IR 05000269/1989028
| ML15224A585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1989 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A584 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-89-28, 50-270-89-28, 50-287-89-28, NUDOCS 8910190049 | |
| Download: ML15224A585 (12) | |
Text
8 RE~o UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4-
REGION II
0t 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos:
50-269/89-28, 50-270/89-28, 50-287/89-28 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38, -47, -55 Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted: -August 20 -
September 16, 1989 Inspectors; P. H. Skinner, Sen/or Resident Inspector Dat6 Slgned L. D Wert, Resideht Inspector Approved by:
_____________________
ktc
~>
M. B. Shymlock') Section Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 3A Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, facility modifications (Unit 2 only), operator license verifications (RAI 89-34),
Electric Power System Self Initiated Technical Audit and Design Basis Documentation Programs review, compliance with ATWS rule review (TI 2500/20), and inspection of open item Results: The inspectors identified two weaknesses during this period. The first is in the area of operations. This weakness is concerned with the lack of an appropriate sensitivity to questions concerning the operability of containment isolation valves. This was identified during review of Licensee Event Report (LER)
287/89-03: Post Maintenance Leak Rate Test of Containment Isolation Valve Missed Due To Inappropriate Actio This report identified that several different Operations shifts had failed to recognize a containment isolation valve as potentially inoperable despite indications of faulty operatio The second weakness was noted in the maintenance area and is associated with procedural issues during hydrostatic testin The inspectors attended the Oconee Electrical Power System Self Initiated Technical Audit (SITA) exit meeting. The licensee continues to dedicate significant resources and talent in the SITA and Design Basis Documentation (DBD) analysis program REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager D. Couch, Keowee Hydrostation Manager
- B. Barron, Assistant Station Manager C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
- D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer
- E. Legette, Compliance Engineer
- H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group
- B. Milsaps, Maintenance Engineer G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors:
- P.H. Skinner
- L.D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie.
Plant Operations (71707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument &
electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekend Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Unit 3 Penetration Room Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Room Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1/2 Spent Fuel Pool Room Intake Structure ISFSI Construction Site Keowee Hydro Station Switchyard Relay House During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 -
Unit One reduced power to 40 percent on August 20 to add oil to the 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).
It was returned to 100 percent power on August 2 On September 9 power was again reduced to add oil to the 1B2 RCP. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on September 1 During an inspection the licensee personnel identified a very small cil leak (about one gallon per week estimated) on the pum The licensee is planning a short duration shutdown to correct this problem presently scheduled for the week of September 1 Unit 2 -
Unit two operated at 100 percent power from the beginning of this reporting period until September 5 when power was reduced to 60 percent to repair a minor leak on the B main feedwater pump turbine oil syste The repairs were made and the unit returned to 100 percent on September 7. On September 12 the unit experienced a reactor runback to about 45 percent due to a blown fuse in the Safety Rods Group Out circuit which caused-the Integrated Control System to receive a false indication that the safety control rods were not fully withdraw The problem was corrected and the unit returned.to 100 percent the same da Unit 3 -
Unit three operated at 100 percent full power during the entire reporting perio II
5 Failure Of A 4160 Volt Breaker To Function During the most recent outage on Unit 2 which commenced May 19, 1989, the licensee identified, during testing, a 4160 volt breaker that would not clos A review of this failure identified. that the lubricant used in the charging spring (used to provide the motive force for closing) had solidified which prevented the spring from being charge This specific breaker was a non-safety related breake Since similar breakers are used in safety related applications and Units 1 and 3 were operating, the licensee inspected each breaker to determine operabilit Engineering also evaluated the effect of a loss of each safety related breaker for a failure due to the hardened greas The conclusion reached was that the breakers, if the springs were charged (this is the normal state if the breaker is open), would close the breaker as required. This was confirmed by discussions with the breaker manufacturer (Asea Brown Boveri ABB).
In addition, the licensee identified that a 10 CFR 21 report had been filed by D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant on March 3, 1989, concerning contaminated' lubricant on the operating mechanisms to two 5HK250 circuit breakers resulting in their failure to close on command and perform their safety related functio Discussions identified that although the instruction manuals imply that lubrication during normal service life is not required, the manuals do discuss that cleaning and lubrication would be necessary if the lubricant becomes contaminate The procedure for Oconee has been revised to require periodic lubrication of all 4160 and 6900 V breaker No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequac The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed wor The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
IP/O/A/0253/05A RB Hydrogen Sampling System (Train A) Monthly Check PT/O/A/0600/15 Control Rod Drive Movement Test IP/1,3/B/0340/02 Control Rod Drive Power Supply Checks PT/2/A/0150/22A Operational/Refueling Valve Functional Test PT/3/A/0203/06 LPI System Performance Test PT/O/A/0150/22D Individual Valve Functional Test No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
a. Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed. by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 054509H Hydrostatic Testing of Unit 3 Low Pressure Injection Piping WR 21102C Investigation of Keowee Unit Emergency Start WR 054508 Hydrostatic Testing of Unit 3 Low Pressure Injection/Reactor Building Spray System WR 023613C 3LWD-1 failed to close No violations or deviations were identified b. Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System Hydrostatic Testing On September 14, 1989, the inspector observed portions of hydrostatic testing of the '3B' LPI system. The testing was being performed for ISI routine testing requirement Under Work Request (WR) 054508, Maintenance Procedure MP/O/A/1720/10:
System/Component Hydrostatic Test Controlling Procedure, was being utilized to conduct the tes The testing had been interrupted due to problems with gagging of relief valve 3LP-27 (LPI suction relief).
After problem resolution the test had been restarted. Review of the procedure and discussions with the hydro pump operators disclosed that no written procedure had been utilized to restart the test. Additionally, several restoration steps in MP/O/A/1720/10 had been completed and signed off including
removal of the gagging device on 3LP-27 and positioning of a valv This left the operators with an inadequate restoration procedure to return the system to normal after the retes The inspector noted that Enclosure 13.10 of MP/O/A/1720/10 which was specifically intended to be utilized for a "retest" was not completed at al The testing was being performed under a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in accordance with TS 3.3.2. The inspector's primary concern was that an improper restoration could cause the LCO to be exceeded and the LPI/RBS 'B' train to be out of service for a longer tim The workers stated that their supervision had been informed that they did not have specific written procedures to restart the test but apparently due to a misunderstanding, no additional guidance was provided to them. The inspector noted several other problems with the procedure including the enclosure designating electrical breakers to be tagged out not properly complete in April 1989, the inspector had observed portions of hydrostatic testing of the '2B'
Several problems were noted at that time including incorrect calculation of Corrected Test Pressure, administrative errors on the WR, and several failures to follow procedure In that instance the work had been interrupted due to problems in completely filling the LPI lines that were to be teste The system had been returned to service by completion of a modified valve checklist and completion of some other step However, no restoration steps in MP/0/A/1720/10 had been signed off, the procedure had simply been stopped at the system fill ste Upon investigation the inspector found that all necessary actions to restore the system had in fact been performed but not in accordance with the procedure and had not been signed of Additionally, the testing had been restarted without formally completing the initial steps of the procedure. Management indicated that the workers were not performing the work as expected and that they failed to follow procedure by not performing the restoration steps as require Since this latest issue closely parallels the earlier example, the inspectors again expressed concern that the workers were not formally utilizing written procedures to control such work, especially when operability of safety related components directly depends on proper performance of restoration step The safety significance of this item is diminished due to the fact that no significant mistakes in the actual performance of the work were note Apparently the experience of the work crew involved and close interaction between operations staff was sufficient to prevent major error After discussion with the inspectors, licensee management agreed that in addition to the steps taken to correct some of the earlier problems, more corrective action would be necessar Inspector Followup Item IFI 269,270,287/89-28-01: Hydrostatic Testing Procedural Issues will be utilized to follow the licensees action No violations or deviations were identifie.
Facility Modification -
Installation and Testing (Unit 2 Only)
(37701, 37828)
The inspection completed a review of the mechanisms established by the licensee to control the installation and testing of modifications commenced in the previous inspection period (See IR 269,270,287/89-25).
The following modification was reviewed:
NSM 22450 AK and AL - Update BWST Level Indication to QA1 Several minor administrative errors were identified which were discussed and resolved with the license These errors did not effect the installation, operation or testing of the modificatio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Resident Action Item 89-34, Reactor Operator License Verification Resident Action Item (RAI)
89-34, addressed actions to be taken by the resident inspectors to assure that the licensee had procedures in place to ensure that licensed operators assuming their duties in the control room meet all requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 55 with respect to license requirement The licensee does not have procedures to accomplish this action at Ocone This was addressed at a management meeting conducted between NRC Region II and Oconee management personnel on August 29, 198 Additional details addressing this issue are contained in Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/89-34. The actions requested by RAI 89-34 have been compl ete.
Electrical Power System Self Initiated Technical Audit (SITA) and Design Basis Documentation (DBD) Analysis Programs The inspector attended the SITA formal exit meeting held on September 11, 198 The meeting started with an introduction of the team members and a brief discussion of the audit team classification Then each finding, followup item, observation and recommendation was presented by the member responsible. There was a total of twelve findings (these will require a written response).
The resident inspectors were well aware of five of these issue These items as well as the rest of the twelve findings do not involve unresolved operability issues or directly safety significant issues. There was eight audit followup items (response is not required or prohibited) and nine observations which were also discussed in detai Four recommendations were presente One common link between some of these issues was that the SITA team was concerned that response to engineering studies or problem resolutions was not timely. A formal SITA report will be issued shortl The team apparently did a very thorough analysis overall and did not find many significant problem The inspectors will continue to follow the licensees action During this report period the inspectors observed a training session on Electrical Distribution System issues being presented to a shift of operator This training is being held in response to recent events concerning the Electrical Power Switching Logic (EPSL)
system and the Electrical Distribution System (see IFI 269,270,287/88-15-01). During the presentation the EPSL logic was reviewed by detailed walk throughs -of various scenarios, EPSL related LERs were discussed, the recently proposed TS 3.7 was reviewed, and Electrical System tests were discusse The inspectors noted that the shift was very attentive and asked questions during the presentation. The lecture appeared to be very worthwhil The inspectors will continue to closely follow the DBD analysis program, follow up actions on the SITA, and other corrective actions involving the Electrical Distribution Syste No violations or deviations were identifie.
TI 2500/20:
Inspection To Determine Compliance With ATWS Rule The inspectors reviewed TI 2500/20 which provides inspection requirements pertaining to implementation of the ATWS rule (10 CFR 50.E2) and the Quality Assurance controls applied to ATWS activities which are not safety relate On July 26, 1988, the NRC issued the evaluation of the Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group (BWOG)
generic report "Design Requirements for Diverse Scram System (DSS)
and ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)".
It concluded that most areas of the report provided acceptable guidelines for plant-specific submittals. The SER presented several design requirements which the utilities should follow when considering plant-specific design The primary point of disagreement was an issue of power supply independenc On December 20, 1988, Duke Power Company (DPC) submitted the Oconee DSS/ANSAC Conceptual Design Description and an implementation schedule to the NR On August 30, 1989, the final design description of the proposed Oconee ATWS modification was submitted. A purchase order on the major equipment involved in the modifications has not yet been issue The complete implementation schedule as provided to the NRC is currently August 1991, September 1990 and March 1991, for Units 1, 2, 3 respectivel The inspectors review of the final design description documents did not reveal any problems concerning compromise of the safety features of the existing safety-related protection syste The remainder of the inspection requirements; procurement and installation of the systems, will be completed after the licensee makes more progress on the modification No violations or deviations were identifie II
10 Inspection of Open Items (92702)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate: (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (50-269,270,287/89-08-01) Provide Controls and Guidance to Be Used By Operations Personnel For Use of Valve Operator Aid.-This item was open due to concern by the inspector that no guidance has been provided to operators on use of valve operator aids. One valve recently had been damaged in part due misuse of a valve operator ai Licensee management has reviewed this concern and has issued guidance in Operations Manual Procedure 1-2, Rules of Practice, Revision 8. Based on this action, this item is close (Open)
10 CFR 21: Information on B&W Plugs Fabricated From Heat W592-1 (P 2188-06).
This 10 CFR 21 report was identified in correspondence to the NRC from Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)
dated September 6, 198 Oconee has taken or will take the following actions based on this report and other correspondence with B& For Unit 1 all plugs identified with heat W 592 have been replaced during the most recent outage that was completed in February 1989. A total of 49 plugs were removed and replace For Unit 2 only one plug was identified associated with heat number W 59 This was removed during the outage that concluded in July 198 Unit 3 is presently scheduled to commence a refueling outage November 8, 198 At that time 100% of the rolled mechanical plugs in the upper head area will be inspecte Acceptance Criteria have been established and the plugs will be removed and replaced if the acceptance criteria is not me In addition a sampling of lower tube plugs including ribbed plugs (these are being removed for other reasons) will be removed and sent to an offsite facility for analysis. This sample will include samples from heats W 592 and W 945 (another heat number that B&W has identified with potential problems).
As a result of these issues, the licensee has modified their SG tube inspection program to include a sample of plugs and an inspection of each of these for problem Additional actions will be determined based on the results of these inspection The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's actions for this activit (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-269/88-08: SSF HVAC Service Water Flow Capacity Below The Design Valve For Worst-Case SSF Event Mitigatio This LER was submitted in correspondence dated December 1, 1988. The planned corrective action for this problem was to modify both the SW system and the HVAC system to restore appropriate margin to the HVAC desig During the recent outage conducted on Unit 2, the existing HVAC pumps were provided with new motors (NSM 52764, Rev. 1).
The speed of the motors was doubled (1800 rpm to 3600 rpm) and the horsepower (hp) rating increased from 3 hp to 25 h In addition fans were installed in miscellaneous
electrical equipment cabinets in the Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF).
The increased pump flow has provided satisfactory flow capacity for lake water temperatures as high as 90 degrees Based on this action, this item is close (Closed)
LER 269/89-13: A Reactor Trip Occurred Due To An Inappropriate Action While Resetting Reactor Protective System Trip Setpoint This LER was submitted in correspondence dated September 11, 198 The inspectors have reviewed the LER and the corrective action associated with this proble This problem has been identified as a violation in Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/89-25. Based on this review, this item is close (Closed)
LER 287/89-01: Degraded Capabilities of Unit 3 Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU) Due To Foulin This LER addressed a Unit 3 shutdown in January 1989, in accordance with TS 3.3.5 due to the RBCUs being inoperable. The RBCUs were declared inoperable after performance testing indicated that service induced fouling had reduced the capabilities of the coolers to below required value The testing was being done to verify the operability of the RBCU's due to previous fouling problem Since mid 1987 the licensee has been aware of and attempting to fully resolve these fouling problems (LER 269/87-04, 287/88-03 and Inspection Reports 269,270,287/88-28, 88-35, 89-05 and 89-11 contain information relating to the fouling issue).
The corrective actions for LER 287/88-03: Potential Degraded Performance of RBCU Due to Service Induced Fouling, included periodic testing of all three units RBCUs. While this testing did not prevent the degraded capabilities of the RBCUs addressed by LER 287/89-01, it did result in the discovery of the coolers degradatio Based on the fact that the specific corrective actions for LER 287/89-01 have been completed and LER 287/88-03 remains open until final resolution of the overall cooler fouling issue, LER 287/89-01 is close (Open)
LER 287/88-03: Potential Degraded Performance of RBCU due to Service Induced Foulin The inspectors continued to follow the licensees progress on longterm resolution of the cooler fouling issue (Inspection Report 269,270,287/89-11 contains the latest update.).
Currently the licensee is testing Unit 1 and Unit 2 RBCUs at quarterly intervals and Unit 3 coolers monthly. The licensee has made improvements in their ability to obtain data and perform analysis to determine operabilit Fouling rates continue to be within predicted value Recently the licensee completed Quality Assurance verification of a different analysis program to determine operability (In the past the American Air Filters (AAF) program has been utilized).
Apparently the AAF program contained numerous conservatisms which caused lower valves of cooler performance to be compute The revised program is considered more accurate and thus would allow a higher degree of fouling before cleaning (water side)
is require The inspectors will continue to follow the licensees action.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 19, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 269,270,287/89-28-01 Hydrostatic Testing Procedural Issues