IR 05000250/2019011
| ML19274C217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/2019 |
| From: | James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Moul D Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2019011 | |
| Download: ML19274C217 (16) | |
Text
September 30, 2019
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2019011 AND 05000251/2019011
Dear Mr. Moul:
On August 16, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr.
Stamp and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000250 and 05000251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000250 and 05000251
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000250/2019011 and 05000251/2019011
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2019-011-0003
Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Co.
Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station
Location:
Homestead, FL
Inspection Dates:
July 29, 2019 to August 16, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Corujo-Sandin, Reactor Inspector
T. Fanelli, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. Su, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Qualify D.C. Combination Starter Panel 4N1405-A for Minimum Operating Time Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000250, 251/2019011-02 Closed None 71111.21N The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49.(e)(1), "Temperature and Pressure," for the licensee's failure to qualify direct current (D.C) combination starter panel 4N1405-A for a period of at least one hour in excess of the time assumed in the accident analysis.
Two Examples of Failure to Verify Design Inputs to Qualification Criteria Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000250, 251/2019011-03 Closed None 71111.21N The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III,
"Design Control," for the licensee's failure to verify the adequacy of qualification testing and installation requirements in accordance with Quality Instruction (QI) 1.7, "Nuclear Engineering Design Input/Verification."
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000250, 251/2019011-01 Potential Harsh Environments from High-Energy Line Breaks 71111.21N Open
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21N - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees environmental qualification program implementation through the sampling of the following components:
Select Sample Components to Review - Risk Significant/Low Design (Inside/Outside Containment) (IP Section 02.01)===
(1)3V30C, JOY Manufacturing Company Emergency Containment Cooling Fan
- (2) POV-2604, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Opening Solenoid Channel B AVCO
- (3) FY-3-1457B-6, Fisher Current to Pressure (I/P) Converter CV-2832, 303
- (4) MOV-4-1405, Limitorque AFW Steam Supply
- (5) SV-3-6319B, Target Rock Pressurizer Vent Discharge Solenoid Valve
- (6) SPL SLEEVE-NPK, Raychemcor SPL Sleeve-NPK Nuclear Plant Splice Kit
Select Sample Components to Review - Primary Containment (Inside Containment) (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) MOV-4-751, Limitorque Normal RHR Inlet from Reactor Coolant System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Qualify D.C. Combination Starter Panel 4N1405-A for Minimum Operating Time Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000250, 251/2019011-02 Closed None 71111.21N The NRC identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.49.(e)(1), "Temperature and Pressure," for the licensee's failure to qualify direct current (D.C) combination starter panel 4N1405-A for a period of at least one hour in excess of the time assumed in the accident analysis.
Description:
The team identified that the licensee failed to qualify the D.C. combination starter panel, 4N1405, for MOV-4-1405 to meet the minimum required operating time as specified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.89, Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants. The licensee committed to following the guidance in RG 1.89 by reference in their updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), Appendix 8A, Environmental Qualification.
The Unit 4 D.C. starter panel 4N1405 controls the MOV 4-1405 which is the steam stop valve to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The starter panel environmental qualification report indicated a qualification time of 33 minutes. This time was consistent with the licensees high energy line break (HELB) blowdown time, not the required valve operating time including post-accident operating time (PAOT) for various accidents. The UFSAR, Section 14.2.7, Feedwater System Pipe Break, specified, in part, that it is concluded that the available auxiliary feedwater capacity is adequate for long-term decay heat removal, and the applicable acceptance criteria for the feedwater system pipe break analysis are met.
Final reactor coolant system cooldown begins (time of event turnaround) at one hour into the event (3600 seconds). For this accident sequence, the auxiliary feedwater pumps must operate for longer than 33 minutes. The pumps must continuously remove heat from the steam generators. The RG 1.89 Reg Position C.4, stated, in part, that the equipment should remain functional in the accident environment for a period of at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in excess of the time assumed in the accident analysis. This time included HELB blowdown time and PAOT, including an additional one hour in accordance with the site design basis above.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered these deficiencies into the corrective action program to restore compliance.
Corrective Action References: AR 02324645
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to qualify D.C. combination starter panel 4N1405-A for a duration with margin as specified by RG 1.89 was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, RG 1.89 stated, in part, that the equipment should remain functional in the accident environment for a period of at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in excess of the time assumed in the accident analysis. This included PAOT.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to qualify 10 CFR 50.49 equipment to the most severe environment for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in excess of the operating time assumed in the accident analysis fails to ensure the reliability and capability of those components to perform their safety function when called upon during and following a design basis accident.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued December 7, 2016, for mitigating systems, and IMC 609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency of a mitigating SSC and the SSC maintained its functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.49(e)(1) requires, in part, that
- (e) The electric equipment qualification program must include and be based on the following:
- (1) Temperature and pressure. The time-dependent temperature and pressure at the location of the electric equipment important to safety must be established for the most severe design basis accident during or following which this equipment is required to remain functional.
Contrary to above, since February 25, 2013, the licensee failed to base qualification on the time-dependent temperature and pressure at the location of the electric equipment important to safety during and following the most severe design basis accident which this equipment is required to remain functional. Specifically, combination starter panel 4N1405-A was not qualified for the post accident operating time.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Two Examples of Failure to Verify Design Inputs to Qualification Criteria Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000250, 251/2019011-03 Closed
None 71111.21N The NRC identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to verify the adequacy of qualification testing and installation requirements in accordance with Quality Instruction (QI) 1.7, "Nuclear Engineering Design Input/Verification."
Description:
Licensee instruction QI 1.7, Section 5.3, "Design Verification," required, that design verification is the process whereby a competent individual, who has remained independent of the design process, reviews the design inputs, design and safety analyses, and design output to verify design adequacy. This independent review is provided to minimize the likelihood of design errors in items that are important to nuclear safety. In the following examples the adequacy of the environmental qualification and installation was not verified.
Example one: The licensee committed to RG 1.89 and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 323-1974 by reference in their updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), Appendix 8A, Environmental Qualification. The site failed to verify that Fisher current to pressure (I/P) transducers were qualified in accordance with the site EQ requirements in RG 1.89 and IEEE 323-1974. The qualification program and testing performed on Fisher I/P transducers did not meet the requirements in IEEE 323-1974 or RG 1.89 for replacement equipment. For instance, the recorded accident environment did not include a temperature and pressure transient. Further, the recorded cool down rate was uniform over ten hours rather than the abrupt temperature changes expected during accidents. Also, the transducers were not operated or cycled during a transient or throughout the testing as expected for a modulating valve. When asked, the licensee performed an analysis to demonstrate how the Fisher qualification met the IEEE and RG. The qualification was determined to be nonconforming. The testing was not adequate to support qualification of the transducers.
Example two: The site failed to verify that environmentally qualified components were installed in the as-qualified configurations. Weep holes are required for all boxes containing terminal blocks, relays, devices with exposed terminals, visible contacts, etc. as per licensees drawing 5610-E-302, Rev. 22. The inspectors noted at least three examples where control and terminal boxes were installed without the requisite weep holes.
1. On Unit 4, the site failed to install drain holes for 1N1405 Starter panel as required per
above referenced drawing.
2. On Unit 4, the site failed to install drain holes for the junction box associated with
Automatic Valve Company (AVCO) solenoid valve, SV-4-2604B as required per the above referenced drawing.
3. On Unit 3, the site failed to install drain holes for the junction box associated with the
Fisher I/P converter, FY-3-14578-6, as is required per the above reference drawing.
Some of the qualification records indicated that boxes with blocked weep holes failed the LOCA and HELB tests.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered these deficiencies into the corrective action program to restore compliance.
Corrective Action References: AR 02324142 and AR 02324348
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to verify the adequacy of qualification testing and installation requirements to maintain qualification in accordance with QI 1.7 Section 5.3 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to verify component qualification during testing and installation affected the component reliability when it is required to operate.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued December 7, 2016, for mitigating systems, and IMC 609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency of a mitigating SSC and the SSC maintained its functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, required, in part, that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, since 1984, the licensee failed to provide design control measures that verified or checked the adequacy of design, by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of environmental qualification testing and equipment installation methods to maintain environmental qualification, which resulted in unqualified I/P transducers and terminal boxes being installed in the plant.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Open)
Failure to Mitigate Potential Harsh Environments from HELBs URI 05000250, 251/2019011-01 71111.21N
Description:
The inspectors are concerned that the licensee incorrectly classified certain areas in the turbine building as mild environments when the areas contain high energy fluid lines that could create harsh environments if pipe cracks or breaks occur in the lines. The high-energy fluid lines are near safe shutdown equipment. For these areas, critical cracks may have been required to be assumed by the sites current licensing basis. Licensee calculations did not address the possible harsh environments from high-energy line breaks (HELBs) in the turbine building. This was based on the turbine building design being open to the atmosphere; its structure has floors with no sides. Calculation 87-264.6000_000_2, Section 7.3, Environmental Effects, stated, in part, since the blow down piping system is located outside (open to the atmosphere) flooding and temperature rise are of no significance and therefore not a concern to this analysis. All the postulated line breaks in this calculation had this same statement. The jet impingements temperatures could exceed 212 °F, and steam in an outside at atmospheric conditions could reach at least 212 °F, both of which would be classified as a harsh environment.
In addition, calculation PTN-BFJM-92-016_000 determined that a break in a three-inch main steam line would have a mass flow rate of 215,645 lb./hr. Main steam is 1034 psi and 547 °F.
A fraction of this flow jet could cover a large area with 212 °F steam. The calculation indicated that a break of this size would not cause a plant trip, so it could persist until it was noticed and manually stopped.
The high energy fluid lines in the turbine building are not safety related. The UFSAR Section 5A for Seismic Classification & Design Basis does not list the lines as Class 1 (seismically qualified) and they are adjacent to the safe shutdown electrical equipment. The inspectors are concerned that a HELB in certain turbine building areas could cause a plant trip and thus a potential loss of offsite power. There are feedwater and main steam lines in the area. The cracks in the high energy lines, as discussed in the guidance the licensee stated they used to develop their analysis (Giambusso letter errata dated 1/26/1973) range from four to twelve inches long, which are equivalent analytical pipe diameters of one to seven inches. The inspectors are concerned that either a feed water line HELB or a steam line HELB could create harsh environments in the areas. A HELB in these lines could create an initial transient overpressure that the doors in the area may not be designed for. These doors are to rooms that contain multiple trains of safety related switchgear.
The feedwater jets may not immediately flash to steam, which could impact the doors in the area. The jets from steam or feedwater may have enough energy to physically open some doors and damage some electrical equipment such as exposed cables or MCCs. The fluid release from any of the lines could elevate the temperature to at least 212 °F and envelope the areas with high humidity that could condense inside electrical equipment for which they are not qualified.
The Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station may not have met the following licensing basis requirements:
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station received information notice (IN) 2000-20, "Potential Loss of Redundant Safety Related Equipment Because of the Lack of High-Energy Line Break Barriers," ML003760571. The IN informed licensees of the requirements to address the environmental effects from HELBs (critical cracks) near safety related SSCs. In addition, the IN 2000-20 identified four conditions that must coexist to produce a risk-significant configuration.
1. lack of a HELB barrier between the redundant trains of a system that is needed to
mitigate accidents,
2. the lack of environmental qualification for the redundant components of trains located
in the same area,
3. the presence of high-energy piping in adjacent areas,
4. the lack of a HELB barrier between adjacent piping and the redundant safety system
trains.
The Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station may not have met the following licensing basis requirements:
10 CFR 50.55a(h)-IEEE 279-1968, stated in part, the design basis of protection system equipment shall be provided and based on, the malfunctions, accidents, or other unusual events (e.g., fire, explosion, missiles, lightning, flood, earthquake, wind, etc.) which could physically damage protection system components or could cause environmental changes leading to functional degradation of system performance, and for which provisions must be incorporated to retain necessary protection system action.
The Giambusso letter dated December 18, 1972, General Information Required for Consideration of the Effects of a Piping System Break Outside Containment, in conjunction with General Design Criterion 4, required, in part, that, structures, systems, and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. The licensee specified that they performed an analysis in accordance with the Giambusso letter and errata thereto. The errata specified, in part, that where pipes carrying high energy fluid are routed in the vicinity of structures and systems necessary for safe shutdown of the nuclear plant, supplemental protection of those structures and systems shall be provided to cope with the environmental effects (including the effects of jet impingement) of a single postulated open crack at the most adverse location(s) with regard to those essential structures and systems. The licensee responded, in part, that equipment is located sufficiently distant from the postulated high energy line breaks so as to ensure operability throughout cooldown in the event of a postulated pipe break. It was not evident to the inspectors how the licensee arrived at this conclusion given a lack of documented analysis concluding this.
10 CFR 50.49(d) dated 1984, stated in part, the licensee shall include the information in paragraphs (d)(1), (2), and
- (3) of this section for this electric equipment important to safety in a qualification file.
1. The performance specifications under conditions existing during and following design
basis accidents,
2. The voltage, frequency, load, and other electrical characteristics for which the
performance specified in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section can be ensured,
3. The environmental conditions, including temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation,
chemicals, and submergence at the location where the equipment must perform as specified in accordance with paragraphs (d)(1) and
- (2) of this section.
Planned Closure Actions: This issue is a URI pending further review, including consultation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Regional Counsel, to determine if this issue of concern constitutes a violation.
Licensee Actions: The licensee captured the inspectors questions in their corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: AR2324737
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 16, 2019, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Mr. Stamp and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
PTN-BFSM-11-
20
NRC Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Design Basis Differential
Pressure Determination - Post-EPU
Corrective Action
Documents
01761767
W/O#40034286-01, Lube ECC Motor
04/12/2012
2305467
MOV-4-751: Inactive Boric Acid @Stem and Packing Gland
03/13/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2324144
CFR 50.49 Check Box
08/12/2019
2324350
NRC DBAI EQ Program Inspection - Program Applicability
08/13/2019
2324618
DOC Pac 16.0 Eval of Test RPT Anomalies
08/15/2019
2324654
DOC 17.0 Changes
08/15/2019
Drawings
5610-E-302
Electrical Installation Raceways, Notes, Symbols & Details
Rev. 22
5614-E-26 SH
2G
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply D.C. MOV-4-
1405
Rev. 9
5614-E-377
Connection Diagram for Motor Operated Valves
Rev. 7
5614-E-397
Connection Diagram - Control Board 4C02
Rev. 6
5614-E-486
Connection Diagram - Containment Isolation Rack 4QR51
Rev. 5
Engineering
Evaluations
1003483
EPRI Technical Report 1003483 Comparative Analysis of
Nebula and MOV Long Life Greases for Limitorque Main
Gearbox Applications
600456
Limitorque Test Report No. 600456 Qualification Type Test
Report Limitorque Valve Actuators for PWR Service
B0058
Limitorque Test Report No. B0058 Limitorque Valve
Actuator Qualification for Nuclear Power Station Service
DOC PAC No.
1000
Generic Backup Documentation
Rev. 10
Documentation
Package 14.1
Nuthern Starters
Rev. 1
Documentation
Package 16.0
Doc Pac - Joy Manufacturing Co. Electrical Fans
Documentation
Package 17.0
Doc Pac - Limitorque Corporation Valve Actuators
Engineering
Evaluations
Documentation
Package 17.3
Limitorque Corporation Valve Actuators
Documentation
Package 26.0
Rev. 10
Documentation
Package 41.0
Automatic Valve Company (AVCO) Solenoid Valves
Page 1
JPN-PTN-SEEJ-92-
006
Engineering Evaluation to Develop an Enhanced EQ
Profile
X-604
Joy Manufacturing Co. Test Report X-604 Qualification
Testing of Joy Axivane Fan and Reliance Electric Motor
Miscellaneous
2375
TRC Report 2375 Qualification Test Report Aging, Seismic,
& Accident Simulation Test of Target Rock
Corporation 1 Solenoid Valve, Model 77CC-001_
G
3854
TRC Report 3854 Qualification Extension Analysis Report
for Project 83UU Solenoid Operated Globe Valves_
3996
TRC Report 3996 Qualification Test Report for the
Environmental Qualification of the Target Rock Corporation
Solenoid Operated Globe Valves
A
Certificate of Compliance - Bechtel Power Corporation
10/20/1983
44400R97
Qualification Test Report For Automatic Valve Solenoid
and Air Operated Valves for Use in Various Nuclear Power
Plants
Rev. A
600456
Limitorque Test Report No. 600456 Qualification Type Test
Report Limitorque Valve Actuators for PWR Service
B0058
Limitorque Test Report No. B0058 Limitorque Valve
Actuator Qualification for Nuclear Power Station Service
B0058
Limitorque Valve Actuator Qualification for Nuclear Power
Station Service
Rev. 0
B0212
Limitorque Test Report B0212 Qualification Type Test
Report Limitorque Valve Actuators with Type LR Motor for
Miscellaneous
F-C3271
Franklin Research Institute Test Report F-C3271
Qualification Test of Limitorque Valve Actuator in a Steam
Environment
FPL-12808R
Nutherm Qualification Report for Nutherm Model 72978 &
Model 73010 DC Starter Panels
Rev. 3
Procedures
0-ADM-540
Motor Operated Valve Program
0-ADM-703
CFR 30.49 Environmental Qualification
0-ADM-704
Environmental Qualification Maintenance Index
Rev. 7
Documentation
Package 1001
Environmental Qualification Generic Approach and
Treatment of Issues
Environmental Qualification Program
ER-AA-112-1000-
10000
Environmental Qualification Program Document Control
and Retrieval Guidance
Rev. 0
Motor Operated Valve Program
Work Orders
40016308 01
EQ-MOV-4-751 MOV & Grease Inspect
04/08/2011
40189647 01
MOV-4-751: MOV & Grease Inspect
10/08/2014
40470455 01
MOV-4-751: MOV & Grease Inspect
10/22/17