IR 05000250/1981025
| ML17341A855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341A850 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.5, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM 50-250-81-25, 50-251-81-25, NUDOCS 8202050140 | |
| Download: ML17341A855 (18) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-251/81-25 and 50-251/81-25 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Florida Inspector:
C R. Vogt-L we Approved by:
C H.
C.
Dance, ection C le
, Dsvisson of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection
/1 Z.r D te igned rc'
e gned Inspection on September 26 - October 25, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 117 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee event report followup; Post THI requirements imple-mentation followup; followup on 10 CFR Part 21 report; Unit 4 shutdown for refueling; radioactive wastes systems; surveillance test observation; plant operations; and plant tours.
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in seven areas; one violation was found in one area (Violation - failure to use an existing maintenance procedure - paragraph 5).
8202080140 820i20
. PDR ADDCK 05000250
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees DETAILS
- J.
K. Hays, Plant Manager, Nuclear J.
P. Mendieta, Maintenance Superintendent Nuclear D.
W. Haase, Operations Superintendent-Nuclear J.
P.
Lowman, Assistant Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance-L. L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance W.
R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent Electrical Maintenance J.
W. Kappes, Instrumentation and Control Supervisor V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor A. E. Byrnes, Auxiliary Building Supervisor V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor J.
S.
Wade, Chemistry Supervisor P.
W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor J.
H. Hopkins, Rad Waste Supervisor D.
W. Jones, guality Control Supervisor K. N. York, Document Control Supervisor J.
A. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor J.
C. Balaguero, Licensing Engineer
- S. Feith, Operations guality Assurance Supervisor Nucl ear
- Nuclear
- Attended exit interview T. Essinger, Assistant Manager gA Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview 3.
4.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 2, 1981, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee was informed of the violation identified during the inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve non'compliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5b and 12 I'I
5.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or technical specificaiton conditions had been identified.
- 251-81-10,
"A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFWP)
- 251-81-11, Boron Injection Tank flow Path Blockage
'a ~
With respect to 251-81-10, while the inspector was reviewing docu-mentation relating to maintenance on the "A" AFWP performed subsequent to the date of occurence of LER 251-81-10, an examination of plant work order PWO-2838 was conducted.
This work order was commenced on September 30, 1981, and dealt with the inspection and repair of the "A" AFWP throttle trip valve.
The inspector noted that although main-tenance procedure N.P.
7307.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Throttle Trip Valve Overhaul", addresses the work,that was performed, the procedure was not referenced, as required, on the PlJO form pre-planning section resulting in the unavailability of documentary evidence that it was followed during the performance of maintenance on this safety-related system.
Paragraph 7.0,
"Records Required" of tl.P.
7307.4, states that paragraph 9.0, "Detailed Procedure" of tl.P.
7307.4 is a quality assurance record and shall be retained in accordance with the applicable document control requirements.
Discussions with the maintenance foreman disclosed that, at the time, it was not realized that the maintenance involved was covered in an existing 'plant procedure,and consequently tl.P.
7307. 4 was not used.
Failure to follow procedure H.P.
7307.4 constitutes a violation (250, 251/81-25-01).
b.
In reference to 251/81-11, the licensee's preliminary evaluation during the performance of the full flow test on the discharge check valves of the safety injection pumps indicated that the obstruction was located somewhere at the inlet of the boron injection tank (BIT).
The heat tracing temperatures logged by the nuclear operator prior to the observed obstruction were studied and appeared to be within acceptable limits.
Final cause of the obstruction was ascribed to missing insulating material on a portion of piping at the inlet to the BIT, which had allowed the temperatures in the pipe area just upstream of the inlet motor operated valves to fall below the crystallization point of the boric acid solution.
A visual inspection was conducted of all the piping around the BIT and no additional uninsulated sections were found.
The maintenance department will install the required insulation prior to Unit 4 startup from current refueling outage.
In addition to installation of the insulation comprehensive review by the licensee is currently underway to identify possibly further corrective action that would preclude this event from recurring.
The adding and/or
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repositioning of the heat sensors on the piping with respect to the location of the heat tracing lines are being considered.
A final evalution of this matter will be completed by the licensee prior to the unit 4 startup.
The licensee has stated that this is the first observed blockage of this location of the system.
Final dispositioning of this matter will be tracked as an unresolved item 50-251/81-25-05.
Followup of Post THI Requirements Implementation (NUREG-0737)
Item I.C.5 -
Feedback of Operating Experience - A recent review of this item is addressed in inspection report 50-250, 251/81-16.
That report contains a description of the commitment3 made by the licensee (Plant t1anager)
to strengthen the administrative controls required by modifying administrative procedure A.P. 0103.15 by September 1, 1981.
A reinspection of this item on October 9 revealed that A.P.
0103. 15 had not yet been revised to include the items described in the commit<ment3contained on page 5 of inspection report 50-250, 251/81-16.
When this finding was brought to the attention of the licensee a
new date of December 1,
1981 was requested for implementation of the revision.
This item will remain open pending a
review of the revised procedure.
Item I.C.6 -
Procedure for Verifying Correct Performance of Operatinp Activities - The inspector confirmed that the licensee met his commit~ment~
of strengthening the administrative controls in the areas of independent verification.
Procedure A.P. 103.4, "In-plant Equipment Clearance Orders",
has been revised to reflect the independent verification requirements of part 3 and 5 of item I.C.4.
This item is closed.
Item II.E.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) Initiation and Flow Indication - The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans for upgrading the AFWS initiation and flow indication to safety grade.
At the present time, the licensee intends to complete the upgrade prior to the Unit 4 startup from the current refueling outage.
This item will remain open.
Report of "Substantial Safety Hazard" in Accordance with 10 CFR Part
On October 20, 1981, the Plant tanager - Nuclear advised the resident inspector of a potential part 21 report.
The licensee received a modifi-cation from Westinghouse on October 19, 1981, describing a potential substantial safety hazard concerning the performance of the Westinghouse manufactured NBFD relay identified as relay style number 5072A49 (followed by the letter G and a two digit number, depending on pole configuration),
with coil style number 1271C50G01.
The notification indicated that the relay was first made available in December of 1976.
The concern expressed by the manufacturer, is that the results of their investigations of the failure rates of NBFD relays indicate the voltage spike generated through current interruption to the relay coil, could cause arc-over and a sub-sequent open circuit at the junction between the coil coinding and the lead wire.
The vendor indicate that NBFD relay failure reports received to date, have been in those applications where the relay is constantly energized under normal operations (i.e., reactor trip circuitry).
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At the time the licensee received notification of this substantial safety hazard from Westinghouse, Unit 3 was in cold shutdown and unit 4 was at 100K but has since been shutdown for a refueling outage.
The licensee intends to replace all affected relay coils during the current plant outage (Unit 3 is currently is a steam generator/turbine generator replacement outage and Unit 4 is in a refueling outage) with a newly improved relay coil design offered by Westinghouse.
An initial evaluation indicates a total of 46 BFD type relays in the Reactor Protection Racks and
BFD type relays in the safeguards system racks.
The inspector will review the implementation of corrective action during a subsequent inspection prior to the startup of Unit 4.
(50-250, 251/81-25-03).
8.
Unit 4 Refueling Outage - Core VII/VIII On October 19, 1981, operating procedure O.P.
0205.1, "Unit Shutdown, Full Load to Hot Shutdown Conditions",
was commenced at 1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br /> and completed at 0137 hours0.00159 days <br />0.0381 hours <br />2.265212e-4 weeks <br />5.21285e-5 months <br /> on October 20, 1981.
Draining of the Reactor Coolant system per O.P.
1005.1 began at 0320 hours0.0037 days <br />0.0889 hours <br />5.291005e-4 weeks <br />1.2176e-4 months <br /> on October 21, 1981, once O.P.
0205.2,
"Reactor Shutdown, Hot Shutdown to Cold shutdown Conditions" had been completed.
The outage is expected to lqst approximately forty days and will include a
steam generator tube inspection program and preventive plugging as applicable.
Cycle VIII for Unit 4 was designed using 32 of the fresh fuel elements originally scheduled for Cycle VIII on Unit 3 but which were only in the Unit 3 core until the conclusion of the post refuel startup testing just prior to synchronizing the unit.
At that time, following the damage sustained by the Unit 3 electrical generator, there 32 assemblies were removed from the Unit 3 core and transferred to,the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.
9.
Radioactive Waste Systems a ~
Liquid 'Wastes:
On October 21, 1981, the inspector observed the following:
(1)
Performance of nuclear chemistry procedure NC-43,
"Sampling and Analysis of the contents of Liquid Waste Tanks for Gross Beta-Gamma or Isotopic Radioactivity" which included observation of the drawing of a 500 ml sample from monitor tank B and its subsequent isotopic analysis; (2)
Performance of nuclear chemistry procedure NC-44, "Preparation of a Liquid Release Permit", resulting in the issuance of Liquid Release Permit number 81-589 for the release of the contents of Monitors Tank B.
The inspector ascertained that the specific activity of the sample (in microcuries per milliliter) from monitor tank B was within the release limits applicable to controlled radioactive liquid discharge to the circulating wate ~
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(3)
Performance of portions of operating procedure O.P.
5153.2,
"Waste Disposal System - Controlled Liquid Release to the Circulating Water", applicable to the release of monitor tank B using the "B" pump.
(4)
Performance of portions of nuclear chemistry procedure NC-91,
"Determination of Boron Concentration in Aqueous Solutions and Standardization of Reagents used in the Analysis", related to the determination of the boron concentration in the A, B, and C boric acid storage tanks.
The inspectors ascertained from the results of the sample titrations that the boron concentration for each tank was within the required range.
During the management interview conducted on November 2, 1981, the inspector pointed out to the licensee that the three Nuclear Chemistry procedures addressed above did not contain a "Record Required" section typically found in other plant procedures and addressed in paragraph 8.7. 15 of administrative procedure A.P.
0109. 1, "Preparation, Revision and Approval of Procedures".
Paragraph 5.6 of A.P. 0109.01 assigns the responsibility for reviewing procedural records retention provisions to the guality Control department.
The licensee committed to performing a
review of the record retention provisions applicable to nuclear chemistry procedures and to the incorporation of the necessary provision into the procedures by February 1,
1982.
Inspection of the fulfillment of this committment will be tracked as open item 250/81-25-04.
b.
Solid Wastes:
On October 8, 1981, the inspector reviewed the following:
(1)
Operating procedures:
OP 11550.42,
"Handling and Storage of Radioactive Waste" OP 11550.45,
"Release of Material from the Radiation Controlled Area" OP 11550.46,
"Shipping and Receiving Radioactive Material" OP 11550.47,
"Compacting Solid Waste" (2)
The log book maintained by the radwaste supervisor entitled
"Shipment of Radioactive Material from Plant Turkey Point" (3)
The documentation associated with the fol,lowing two shipments of radioactive material:
Shipment no.81-079 - consisting of a 170 cubic fooot Hittman resin lier shipped to the Barnwell Waste Management Facility on October 7, 198 l
Shipment no.81-076 - consisting of twn 105 cubic foot low specific activity boxes shipped to Richland, Washington on September 30, 1981.
c.
Shipment of tiodel No.
NFS-4 Cask:
The inspector ascertain that on October 17, 1981, cask model no.
NFS-4, serial no.
NAC-1D was shipped from the site empty and consigned to Babcock and Wilcox Research Division in Lynchburg, Virginia.
The case was transported by the Tristate Motor Transit Co.
Surveillance Test Observation The inspector witnessed the performance of the monthly periodic test of the Containment Spray Pumps for Unit 4.
This test was performed in accordance with operating procedure O.P.
4404. 1, "Containment Spray Pumps - Periodic Test", dated June 4, 1981.
The test was performed on October 6, 1981.
The inspector verified the following aspects of this surveillance test:
procedure conformed to technical specification requirements and proper licensee review, test instrumentation was calibrated; removal of the system from service; conduct of the surveillance test; restoration of the system to service; review of the test data for accuracy and completeness; independent calculation of selected test results data to verify its accuracy; con-firmation that surveillance test documentation was reviewed and that discrepancies were rectified; test results satisfied technical specification requirements; testing was done by qualified personnel; and surveillance schedule for this test was met.
Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during the report period.
The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings, and recording, annunciator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls, and vital area controls.
Informal discussions were held with operators, and other personnel on work activities in progress and status of safety-related equipment or systems.
On October 8, 1981, the inspector observed work in progress associated with the troubleshooting of the 4A Inverter.
Earlier, a trip of breaker 3A46 (connecting the 4A Inverter to its power supply from D.C.
Bus 3A) had caused power interruption to AC Vital Bus 4P07 which is normally supplied by the 4A inverter
.
Loss of power to AC Vital Bus 4P07 put all the channel II protection instrumentation in the trip mode causing a turbine runback from
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100% power due to a one out of four runback logic on the nuclear instrumentation system.
The cause of the inverter failure was attributed to a fault in the AC filtering unit.
After the repair was accomplished, the inverter was load tested satisfactorily and released to operations.
The inspectors ascertained that work on this system was performed under plant work order PWO-3475 and in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures.
The inspector observed performance of maintenance procedure 7307.4,
Pump Turbine Throttle Trip Valve Overhaul",
on the B
AFW Pump.
Work was accomplished under PWO-2843.
The inspector ascertained that the following actions were properly executed:
obtaining equipment clearance from operations; disassembly, inspection, repair,and reassembly of the valve and trip linkage; testing of pump in accordance with administrative procedure A.P. 190.28,
"tlechanical Test Control (Post Maintenance)".
No violations were identified within the areas inspected.
12.
Plant Tours During the inspection report period, the inspector performed a walkdown of portion of procedure O.P.
4103. 1, "High Lead Safety Injection and containment Spray Lineup for Automatic Operation".
At the time of the walkdown, Unit 3 was in an, extended steam generator repair outage and Unit 4 was operating at 100K power.
The inspector made the following observations:
a.
Step 8.2.A of the procedure requires valves 870A and 870B ("Sectionalizing Valves SIS Pumps Suction Header" ) to be closed - these valves were found locked open.
Also valves 892A and 892B (Sectionalizing Valves SIS Recirculation Header)
were required to be closed and were found open with active clearances hung.
A review of the system diagrapm and a discussion with operations personnel revealed that the as found valve configuration was the correct one based on the desire to have suction to the SI pumps lined up to the Unit 4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) due to Unit 3 being in an extended outage.
The licensee pointed out that O.P.
4103. 1 was really based on both units being in opertion and as such did not adequately reflect the actual plant configuration.
The licensee agreed to revise O.P.
4103. 1 in a manner that would enable recognition of configurations other than both units at power by December 15, 1981.
This will be tracked as inspector follow item 250, 251/81-25-02.
b.
Step 8.2.7 requires manual valve 4-895M (Boron Injection Tank Drain) to be closed.
The inspector noted this valve to be open and a ball valve, directly downstream of 4-895fl and not reflected on the system diagram to be closed.
After the inspector pointed this out to the on duty nuclear operator, the latter proceeded to shut 4-895M.
This discrepancy was pointed out to the licensee who indicated that a review of the matter would be conducted.
During a subsequent tour of the BIT
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tank room towards the end of inspection report period, the inspector noted that the ball valve downstream of 4-895M had been removed.
In an attempt to review the matter further, the inspector held discussions with maintenance personnel.
As of this writing, it appears that removal of the valve was performed without a written plant work order and as such may be contrary to current plant procedures.
This item is thus unresolved pending further review by the inspector (250, 251/81-25-04).
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