IR 05000269/1992019
| ML16148A672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1992 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A671 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-92-19, 50-270-92-19, 50-287-92-19, GL-89-08, GL-89-8, IEIN-88-048, IEIN-88-48, IEIN-91-031, IEIN-91-31, NUDOCS 9209220120 | |
| Download: ML16148A672 (20) | |
Text
68 8 GUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/92-19, '50-270/92-19 and 50-287/92>19 Licensee:
Duke Power Company P.O. Box 1007 Charlotte, N.C. 28201-1007 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47, and 50-287 and DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: August. 10-14, 1992 Inspector: KleinsoX e Date Signed Reactor Inspector Inspector:
mes Col Date Signed Reactor Inspe or Approved by Tlake, Chief Date Signed Maerials and Processes Section E gineering Branch Division of. Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted onsite in th areas of Inservice Inspection (ISI).
In addition the following areas were examined:
Review of radiographic film packages for; piping modifications and replacements, Followup on-NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-08 "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning";
NRC Information Notices (IN) : 88-48 "Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Valves " and 91-31 "Nonconforming Magnetic Particle (14AM) Prepared Bath."
9209220120 920909 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR
Results:
In each of the areas examined the inspectors discovered that nondestructive test (NDE) examiners were conducting conservative examinations in accordance with the appropriate test procedur NDE procedures were also noted to be very deta'iled, well organized and technically effective.in implemehting the applicable code requirements. Supervisors, engineers, and NDE examiners contacted during this inspection were very knowledgeable in their areas of responsibility!.
One violation: "Failure to Follow Problem Investigation 'Process Procedure For Documenting and Resolving Discrepancies Identified by Vendor"-Paragraph 3, and one unresolved item: "Failure of Vendor to Document Geometrical Reflectors" Paragraph 2.c. were identified. -The inspectors noted that although vendor discrepancies were.subsequently identified either. by the vendor or the licensee, plant personnel appeared to be reluctant-to document the problems using the two tier Problem Investigation Process. Discrepancies therefore, tend to be corrected withou the root cause being identified, evaluated, and the total problem corrected. Discrepancies were noted in the licensee's procedures and practices for the storage of radiograph It appears that the licensee has established an effective program to maintain high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall thickness limit The licensee has taken appropriate actions in response to IN 91-31. The actions taken in response to IN 88-48 address only safety related'valves, an analysis which misses the main thrust of the IN which predominantly discusses non safety related valve.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. Bibb,-UT Examiner
- T. Coleman, ISI Coordinator/Compliance Engineer
- C. Freeman, NDE Supervisor
- Karriker, Component Engineering
- M. Patrick, Regulatory Compliance
- B. Peele, ONS Engineering
- Perry,. Regulatory Compliance
- R. Pettit, ISI Outage Support
- M. Sills, ONS Engineering Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Desai
- K. Poertner
- Attended exit intervie Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Inservice Inspection (ISI)
The inspectors reviewed documents and records, and observed activities, as indicated below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitment The applicable code for ISI, for Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3, is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition with Addenda through Winter 1980 (80W80).
Unit 1 is operating, in the fourteenth fuel cycle, of the third 40 month period, of the second ten.year ISI-interval (P3,I2).
Unit 1 received its operating license.on February 6, 1973 and commenced commercial operations on July 15, 1973. Unit 2 is operating, in the thirteenth fuel cycle, of the third 40 month period, of the second.ten year ISI interval (P3,12).
Unit 2 received its operating license October 6, 1973 and commenced commercial operations on September 9, 1974., Unit.3 has completed the thirteenth fuel cycle, and is in the second outage of.the third 40 month period, of the second ten year ISI interval (P3,I2).
Unit 3 received its operating license July 19, 1974 and commenced commercial operations on December 16, 197 The licensee's
nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel are performing the liquid penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT),
ultrasonic (UT) radiographic (RT) examinations under the umbrella. of.the Duke Power Company (DPC) Quality Assurance (QA) program. Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) is acquiring eddy current (EC) examination data and performing the primary data analysis of that data, for the Steam. Generator (S/G)
tubing examinations, under the umbrella of the B&W QA program. Secondary data analysis is bein4 performed by DPC augmented by personnel provided by Zetec and B& ISI Program Review, Units 1 and 2 (73051)
The inspectors reviewed the following documents relating to the ISI program to determine whether the plan had been approved by the licensee and to assure that procedures and plans had been established for the applicable activities. Documents were reviewed for technical conten Documents Reviewed ID Revision Title Unit 3 ISI Plan for Outage 2 Period 3, Interval 2 Unit 3 Steam Generator Inspection Plan for Outage 2 Period 3, Interval 2 QA-102 (R6)
Storage of Special Processed Records QA-113 (R9)
Procedure for Microfilming Records QA-116 (R12)
Quality Assurance Records Collection, Storage, and Retention QA-13 (R8)
Control of Inspection Plans and Reports QA-514 (R3)
Procedure for Discrepancies Found During Inservice Inspection Visual Examination of Supports (ONS and MNS-only)
QA-516 (R6)
Evaluation of ISI Indications
Documents Reviewed (Cont.)
ID Revision Title QA-518 (RI)
Administrative Guide for Resolving Differences During the Review of Eddy Current Data QCL-5 (R11)
Control of Preservice and Inservice Inspection Activities Relative to the review of documents indicated above the inspectors noted the following:
American National Standards. Institute (ANSI)
standard ANSI N45.2.9-74, "Requirements for Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants" requires special processed records (such as radiographs, photographs, negaives, microfilm, and magnetic media eg. audio and video tapes and computer diskettes) which are light sensitive, pressure sensitive or temperature sensitive be packaged and stored in accordance with, manufacturers recommendations. DPC procedure QA 102 acknowledges radiographs, photographs and negatives, but only requires a bi-annual review of radiographs (to identify the early stages of deterioration).
No review (to identify the early stages of deterioration) is required or recommended to be made for the other special processed record o DPC procedure QA-102, specifies the storage environmental conditions for radiographs as a temperature range of 50'F to 90*F with the maximum temperature for extended periods not to exceed 75'F and relative humidity within the range of 30%
to 60%.
This is not consistent with Kodak (the licensee's radiographic film manufacturer)
reference catalog Fl-3 "KODAK Products for Industrial Radiography", dated 4/91, which states that "Processed radiographs should be stored at 60 to 80*F (16 to 27.C), and 30 to 50 percent relative humidity." At the time of this inspection the basis forthe 30% to 60% relative humidity range specified in QA-102 could not be determine Storage of special process records is further discussed in paragraph 2c., Review of NDE Procedures, Units 1 and 2 (73052)
The inspectors reviewed the procedures listed below to determine whether these procedures. were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The procedures were also reviewed for te'hnical conten Procedures Reviewed ID Revision Title NDE-10 (R18)
Radiographic Examination Procedure NDE-25 (R14)
Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure and Techniques NDE-35 (R13)
Liquid Penetrant Examination NDE-C (R4)
Control of Nondestructive Equipmient NDE-600 (R1)
Ultrasonic Examination of Similar Metal Piping Welds in Wrought Ferritic and Austenitic Material B&W-ISI-418 (R7)
Technical Procedure for the Multifrequency Eddy Current Examination of OTSG Tubing.in 177 S/G Using MIZ-18/18A B&W-ISI-430 (R6)
Eddy Current Examination of Sleeved OTSG Tubes B&W-ISI-460 (R15)
Technical Procedure for Evaluation of Eddy Current Data for Nuclear Grade Steam Generator Tubing B&W-ISI-510 (R11)
RPC System Operating Procedure
Relative to the review of procedures indicated above the inspectors noted the following:
The Code of record for ISI at Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 is ASME B&PV Code SectionJXI 80W80. All the B&W procedures reviewed and DPC procedure QCL-5, Table A, discussed in the paragraph above reference ASME B&PV Code Section XI 80W81. Th inspectors reviewed the 80S81 and 80W81 Edition/Addenda and determined that the above indicated procedures are consistent with the committed Code of recor.
All procedures reviewed appeared to contain the necessary elements. for conducting the specific examinatio Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 1' (73753)
The inspectors observed work activities, reviewed certification records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel qualifications for personnel who had been utilized in the ISI examinations during this outage. The observations and reviews conducted by the inspectors are documented belo Activities Observed Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT)
The inspectors observed PT examinations of piping welds listed below. The inspectors performed an independent evaluation of the indications obtained to confirm the NDE examiner's evaluatio Liquid Penetrant Examinations Observed Item No Weld N Size System B09.021.110 3-51A-64-11 2.5"xO.375" High Pressure Injection The inspectors reviewed the,certification documentation for penetrant Batch No.87K043, developer Batch N C17P and cleaner Batch No 92D00 The inspectors reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for PT II examiner WG The examination was performed satisfactoril Magnetic Particle. (MT) Examination The inspectors observed the MT examihation of the welds listed below.' The inspectors performed an independent evaluation of the indications obtained to confirm the NDE examiner's evaluatio Magnetic Particle Examinations Observed Item No Weld N Size, System C05.011.307 3-03A-145-16B 6"XO.432 Emergency Feedwater C05.011.308 3-03A-145-22 6"XO.432" Emergency Feedwater The inspectors reviewed the certification documentation for gray MT powder Batch No.89DO81, and yoke'OCQUA-24 The inspectors reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual acuity documentation for MT-II examiners EDC and WG The inspectors noted the following relative to the MT examinations observed:
ASME B&PV Code Section V Article 7, Paragraph T 733.requires AC and DC Yokes to be calibrated by lifting.10 and 40 Lbs weights respectively. The notion of "calibration" infers traceability to standard weights. The AC yoke (OCQA-242) used to perform the examinations above was calibrated 2/28/91-by lifting UT IIW block S/N 78817 DPC records indicate that the calibration was verified 2/28/92 with no test weight specified. No records were available traceable to standard weight certifying that the IIW block or.the unspecified weight used to test the Yoke were 10 Lbs. or greater.. The licensee retested the Yoke-using a 10"Lbs weight traceable to a standard weight just prior to the exit interview and telecopied the supporting documentation to the inspectors at the regional office on 8/17/9 The inspectors have no further questions in this are o Although marginally acceptable contrast was obtained between the gray MT powder and the bright metal-finish of the welds indicated above, significantly better contrast would have been obtained had red or black powder been use o With'the exception of.the issues discussed above
.the examinations were satisfactorily performe Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
The inspectors observed examiners perform equipment, calibrations and ultrasonic examinations for the welds listed.below. The examinations were observed to determine whether approved procedures were being followed, if examination personnel were knowledgeable of the examination method and operation of the test equipment, whether welds were properly scanned, and whether examination results and evaluations of the results were recorded, plotted, and dispositioned correctl The applicable procedure for the, examinations was NDE-600, Revision 1. Personnel and equipment certifications were verified by the inspectors. The following ISI examinations were observed by the inspectors:
Ultrasonic Examinations/System Calibrations Observed Weld Number Item Number Size 3-53A-17-04 **
B09.011.162 10" DIA x 1.0" 3-53A-17-12 **
B09.011.164 10" DIA x 1.0" 3-53A-17-08 B09.011.163 10" DIA x 1.0" 3-53A-17-02 B09.011.161 10" DIA x 1.0" 3PIB2-7 **
B05.050.007 33.5" DIA.x 3" Note: ** Denotes system calibration observed only The inspectors noted the following relative to the UT examinations observed:
o Previous ultrasonic examination data for the 10" diameter welds listed above had not recorded any geometric indications. These examinations had been performed by Babcock and Wilcox examiner During examinations performed on the same welds this outage by Duke Power ultrasonic examiners, counterbore and weld root conditions were recorded as required by Cod Construction radiographs confirmed the geometric reflector However, at the conclusion of.the inspectors' visit the licensee examiners had not identified the vendor discrepancies utilizing the Problem Investigation
Process delineated in Station Directive 4. This item was identified as Unresolved Item 50 269,270,and 287/92-19-01,"Failure of Vendor to Document Geometrical Reflectors".
Radiographic (RT) Examination The inspectors reviewed the radiographic film for the welds listed below to determine if the radiographic quality and the evaluation of the examination results were in accordance with the requirements of the approved radiographic procedure (NDE-12 Rev.8).
ISI ITEM N WELD ID N PIPE SIZE E09.001.013 3-03A-146-1 6"DIA. X.432" C05.021.307 3-03-29-WG91D 14"DIA. X.750" C05.021.35 A-3MG-lB-A 26"DIA. X.825" C05.022.004 3-01A-3MG-1B-AL Long Seam The inspectors review of the above film revealed that Duke's radiographic examiners are obtaining high quality radiographs and that evaluation of discontinuities were within Code requirement Eddy Current (EC) Examination The inspectors observed.EC data acquisition activitie associated with the S/Gs, and reviewed the EC examiners qualification and certification, and visual acuity documentation, records of the calibration standards and the certification records for remote data acquisition units, associated with EC data acquisition of the S/G tubing which are indicated below EC Examiner Records Examined WRC EC-II ACM EC-IIA JDM EC-II THM EC-II GDD EC-IIB DRC EC-I KLJ EC-I BLK EC-I RLD EC-II FJE EC-II WPM EC-II DCB EC-II WGK EC-IIB DJH EC-I JCM EC-II RSS EC-II Calibration Standard Records Examined 1217624B 1217625B 1217626B 1191117B 1196042D
.1211014B 1196027B 1196030B 1169724B 1190633B *
1170927B 1189387B
Actual mechanical test data and chemical analysis were not available for the base materials for the calibration standards marked with an asterisk *
Remote Data Acquisition Equipment Certification Records Examined MIZ-18A RDAU VH-1111 MIZ-18A RDAU VH-1114 MIZ-18A RDAU VH-1115 MIZ-18A RDAU VH-1117 MIZ-18A RDAU VH-1119 Data acquisition was performed satisfactoril Radiographic Film Storage The inspectors examined the film storage facilities at the Oconee Nuclear Station for compliance with DPC procedure QA-10 The inspectors made the following observations:
The humidity measured during this inspection in the records storage vault (archival storage), the radiography vault, and the Oconee Office Building sixth floor film reading area (interim inprocess storage) conformed to the requirements of QA-102 but exceeded the manufacturer's recommendations (greater than 50% but less than 60%).
Records indicate that the humidity in the records storage vault has been in excess of the radiographic film manufacturers (Kodak)
recommended.range (30%.to 50%) since October 5, 199 Procedure QA-102 requires temperature and humidity controls be maintained in both interim and archival storage facilitie The procedure provides no guidance other than temperature and humidity range requirement The temperature and humidity in the interim facilities is controlled to suit personnel comfort. No records are available attesting to the temperature and humidity conditions over time in those facilitie Temperature and humidity are measured and documented at irregular intervals in the archival facility as indicated belo Year Number of Measurements 1988
1989
1990
1991
1992 2*
- This includes the measurement taken at the request of the inspector o QA-102 requires a biannual film storage inspection. The last documented film storage inspection was conducted June 2,1987. The 1987 licensee inspection.identified vendor film stored on its side with other film stored on top. The inspection report indicated that film should be stored on its side. The same condition currently exists in the archival facilit The licensee indicated that the vendor radiographs were not indexed to facilitate accurate retrieval without undue delay. The preceding is contrary to ANSI N45.2.9-1974, paragraph As a result of the inspectors examination of the licensee's storage facilities for radiographs, the licensee performed the "Biannual" inspection of the radiographs as required by QA-102. The licensee examined the radiographs for three welds and vendor radiographs for a Bingham pump. The, inspection report identified some moisture damage, which did not appear to be propagating, rating the overall condition as satisfactory. No mention was made of the discrepancies identified by the inspectors listed above. Special process record storage is further discussed i paragraph 2 Code Repairs The inspectors reviewed procedures and reviewed selected quality records associated with the code repair to the wastage identified at Reactor-Coolant system pipe weld 3P1B2-7 at Reactor Coolant Pump 3B The applicable codes for the repair are ASME B&PV Code Sections III and I The repair was controlled by the B&W QA progra The inspectors reviewed B&W traveler 50-1209599-00 and Engineering Record. 1209601-0, the controlling documents for the repai In addition the inspectors reviewed the associated welder qualification certification and
maintenance documents, the Welding Procedure Specification and the supporting Procedure Qualification Test Record, the welding.filler material certified material test reports and weld control reports, the calibration certification documents for the measuring and test equipment, the PT material certification documentation, the PT examination procedure and the qualification and visual acuity documentation for the-PT examiners. 'All aspects of the procedures and records reviewed indicated compliance with procedural and regulatory requirement Data Review and Evaluation Unit 3 (73755)
The inspectors reviewed ultrasonic data for.weld 3SGB WG58-1 on steam generator #3B and weld 3SGA-WG8-1 on steam generator #3 Ultrasonic indications exceeding the acceptance standards had been detected during examinations conducted in 1982 for these welds. The'
weld flaws were determined however, to be acceptable for service without flaw removal or repair based on an evaluation analysis, as described in' paragraph IWB-3600 of Sectibn XI, to the ASME Code. 'Flaw indications that are evaluated and determine to qualify for continued service are required to be re-examined during the next three inspection periods of the inspection progra Steam generator 3A has completed its 3 cycles of re examination and is.presently being examined on the normal 10 year program cycle. Steam generator 3B is presently being examined for the third time during the analysis perio Both welds have experienced differences in recorded data this outage verses previous outages.: These differences.are presently being evaluated by the licensee. However, discussions with the Duke Level III examiner'indicated that the differences noted on steam generator 3B was due to'the fact that a Relief Request (ONS-004) on the calibration block used for the previous examinations had been rejected by NRC because of material differences and the new calibration block was less sensitive. Therefore, the previous data was not comparable. Further discussions-with the Level III Examiner also revealed that he was considering re examining the weld 3 more times to establish whether the indications were growing as a result of servic The inspectors suggested that the licensee discuss using the initial calibration.block for the.third examination, with NRR, in order to make a direct correlation of defect size with previous data and its associated techniques since this calibration block appears to be giving conservative result I
V
The examination differences observed on steam generator 3A were thought tentatively to be due to differences in recording levels (20% verses 50%) and expansion.of the area examine Completed data and evaluations for the above welds will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection planned for this outag Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Review of Radiographic Film Packages For Replacement Piping Welds and Plant.Modifications Units-1, 2, and'3 (57090)
The inspectors examined the radiographic film and records for the welds listed below to determine whether they were prepared, evaluated, disposition, and maintained in accordance with the licensee's approved procedure NDE-10, Rev. 1 Radiographs Examined Weld ID N Size 1-EC-13-1 3.5" DIA. X.120" TH WD-9-1 3.5" DIA. X.120" TH WB-13-1 3.0" DIA. X.120" TH.0" DIA. X.237" TH B-44-37 12" DIA. X.180" TH B-44-38 12" DIA. X.180" TH A-69-69 1.5" DIA. X.281" TH A-134A-24 3" DIA. X.438" TH A-136-22 3" DIA. X.438" TH A-136-23 3" DIA. X.438" TH A-134A-23 3" DIA. X.438" TH EB-12-1 3" DIA. X.120" TH A-69-74 DIA. X.375" TH A-69-75 2.5" DIA. X.375" TH Radiographs Examined (Cont'd)
3-51A-69-71 2.5" DIA. X.375" TH A-69-76 2.5" DI X 375" TH Weld ID N Size 3-51A-69-78 2.5" DIA. X.375" TH A-69-70 2.5" DIA. X.375" TH A-69-77 2.5" DIA. X.375" TH The inspectors review of the above film revealed that the licensee had obtained satisfactory radiographic quality and disposition of discontinuities were properly addresse Examiner certification records for personnel utilized in the above examinations was also reviewed by the inspector However, as a result of discussions with the radiographic supervisor regarding why certain installed relief valves were being radiographed, the inspectors discovered that a vendor (Anderson Greenwood) had notified Duke Power in a letter dated April 21, 1992 that welds in 28 relief valves purchased by Duke in 1990 had not been radiographed as required by the ASME Code. The licensee had made arrangements with Anderson Greenwood to radiograph 'the welds in question and was in.the process of correcting the defec The inspectors requested to see the Part 21 or the Problem Investigation Process Report for this Code violation to determine how this discrepancy had gone through the vendor's inspection program and the licensee's receipt inspection program without being detected, and what, effect the violation would have on plant operabilit The inspectors discovered that the vendor had not issued a Part 21 because they did not consider the problem to be
"significant" and had furnished the licensee some technical justification for their decision. The cognizant engineers for the licensee stated that, a Problem Investigation Process Report (the mechanism used by the licensee to handle discrepancies) had been discussed initially but apparently had fallen through the crack and was not issue The inspectors considered the significance of the defect identified was not only the fact that the welds had not been radiographed, but that the vendor's QA program and the
licensee receipt.inspection program had not identified the problem before the relief valves had been installed in high pressure nuclear systems. The inspectors review of the licensee's receipt inspection activities revealed that the licensee will send a.vendor a Form 930.1A with each procuremen The 930:1A is a Duke Power Company Quality Assurance Department Supplier Quality Assurance Certification Form. The vendor is required to fill this form out and to designate what test,.inspections, and reports are required by the applicable specification and provided with the items procured. The licensee's receipt inspection personnel also use this form to account for the applicable data that the vendor indicates is require The problem with the above system is that there is no independent verification 'of what documentation is require The inspection criteria used by receipt inspection personnel to verify proper'documentation for the item procured, has been designated by the vendor, not the license The proper mechanism by which problems are identified, documented, and responded to with a level of effort and timeliness commensurate with their significance is th Problem Investigation Process (PIP) implemented in Oconee Nuclear Station Directive 4.5.5.- Failure of the licensee to properly implement the requirements of this procedure was identified as Violation 50-269,270,287/92-19-02, "Failure to Follow Problem Investigation Process Procedure For Documenting and Resolving Discrepancies Identified by,.,
Vendor".
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified except as noted abov.
Followup (92701) NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-08:
"Erosion/Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning" This GL requested licensees to provide assurances that a long term Erosion/Corrosion (E/C) monitoring program, consisting of systematic measures to ensure that E/C does not lead to degradation of, single and two phase high energy carbon steel piping system The licensee has established an E/C inspection program which uses Keller. equation calculations, industry experience, and previous inspection data as predictive tools for the determining and prioritizing inspection locations. The licensee is in the process of putting out bids for contractorsto develop a CHECMATE electronic model.for one unit with the intention of
developing the models for the other two units inhous This program is implemented by Nuclear Production Department "Piping Erosion Control P rogram Manual", the unit specific "Piping Erosion Control Manual", and Procedure MP/O/B/3005/006, dated 7/27/92, "Piping Periodic Inspection of Wall Thickness-Preparation and Marking".
The unit specific "'Piping Erosion Control Manual"- contains test result summaries, and the evaluations of results for successive outage testin The manual is updated after every inspection outage and is used to trend each inspection point in the progra The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program, examined marked grids, observed data collection, interviewed'licensee personnel and reviewed inspection data and calculations to evaluate the licensee's E/C program. The inspection sample is selected on an outage by outage basis, based. on the datafrom previous outages. The.licensee's program has, 572 test locations for Unit 3 with approximately the same number for Units 1 and 2. During the refueling outage 13, for Unit 3, approximately 323 test locations will be examined. To date, for Unit 3, the licensee has examined 260 of the 572 test locations in the program, 105 locations have been examined more than once. As a result of the erosion program the licensee has replaced 29 fittings in seven pipe run The replacements were made prior to exceeding minimum wall requirement The grid layout.schemes used by the licensee have been changed a number of times making data trendin difficult at best. The licensee's current gridding scheme deviates from EPRI's recommendations in that for pipe larger than 3-inch, inspections do not'extend two pipe diameters down stream of the component examined or two pipe diameters up stream of diffusers or. expanding elbows being examined,.unless adjacent up or dowh stream components are also examined during the same outag It should be noted that although not consistent with EPRI, the licensee's marking'practices are consistent.with ASME B&PV Code Section XI Draft 5 Subsection IWH dated 10/16/9 Not withstanding the above, it. appears that the, licensee has established an effective program to maintain high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall thickness limit NRC Information Notice (IN) 88-48: "Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Valves."
In this IN and the two associated supplements,' the staff discussed the problem (counterfeit valve) that Pacific Gas and Electric Company found with what they believed-to be a valve manufactured by Henry Vogt Company in a non-safety related (NSR) system.".
The licensee's documentation for this issue indicates that this matter does not apply to Oconee because DPC only buys safety related valves directly from reputable
"N" stamp vendors or has commercial valves refurbished which are subsequently up graded by the original manufacturer. The inspectors indicated that the' above is a commendable practice, but the licensee had missed the point of the IN. The majority of the identified examples were found in NSR applications. While the components listed in the IN do not have specific safety applications, it is plausible for non-safety related valves to have a potentially adverse impact on safety related system The licensee's evaluation did not appear to take this into consideratio The licensee indicated that they would revisit this issue and provide a more definitive closur NRC Information Notice (IN) 91-31:
"Nonconforming Magnetic Particle (14AM) Prepared Bath" This IN transmitted a Magnaflux Notice which recalled three batches of 14AM MT aerosol prepared bath, and included a warning for six other The licensee reviewed their records and determined that they have never received any of the material identified in the IN.,
The licensee has taken appropriate action.in response to this I (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-269,270,287/92-05-01,
"Maintenance Corrective Action on Failed Supports" This item dealt with two primary issues' (1) mixed snubbers (hydraulic/mechanical) werelbeing used.on the same hanger support for main steam piping and (2)
the piping analysis used for the basis of removing snubbers on Unit-1 indicated that the' pipe modeled was 24" :in diameter in lieu of the' 28" piping i stalled in the plan Item 1 was a concern because the hydraulic snubber is a velocity-limiting device while the mechanical is a acceleration limiting devic Duke's design engineers subsequently reviewed the inspector's concern and concluded that, the configuration was consistent with station specifications and procedures in that, although they react somewhat differently, both type snubbers are design to restrain dynamic load Due to the short duration and cyclic nature of seismic loads, the differences in how these snubbers react would not inhibit their ability to restrain the pip Item 2 was identified by the inspector when reviewing an analysis that had been fax to the site for the inspector's. However, a number of the fax pages were found to.be difficult to read and led to inaccurate conclusion The report reviewed did report the fact that 24" pipe had been used in modeling portions of the main steam system initially. But the mistake had been identified and corrected by Duke's design engineerin The removal of the snubbers question by the inspector however, was based.on a 28" pipe model. Calculations were furnished to the inspectors which verified the acceptance for removing the snubber This item is considered close In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were.summarized on August 14, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and the findings listed below. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license (Open) Unresolved Item 50- 269,270,and 287/92-19-01,"Failure of Vendor to Document Geometrical Reflectors" Paragraph (Open) Violation 50-269,270,287/92-19-02, "Failure to Follow Problem Investigation Process Procedure For Documenting and Resolving Discrepancies Identified by Vendor" Paragraph.
Acronyms and Initialisms ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers B&PV Boiler and Pressure Vessel:
.
Babcock and Wilcox EC Eddy Current E/C Erosion/Corrosion EPRI-Electric Power Research Institute GL-NRC Generic Letter ID Identification ISI Inservice Inspection IN NRC Information Notice MT Magnetic Particle NDE
-
Nondestructive Examination:
N Number NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSR
-
Non Safety-Related OTSG
-
Once Through Steam Generator Professional Engineer PT
-
-
Quality Assurance R
-
Revision RPC
-
Rotating Pancake (EC Probe)
S/G
-
Steam Generator U Ultrasonic Testing