IR 05000269/1992007

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Insp Repts 50-269/92-07,50-270/92-07 & 50-287/92-07 on 920210-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Snubber Surveillance Program,Reactor Bldg Secondary Shield Wall Tendon Surveillance Program & Previously Inspected Items
ML16148A620
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/1992
From: Blake J, Lenahan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML16148A619 List:
References
50-269-92-07, 50-269-92-7, 50-270-92-07, 50-270-92-7, 50-287-92-07, 50-287-92-7, NUDOCS 9203180027
Download: ML16148A620 (5)


Text

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tG UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-269/92-07, 50-270/92-07, and 50-287/92-07 Licensee:

Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:

Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted:

February 10-14, 1992 Inspector:

a1 X

J. 3. Lenahan Date Signed Approved by:

Material d Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of the snubber surveillance. program, the inservice inspection program, the reactor building secondary shield wall tendon surveillance program, and licensee action on previous inspection finding Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Management involvement was evident through well defined procedures and assignment of priorities in the ISI, tendon surveillance and snubber surveillance program A weakness was identified in the licensee's corrective action program regarding the lack of a long term solution to the numerous deficiencies being identified on pipe supports during ISI activitie PDR ADOCK 05000269

REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • H. Barron, Station Manager
  • T. Cole'an, ISI Engineer
  • W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
  • F. Linsley, Civil Engineer
  • B. Millsap, Manager Component Engineering
  • M. Patrilck, Regulatory Compliance
  • S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance
  • T. Royal, Supervisor, Component Engineering Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors P Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector B Desail, Resident Inspector K. Poertner,.Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2. Reactor Building Secondary Shield Wall Tendon Surveillance Program Unit 2 (61701)

The inspector examined procedures, observed work activities, and reviewed quality record related to surveillance of tendons in the Unit 2 reactor building secondary shield wal The secondary shield wall is constructed with removable, precast, reinforced concrete blocks, prestressed with horizontl and vertical tendons which provide the strength to resist postulat d design loads. The criteria for the surveillance inspection is contained in Duke Power Design Specification OSS-011F.00-00-0001, Specific tion for Reactor Building Secondary Shield Wall Post-Tensioning Tendon Surveillanc The inspector examined procedure number MP/O/A/1400/21, Revision 10, Tendon-Secondary Shield Wall Surveillanc This procedure, based on the design specification, specifies the surveil lance requirements and acceptance criteria for the secondary shield wall tendon The inspector witnessed stressing operations for determination of the '1ft-off (prestress) force in horizontal tendon SW-H65, detension ing of the tendon for replacement of the shims, and retensioning of the tendon. IThe licensee was replacing the shims for this tendon with special tapered shims to assure bearing of the stressing washer on the shim stac The stressing washer was not flush with the anchor head on the tendo This problem is documented in Problem Investigation Report (PIR)

2-092-0029. The licensee fabricated the tapered shim to replace the

cricirl shim The inspector also examined the anchor head and stressino washers on the north end of tcrdons SSW. H54 H58,.and H6 Two of thesE tendon anchor head assemblies had visible surface corrosion which was identified as corrosicr level 3. The licensee documented this problem on PIR 2-092-0026, prior to. the inspectio The irsp.Cctor examined quality records which document the tendon lift-off forces measured in the follcwing Unit 2 tendons:

SWV1, V3, V4, VF, V7 ard V8, and SWH 10, 15, 16, 19 29, 35, 45, and 4 The measured lift-off forces met the acceptance criteri The inspector also examined the tendon stressino ram calibration record Within the areas inspected, deviations or violation were not identifie. Snubber Surveillence Proaram, Unit 2 (70370)

The inspccor exa'ineo the results of functionl tests performed on Unit 2 snubbed Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are specified in Technical Specification 3.14 and 4.1 The onsite functional testine is performed in accordance with Prke Powc-r Procedure.MP/0/A/3018/09A, Functidnal lesting of Hydraulic Snubbcr The mechanical snubbers are tested at the Catawba Nuclear Statio All snubbers testeo met the functiori testing acceptance criteria; The licensee has purchased a state-of-the-art test

'erch and will perform testing stat 0 1perorm ingof mechanical snubbers onsite in future refueling outags,.

Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie. Inservice Inspectior Prcgra. - Units 1, 2, and 3 (73753)

The inspector examinEc-procedures and quality. records related to, the inservv icc inspection (ISI)

program for safety-related pipe supports. The applicable code for 1SI is the Arerican Society of Mechanical Enireers (ASE[') Failer and Pressure VEssel CCde,Section XI, 1980 edition throuch winter 1980 addend The 151 exam-s were conducted by Duke personne a. Peiepw of ISI Program/Procedures, Units 1,.2 and 3 The inspector examined the following procedures which control IS1 activities:

(1) Procedure QAL-13, ISI Visual Examination, VT-1 (2) Procedure QAL-14, IST Visual Examination, VT3 and VT4 (3) Procedure QCL-5, Control of Preservice and Inspection Inspection Act ivities (4) Procedure NDE-B, Training, Quaification, and Certification of NDE Personne The lnspeto vc t ed the procedures were consistent with regulatory requ1 remeis aid licensee commitments, contaired sufficient insiructions fur perforrrrce of exams/inspections, and specified inspectie acceptance criteri b. Review of ISI Records, Units 1 and 2 The inspector reviewed the ISI examination reports compiled for the supports.examined under the ISI prcoram for Unit 1 during the Fall 1991 refuelinc cutage and for Unit 2 during the current refuelincg cutoc A large number of discrepancies continue to be identified during the ISI visual examinations of pipe support The discrepancies are docu;nntec on Forrr QAL-14A, ISI Visual Examination VT-3 ar!

VT-P Pargers, as unacceptable indication These forms are transmitted to Desir, Er.cireering for evaluation and dispositio Examples of.problem identified with hancers were missing or undersized welds, incorrect spring car settings, loose locknuts incorrect hanger corficuration, incorrect clearance/caps, ar excLve gapt under baseplate The licensee attributes the large num er of discrepancies to the sampling and inspection techniques utiljzeu whil pe rfcrr rc the IEB 79-14 progra Licensee design

engirseern concluded that all supports except one Unit 1 support were operable in their as-found conditions.. However design engineering did recrrend that some hangers be repaired to restore the original desigr margin, while the harccr sketches are revised for the remaining hangers to reflect t c as built conditions. The ore hancer that was coL(ared inoperable was support number 1-54A-0-435B-DE1O due to damaged/cracked concrete under the baseplat This probler was documte 1rL IC:

G.spiitioreO by PIR 1-GI-C0 The fact that safep+y-relctc-d pipe supports exist in all three units which have different corficuration.than shcwr on the design hanger skctches. and that the licensee has not undertaken sufficient corrective actions to resolve these proble:C, are

. weaknesses in the licensee's n:ir.

tcwhnce corrective action program, which is further discussed in paracraph 5, belo With n the arESS inSpECted, deviations oY violations were not identifie.

Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701)

(Open) U resolved Item 269, 270, 287/91-23-01, Maintenance Corrective Action Program.. During cooldown of Unit 2, prior to the start of the current refueling outage, thermal contraction of the main steam line caused the support for mechanical snubber 2-OIA-0-1441-R1 to pull out of the suppcrting concrete bea The support falure was caused by a locked up wechanical snubbe The probLem was documented on PIR 2-052-002 This prob er had been examined by another Region II inspector during an inspection completed January 31, 1992, documented.in NRC.Inspection Peport rumbers 50-269, 270, and 287/92-0 Review of the problem during that

inspection disclosed tIat the sane problem had occurred in Unit ).

No PIR was written to document the Unit 1 proble Iistead, a Station Problem Report was written and transmitted to Design Engineering tc repair the supcr The solution to the Unit 1 problem was to remove the support, after concluding that it was rot required. however, the other units were not consIdered. During the current inspection, the inspector examined the same Unit 3 support, which is a hydraulic snubbe No problems were identified with this snubber. Licensee engirecrs had not examined the Unit.3 support prior to this inspectio The inspector noted that. concrete had been damaged on embed plates on several main steam lire ireortsi in proximity to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 supports which pulled ou The concrete damage appeared to have occurred several years ag However, the licensee had not made repairs to.the concret In Inspection, Report 92-05, the inspectcr identified the failure of the licensee to writE a PP to evaluate the damaced Uit I support as an Unresolved Ite Pending further review of thEse problems by NRC, the unresolved item will rcn.-r opt The inspector will alsc review the licensee's correctivE aciG;n program regarding the largc number of pipe support deficiencies dentified under the ISI program, and the oesign reanalyzes of these supports 6. Exit Interview The inspcction scope and results were surcorized on January 14, 1992, with those pe sons indicated in pKrecraph The inspector described the areas i i pect.e y arc iscussed 'in de'Li thC irspection result Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were nct received 1fron the licensee.