IR 05000261/2002005
| ML022700149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/2002 |
| From: | Shannon M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Moyer J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-005 | |
| Download: ML022700149 (20) | |
Text
ber 26, 2002
SUBJECT:
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-261/02-05
Dear Mr. Moyer:
On August 30, 2002, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2, the enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff during an exit meeting August 30, 2002.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the corrective action program. However, during the inspection, several examples of minor problems were identified related to action request prioritization, one case where corrective action was signed off prior to completion, one case where the root cause investigation was not comprehensive, and some examples of action requests which were rejected in favor of other plant programs which subsequently were not initiated.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
CP&L 2 Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Melvin C. Shannon, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23 cc w/encl: (See page 3)
CP&L 3 cc w/encl:
Chris L. Burton William D. Johnson Director, Site Operations Vice President & Corporate Secretary Carolina Power & Light Company Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution John H. ONeill, Jr.
T. P. Cleary Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Plant General Manager 2300 N. Street, NW Carolina Power & Light Company Washington, DC 20037-1128 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General Terry C. Morton, Manager State of North Carolina Performance Evaluation and Electronic Mail Distribution Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Electronic Mail Distribution Robert P. Gruber Executive Director C. T. Baucom, Supervisor Public Staff - NCUC Licensing/Regulatory Programs 4326 Mail Service Center Carolina Power & Light Company Raleigh, NC 27699-4326 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Public Service Commission State of South Carolina B. L. Fletcher III, Manager P. O. Box 11649 Regulatory Affairs Columbia, SC 29211 Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)
Electronic Mail Distribution Henry J. Porter, Director Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
Dept. of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution Beverly Hall, Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution
CP&L 4 Distribution w/encl:
R. Subbaratnam, NRR RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB PUBLIC OFFICE DRP/RII DRP/RII DRS/RII SIGNATURE gm ah wb NAME GMacDonald:vg GHutto WBearden DATE 9/26/2002 9/24/2002 9/25/2002 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML022700149.wpd
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 50-261/02-05 Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: August 12 - 16, 2002 (Week 1)
August 26 - 30, 2002 (Week 2)
Inspectors: G. MacDonald, Senior Project Engineer A. Hutto, Resident Inspector W. Bearden, Reactor Inspector Approved by: Melvin C. Shannon, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES
IR 05000261-02-05; Carolina Power & Light Company; on August 12 - 30, 2002; H. B.
Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2; baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.
The inspection was conducted by a regional projects inspector, resident inspector, and a regional reactor inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution as evidenced by the inspectors review of maintenance records, site programs, audits, assessments, external operating experience, and through plant tours.
No deficiencies were identified which were not contained within the CAP. Oversight of the CAP was effective with the self evaluation group tracking program completion activities, grading action requests (ARs) to monitor quality, and using performance indicators to track CAP performance. CAP rollup meetings were good at identifying the causes of deficiencies and examining the potential for common causes and trends. Three examples were noted where ARs were rejected to resolve deficiencies outside of the CAP which were subsequently not initiated. The inspectors determined that the licensee generally classified discrepant conditions correctly, but had not yet implemented its plan to incorporate a formal process for using risk significance in classifying / prioritizing ARs. Two examples of incorrect AR classification were noted which were corrected by the licensee. Root cause investigations were generally thorough and corrective actions were appropriate to the root and contributing causes. One case was noted where the root cause was not comprehensive which was identified during the licensees AR effectiveness review. One example was identified where a corrective action assignment was signed off before it had been completed. Licensee audits and assessments were determined to be effective with all identified deficiencies noted to have been included within the CAP. Employee concerns reviewed were properly substantiated and entered into the CAP for resolution. All personnel interviewed felt free to input safety findings into the CAP for problem resolution. The team noted corrective action program ownership at every level and in all plant departments observed.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification
- (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program (CAP) for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed work requests, work orders, maintenance rework data, operating experience items, actions plans, procedure change data, NRC Inspection Reports, and licensee assessments to determine if identified deficiencies were being entered into the CAP.
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns with system engineers and reviewed system health reports, trend reports, system data, and interviewed system engineers to determine if identified system deficiencies had been captured within the CAP.
The inspectors review included the component cooling water (CCW) system, the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and the emergency diesel generator (EDG)system.
The inspectors reviewed CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience(OE) Program, and interviewed the licensees OE coordinator to determine if OE items relevant to the Robinson plant were identified and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed 10 action requests generated as a result of OE from a list of approximately 200 generated in the last 18 months to assess the adequacy of the evaluations and appropriateness of any resulting corrective actions. The sample selected for review is listed in attachment 2.
The inspectors reviewed 13 work orders and 27 Action Requests (ARs) to understand the interface between the work control process and the CAP.
Maintenance rule documentation and maintenance rework data were reviewed. The inspectors also attended daily work control meetings and a maintenance rule expert panel meeting. The review sample is listed in attachment 2.
Selected site programs were checked to determine if program deficiencies were entered into the CAP. The inspectors examined records of the procedure change process, the lubricating oil analysis program and the measuring and test equipment calibration programs.
The inspectors reviewed 27 significant adverse condition ARs, 40 adverse condition ARs, and 13 improvement ARs to determine the licensees threshold for entering problems into the CAP. Selected licensee assessments were reviewed including two Nuclear Assessment Section (NAS) assessments of the CAP, seven Performance Evaluation Section (PES) assessments, and three departmental self-assessments. The effectiveness of assessments were evaluated to determine if the assessments were thorough and comprehensive and identified problems which were entered into the CAP. The administration of the CAP was reviewed through attendance at several CAP rollup meetings and by review of program tracking documents to determine if program oversight was effective and if programmatic trends were identified.
- (2) Issues No findings of significance were identified.
Based on review of deficiencies identified in NRC inspection reports, site programs, operating experience items, selected safety systems, maintenance records, and licensee assessments the team did not identify any deficiencies that were not captured within the CAP. The team determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action system. Licensee assessments were of good depth and identified issues similar to those that were raised during previous NRC inspections. The team determined that the CAP rollup meetings were good at evaluating the causes of deficiencies and examining the potential for common causes and trends. The team noted that the operating experience program was integrated into site activities. The maintenance rule expert panel meeting was thorough and reviewed ARs, corrective actions, goals and the results were appropriate. Oversight of the CAP at Robinson was effective with the self evaluation group tracking program completion activities and using performance indicators to monitor CAP performance. The self evaluation group reviewed and graded action requests to monitor the quality of item resolution within the CAP.
During the review of rejected ARs, the inspectors determined that AR 59157 had no basis for rejection. Review of the item determined that the item was not an adverse condition and rejection was appropriate. The inspectors identified three ARs which had been rejected in favor of fixing the items without tracking the resolution inside the CAP. The inspectors verified that these three issues did not constitute conditions adverse to quality, but were enhancements. AR 47093 was rejected with the issue to be resolved as part of the Pressurizer Relief Tank Action Plan. Later it was determined that this issue was not within the scope of the plan and the plan was revised. AR 50862 was for a drawing error which was to be resolved using the drawing change form (DCF) process. The licensee determined that the DCF had never been generated and wrote AR70012 to capture and resolve the issue. AR 59784 was written for a procedure issue which was to be resolved via the procedure change form (PCF) process. No PCF had been generated for the item and the licensee initiated AR 69914 to resolve the issue. The team determined that the licensee had appropriately resolved the rejected ARs and observed that the review of the rejected ARs showed that items which are planned for resolution outside of the CAP receive less oversight.
b.
Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
- (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed 27 significant adverse condition, 40 adverse condition and13 improvement ARs to evaluate the AR classification and extent of condition determination. The inspectors reviewed the prioritization criteria to determine if plant risk was utilized in the determination of AR classification. The ARs reviewed are listed in attachment 2.
- (2) Issues No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors identified two examples where ARs were not correctly classified. The first example involved an AR written as a result of a repetitive functional failure of the service water booster pump motors. This AR was classified as a priority 2 adverse condition report where CAP-NGGC-200, Attachment 1 specifies that a priority 1 significant adverse condition report should have been written. This AR did have attributes of a priority 1 AR such as a root cause investigation, corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence, and an effectiveness review scheduled; therefore, the mis-classification only had significance from a trending standpoint.
The second example of incorrect AR classification involved a personnel contamination event where a hot particle was detected by the west entrance/exit portal monitor as this person attempted to leave the protected area. The AR was originally classified as a priority 2 adverse condition report but subsequently downgraded to an improvement AR based on an incorrect conclusion from the investigation that no adverse condition existed and no further action was required.
The original investigation did not explore how the individual originally became contaminated. Both ARs were reclassified by the licensee.
The previous problem identification and resolution (PI&R) inspection, NRC IR 50-261/01-02, documented that the licensee did not have a formal process for using risk significance when classifying/assigning prioritization of ARs within the CAP. The licensee had previously done benchmarking visits and was tracking this item under AR 28195. This issue was an improvement item listed in the Robinson 2001-2003 Business Plan Initiative for the self evaluation group. There has been no change in this activity since the last PI&R inspection and the item is still carried as a business plan improvement item under the same AR.
c.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
- (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 27 significant adverse condition (priority 1) ARs, and 40 adverse condition (priority 2) ARs out of the approximately 3000 ARs that had been issued between March, 2001 and August 2002. The significant adverse condition ARs were evaluated to review the adequacy of the root cause investigation and to determine if corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR) and corrective actions were appropriate to the root and contributing causes and had been adequately resolved. The adverse condition ARs were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the apparent cause and if the corrective actions were appropriate to the apparent cause and had been adequately resolved.
- (2) Issues No findings of significance were identified.
The team noted that one significant adverse condition AR, AR 31337, related to the lifting and failure to reseat of CCW relief valve CC-715, had an incomplete root cause investigation. The investigation focused on why the valve failed to reseat but did not explore why the relief valve lifted, and CAPR was not determined to address the cause of the relief valve lifting. This deficiency in the investigation was noted by the licensee during the effectiveness review of the AR and a corrective action item assignment was added to review the relief valve lifting aspect of this significant AR.
The inspectors noted that significant AR 58980 regarding environmental qualification (EQ) of taped motor splices had corrective action signed off that had not been fully completed. This raised a concern regarding the EQ of the motor splices for the RHR, containment vessel (CV) spray, and safety injection (SI) pump motors. The corrective action was to determine the type of splice utilized, determine the EQ adequacy of the splices and appropriately document the results within the plant EQ program documents. The corrective action assignment had been signed off without properly completing the assessment and documentation. The inspectors reviewed the following documents and verified that there was no EQ operability concern for the RHR, CV Spray, and SI Pump motor splices:
- Engineering Service Request (ESR) 95-0670, Revison 0, Evaluate The Splice Requirements For RHR Motor Leads
- Engineering Change (EC) 48984, Revision 0, Evaluation Of Splice Requirements For RHR Pump Motors
- Procedure TMM-036, Revision 16, Environmentally Qualified Electrical Equipment Required Maintenance
- Procedure CM-303, Revision 17, Installation Of Environmentally Qualified Or Safety Related Taped Splices
- Drawing HBR2-11260 sheet, 1 of 8, Revision 4, Zone Map For Environmental Parameters Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 226'-0" The corrective action item assignment was reopened and the licensee initiated AR 70037 for resolution.
d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
- (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed the employee concerns database and examined the evaluation of the following five items: 41560, 41824, 41748, 41504, and 41801. The inspectors reviewed the items to evaluate the dispositioning of the concerns. The team interviewed site personnel, including both workers and supervision from operations, maintenance, and engineering to determine if there was any hesitancy to using the CAP for problem resolution or any indication of any chilling effect or reluctance to report safety concerns.
- (2) Issues The inspectors determined that the samples reviewed were properly substantiated and entered into the CAP for resolution. All personnel interviewed were comfortable writing ARs and using the CAP system for problem resolution. No hesitancy to using the CAP system was noted and no safety-conscious work environment concerns were noted. The team noted CAP program ownership at every level and in all plant departments observed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
- M. Bowskill, Performance Evaluation Section
- C. Burton, Director of Site Operations
- B. Clark, Site Support Services Manager
- T. Cleary, Plant General Manager
- J. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- R. Fuller, Nuclear Assessment Section Manager
- R. Ivey, Operations Manager
- K. Kirks, Employee Concerns
- J. Moyer, Vice President Robinson Nuclear Plant
- E. Rothe, Maintenance Manager
- D. Statile, Licensing Engineer
- D. Stoddard, Robinson Engineering Support Services Manager
- B. Toney, Self Evaluation Supervisor
- S. Weise, Training Manager
- S. Wheeler, Lead Self Evaluation Specialist
- D. Winters, Supervisor Plant Support Group
NRC
- M. Shannon, Acting Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
- B. Desai, Senior Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Significant Action Requests (Priority 1)
58980 Non-EQ Splice On The B RHR Pump Motor
289 Failure Of HRA Boundaries By Scaffolders
30704 Discovered Increased Dose Rates In B RCP Pump Bay
30657 Formation Of Nitrogen Bubble In The RV Head
31337 Loss Of CCW During OST-946 Phase A CV Isolation Override
61013 Inattentive Security At The Plant Access Control Point
30119 ECCS Transfer To Recirc. PCT Calc
49198 SW Pump Deadheaded During OST
57917 SWBP Repetitive Motor Failure
60373 CST Chemistry Out Of Spec. (repeat)
31045 Inadequate Search On Trailer Entering Protected Area
30405 SG Safety Valve Setting Incorrect
2102 Outage NAS Roll-up (Human Performance)
30092 Instrument Air Compressor D Tripped
30583 Boric Acid On RPV Head
30920 Fault Pressure Relay For C Phase Main Transformer Failed To Operate
During Testing
2105 Area Did Not Meet The Requirements Of MNT-NGGC-007, Foreign Material
Exclusion Program
43473 General Emergency Classification Not Made As Needed By Drill Scenario
44130 ERO Training And Qualification Program Standards Do Not Ensure High
Quality Performance
251 EDG B Failure To Start Resulting In Unplanned Unavailability
49602 Instrument Air Compressor D Tripped Due To Motor Coupling Failure
50004 EDG B Unplanned Unavailability
2686 Analysis Of Previous Significant ARs Shows Recurring Maintenance On Some
Plant Systems
54006 Instances Of MR Unavailability Not Identified By System Engineers,
Subsequently Identified By MR Engineer
57726 INPO Area For Improvement, Secondary Chemistry Not Maintained In Manner
To Assure Long Term Reliability Of S/Gs
61441 EDG B Inoperable Due To Indication Problems
63678 EDG B Exceeded Unavailability Criteria Due To Unplanned And Planned
Maintenance
Adverse Action Requests (Priority 2)
30026 PT-602A & PT-602B Not Installed By Modification As Safety Class Q
47141 Pressurizer Backup Heater Group A Breaker Found Tripped
54339 Galvanized Union Installed On Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Lube Oil Pipe May
Result In Zinc Contamination And Silver Bearing Damage
54356 Water Present In Left Stop Valve Limit Switch Enclosure
200 Incorrect Relief Valves Installed For C-250A, C-250B And C-250C
63111 Improper Grease Handling
45417 Repeated Security E Field Failures
45601 Pipe Union On LC1535 Replaced Three Times
48088 Pressure Transmitters Found Out Of Tolerance Due To Mis-Calibration
50739 Leaking Boric Acid After Weld Completed On Pipe Cap
50824 Flange Leaked When Clearance Removed After Gasket Replaced On WO 65469
2345 Oil Cooler Leaked After SDAFW Oil Cooler PM
2531 Radiation Monitor R-20 Spiking
53473 Radiation Monitor R-11 Filter Paper Failure
54385 A Waterbox Condenser Tube Plugs Not Installed In Accordance With
Plugging Map
54399 Cover For PS1-1474 Not Installed Correctly Following WO 18291-01
55076 Number 1 Crosshead Stubshaft Damaged On B Charging Pump Due To
Incorrectly Installed Center Seal
55466 LE-10864 Worked Twice In Last 12 Months
55673 Outer Shield Connected To Incorrect Pin
55914 B Gland Steam Exhaust Fan Replaced After Only Few Weeks Of Operation
57818 WO 53754 On DW-436 Not Correctly Classified As Rework
58437 Oil Seal Damage Due To Incorrect Installation
261 Relief Valve SGB-RV-3 Lifted After Replacement
61601 LCV-1509A Actuator Bushing And O-Ring Found Damaged
2878 EDG B Fuel Oil Filter D/P Gauge Slow Response Following Recent
Calibration
63462 Belt Guard On HVA-1B, Control Room Air Handler, Failed
66323 Potential Rework Of A Battery Charger Ground Alarm
2731 SDAFW Pump Impeller Degradation Of One Vane
30435 PT-447 Failure - Bad Power Supply
46159 Non-Conservative Assumptions Used In EPM Calc No. 52
266 Use Of The Enpac Vibration Meter With The Charging Pumps
44996 HVH-1 Operabililty Concern
30513 SDAFW Snubber Cold Piston Setting Out Of Tolerance
30477 Letdown Snubber Cracked Oil Reservoir Resulting In Loss Of Oil
67182 Emergency Cooling Fitting Wrong For AOP-022
45453 CC-715 Drawing Error
31970 SWBP Motor Failed
50834 SWBP Oil Seals
27323 SI Pump A Dark Oil
240 SI Pump C Dark Oil
Improvement Action Requests (Priority 5)
30727 4000 Cpm Skin Contamination
287 CCS Pump Low Pressure Lockout Reset
29711 Marginal 50.59
29904 EOOS Values
43955 NRC Loss Of Voltage Relay Question
45079 Items With Purple Tint Paint In Bulk Warehouse
45926 Path-1 Reset CV Spray Step At G-11
46159 Non-Conservative Assumptions In Calc.
296 Emergency Notification Forms Contain Errors
51883 Improvements To DSP Procedures
2641 DSDG Start Failure Alarms
208 Charging Pump Suction Line Oscillations
56706 Charging Pump A Inoperable
Rejected Action Requests
47093 Evaluate PRT Pressure Level Control Bands
50862 Valve Downstream FP-425 Not On Drawing
59157 Passport Clearance Order Online Clearance Holder
59784 Need For Clearance During CP-110
Operating Experience Items
45191OE Grinnel Diaphragm Valve Failure Rate
48133OE INEEL - 156 Battery Failure/Explosion
2863OE NSAL 01-08 Reduced RHR Flow
55622OE MDAFW Air Binding Due To Blockage
60081OE NSAL 02-07 DB50 Failure To Close
60090OE EDG Start Failure 3 Due To Corrosion
64583OE IN 02-02 Degraded Bearings In EMD EDGs
66908OE WTB 2-04 Crossflow Ultrasonic Flow Measurement
291OE Droop Switch Failure Causes EDG Load Swings
67590OE IN 02-21 Axial Cracking In Alloy 600 S/G Tubes
Work Orders
241329-01 Replaced Protection Train A SI Test Button, Relay Rack #57
242030-01 Pressurizer Backup Heater Group A Breaker Found Tripped
259061-01 Disassemble And Inspect RHR Pump A Seal Water Outlet Check Valve
263142-01 Battery Charger A/A1 Alarm Failure
264070-01 Replacement Of Over Ranged Pressure Gauge
271694-01 Check Calibration Of B EDG Local MW Meter
271694-02 Replace B EDG Local MW Meter
272050-01 Boric Acid Transfer Pump B Suction Valve Leakage
282006-01 Battery Charger A/A1 Trouble Alarm Locked In With No Apparent Cause
285502-01 Battery Charger A/A1 Voltage Drifting
286735-01 Inspection Of Battery Cell Connections On A Station Battery
286833-01 EDG A Jacket Water Valve DG-47A Difficult To Operate
290108-01 Charging Pump C Discharge Relief Valve Lifting Low
Procedures
- Procedure, CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 5
- Procedure, CAP-NGGC-0201, Self-Assessment Program, Rev. 5
- Procedure, CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 3
- Procedure, CAP-NGGC-0203, Benchmarking Program, Rev.0
- Procedure, MNT-NGGC-0050, Measuring &Test Equipment Calibration Program, Rev. 1
- Procedure, TRO-NGGC-0204, Procedure Review and Approval, Rev. 0
- Corrective Maintenance Procedure, CM-149, Anchor-Darling 1878 Series Check Valve
Maintenance, Rev. 8
- Procedure, MNT-NGGC-0001, Maintenance Rework Program, Rev. 2
- Maintenance Management Procedure, MMM-010, Cleaning And Flushing requirements,
Rev. 22
- Preventive Maintenance Procedure, PM-320, Anchor-Darling 1878 Series Check Valve
Inspection, Rev. 8
- Preventive Maintenance Procedure, PM-480, Bridging And Meggering Pressurizer
Heaters, Rev 5
Assessment Documents
- Nuclear Assessment Report, R-SP-02-01, Zero Tolerance For Equipment Failure
Assessment, May 16, 2002
- Nuclear Assessment Section Report, RR-CA-02-01, HNAS02-086, Round Robin
Assessment Of The Corrective Action Program For Robinson And Harris Nuclear Plants
Round Robin Corrective Action Program Assessment
- Self-Assessment Report, SA-00054048, Zero Tolerance For Equipment Failure Initiation
Within Maintenance, February 28, 2002
- 2001 First Quarter Performance Evaluation Support (PES) Oversight Analysis Report, 01-
08-SP-C
- 2001 Second Quarter PES Oversight Analysis Report, 01-14-SP-C
- 2001 Third Quarter PES Oversight Analysis Report, 01-19-SP-C
- 2001 Fourth Quarter PES Oversight Analysis Report, 02-02-SP-C
- 2002 First Quarter PES Oversight Analysis Report, 02-06-SP-C
- PES Nuclear Assessment Section Assessment Report, 01-13-QA/QC-R
- PES Engineering Assessment Report, 01-30-ES-R
- E&RC PES Led Self-Assessment Report, 01-02-ERC-R
- Plant Support PES Led Self-Assessment Report, 01-06-PS-R
- Self-Assessment Report, AR47169, Condenser Tube Leakage Identification
- RNP Site Wide Analysis Of Condition Reports For Human Performance Trends, April 1 -
June 30, 2001
- RNP Site Wide Analysis Of Condition Reports For Performance Trends, July 1 -
September 30, 2001
- RNP Site Wide Analysis Of Condition Reports For Performance Trends, October 1 -
December 31, 2001
- RNP Site Wide Analysis Of Condition Reports For Performance Trends, January 1 -
March 31, 2002
- RNP Site Wide Analysis Of Condition Reports For Performance Trends, April 1 - June 30,
2002
Quarter 2001
Quarter 2002
Other Documents
- Robinson Action Plan For Pressurizer Relief Tank In-leakage
- NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-261/01-02
- NRC IR 50-261/01-03
- NRC IR 50-261/01-04