IR 05000250/1985016
| ML17346B099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1985 |
| From: | Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17346B098 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 50-250-85-16, 50-251-85-16, IEB-80-11, IEIN-85-10, NUDOCS 8506270686 | |
| Download: ML17346B099 (16) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/85-16 and 50-251/85-16 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 3310,2, Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
April 29 May 3, 1985 Inspector:
J. J.
Lenah n
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F. Jape, S ction Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY s-/x >le Date Signed w// 7/B Date Signed t
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 35 inspector-hours on site in the areas of the snubber surveillance program, control of heavy loads (NUREG 0612),
licensee identified items (LER),
followup on IEB 80-11 and IEN 85-10, and Unit 3 containment reactor building protective coating.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Arias, Jr.,
Regulation and Compliance Engineer
"C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager Nuclear
"J.
M. Donnis, Site Engineering Supervisor
- E. Hartman, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Specialist
"J
~ A. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor D. Osbourne, Civil Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
"C. Wethy, Vice President Turkey Point Other licensee employees contacted included two field engineers.
Other Organization G.
P. Nutwell, Project Engineer, Bechtel NRC Resident Inspectors D.
R. Brewer
"T. A. Peebles
"Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 3, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new item was identified during this inspection:
Unresolved Item 250, 251/85-16-01 - Adequacy of Containment Building Protective Coating, paragraph 5.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio I I
t 4.
Unresolved Items f
Unresolved items are matter about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-
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5.
tions.
One new unresolved item was identified during this inspection as discussed in paragraph 5.
Independent Inspection Effort Containment Building Coating (92706)
The inspector walked down portions of the Unit 3 containment building and examined the condition of protective coating on the containment liner plate and concrete surfaces.
This examination disclosed that the protective coating was peeling, blistering or flaking in several areas on the liner plate and on the concrete walls.
The characteristics of the protective coatings are specified in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Section 5. 1.6.2.J and FSAR Table 5. 1.6-2.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector stated that the condition of the protective coating inside the Unit 4 containment building was similar to Unit 3.
Further discussions with licensee personnel disclosed that the adequacy of existing protective coating inside the containment building has been questioned by QA during Audit Number QAO-TPB-84-04-088 which was completed in October 1984.
The position of Florida Power and Light (FP&L)
Power Plant Engineering concerning the adequacy of the existing coating, documented in an inter-office memo to K. L. Jones from H. T. Young, dated April 15, 1985, subject:
Response to Quality Assurance Audit QAO-TPB-84-04-088, is that Quality Assurance (QA) personnel can determine the adequacy of the existing coating by reviewing QC inspection documentation associated with application of the coating.
Considering the condition of the protective coating, the inspector questioned whether this suggested corrective action was an appropriate response to the audit finding.
Further discussions with licensee management personnel during the exit interview disclosed that the licensee has established an engineering task force to address this issue.
Pending further review by NRC regarding the promptness of correcting the defective coating and the adequacy of the licensee's corrective action program, this problem was identified to the licensee as Unresolved Item 250, 251/85-16-01, Adequacy of. Containment Building Protective Coating.
6.
Snubber Surveillance Program, Units 3 and 4 (61729)
The inspector reviewed procedures and quality records related to the snubber surveillance program and inspected selected snubbers on safety-related piping systems.
Acceptance criteria examined by the inspector appear in Technical Specifications 3'3 and 4.14.
a.
Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedure The inspector examined the following procedures which control snubber surveillance activities:,
'I (1)
FP&L Maintenance Procedure number 0707.32, Snubber Removal and Replacement r
(2)
FP&L Administrative Procedure 0190.83, Mechanical Shock Arrestor Surveillance Program b
E,
(3)
FP5L Administrati ve Procedure 0190. 85, Functi onal Testing of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (4)
FP8L Operating Procedure 0209.9, Visual Examination of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (5), Paul-Munroe QA Procedure OSS5-QAP 10. 1-1, Visual Examination of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (6)
Paul-Munroe QA Procedure OSS-QAP 10.2-1, Limited Functional Examination (VT-4) of Mechanical Shock Arrestors (7)
Paul-Munroe QA Procedure OSS-QAP 11. 1-1, Functional Testing of PSA Mechanical Shock Arrestors l
b.
Inspection of Snubbers The inspector performed a visual inspection of the snubbers listed below and verified that the snubbers were not damaged, that attachments to the supporting structure and piping were secure, and that the proper size snubbers were installed:
. The inspector.
also verified that the correct serial numbers were recorded and that snubber settings were correct.
,Snubbers examined were as follows:
(1)
Snubber numbers PTP-3-1008, 3-1011, and 3-1012, on the Unit 3 main steam system (2)
Snubber numbers PTP-3-1000, 3-1001, and 3-1002 on the auxiliary feedwater system (common to both units)
(3)
Snubber numbers PTP-4-1099 and 4-1100 on the Unit 4 high head safety injection system C.
Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed the following snubber surveillance quality records:
(1)
Results of functional tests performed on Unit 3 snubbers through this inspection date (2)
Results of visual inspections performed on ten Unit 3 snubbers (3)
QA audit number QAO-PTP-84-03-542, Snubbers; conducted between March 26 and May 31, 1984 t
Review of the results of functional tests performed on the snubbers tested as of the inspection date disclosed that approximately
percent of the snubbers failed to meet the licensee's functional test acceptance criteria.
Two of the failed snubbers did not achieve activation within the specified range (acceleration less than 0.02g),
and three had measured running drag (internal frictional resistance against axial movement) slightly in excess of the licensee's limit of one percent of the snubber's rated capacity.
The remaining snubber failures were classified as failures because the measured running drag forces had increased more than 50 percent since the last functional test performed in May of 1984.
However, review of these results disclosed that these increased measured drag forces were in the range of 0. 1 to 0.25 percent of rated snubber load, well below the licensee's limit of one percent.
The inspector reviewed the nonconformance reports written for each snubber test failure.
This review disclosed that snubbers which had failed activation tests and had measured drag forces greater than one percent would be replaced with new snubbers.
However, based on an engineering evaluation, the licensee decided to reinstall the snubbers that experienced the more than
percent increase in measured drag since the last surveillance because the results of the functional tests indicated that snubbers meet the licensee's acceptance criteria for achieving activation at less than 0.02g and have a measured drag less than one percent of rated load.
The inspector concurred with the results of the engineering evaluations.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector examined the procedures listed below which address require-ments for safe handling of heavy loads stipulated in NUREG 0612.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are commitments contained in licensee letters to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated September 4,
1981; November 12, 1981; August 10, 1982; March 15, 1983; and August 15, 1983, subject:
Procedures examined were as follows:
a.
Maintenance Procedure 0736, Heavy Load Handling b.
Maintenance Procedure 1407. 1, Reactor Vessel
-
Removal of Missile Shield c.
Maintenance Procedure 1407.8, Reactor Vessel Removal of Vessel Head d.
Maintenance Procedure 1407.9, Reactor Vessel Removal of Upper Internals e.
Maintenance Procedure 1407. 10, Reactor Vessel Internals l
Maintenance Procedure 1407. 11, Reactor Vessel Head Installing Upper Installation of Vessel g.
Maintenance Procedure 1407. 18, Reactor Vessel Installation of Missile Shield
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
(Open)
IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design FP&L submitted its 60-day IE Bulletin 80-11 response for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to NRC Region II in a letter dated July 24, 1980.
FP&L submitted its final report (180 day)
on IEB 80-11 to NRC Region II in letters dated November 4, 1980; February 11, 1980; and April 3, 1981.
FP&L provided additional information to NRC regarding masonry wall design criteria in letters to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated May 27, 1983; November 7, 1983; January 7,
1984; and February 1,
1984, subject:
Masonry Wall Design Report for Additional Information.
The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulation issued a
safety evaluation report on masonry wall design for Turkey Point Units
and
and concluded that the masonry walls would withstand specified design load conditions, provided that results of tests of in-place materials in the existing wall demonstrated that the materials meet or exceed design requirements.
These tests (Masonary wall prison tests) will be performed in the summer of 1985 and final evaluation of the test results will be completed by late 1985.
On April 6, 1985, the licensee reported to NRC Region II that numerous masonary walls in the Control Building did not comply with the original design/construction requirements.
This problem was discovered during modification of the control building and was reported to NRC as a
Licensee Event Report (LER).
As a result of deficient masonry walls reported in the LER, it was necessary for the licensee to develop an inspection program to determine as-built conditions of the masonry walls, perform engineering evaluations to determine necessary corrective actions, and modify the defective walls to comply with design requirements.
The inspector previously examined the licensee's masonry wall inspection program during an inspection conducted on May 26 27, 1983 (See Inspection Report number 50-250, 251/83-21).
The inspector discussed the status of the masonry wall repair program with licensee and Bechtel engineers.
These discussions disclosed that all wall repairs have been completed except for two walls and portions of two walls forming the battery rooms on elevations 30 and 42 of the control building.
These repairs will be completed by July 1985 in conjunction with a project to rerack the batteries.
The repairs involved addition of rebar and/or grout to the walls, complete removal of the walls, removal and reconstruc-tion of the walls, and/or addition of external steel braces to the walls.
The inspector walked down the elevation
and 42 levels of the control building and verified that wall numbers C-30-7, C-30-8, C-30-9, C-30-11, through C-30-18 and C-42-1 through C-42-4 had been removed as required.
The inspector examined quality records for modification of wall numbers C-30-6 and C-30-10 around the mechanical equipment room.
These repairs involved removal and rebuilding of wall number C-30-10, and addition of grout, rebar, and external steel supports to wall number'-30-6.
Records examined included those covering inspection of structural steel installation, reinforcing steel installation, grouting, welding, and installation of concrete
expansion anchors.
IEB 80-11 will remain open pending completion of repairs to the remaining walls, completion of the masonry wall prism tests, and completion of evaluation of the test results by NRC and the licensee.
Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
IE Information Notice 85-10, Tendon Anchorhead Failures The inspector reviewed a Bechtel letter dated March 8, 1985, documenting evaluation by Bechtel of IEN 85-10 regarding the problem of the Farley tendon anchorhead failures and the potential for a similar problem in the Turkey Point containment post-tensioning system.
Bechtel's evaluation concluded that the Turkey Point anchorheads should not experience similar damage for the follow reasons:,.
a.
The anchorhead materials are made of ASTM A-107 C1045H.R.
which is less susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement than the AISI 4140 material used at Farley.
b.
The tendon sheathing and grease cans are made of carbon steel instead of the galvanized steel used at Farley; therefore, no source of zinc exists.
c.
The donut-shaped anchorheads used at Turkey Point do not allow water entrapment, unlike the configuration of the anchorheads on Farley.
d.
The stress distribution on Turkey Point'
anchor head i s different than that on Farley's.
The stressing force is applied through the center hole as opposed to the outside.
e.
The total force per tendon is approximately one half that on Farley.
The inspector examined the quality records documenting tendon surveillance inspection performed on Units 3 and 4 one year, three years, and five years after completion of the structural integrity test (construction).
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appear in Technical Specifica-tion 4.4.5.
No major deficiencies were noted during the tendon surveil-lances.
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)
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(Closed)
LER (250-83-06):
Control Building Masonry Walls.
This LER was reported to NRC Region II on April 6, 1983.
The licensee submitted written reports on April 19 and June 20, 1983.
During modification of the control room and computer room, the licensee discovered that nine masonry walls did not comply with the original design requirements.
Specifically, it was discovered that the cells in the masonry units did not contain grout and reinforcing steel required
by the design drawings.
After this problem was identified, the licensee and the licensee's Architect-Engineer, Bechtel, developed an inspection program to investigate the balance of the masonry walls in the proximity of safety-related equipment in the control building and to develop corrective actions and necessary repair.
As discussed in paragraph
above, all repairs have been completed except for two walls and portions of two walls.
The followup on. the repair program is discussed in paragraph 8, above.
Additional followup on this problem will be performed during final close out of IEB 80-11.
LER 250-83-06 is closed.
(Open)
LER (250-85-09):
This item was reported to NRC in a report dated May 1, 1985.
On April 1, 1985, the licensee determined that an evaluation required by the Technical Specifications (TS)
was not completed within the allowable time limits.
On December 18, 1984, and on March 16, 1985, snubber number 3-1034, which was installed on the Unit 3 steam generator (SG)
blowdown system, was found to be inoperable.
A nonconformance report (NCR)
was written in both instances and the disposition of each NCR was to replace the damaged snubbers with new snubbers.
On March 20, 1985, the damaged snubber s were examined further and found to be locked up (inoperable).
The TS requires the components supported by inoperable snubbers to be evaluated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Although the snubbers were replaced within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period, the evaluation on the system was not performed.
Since this problem was discovered, an evaluation has been performed on the SG blowdown system.
The results of the evaluation showed that the condition of the snubbers had no adverse effect on the SG blowdown system.
Administrative Procedure Numbers 0190.83 and 0190.85 and Operating Procedure 0209.9 have been written since this problem occurred to clarify the steps necessary for removal of snubbers.
Procedures used by backfit construction personnel are being reviewed to determine if additional revisions are necessary to prevent recurrence of this problem.
LER 250-85-09 will remain open pending fur ther review by NRC, and completion of the licensee's corrective action.
(Open)
LER (250-85-11):
This item was reported to NRC Region II in a report dated May 6, 1985.
On April 6 and 8, 1985, two safety related snubbers, were removed from the reactor coolant pressurizer spray system by Construction Backfit personnel prior to performance of the visual inspection required by TS 4. 14. 1.
This problem is similar to a violation identified by the inspector during an inspection conducted on May 1-4, 1984 (See Inspection Report number 50-250, 251/84-15).
The snubbers were removed under PCM 81-146.
The licensee determined that the cause of the event was inadequate guidance to construction backfit personnel to properly implement the TS requirements.
The licensee has revised procedures which control removal of snubbers and has held discussion with cognizant backfit personnel on the need to inspect snubbers prior to removal for maintenance and/or backfit wor ~,
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LER 250/85-11 will remain open pending further review by NRC of the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action I a
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