Draining and Nitrogen Purging of the Reactor Coolant System. The procedure requires that the following prerequisites were completed prior to reducing RCS level below 50 inches as indicated on reactor vessel,level indicator LT-5:
Containment closure survey performed to identify containment penetrations that would have to be closed in the event of a loss of decay heat removal capability and to ensure that containment closure can be achieve Two independent RCS temperature indicators and alarms operabl LT-5 operable and calibrate Ultrasonic level instrumentation operable..,
-
Two-low pressure injection pumps operabl Both main feeder busses are required to be energized and two sources of electrical power are required -to be availabl Two means of adding inventory to the RCS are require A review of maintenance and testing activities to ehsure no adverse effects-on systems and components required for decay heat remova The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the performance of portions of OP/1/A/1103/11 and verified that the requirements contained in the controlling procedure were accomplished prior to reducing vessel level below 50 inches on LT-Low Pressure Service Water Valve Failure During the inspection period, three failures of the Unit 1 low pressure service water (LPSW) air operated control valves (1LPSW 251 and 1LPSW-252) to the low pressure injection (LPI). coolers occurred. These valves control LPI cooler outlet temperature when the LPI system is operated in the decay heat removal mode of operation. These valves fail open on a loss of instrument ai On December 6, 1992, valve 1LPSW-252 failed open due-to a loss of instrument air; on December 8, 1992, valve 1LPSW-251 failed open due to a loss of instrument air; and on December 9, 1992, valve 1LPSW-251 failed open again due to a loss of instrument air. The failures occurred at the instrument air tubing connections to the valve operators and were caused by flow induced vibration. The licensee was making preparations to enter midloop operating conditions during this time period and decided to replace the existing instrument air copper tubing with-a.flexible hose prior to reducing the RCS level to midloop. The instrument air tubing was replaced with flexible hose and the valves have not failed open due to a loss of instrument air since thevalves were modified. The licensee plans to modify the instrument air lines for the corresponding valves in Unit 2 and Replacement of 2CA and 2CB Control Batterie During this inspection period, the licensee replaced the Unit 2 CA control battery and were in the process of replacing the Unit 2 CB control battery when-the inspection period ended. The battery replacement was required because battery capacity was less than 80 percent. The battery capacity problems were addressed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269, 270, 287/92-18. The inspectors identified the replacement of the control batteries as an item to be followed to completion. The replacement of the 2CA and 2CB control batteries resolved the inspector's specific concerns with regard to battery capacit Refueling Shutdown Risk Management The licensee implemented Oconee Nuclear Station Shutdown Protec tion Plan 1EOC14 on November 17, 1992. The plan is specific to the Unit 1 refueling outage in progress during this report perio The published plan follows the general guidelines of the NUMARC Guidelines for Industry Action to Assess Shutdown Management document published in December 199 The licensee's plan incorporates the principles and standards of the NUMARC documen In the plan, management expectations and guidance are clearly expressed for risk management and general work practices to all station employees involved in the outage. The guidance is considered a positive step-in improving Oconee's outage management performance. Section 4.0 of the plan, Contingency Plans, delineates guidance for specific events which can be encountered during refueling outage The guidance provided in the plan represents a conservative, careful approach to managing the outage. In particular, the guidance to maintain both normal and emergency electrical power, core cooling, and containment isolation capability is thoroughly described and conservative. The plan is considered a strengt Implementation of the plan will be assessed during the remainder of the outag The licensee's performance has improved steadily during recent refueling outages, largely due to the implementation of the protection plan and management's support in maintaining the principles and requirements outlined in the pla Safety consciousness and a general awareness of what systems, components and functions must be maintained is evident at management, supervision and worker levels. The result of these positive changes has been a decrease in the number and safety significance of outage related events during the inspection perio Within the areas reviewed, the licensee's activities were satisfactor A strength was rated relative to the station shutdown protection pla No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Testing (61726) General Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and system restoratio was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
TT/O/A/065O/0001 Keowee Hydro Emergency Blackout Start Test PT/2,3/A/0150/22L TDEFWP Cooling Water Supply Valve Test PT/1/A/251/24 LPI to HPI, BWST Suction, and HPI to the RCS Check Valve Test Inadequate High-Pressure Service Water (HPSW) Flow to the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pump Oil Cooler As a.result of performance tests conducted on December 18, 19, and 20, 1992, the licensee determined that the HPSW flow through the Unit 3 TDEFW pump turbine oil cooler would not be adequate for cooling the turbine oil cooler. On December 22, the licensee determined that a similar condition existed on Units 1 and The TDEFW pump is required to perform its decay heat removal function for up to four hours during a station blackout conditio The cooling water for the turbine oil cooler and the pump bearing jackets during a station blackout is provided by the HPSW syste The HPSW system was realigned to ensure adequate flow through the turbine oil cooler. The licensee is currently conducting an evaluation to determine past operability of the TDEFW pum Performance Test, PT/1,2,3/A/0150/22L, TDEFW Pump Cooling Water Supply Valve Test, is performed to ensure adequate HPSW flow to the turbine oil cooler and to the pump cooling jackets. The current acceptance criteria for flow through the turbine oil cooler is greater than or equal to 13 gpm. The valve alignment
during this portion of the test is such that LPSW-137, -138 and HPSW-284 are shut. This alignment isolates the pump bearing jackets and HPSW is allowed to flow only through the turbine oil cooler. HPSW flow through the pump bearing jacketsis.later verified with the turbine oil cooler isolated by having HPSW-184 closed. The acceptance criterja for flow through the pump bearing jackets is visible flow into the trench. The turbine oil cooler and the turbine jacket 'are not simultaneously subjected to HPSW flow during the test as they would be in an actual situatio On December 18, the licensee performed PT/1,2,3/A/0150/22L several times on Unit 3. During these tests, the required flow of at least 13 gpm through the turbine oil cooler was not achieve Following troubleshooting maintenance on several valves in the configured lineup, the PT was reperformed on December 1 At this time, the test acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 13 gpm flow through the cooler was achieved. During performance of these tests, the Unit 3 Test Supervisor noted that when valves 3HPSW-184 and 3LPSW-138 were open simultaneously, i.e., HPSW aligned to both the turbine oil cooler and the pump bearing jacket, the HPSW flow took the path of least resistance and flow through the turbine oil cooler went to zer The test supervisor reviewed the Design Basis Documentation (DBD)
and noted that HPSW flow was required through the turbine oil cooler for the TDEFW pump during a station blackout situation. He notified Systems Engineering of.the observation. On December 20, Systems Engineering determined that an operability question on the TDEFW system existed for all three units and that further testing would have to be performe Further testing was performed on December 21 on Unit 3 and on December 22 on Unit 2. Data obtained from these tests were similar to that observed on December 18 and 19, in that with HPSW aligned to both the turbine oil cooler and the pump bearing jackets, HPSW would take the path of least resistance through the pump bearing jackets resulting in zero flow through the turbine oil coolers. The licensee took temporary corrective.action by realigning the HPSW system such-that 2HPSW-284 and 3HPSW-284 were throttled open to get approximately 15 gpm flow through the turbine oil cooler and also flow through the pump bearing jacke On December 21, the licensee made a notification to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 50.72 b.2.iii.b. *This notification communicated that insufficient data was available to assure that during a station blackout, adequate flow to the turbine oil cooler would exist such that it would be capable of removing the potential heat loads required to maintain the TDEFW pump in an operable conditio As of the end of this report period, the licensee had not determined the past operability of the TDEFW pumps on all three
units:
The licensee plans to discuss this issue with the vendo Additionally, the licensee plans to perform a special test to obtain the oil temperature profile without HPSW flow to the turbine oil coolers. Pending the licensee's determination as to the operability of the TDEFW pump without HPSW flow through the turbine oil cooler, this issue will be classified as Unresolved Item 50-269, 270, 287/92-30-01, Inadequate HPSW Flow To TDEFW Pump Oil Cooler Letdown Storage Tank (LDST) Outlet Check Valve Failur During the performance of PT/1/A/251/24, LPI to HPI, BWST Suction, and HPI to the RCS Check Valve Test, the LDST outlet check valve, 1HP-97, failed to close when the low pressure injection (LPI)
system was aligned to the suction of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps.- The check valve is required to close~when the LPI system is aligned to the HPI system in the piggyback mode of operatio This prevents overpressurization of the LDST and loss of containment sump inventory through the LDST relief valve or rupture of the LOST. The LDST outlet line contains a motor operated valve in series with the check valve; however, the motor operated valve is not a safety related valve and is not powered from a 1E power supply. Additionally, the valve is not required to be shut per the operating procedures during alignment in the piggyback mode of operation. The inspectors have questioned the configuration of the LDST previously and the licensee is modifying the outlet piping this outage because of problems identified previously by the inspectors concerning the pressure rating of the check valve and piping. The licensee has not completed a past operability determination as of the completion of the inspection period. The inspectors will review this item and the licensee's corrective actions in the next monthly inspection repor One Unresolved Item was identifie.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the report ing period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of-the trade. Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to-service, and that-limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
MP/0/A/1800/029 Manways And Blank Flange Installation And Removal TN/1/A/2861/AM2 LPI Cooler Upgrade WR 38547C Repair 1LPSW-251
Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactor No violations or deviations were identifie.
Keowee Issues Keowee Hydro Emergency Blackout Start Test On December 16, 1992, the licensee performed a special test, TT/O/A/0650/0001, Keowee Hydro Emergency Blackout Start Test, to demonstrate the capability of each Keowee Hydro unit to emergency start during blackout conditions. The test also determined the changes in voltage and current with one and two cells of a battery out of service during a blackout start. The two Keowee Hydro units provide emergency AC power to Oconee through the overhead and underground emergency path The test is not required by TS or other surveillance requirements.,
The licensee decided to perform the test for assurance of battery capacity and start capability following discovery that available DC voltage may be inadequate to close the breakers. The breakers in question are Westinghouse DB50 breakers which had been recently modified to revise the control circuit The Keowee DC power system is comprised of DC buses IDA and 2DA, and supplies power to safety loads including Keowee control circuitry, relaying power, and generator field flashing. IDA receives power from 600 VAC MCC.IXA through a battery charge Similarly, 2DA receives power from MCC 2XA. MCCs 1XA and 2XA are normally energized from loadcenter 1TC through transformer CX, through the Keowee main transformer, or by the running Keowee unit. In the event of the loss of AC sources, the two Keowee batteries pick up the loads on IDA and 2DA respectively, thus maintaining emergency start capability of the-Keowee Hydro Unit Keowee Unit 1's capability to start under blackout condition was tested with one battery cell removed from service and the battery charger isolated from the DC bus. Keowee Unit 2's capability to start under blackout conditions was testediwith two battery cells removed from service and the battery charger isolated from the DC bus. Emergency start of the Keowee units was initiated from the Oconee Unit 3 Control Room. Keowee Unit 1 started successfully and came up to speed at rated frequency and voltage unde simulated blackout conditions. Keowee Unit 2 also performed as required under simulated blackout condition The decision to perform the test as well as successful' completion'
of the test is considered conservative action in excess of the regulatory requirements. LER 269/92-18 pertaining to this issue was issued on December 31, 199 The inspectors will review the licensee's planned corrective actions during closure of the LE The inspectors noted that When a Keowee Battery was isolated to remove cells from service, the battery was cross tied to both DC buses IDA and 2DA. The inspectors questioned the practice of cross connecting both emergency DC busses. The inspectors also requested that the licensee supply the calculation that shows that a single battery is capable of emergency starting both Keowee units. The licensee's position is that when'the two DC buses are cross connected with one battery out of service, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action statement pursuant to TS 3.7.2.e.2 is applicable. The inspectors, will review the calculation and determine the adequacy of the practice of cross tying both Keowee DC buses with one battery out of service during subsequent inspection AIT Followup An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was conducted on October 20-28, 1992, to review the October 19 loss of off-site AC power even On October 26, a conference call was conducted during which the licensee summarized their response to the Confirmation of Action letter that was issued on October 2 Following the conference call, Duke Power Company issued a letter dated October 27, regarding enhancements to the Keowee Hydro Station operator's performance during emergency operations. This letter also documented commitments regarding the alignment'of the Keowee auxiliary power systems and the availability of an additional source of power to the Oconee standby busses. The process under way to enhance Keowee operator performance was summarized in the AIT report, NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269, 270, 287/92-2 The resident inspector reviewed the licensee's actions pertaining to this issue. Abnormal Procedure AP/0/A/2000/002, Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Start, was issued on November 12, 1992. Job Performance Measures which establish training objectives and evaluation criteria have been developed. The role and responsi bilities of the Keowee operators were documented in operations Management Procedure 5-2, Duties and Responsibilities of Keowee Station Personnel, which was issued on November 19. The peer assessment to stress Keowee operator watchstanding practices involved stationing a licensed Oconee operator at Keowee until the Keowee operators exhibited adequate performance as determined by Oconee Management. This action is complete. There-were items identified by the Oconee operators that are currently being assessed by management for applicability. The Oconee loss of power abnormal procedure was revised to include guidance for recovery from a switchyard isolation event. The Keowee organiza tion was realigned to report to Oconee Operations effective November 9, 199 In addition, LER 92-04, pertaining to this event, was issued on November 18. This LER contains additional actions the licensee has completed or plans to complete. The inspectors will continue
to monitor the licensee's actions related to this issue and will address them in the closeout of the LE No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspection of Open Items (92700, 92701 and 92702)
The following open items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspec tion, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate: (Closed) Violation 287/91-03-04:
Failure to Follow Proce dure/Inadequate Control of Maintenance Activitie The Licensee responded to this.violation by letter dated April 8, 199 This violation involved the disconnection/reconnection of wiring during-maintenance activities without proper documentatio The licensee's corrective actions. included the issuance of an I&E communication package for I&E Supervisors to review Maintenance Directives 7.5.3 and 7.5.4, Work Request Completion, with their crew Procedure IP/0/A/0305/013 was revised to include specific signoffs for removing and replacing leads on Reactor Protection System power supplies during maintenance activitie Procedure IP/0/A/0310/023 was revised to include sign-off steps to document the leads which are removed and returned to servic (Closed) Violation 269, 270, 287/91-08-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure and Inadequate Component Identification Resulting in Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventor The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated July 2, 199 An enclosure and a diagram have been added to Procedures PT/1/A/0203/04, PT/2/A/0203/04 and PT/3/A/0203/04 and steps have been added in the body of the procedures to aid in the identification and verification that the correct flanges have bee installed. Procedure MP/O/A/1800/105 has been revised to provide the location and labeling details to help assure verification of the correct component. Flanged connections on other safety systems routinely manipulated have been identified to be:
- LP-19 and 20 suction lines
- Fuel transfer tube cover plates-Reactor cavity flood line blind flange-Hydrogen recombiner (penetration Nos. 60 and 61) suction and discharg These components are included in the following procedures:
MP/0/A/1800/105 MP/0/A/1405/001 MP/0/A/1800/085 MP/0/A/1800/054
OP/2/1102/15 OP/3/1 102/15 These procedures have been revised to include the location and a description of the flange connection. A training package was issued for Station Directive 3.1.6, Station Labeling, which included a description of the limitation and use of electrical elementaries and flow diagram drawings. This training was given to all appropriate maintenance personne Communication packages were also sent to appropriate maintenance personnel explaining the proper use of component verificatio The circumstances associated with the installation *of the flange on valve 3LP-20 in lieu of 3LP-19, as specified, has been reviewed with all operations personnel during crew meetings. Included in these reviews were instructions on proper communication and verification techniques. This event was also discussed with appropriate maintenance and testing personnel. A number of procedures, as noted above, were revised to help assure that flanges will be installed at the correct location for all future testing activitie Stenciled labels have been painted on the Reactor Building wall at the emergency sump for identification of valves LP-19 and LP-2 Operations Manual OMP-4.5, Station Labeling and Control Board Conventions, has been revised to include labeling-requirements for safety related system flanges. Training has been given to appro priate personnel on the new labeling requirement (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 269, 270, 287/91-11-01:
LPI Testing Criteri The licensee has initiated a revision to the existing Oconee Inservice Test (IST) program. The pumps covered by the IST program are to be tested in accordance with the criteria of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWP and the licensee's Oconee IST Progra The revised test requirements for Oconee are outlined in a licensee's Memorandum to File on IWP Interpretations - File N OS-122.06 dated June 18, 199 The IST test procedures are to be revised to conform to these requirement The inspectors reviewed procedure PT/3/A/0203/06A, LPI Pump Test Recirculation, and verified that the procedure had been revised to meet the revised requirements. Previously, this procedure speci fied an acceptable flow rate of 800 to 2300 gpm with a head pressure of 170 psig. The revised test acceptance criteria for flow and flow developed head are:
LPI Flow (Baseline)
Head Pressure (Baseline)
Pump 3A (1192) 1105-1276 gpm (170) 159.5 -
161.5 psig 3B (3000)
3000-3045 gpm (153) 142.5 -
163.5 ps-ig 3C (3000) 3000-3045 gpm (154) 143.5 - 164.5 psig (Closed) Violation 270/91-12-01: Inoperable Flow Instrumen The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated August 13, 199 This violation occurred during the transfer of information from a working copy of a procedure to a final cop To avoid further violations, the Ticensee-has developed guidelines for data collection, -consolidation and transfer of information by I&E personne This information was incorporated into the Contin uing Training Program which has been given to the Oconee plant staf (Closed) Violation 287/91-12-02: Failure to Follow Procedure The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated August 13, 199 The violation involved a failure to follow procedures while sluicing the "A" Core Flood Tank to the "B" Core Flood Tank. The licensee performed a subsequent operability evaluation which determined that the Core Flood Tanks were operable during this sluicing operation. However, to prevent recurrence, procedure OP/1,2,3/A/1104/01 was revised to provide additional guidance for the operators-. These revisions will help assure future sluicing operations will be performed in accordance with the procedure. For the performance cited in the violation, the sluicing operation was not performed in accordance with the procedure and a procedure change request was not initiated or approved prior to the sluicing operatio (Closed) Violation 269, 270, 287/91-30-01:
Inadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Operability Concern The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated February 6, 1992. The violation was related to the-failure to revise the Letdown Storage Tank (LDST) operating curve after it was found to be non-conservative by the licensee's Design Basis Documentation review program. Corrective actions to the violation included issuing a new LDST pressure versus level curve which is based on revised design calculations. This curve has been added to the Operating Procedure Items identified during future Design Basis Documentation (DBD) reviews will be included in the Commitment Index as soon as the DBD is completed. Open items from previously completed DBDs have also been added to the Commitment Inde The inspector reviewed the Commitment Index dated November 30, 1992, and verified that the list included items from the completed DBD review (Closed) Violation 269, 270, 287/91-31-02: Failure to Follow Requirements of Station Directive 3. The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated February 18, 1992. The violation involved removing radioactive/contaminated asphalt material from the Protected Area prior to being surveyed for'contamination. The asphalt which was removed from the Protected Area was surveyed and the asphalt found to be contaminated was returned to the Protected Area for proper disposa The contaminated asphalt remaining at the job site in the Protected Area was put in containers for proper disposa This contaminated material was scheduled to be buried prior to December 31, 199 Contaminated asphalt located in high traffic areas within the Protected Area has been removed and, as noted above, will be properly disposed of. Contaminated asphalt in other locations has been roped and posted with signs warning workers to notify the Radiation Protection (RP) group before removing material'from these areas. All vehicle drivers are required to notify RP prior to loading and removing contaminated or potentially contaminated materials from the Protected Are Station Directive 3.3.2 has been revised to better define the licensee's responsibility for RP~notification.and removal of contaminated or potentially contaminated material from the Pro tected Area. The Radiation Protection Section Manual has been updated to indicate locations within the Protected Area that contain potential sources of radioactive materia This. incident has been incorporated in the Oconee Nuclear Site Staff Notes and will be presented during the annual employee training for a duration of one yea (Closed) Unresolved Item 269, 270, 287/91-31-03:
Control of Contaminated Materia The item was evaluated by the Region II Radiation Protection Section. For details refer to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-269, 270, 287/92-0. (Closed) Violation 287/91-34-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated March 12, 1992. The violation involved the improper use of the Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV) to control secondary pressure during cooldow Procedure OP/1102/10 for all three units has been revised to preclude using the TBVs in the automatic mode as an option for RCS cooldown. Training package 92-12 has been' issued to address this change. This training package has been reviewed by the licensed operation's staf (III)
14 (Closed) Violation 287/91-34-02:
Inadequate Installation and Inspection Procedure The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated February 13, 1992. This violation involved the inadequate installation of compression type fittings which resulted in the release of approximately 87,000 gallons of reactor coolant water into the reactor building. The corrective action initiated included an inspecti6n of all compression fittings on tubing connected to the RCS and related HPI and Core Flood Systems to verify correct installation. This has been completed on Units 2 and 3 and is scheduled to be completed on Unit 1 during the refueling outage which began on December 3. Procedure IP/0/A/0075/012, Procedure for Installation of Instrument Line Tube Fittings, has been developed to provide appropriate installation instructions for future installation activitie Appropriate licensee staff personnel have been trained to the requirements of this procedur The instrument lines for the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) have been evaluated and where possible, a configu ration using fewer compression type fittings will be incorporated for all three unit (Closed) Violation 269,270,287/92.-03-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure for Power Alignmen The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated May 8.,
1992. The violation involved connecting the Oconee Standby Busses to the Lee Station switchyard rather than an isolated Lee gas turbine as required by the TS. The licensee placed the breakers in the correct alignment as soon as the degradation was realize Procedure OP/0/A/1107/03 has been revised to include specific steps describing the alignment conditions of the standby busse Classroom training has been provided to all licensed operators on the correct use of procedures and the process for determining whether a procedure step is not applicabl.. (Closed) Violation 269/92-03-03:
Instrumentation Improperly Returned to Servic The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated March 25, 1992. The violation involved returning the reactor coolant makeup pump pressure and flow instruments to service without the test tees being properly tightened. The individuals involved with this violation were counseled and appropriate disciplinary action was administered. This incident, involving.poor work practices in returning test tee caps to the normal position, was covered in I&E training. Training on component verification and independent verification were also given to the I&E staff during.Continuing Training Cycle 92-0 Procedure MP/0/A/1720/10, System/Component
Hydrostatic Test, Enclosure 13.3, has been revised to require tee caps to be removed during isolation of the instrumentatio (Closed) Violation 270/92-03-04:
Inadequate Control of Maintenance Activitie The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated March 25, 1992. This violation involved the improper documentation of the disconnection/reconnection and replacement of electrical wiring during-maintenance activities. The licensee's corrective actions included the issuance of a work request to replace the jumper that was installed. Engineering personnel reviewed the test data and found that Valve 2HP-26 had not been damaged. Formal counseling was given to the two I&E technicians involved with these work activities. Procedure IP/O/A/011A, Testing Motor Operated Valves Using VOTES, has been revised to precisely describe what maintenance may be done under the VOTES test work request. Also, maintenance instructions and maintenance documentation requirements have been added to the procedure and training on the procedure changes has been given to appropriate personne (Closed) Violation 269/92-11-01: Unit 2 Estimated Critical Rod Position (RCP) Procedure Used to Startup Unit The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated July 8, 1992. The licensee's corrective actions included calculation and verification of the Unit 1 ECP by using the Unit 1 reactivity curves. The shutdown margin available was calculated and found to be adequate. Reactivity curves have been placed in unit specific color coded notebooks. Working copies of Reactivity Balance Procedures have been placed into working copy file cabinet Other procedures and data books in the Units 1 and 2 Control Room were evaluated for the possibility of using the wrong unit's procedure. The only other items considered a potential problem were the Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures. The Emergency Procedures were placed in a red binder and the Abnormal Operating Procedures were placed in a blue binder. The personnel involved in this event were counseled concerning their method.of using the correct procedure. This incident has been discussed with all licensed operator (Closed) Violation 269, 270, 287/92-15-02:
Both.Keowee Units Inoperabl The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated September 17, 1992. Both of the Keowee Hydro Units were inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> on July 16-17, 1992, with th volt standby busses not energized by a Lee gas turbine as required by the Technical Specifications. One Keowee unit was out of service for modification implementation and the'other unit was'.
discovered to be out of service due to a blown fuse. The corrective action included replacing the blown fuse and restoring
Unit 2 to service. To avoid further violations, the Keowee Breaker Status Checklist has been revised to include additiona breaker and indicator status for each breake' and to provide operationalguidance-on abnormal conditions. iAlso, procedure OP/O/A/2000/043, Keowee Shift Turnover and Rounds, has been issued. This procedure covers all areas of the station and provides a section for each shift to list any items out of norma All Keowee operations personnel have been trained to this procedure as well as to the time restraint requirements of the Oconee Technical Specifications. The I&E staff investigated the cause of the fuse failure and found indications, although not fully conclusive, of a possible degraded fuse conditio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Review Of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied,.and the relative safety significance of each event. The following LERs are closed:
LER 269/91-04 Technical Inoperability of an Emergency Electrical Power Path Due to Incorrect Relay Setpoint Results from Inappropriate Action LER 270/91-03 Excessive Letdown Storage Tank Pressure for Unknown Reason Makes High Pressure Injection System Inoperable LER 270/91-04 Breach of Fire Barrier Due to Unknown Cause Results in Technical Specification Violation No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 11, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of.the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph URI 50-269, 270, 287/92-30-01 Inadequate HPSW Flow to TDEFW Pump Oil Coolers (paragraph 3.b).