IR 05000237/1988014
| ML17201J318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1988 |
| From: | Danielson D, James Gavula NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17201J317 | List: |
| References | |
| 50---8-, 50-237-88-14, 50-249-88-15, 50-254-88-14, 50-265-88-14, NUDOCS 8807060210 | |
| Download: ML17201J318 (7) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-237/88014(DRS); 50-249/88015(DRS);
50-254/88014(DRS); 50-265/88014(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249; 50-254; 50-265 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25; DPR-29; DPR-30 Facility Names:
Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3 Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Sargent and Lundy Office, Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
May 25 and June 15-16, 1988 Sl.Q ii.... Otv Inspector: (}. A. G1rrula, Approved By:
D. *H. Danielson, Chief Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary Date Ins ection from Ma 25 throu h June 16 1988 Re orts No. 50-237/88014(DRS)*
Areas Inspected:
Special safety inspection of licensee action an previously identified noncompliances (92702) and licensee event reports (92700).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000237 G
PNU
DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)
- S. Javidan, BWR Engineering
- I. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing Administrator Sargent and Lundy (s&L)
B. Erler, Assistant Manager, Structural Department
- P. Gazda, Senior Structural Project Engineer
- R: Knobel, Structural Engineer
- D. Gullaksen, Assistant Head, Structural Engineering Divisi6n
- R. Krawczyk, Project Engineer
- I. Domashovetz, Mechanical Project Engineer
- J. Nosko, Project Manager
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting June 16, 198.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Closed) Violation (237/87006-lA* 237/87006-lB* 249/87011-lA;.
254/87028-0lA), Open Item (265 87028-01):
Primary containment structural steel connections did not meet original design requirement CEC0 1s responses to the above violations are dated September 24, 1987, April 21, 1988, and May 2, 198 As a result of these violations, CECo implemented a comprehensive program to inspect and evaluate all cheek plate and bolted connecti~ns for critical tangential and radial beams inside the drywells at Quad Cities and Dresde This program documented the discrepancies between the as-built and as-designed connection configurations and if necessary, modified the connections to meet FSAR stress criteri In some instances, even though the as-built configurations met the required FSAR criteria, the connections were modified in order to avoid any questions or potential problems in
- the futur It should be npted, that apparently most of the
deficiencies in the structural connections have existed since original construction and the identification of this issue occurred during a premodification walkdow This type of an occurrence indicates that
. the recent changes to the modification process are being implemented effectively and should identify problems of this nature if they exis The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents relative to regulatory requirements and licensee commitments:
r
S&L Calculation No. 7715-RB-02QC, "Check Plate Connections,"
Revision 1, May 27, 198 *
s&L Calculation No. 7715-RB-02QC, Pages.2.4-2.5, "Drywell Steel Connections," Revision 0, November 20, 198 *
S&L ECN No. QC-865-26, Quad Unit 2, December 3, 198 *
S&L Calculation No. 7877-RB-02-S, Revision 0, October 27, 1987. "Beam no Left. II
S&L ECN No. D-875-21, Dresden 3, November 9, 198 *
S&L Calculation No. 7715-RB-02-QC Page 38, Revision 1, April 26, 1988, "Qualification of Discrepancies on Beam Rl and R25.
Based on the above reviews, the NRC inspector concluded that CECo had performed the necessary surveys and followup actions to correct the present condition The current controls on modifications to the licensee 1 s facilities should preclude recurrence of similar circumstance This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (237/87006-2A; 249/87011-2A; 254/87028-02A; 265/87028-02A):
Embedment plates were fabricated with incorrect anchor strap spacings which affected the embedment plate support capacitie CEC0 1 s responses to the above violations are dated September 24, 1987, April 21, 1988, and May 2, 198 As a result of these violations, CECo implemented a comprehensive 11 Embedment Plate Assessment Program".
This program developed new loading criteria for attachments to embedment plates and reconciled all existing major attachments to this new criteri For those situations *
. where FSAR compliance could not be shown, modifications to embedment plates or changes to attachments were mad This program was completed and a summary report was issued on October 19, 198 During the development of the new loading criteria, several technical questions were raised by the NR Additional discussions between the licensee and technical reviewers at NRR took place over a span of several month Additional information regarding certain questions was provided by the license Based on this interchange, all technical issues were resolved and a Safety Evaluation Report regarding the acceptability of CEC0 1s program was issued by NRR on May 12, 198 As part of the assessment program, certain individual attachments to embedment plates had to be field verified to determine actual location relative to the ends of the embedment plate In other instances, the location of the attachment relative to the anchor straps on the back of the.plate had to be determined using ultrasonic examination (UT) technique For a limited number of attachments, the accessibility for either the visual inspection or UT inspection was restricted due to radiological concerns or
- proximity to sensitive equipmen Of the total population of attachments reviewed, the number of inaccessible safety significant attachments for this program was less than 1/2%.
Based on reviews of existing documentation and comparisons with evaluations of similar attachments, CECo concluded that further detailed evaluations of this limited population was not warrante Based on the reviews of the justifications provided and on supplementary discussions with the licensee, the NRC inspector concurred with this position for both the Quad Cities and Dresden Station *
The following documents were reviewed by the NRC inspector relative to regulatory requirements and licensee commitment *
S&L Calculation No. 7941Q-294, "Data base Input for Mechanical Hangers Attached to Embedment Plates, 11 Revision *
S&L Calculation No. 7941Q-294.1 11 Embedmerit Plate Deformation."
- S&L CalculatiOn No. 7941Q-29 Embedment Plate Check*
M-1606-30. II
S&L ECN QC-875-10, June 24, 198 *
S&L Calculation No. 79410-260, "Database Input, 11 Revision *
S&L ECN D-875-13, April 11, 198 *
S&L Calculation No. 7941DQ, "Design Control *summary Assumptions and Procedures, 11 Revis ion *
Architect Engineer Guidebook Volume II, Exhibit 3-1, "Embedmen Plate Attachment Criteria, 11 Revision l,.February 22, 198 This last document is the controlling aspect for all future additions or modifications of attachments to embedded plates at both Dresden
- and Quad Citie Utilization of this document will assure that future work will comply with guidelines established during this progra Based on the above reviews, this item is considered close (Open) Unresolved Item (237/87030-01; 249/87029-01; 254/87028-05; 265/87028-05):
Flued head anchor supports were determined to exceed safety analysis design criteri As previously documented, CECo committed to a 11 Flued Head Assessment" (FHA) Program as a result of the concerns identified under this ite In order to clarify the scope of the ongoing program, a letter was sent to T. E. Murley (NRC-NRR) from I. M. Johnson (CECo)
on June 6, 198 This letter addressed on a point-by-point basis all of the concerns documented by Brookhaven National Laboratory consultants during the original inspectio Pending review and comment of this document by NRR, acceptability of CEC0 1 s program will be considered as an open issu The NRC inspector reviewed portions of the following documents to verify compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and licensee commitment *
S&L Calculation No. 8188-PS-S, "Rock Anchor Bolt Evaluation,"
March 24, 198 A portion of this calculation was an evaluation of the controlling aspect of rock anchor bolt installation The calculation determined whether the strength of the bolts or that of the concrete was the controlling paramete Using conservative assumptions, the ultimate capacity of the maximum number of bolts was shown to be less than the minimum capacity of the concrete cone are On this basis, anchor evaluations need only consider the capacity of the rock anchor bolts and not concrete strengt *
S&L Calculation No. 8818-138-D3, 11 Flued Head Anchor Xl38,
May 9, 198 Anchor bolt allowables were consistent with the pre-established criteri Calculated bolt loads were found to be significantly less than the bolt capacitie Frame members back to the shield wall were modeled with rigid connections capable of transmitting moment This complies with commitments made in the progra Member stresses and weld capacities were within code allowable *
S&L ECN No. D88S-09, 11 FHA Xll3
The existing struts, which were installed as part of the Recirculation Pipe Replacement Project, were found to be overstressed by a factor of The change notice replaced these member with appropriately sized component No violation or deviations were identified during the reviews of the above documentatio Pending finalization of all modifications, the FHA issue will remain ope.
Licensee Event Reports (LER) (Closed) LER (254/87-030-0):
ATWS instrument piping was not installed in accordance with design document As a result of this discovery, comparable piping was reviewed at both units at Dresden and Quad Citie The problem was eventually determined to be restricted to the Quad Cities Statio During a previous modification, support drawings were issued to the plant but were subsequently never installe This resulted in the piping being in an unanalyzed conditio An oper~bility analysis was performed by s&L to determine if interim operation of the as-found configuration could be justifie By using ASME Code Case N-411 damping in conjunction with level D allowables, it was concluded that no immediate safety concerns existe The Unit 1 piping was corrected during the previous outage and the Unit 2 piping was recently corrected during the current outag Based on the reviews performed by the licensee, the evaluations of the as-found condition, the modifications installed to correct the deficiencies and the recent corrective actions to the modification program, this item is considered close (Closed) LER (237/88-001-0):
Diesel generator air start piping was found to be outside FSAR stress allowables due to apparent original design deficiencie During field walkdowns, the licensee discovered that safety related piping was supported by a non-seismically qualified hand rai This deficiency had apparently existed since initial installation of the piping in questio Additional reviews by the licensee concluded that the deficiency was restricted to Dresden and did not occur at Quad Citie An operability analysis was performed by S&L to determine if interim operation of the current configuration could be justified. Analysis of the piping indicated that FSAR stress allowables would be me However, the handrail, which supported a portion of the piping, was found to exceed FSAR stress allowable By using an operability limit based on plastic moments less than twice the yield strain, it was concluded by CECo that no immediate safety concerns existe The corrective actions taken to correct the deficiencies was to replace the existing support system with seismically qualified*
supports during the next refueling outage Recent changes to the modification process are intended to preclude this type of deficiency from occurring in the futur Detailed checklists containing seismic to non-seismic interfaces and interactions are now mandatory modification step Based on NRC reviews of the above actions, this item is considered close (Closed) LER (249/88-003-0):
Flued head anchor supports were determined to exceed safety analysis design* criteri This item is currently being tracked under Unresolved Items 237/87030-01; 249/87029-0 (Closed) LER (265/88-006-0):
Flued head anchor supports were determined to exceed safety analysis design criteri This item is currently being tracked under Unresolved Items 254/87028-05; 265/87028-0 (Closed) LER (265/88-010-0):
Primary containment structural steel connections were determined to exceed safety analysis design*
criteri This item was being tracked under Open Item 265/87028-01 and is closed in Paragraph 2.a of this repor.
. Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 16, 198 The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspectio The licensee representatives acknowledged this informatio The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspectio The licensee representatives did not identify and such documents/processes as proprietar