IR 05000250/1987020
| ML17347A494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | Jape F, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347A493 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 50-250-87-20, 50-251-87-20, GL-81-07, GL-81-7, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-2, IEB-86-3, IEIN-85-094, IEIN-85-94, NUDOCS 8706010360 | |
| Download: ML17347A494 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/87-20 and 50-251/87-20 Licensee:
Floiida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
April 27 - Nay 1, 1987 Inspector':
G.
.
c neb i Accompanying Personnel:
S.
G. Tingen Approved by:
F. Jape, Section Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 W/Zo/87 Date Signe Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of surveillance testing, post refueling startup testing, spent fuel pool activities, IE Bulletin status, and closeout of open items.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. Abrisham, System Performance Supervisor
- J. Arias, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- C. Baker, Plant Manager W. Coutier, Supervisor of Vendor Activities
- R. Hart, Licensing Engineer H. Hoffman, Support Group Supervisor - El'ectrical
- R. Longtemps, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Mende, Reactor Supervisor - Operations D. Spence, Operations
- Watch Engineer V. Wager, Assistance Superintendent of Procedures M. Wayland, Field Supervisor - Electrical Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- D. Brewer, Senior Resident Inspector J.
MacDonald, Resident Inspector K. VanDyne, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview 0'
~
(Closed) Deviation 250/83-11-04 and 251/83-11-03, Failure to describe the cask lifting yoke in response to Generic Letter 81-07 and NUREG 0612.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 1; 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection.
Unresolved Item 250, 251/87-20-01, Determine temperature correction required when bench testing pressurizer safety valves - paragraph 5.a.(2).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
The fact that the. yoke on the spent fuel cask was not included in the licensee's response to NUREG-0612 with respect to special, lifting, devices was sited as a deviation from the requirements of Generic Letter (GL) 81-07.
This letter required that all licensee's include in their response to NUREG-0612, a description of all special lifting devices and to ensure that they are operated, inspected,
.and maintained in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978.
On October 7, 1983, the licensee submitted a
supplemental response to the NRC for GL 81-07 that addressed the yoke on the spent fuel cask.
In this response, the licensee stated that the yoke was rented and that in the future the terms of the rental agreement will require a Certificate of Compliance to ANSI N14.6-1978 with each rental.
In discussions with the licensee s Supervisor of Vendor Activities, they stated that this requirements will be included on the list of approved suppliers of the yoke to ensure the requirement was not missed in the future.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Deviation 250/83-11-03 and 251/83-11-02, Concerning ANSI B30.2-1976 not adequately implemented.
Maintenance Procedure M/P 16701. 1, Gantry Crane Inspection and Preventative Maintenance, did not invoke Chapter 2.2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, Crane Inspection Requirements.
On July 14, 1983, the licensee revised M/P 16701. 1 to envoke these ANSI requirements.
Subsequent NRC review of the revised procedure revealed several deviations from the ANSI requirements.
On April 26, 1985, the licensee revised the M/P to incorporate the deviations identified.
Review of the subsequent revision of M/P 16701. 1 by the inspector showed that the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 were met.
This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.a.(2).
5.
Survei1 lance Testing (61701)
a
~
The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance test program for the mainsteam and pressurizer safety valves to ensure that functional testing is in accordance with regulatory requirements and industry guides or standards.
The inspection consisted of discussions with responsible licensee engineers, review of the test procedures, and evaluation. of data obtained during the last performance of the testing for Unit 4, January - April 198 'I
(I)
The licensee presently sends all 12 of the mainsteam safety valves to Wyle Laboratories for testing during each refueling outage.
Testing of all valves each outage is more that required by ASME,Section XI, IWV-3500, Inservice Testing of Category C
Valves.
The inspector reviewed Wyle Test Report 48149-0, dated March 4, 1986, which included the procedures and data for the subject valves.
The testing performed by Wyle was in accordance with ASME PTC 25.3-1976, which included
"as received" testing prior to refurbishment.
Subsequent to repair the valves are retested and setpoints adjusted, as required.
The inspector considered the licensees program for the main steam safety valves to be adequate.
(2)
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's procedure and data for testing the pressurizer safety valve setpoints, 4-SMM-041.1.
The procedure requires the valves to be bench tested at ambient temperature.
The inspector verified test prerequisites were specified and met, test instructions and objectives were clear ly stated, and the correct acceptance criteria were specified.
Although the inspector considers the test method used to be acceptable, one area of concern was the possible influence of ambient temperature on valve setpoint.
As previously stated, the licensee bench tests the valves at ambient temperature.
The valves are then reinstalled at their respective locations near the top of the pressurizer such that the valves will be much hotter at system normal operating temperatures than the temperatures the valves were set at.
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Report NP-4235, Set-Point Testing of Safety Valves Using Alternate Test Methods, indicate that ambient temperature is a significant setpoint influencing parameter for actual installations.
This finding is consistant with both the valve manufacturer and several valve testing laboratories.,
The influence of ambient testing does not appear to be constant with each valve, yet the findings indicate there is a consistent downward setpoint drift which an increase in medium temperature.
This would result in a lower actual setpoint at normal operating temperatures.
Further discussion of this matter was held with the licensee by telephone on May 6, 1987.
This item is identified as Unresolved Item.250, 251/87-20-01.
b.
The inspector reviewed TP-303, Emergency Diesel Generator Overhaul for "A" Diesel Generator.
This procedure provides for the overhaul of the diesel generators and the subsequent testing required to return the Unit to service which was in progress during this inspec-tion.
The procedure and data packages were reviewed to ensure that:
testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures; latest revision of the approved test procedure were used by personnel performing the testing; test data was properly collected and recorded; test changes were approved in accordance with administra-tive procedures; actions required by test changes had been completed; and test objectives and acceptance criteria were me No violations or. deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Post Refueling Startup Testing (72700)
The inspector reviewed the completed procedures and data packages for the licensee's Operating Procedure 0204.5, Nuclear Design Check Tests During Startup Sequence After Refueling.
The specific procedures reviewed-were for Unit 3 Cycle X and Unit 4 Cycle XI startups after refueling.
The review verified that:
the purpose of the tests were in accordance with technical specification requirements; the testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures; evaluation of test data were properly conducted and acceptance criteria were specified and met.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
7.
Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86702)
During the course of this inspection, the inspector witnessed the visual inspection of a
hafnium vessel flux depression assembly (HVFDA).
The visual inspection was conducted in accordance with the licensee's Temporary Procedure, TP-332.
This inspection was conducted at the request of the vendor to verify the structural integrity of one of the twelve HVFDA's which had just completed their first cycle of operation in Unit 3.
These assemblies will be used a minimum of two more operating cycles.
The inspection was accomplished in Unit 3 spent fuel pool using an underwater TV camera and associated VCR.
The inspector verified properly approved procedures were in use by personnel conducting the inspection; precautions and limitations specified by the procedure were met, spent 'fuel pool levels and temperature requirements were met, and the visual inspection was conducted as required by the procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
8.
Followup on IE Bulletins (92703, 25573, 25581)
a ~
(Open)
250, 251/85-BU-03, IE Bulletin 85-03:
Motor Operated Valve Conmon Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings.
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee engineers and maintenance personnel concerning their program to meet the requirements of IEB 85-03.
The licensee is using'the Motor Operated Valve Analysis Test System (MOVATS) to provide demonstrated operability of the valves identified in the bulletin.
The testing will involve both static and dynamic tests to verify that the switch setpoint criteria established will ensure that these valves will perform their design function when exposed to maximum differential pressure (d/p) conditions.
Initial testing includes evaluation of static signatures for valve degradation, incorrect adjustments, and other abnormalities in the motor operated valves (MOVs).
b.
The inspector reviewed the work packages and procedures used to NOVATS test three NOV's (PWO 3084 for Unit 3 MOV 843B, PWO 3083 for Unit 3 MOV 843A, and PWO 3093 for Unit 3 NOV 864A).
In general, the inspector considered the procedure, 0-CME-102. 1, to be well written and easy to follow.
Problem identified to date were identified and corrected.
The inspector informed the licensee that the actions required by the bulletin would be followed in future inspections until complete.
(Closed)
250, 251/86-BU-02, IE Bulletin 86-02:
Static
"0" Ring Differential Pressure Switches.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 86-02, dated July 28, 1986 and August 6, 1986.
In these responses, the licensee stated that their inspection to determine the extent to which the subject differential pressur e switches were installed indicated that the switches are not used in saf'ety-related or important to safety applications.
This item is closed.
co (Open)
250, 251/86-BU-03, IE Bulletin 86-03:
Potential Failure Of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due To Single Failure Of Air Operated Valve In Minimum Flow Recirculation Line.
The licensee initially identified a potential problem in this area while evaluating IE Notice 85-94; in December 1985.
The evaluation determined that the High Head Safety Injection Pumps (HHSI) were subject to this failure mode.
Upon identification of the problem, the plant implemented engineering recommendations which blocked the HHSI Pump's minimum flow recirculation valves in the open position.
This provided a temporary resolution to the concern raised by the Bulletin, and the safety evaluation performed by engineering showed that this would not involve any unreviewed safety questions, provided administrative controls were in place to ensure that the blocks would be removed prior to the recirculation phase.
Training briefs 105 and 112, identifying the concerns and actions to be taken, were issued at that time.
Simultaneously, an evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part
was initiated.
Upon conclusion of this evaluation, on June 30, 1986, a Licensee Event Report (LER 250-86-028)
was filed identifying the design deficiency as raising the potential for the loss of minimum flow for the HHSI pumps with consequent pump failure in more than one train, and the temporary measures which were taken.
Also, at the time, FPL completed a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO).
The long term resolution for this item is under evaluation.
The inspector informed the licensee this item will be followed until completion.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte '
9.
Followup on Pr evio'usly Identified Inspector Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed)
IFI 250, 251/83-11-01, Concerning Corrective Actions For Fuel Handling Improved Lighting In Vessel.
During a
past refueling outage, a fuel assembly fell over during insertion.
The exact cause of the assembly falling over'was not determined.
The corrective action taken by the licensee for future refuelings when a fuel assembly that is being inserted and not guided by four surrounding surfaces is to use improved lighting in the vessel, use of a submersible TV camera to verify proper assembly seating, increased use of binoculars, and a requirement that the Nuclear Watch Engineer be present in the containment during fuel movement.
The inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 16200, Manipulator Crane Operating Instructions, Operating Procedure 16002.6, Preparations and Precautions for Refueling Fuel Shuffle, and Plant Change/Modification 82-315, Manipulator Crane Modification to verify that the licensee's corrective actions were implemented into these procedures.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 250, 251/84-20-01, Concerning Initial Criticality And Nuclear Design Check Test Procedure.
This IFI Consisted of four separate issues identified in paragraphs 5.b, 5.c, 6.b and 6.d of Inspection Report 50-250, 50-251/84-20.
Each issue will be discussed separately.
(1)
Paragraph 5.b - Operating Procedure 0204.3, Initial Criticality After Refueling, contained an option to allow performance of a specific physics test at or above the point of adding heat.
In order to perform the required physics test using this option, additional reactivity corrections were needed but not provided by the procedure.
Therefore, the option could not be used during the test.
The licensee changed Operating Procedure 0204.3 to delete this option.
The inspector reviewed this procedure and verified that the option to allow performance of physics testing at or above the point of adding heat has been deleted.
(2)
Paragraph 5.c -
One of the objectives of Operating Procedure 0204.3 is to verify proper operation of the reactivity computer.
The reactivity computer check was performed by determining a
calibration factor from the the average value of the reactivity change using the reactor period.
The procedure lacked instructions for performing the positive and negative reactivity changes.
The licensee has added instructions to this procedure to perform the positive and negative reactivity changes.
The inspector verified that the instructions for performing these changes were contained in the procedur r
(3)
Paragraph 6.b - Operating Procedure 0204.5, Nuclear Design Tests During Startup Sequence After Refueling, did not adequately address the action to be taken when the moderator temperature coefficient exceeded the specified acceptance criteria.
In addition, the procedure did not clearly verify that the acceptance criteria for this parameter was met.
The licensee modified the procedure to incorporate these issues.
(4)
Paragraph 6.d - Appendix G of Operating Procedure 0204.5 did not define the measured and calculated parameters.
The licensee has changed this section of the procedure to define these parameters.
Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's actions to correct the issues discussed in Sections 9.b.(1) through (4) above, this item is closed.
No violations were identified in the areas inspected.