IR 05000250/1985006
| ML17346B087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1985 |
| From: | Brewer D, Elrod S, Elrods S, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17346B085 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-85-06, 50-250-85-6, 50-251-85-06, 50-251-85-6, IEB-80-04, IEB-80-05, IEB-80-4, IEB-80-5, IEB-83-08, IEB-83-8, NUDOCS 8506210273 | |
| Download: ML17346B087 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/85-06 and 50-251/85-06 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL-33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
rc ll - April 8, 1985 Inspectors:
T. A.
eeb s,
en'or Resident Inspector Da e
S gned D.
R.
r w
,
s dent Inspector Da e
S gned Approved by:
Stephen A. Elro
, Section Chief Dat S'gned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 202 direct inspection hours at the site, including 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of backshift, in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Bulletin followup, Licensee Event Report followup, annual and monthly surveillance, maintenance observations and reviews, operational safety, engineered safety features walkdown, plant events, prepara-tion for refueling, and independent inspection.
Results:
Of the ten areas inspected, no violations were identified in nine areas and two violations were identified in one area (two separate occurrences of fai lure to meet Technical Specification surveillance requirements, paragraph 7).
No deviations were identified.
85Og21027 0500P250 85050>
pgg g90CK pgR
REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted
"C.
M. Wethy, Vice President Turkey Point K. N. Harris, Vice President St.
Lucie
"C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager - Nuclear
"J.
P. Mendieta, Services Manager Nuclear
"D. D. Grandage, Operations Superintendent Nuclear T. A. Finn, Operations Supervisor J.
A. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor B. A. Abrishami, Inservice Testing (IST) Supervisor D. Tomaszewski, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- E. A. Suarez, Technical Department Engineer D. A. Chancy, Corporate Licensing
"J. Arias, Regulation and Compliance Engineer
"J.
W. Kappes, Maintenance Superintendent Nuclear W.
R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance
"F.
H. Southworth, Electrical Department R. A. Longtemps, Assistant Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance
- E. F.
Hayes, Assistant Superintendent, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor R.
G. Mende, Reactor Engineer R.
E. Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor P.
W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor and Acting Operations Superintendent
~R.
M. Brown, Assistant, Health Physics Supervisor W.
C. Miller, Training Supervisor
"P. J.
Baum, Assistant Training Supervisor J.
M. Donis, Site Engineering Supervisor J.
M. Mobray, Site Mechanical Engineer L. C. Huenniger, Start-up Superintendent
"H. T. Young, Project Site Manager
"M. J.- Crisler, equality Control Supervisor R.
H. Reinhardt, guality Control Inspector
"K. L. Jones, Plant guality Assurance Superintendent
- J.
E.
Moaba, Performance Enhancement Program Manager J.
E. Price, Safety Engineering Group
- G.
MD Vaux, Safety Engineering Group T.
C. Grozan, Licensing Engineer P.
Pace, Licensing Engineer
"B. C. LaPira, Fire Protection Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, electricians, and security force members.
"Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
The exit meeting was held on April 5, 1985, with the persons noted above.
The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.
The items which were identified as violations requirements of Technical Specification (TS)
Instrument Calibration (250, 251/85-06-01);
requirements of TS 4. 15.2, Fire Protection 251/85-06-02).
were:
failure to meet the 4',
Power Range Nuclear and failure to meet the system surveillance (250, Licensee management was made aware of NRC concerns in the following areas:
battery water level correction for specific gravity readings, which ale addressed in vendor technical manuals, and associated procedure changes to include the correction factors (IFI 250, 251/85-06-03);
a review of the status of corrective actions addressed as part of the TS operability review
';.-.should be completed during the refueling on Unit 3 and prior to its restart (IFI 250, 251/85-06-04);
Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS) operability was an ongoing problem and more attention to maintenance is appropriate (IFI 250, 251/85-06-05);
and operation of the spent fuel pit leakage detection system and minimization of leakage potential from the spent fuel transfer canal will be procedurized ( IFI 250, 251/85-06-06).
The licensee stated that these items were receiving attention and were being followed and that an update on status would be provided by the end of April 1985, The licensee acknowledged the findings and agreed to the commitments.
3.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
a.
Monthly Update of Performance Enhancement Program (PEP)
The PEP was reviewed to determine if commitments were being met.
Status was discussed with the PEP Manager and with other members of management.
The facility upgrade project has progressed to the point of pouring concrete support columns for the new administrative building.
The schedule for completion of the building including the third floor is.
the end of December 1985.
The new Health Physics building is progressing toward its May 1985 completion, with move-in scheduled for July 1985, The schedule for the PEP continues to be met within acceptable limits and all modifications have been cleared by Region II managemen ~
~
b.
Previous Inspection Findings (OPEN)
Violation 250/84-39-03 resulted when a
Unit 3 power range Nuclear Instrument (NI) drawer was installed without benefit of an approved procedure.
The drawer was incorrectly installed in that the output leads from the upper and lower power range NI detectors of instrument 41.to the over power delta temperature (OPDT)
and over temperature delta temperature (OTDT) protective circuits were reversed.
This precluded the correct operation of one of three protective circuits.
Additional information is documented in report 250/84-39.
Corrective actions were proposed as described in FPL letter L-85-109.
The letter specifies that MP 12307.3 was revised to include steps which test the interconnections between the power range NI and the OPDT and OTDT protective circuits.
A review of the maintenance procedure (MP)
revealed that the procedure revision addressed only one of the two leads connecting these components.
The testing of the second lead was not included in the revision.
Consequently, this violation remains open.
The licensee is developing an additional revision to MP 12307.3 to include this lead and to correct violation 250, 251/85-06-01 which is discussed in.paragraph 7 of this report.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
IE Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)
The inspector discussed the requirements of pending IEB's with the licensee.
Based on an analysis of licensee supplied information and documentation, the inspector closed all action items relating to the following three bulletins:
(Closed - Units
and 4)
IEB 80-04 Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition.
NRC letter dated October 8,
1982, from NRR (Varga) to FPL (Uhrig), stated that the analysis is acceptable and no further action is required for this bulletin.
(Closed Units
and 4) IEB 80-05 Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks.
FPL letter of June 12, 1980, stated that adequate design and administrative features are in effect to preclude damage to tanks which would be susceptible.
Vacuum reliefs were added to the CVCS tanks following the August 1979 event in which the B CVCS tank was damaged due to low internal tank pressure.
(Closed Units
and 4) IEB 83-08 Electrical Circuit Breakers with Under-voltage Trip Feature in Use in Safety-Related Applications Other than the Reactor Trip System.
FPL letter, March 29, 1984, stated that undervoltage
trip attachments are not used in any switchgear other than the reactor trip breaker s.
The inspectors have verified this review.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; and the LER forms were complete.
A more detailed review was then performed to verify that:
the licensee had reviewed the event; corrective action had been taken; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and violation of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
(Closed)
LER 250/82-19 On December 23, 1982, while performing a control rod drive exerci se surveillance, rod J3 did not move.
Shutdown margins were verified.
The problem corrected itself on December 31, 1982, and further testing was not able to reproduce the problem.
The cause has not been determined, but is believed to have been crud which broke loose during the testing.
However, the unit has gone through a year of operation and was refueled in 1984 and is now shutdown for refueling without the problem recurring.
~
(Closed)
LER 250/83-15 On September 11, 1983, the heat tracing circuit from the Unit 3 boric acid filter to the Unit 3 charging pumps was declared inoperable due to a short circuit.
No blockage occurred in the affected lines and the heat tracing was repaired within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
TS allow one channel of heat tracing to be out of service for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> s.
The corrective actions have caused heat tracing to not be a continuing problem.
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation (61726/61700)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified; that the test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TS; that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met; that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved my management personnel; and that system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Quarterly Adjustment and Calibration of the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System Fire Protection Equipment - Annual Surveillance Fire Suppression System Monthly Flowpath Verification
Battery Sur veil lance Monthly and quarterly The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedures for battery testing per the TS and found that the procedures did not correct the specific gravity readings for electrolyte level.
TS 4.8.2 requires monthly equalizing charges and that the specific gravity and voltage readings are to be taken following the monthly equalizing charge.
This is being done even though the vendor manual recommends doing equalizing charges only when the. specific gravity or cell voltage falls to specific values.
The TS requires that water shall be added to restore level to normal and total water use shall be recorded.
The vendor manual for the old batteries does not discuss water level correction of specific gravity but the manuals for the new batteries do.
The resolution of the correction factors for specific gravity versus electrolyte level is an inspector followup item (IFI 250, 251/85-06-03).
The inspector reviewed the battery installations versus the available drawings and vendors manual recommendations and found no discrepancies.
The licensee found another set of drawings for 4B battery.
Inspection revealed that:
two of eight support brackets were missing (These were replaced.);
and two floor to ceiling brackets were found installed which are referenced in a vendor manual but are not on the drawing.
The as-built and as-found condition of this battery is being evaluated, but the current condition of the battery is satisfactory.
There are four batteries for the two units with each battery supplying two inverters.
Design changes (PC/M 83-05 and 83-06) to replace the batter ies and associated switchgear are in progress with the completion dates as shown.
Currently,, the following configuration exists:
3A New (Feb.
85)
Gould NCX-1800 1800 Amp Hour racks as-designed 3B removed C and D LC-25 A temporary battery
. is supplying the load (completion May 85)
1854 Amp Hour temporary racks 4A old (Sept.85)
Exide 648 Amp Hour racks as-designed 4B old (July 85)
C and D LC-31 2175 Amp Hour racks corrected On March 29, 1985, Maintenance Procedure (MP)
12307.3 was performed to calibrate the Unit 4 power range Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).
During the performance of the procedure, a typographical error was discovered which, through omission, prevented the completion of the axial flux tilt indicator calibration.
The error affected only power range (NI)
channel 41.
An on-the-spot change was issued to correct the discrepancy.
The error occurred in December 1984 when the procedure was updated to add a continuity check of the output signal from the power range drawer to the OPDT a'nd OTDT protection circuits.
Revision of the procedure was a corrective action for violation 250/84-39-03 which is discussed in paragraph 3 As a result of the typographical error, the inspector reviewed the quality assurance records associated with the previous performance of MP 12307.3.
The procedure was last completed on the Unit 3 power range nuclear instruments on March 18, 1985.
The typographical error was not detected by the technicians performing the March 18 calibration because they used a data record sheet as their procedural guide rather than the instructions specified by the procedural steps.
The record sheet contained data which could not be obtained by complying with the procedure.
A review was conducted of MP 12307.3 to determine its technical adequacy.
The inspector determined that the power range NI channel calibration did not address the continuity of the NI output signal from the B detector to the OPDT and OTDT protective circuits.
Consequently, the output of the detector was not verified to be received at the input to the protective circuits.
A review of archival records revealed that prior to December 1984 neither of the A or B detectors'utputs were verified to be received by these protective circuits during channel calibrations.
In December 1984, MP 12307.3 was modified to include a continuity verification of the protective signal.
The output of the B detector was not addressed.
The December procedure modification was incorporated as a
corrective action for violation 250/84-39-03 and is addressed in paragraph 3.
Technical Specification (TS)
4. 1, Table 4.'l-l, requires that, each power range NI channel be calibrated quarterly.
TS 1.7.3 requires that a channel calibration encompass the entire channel.
Contrary to the above, as of April 1, 1985, quarterly calibrations of the power range NI channels did not encompass the entire channel in that the power range NI output signal from each instrument's lower detector was not verified to supply an input to the OTDT and OPDT protective circuits.
Failure to comply with the requirements of TS 4. 1 is a
violation.
(250, 251/85-06-01)
A review was conducted of surveillance procedures related to monthly and annual fire protection system verifications.
A walkdown of the system was performed and is discussed in paragraph 10.
MP 15537.2,
"Fire Protection Annual Surveillance",
implements TS surveil-lance requirement 4. 15.2.a
~ 5 which requires the annual cycling of each testable valve in the fire protection system.
The inspector determined that prior to March 1, 1985, numerous testable valves in the system were not cycled annually.
On or shortly before that date, many valves were cycled as a corrective action for licensee identified discrepancies found during a
TS
'perability review.
The TS review resulted from a licensee commitment to the NRC and was completed on November 30, 1984.
The inspector determined that during the TS review, the licensee had not identified all system valves that required annual cycling.
Four post indicator valves (PIVs)
located in the main supply loop remained unaddressed.
These were PIVs 8, 10, 11, and 31.
Contrary to TS 4. 15.2.a.5, these four valves had not been cycled annually.
Unlike other valves, these
were not identified in=the licensee's November TS review indicating that the corrective action for a licensee identified problem was incomplete.
A review was also conducted to determine the adequacy of implementation of TS 4. 15.2.a.3 and 4. 18. 1.
Both of these TS require a monthly verification that flowpath valves are in their correct position.
During the November 1984 TS review, the licensee identified several valves previously not included in the monthly verification.
However, the licensee did not identify PIVs 8, 10, 11, and 31 as requiring monthly position verification.
Consequently, the corrective action taken for the licensee identified valves did not provide complete TS compliance.
Failure to comply with TS required survei llances is a
violation~
(250,251/85-06-02),
The other, licensee-identified, valves found not to comply with applicable sections of TS 4. 15 and 4. 18 will not result in the issuance of a violation because the licensee's actions meet the criteria of
CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section
".'V.
Maintenance Observations (62703 and 62700)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
limiting conditions for operations (LCO)
were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair record accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; par ts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; quality control (gC)
holdpoints were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved quality assurance (gA)
program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed:
Modification of the power supply for control relays PC-600 and PC-601 (PCM 84-132)
Component cooling pump motor removal Spent fuel pool ventilation damper repair
Charging pump piping weld repair On March 18, 1985, a leak was noticed at the discharge of the 3B charging pump on the branch line to the safety valve.
The weld that was leaking had been repaired for a pin-hole leak in January of 1984.
The crack which developed was along the repair weld.
The old weld was cut out at the socket and a
new weld made.
The operating plant's weld program was recently upgraded to conform with the new FPL weld program.
A review of the old weld records was conducted and the proper sign-offs had been made.
On March 22, 1985, the inspectors observed the implementation of Plant Change/Modification (PCM)84-132.
This PCM was designed to modify the power supplies to the control relays for pressure controllers (PCs)
600 and 601.
The non-vital power supply to each relay was changed to a class IE supply from a vital 120V AC distribution panel.
Two separate power trains were created to provide redundancy and to improve reliability.
During the maintenance activity, the inspectors observed that:
a.
Drawings were available and were utilized b.
Process sheets were utilized c.
Available drawings and process sheets did not contain conflicting information d.
Process sheets were accurately implemented e.
Supervisory involvement was adequate f.
guality Control Department involvement was adequate g.
Independent verification was performed h.
Procedures affected by the modification were updated i.
Tools requiring periodic calibration were within their allowed periodicity j.
Post maintenance testing was performed Following the completion of all steps identified on the process sheets, the electricians were asked by a,supervising engineer to take continuity readings on a relay.
The electricians removed several leads from relay-601 to facilitate this effort.
The leads were removed and reconnected without specific procedural authority.
An additional gC verification was performed to ensure that the leads were reconnected as specified by the process sheets.
Discussions were held with supervisory personnel to determine why the leads were removed without specific written instructions.
It was determined that the supervising engineer directed the leads be removed to facilitate the performance of continuity tests which were recommended by Contractor Field Procedure 16003-CFP-E-2,
"Installation of Electrical Cable and Terminations for Plant Modifications".
Continuity tests, though not required, were recommended whenever practical.
Because the tests were not required, they were inadvertently omitted from the process sheets.
The engineer was attempting to expeditiously obtain the test results and to meet the intent of the Contractor Field Procedur 'I tg
The inspector, as part of a group, initially verbalized the above deviation from administrative requirements.
It was understood that the licensee's gC inspector and maintenance supervision recognized the deviation and would have identified it momentarily.
In addition, the licensee took prompt corrective action to modify Contractor Field Procedure 16003-CFP-E-2 to specify that continuity tests would be performed before final equality Control (gC) termination inspections.
This eliminates the possibility of lead removal after the final (gC) inspection is corn'pleted.
Because of the minimal safety significance, the licensee's prompt corrective actions and the general maintenance practices observed during the performance of Field Procedure 16003-CFP-E-2, the inspector determined that this deviation from an administrative requirement was not symptomatic of a programmatic problem and constituted an isolated and promptly corrected event.
Therefore, this event will not result in a violation.
OP 0800.23, Startup testing for PC-600 and PC-601 for Unit 3 was reviewed and found adequate with all appropriate sign-offs complete and the technical content adequate.
Spent fuel pool ventilation louver repair is discussed in paragraph 12; preparation for refueling.
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) and verified the return to service of affected components.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interviews verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Unit 3 and Unit 4 to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
Emergency Diesel Generator s Auxiliary Feedwater System Fire Protection System 4160 volt and 480 volt switchgear Containment Spray System Emergency Containment Coolers Containment Penetrations Nuclear Instrumentation Drawers Refueling Water Storage High Head Safety Injection System Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Engineered Safety Features Wal kdown (71710)
The inspector verified operability of the fire suppression system, which is common to nuclear Units 3 and 4, and fossil Units 1 and 2, by performing a
complete walkdown of the accessible portion of the
'system.
The following specifics were reviewed and/or observed as appropriate:
i W
a.
that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration; b.
that the equipment conditions were satisfactory and items that might degrade performance were identified and evaluated (e.g.,
hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping was adequate, etc.);
c.
that instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning and that calibration dates were not exceeded; d.
that valves were in proper position, breaker alignment was correct, power was available, and valves were locked/lockwired as required; e.
local and remote position indication was compared and remote instrumentation was functional; f.
breakers and instrumentation cabinets were inspected to verify that they were free of damage and interference.
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Plant Events (93702)
An independent review was conducted of the following events.
On March 12, 1985, on Unit 4 duri ng performance of OP 1004.2, Reactor Protection Periodic Test, extraneous status lights were noticed to have alarmed.
These lights indicate an undervoltage condition on 4B 4160 volt bus.
Testing was secured and the subsequent investigation revealed that
relay UV 4B2 train A had failed in the open (safe) condition.
The relay was replaced and tested.
On March 14, 1985, a Unit 3 test of the turbine valves was conducted and resulted in the North East intercept valve sticking closed.
Load was reduced and the 3A condensate pump stopped.
A condenser low vacuum occurred due to reduced cooling flow through the operating steam jet air ejector.
The hogger was put on line and vacuum began to recover.
The intercept valve was reopened after a clogged oil orifice was cleared and the unit returned to service.
On March 15, 1985, the Unit 3 'control room operator noticed containment temperatures and reactor coolant pump (RCP)
motor temperatures increasing.
A unit shutdown was commenced at 10: 15 p.m.
as the 3C normal containment cooler (NCC)
stopped and, with two coolers, insufficient cooling was available.
At 2:30 a.m.,
the unit was off-line and at 3:25 a.m.
in hot shutdown.
The highest containment temperature was in the B
RCP cubicle at 125.8 degrees F.
The 3C NCC was repaired and the unit returned to service.
On March 22, 1985, the number 1 Waste Holdup Tank was overfi lied and spilled to the floor of the 2 ft. elevation of the auxiliary building in the rubber-lined room.
The primary water flush valve on the boric acid concentrator had been left open.
The room was pumped out.
On March 30, 1985, the Unusual Event was declared at 7:35 p.m.
as Unit 3 was being shutdown due to unqualified RTD inputs to the core subcooling monitors.
The unit was scheduled for shutdown for refueling and the RTDs were known to have to be upgraded during the outage.
No violations or deviations were identified in this section.
Preparati on for Re fuel ing (60705)
On March 20, 1985, the inspector observed maintenance repairs on the Unit 3 Spent.
Fuel Pool (SFP)
ventilation-louvers.
The repairs were necessary because one set of louvers failed to close when the ventilation fan was de-energized.
Failure of the louvers to close during a fuel handling casualty could allow increased contamination adjacent to the SFP building and is contrary to the ventilation system description contained in the FSAR.
The bottom louver on each of the two panels was not connected to the mechanical operating bar.
The bar was not long enough to reach the installed louver connection brackets.
Consequently, these two louvers were not capable of automatic operation.
One of the louvers was stuck in the open position.
It was subsequently closed by maintenance personnel.
An inspection of the louvers was conducted in May 1984 and excessive corrosion around the louver support frames was documented in Inspection Report 250,251/84-18.
Repair efforts have exclusively concerned improved mechanical operability.
No improvement has been made in the corroded louver frames.
The inspector determined that following the May 1984 inspection report, a
Request for Technical Assistance (RTA) was submitted by a member
of the Operations Department staff seeking an evaluation of the louvers.
The RTA was not pursued and was not incorporated in the licensee's RTA tracking and management program.
The March 20 maintenance required to restore louver operability adversely impacted a scheduled loading of new fuel.
The Operations Department renewed its efforts to obtain technical assistance in this area.
Current plans are to replace the louvers and associated support framing after identifying the original manufacturer.
A completion date has not been determined.
Temporary improvements in the framing have been made by the Maintenance Department and should suffice until louver replacement.
The High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters in the Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pit venti 1'at1on fan suction were replaced in November of 1984.
The component cooling water returning from the Unit 3 spent fuel pit cooler was noted to be 2100 GPM and the nuclear operator log requirement is that it be verified less than 2250 GPM.
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
Independent Inspection (92706)
During the report period, the inspectors routinely attended meetings with licensee management and monitored shift turnovers between shift supervisors (PSN), shift foreman (NWE) and licensed operators (CRO).
These meetings provided a daily status of plant operating and testing activities in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents.
Based on these discussions, the inspectors reviewed potential problem areas to independently assess their importance to safety; the proposed solutions; improvement and progress; and adequacy of corrective actions.
The inspector's reviews of these matters were not restricted to the defined inspection program.
Independent inspection efforts were conducted in the following areas:
Axial flux calibration of nuclear instrumentation Control point guard house fire protection requirements 4160 volt switchgear fire protection requirements Spent fuel pool (SFP)
leakage detection system status and modifications (PCM 76-17B)
Request for Technical Assistance (RTA) program improvements Health Physics refueling outage preparation Securi ty drug briefi ng Review of proposed TS for the auxiliary feedwater system The Operating Supervisor is to develop a procedure for operation of the SFP leakage detection system-including valve numbering and periodic leakage surveillance.
No leakage detection is available under the spent fuel transfer canal and an effort-to continues to minimize the leakage and to minimize the time the canal has water in it.
This is an inspector followup item (250,251/85-06-06).
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie I r