IR 05000250/1981018
| ML17341A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Ignatonis A, Marsh W, Vogt R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341A578 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-81-18, 50-251-81-18, NUDOCS 8110160545 | |
| Download: ML17341A580 (10) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,G EORG IA30303 I
Report Nos. 50-250/81-18 and 50-251/81-18
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at T rkey Point site. near Homestead, Florida Inspectors:
R. J.
Vog -Lowell C
W.
C.
Marsh Dte iged D te igned e
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'I A. J.
natoni r
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Approved by:
H.
C.
Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on July 26 - August 25, 1981 Areas Inspected Da e Signed F'/
Dat Si ned This routine inspection involved 161 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of (1) Licensee action on previous inspection findings; (2) Action on previous inspector followup items; (3) Licensee event report (LER) followup; (4)
Plant operations; (5) Unit 4 outage.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H.
E. Yaeger, Site Hanager J.
K. Hays, Plant Hanager - Nuclear J.
E. Hoore, Operations Superintendent
- Nuclear
- D. W. Haase, Technical Department Supervisor J.
P.
Lowman, I&C Department Supervisor D.
W. Jones, gC Supervisor B. A. Abrishami, Systems Test Engineer V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor J.
C. Balaguer o, Licensing Engineer J.
P. Hendieta, Haintenance Superintendent
- Nuclear S. H: Feith, gA Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 1,
1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee was informed that there were no violations or deviations identified during the inspec-tion.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deviation (250, 251/80-10-02),
Commitment in IE Rpt.
79-24 to have Haintenance Procedures for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The inspector confirmed the existence of the following approved maintenance procedures:
H.P. 7307.2, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Disassembly, Inspection Repair and Assembly" (Latest Revision approved 9-18-80)
H.P. 7307.3, "Auxilairy Feedwater Pump Turbine Overhaul" (Latest Revision approved 2-29-80)
H.P. 7307.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Turbine Throttle Trip Valve Overhaul" (Latest Revision approved 2-29-80)
(Closed) Infraction (250, 251/79-19-01), Three Examples of Failure to Implement Procedures.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action and had no further question e
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(Closed)
Unresolved (250/79-24-02),
Diesel Generator Transformer Brackets.
This unresolved item was upgraded'to a deficiency (250, 251/79-26-02)
and closed out in IE report 79-31.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Followup Items (Closed)
(250/79-24-03)> Licensee Commitment to have maintenance procedure on the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
See closeout of item 250, 251/80-10-02 in section 3 of this report.
(Closed)
(50-250, 251/78-28-03),
Revision of O.P.
0204.5 to require Review of Results by Responsible Person.
The inspector reviewed the latest approved revision of O.P.
0204.5,
"Nuclear Design Check Tests During Startup Sequence After Refueling" dated 4/23/81 and noted that a provision had been incorporated in the procedure requiring the Reactor Engineer to document with his signature the approval of the results.
(Closed) IFI (250, 251/81-05-04), Timely Incorporation of Technical Specifi-cation Admendments.
The inspect'ors have followed the incorporation of ten amendments to the facility technical specifications with the exception of the two discussed in inspection report 250, 251/81-05 (which took in excess of 60 days to incorporate into site controlled documents),
the amendments have been averaging between 40 and 45 days from receipt at the corporate office to distribution on site.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
- 250-81-13> Containment structure.
- 251-81-08, RCS Leakage from Pressurizer Spray Valve.
With respect to 250-81-13, the inspector examined the void, reviewed the repair procedure, and observed the accomplishment of the repair.
In the first attempt to pour the concrete, the temperature exceeded by 1F; the maximum valve allowed by the specifications for the 5000 psi concrete and the load was rejected.
The repair was completed without further difficulty the next da ~
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7.
With respect to 251/81-08 it was determined that no engineering evaluation of the failed nipple had been performed.
In the absence of a metalurgical examination of the failed part, no definitive failure mode can be determined.
The inspector verified that the failed nipple was cut back to good metal (passed a liquid penetrant test)
and recapped.
The second spray valve nipple was similarly liquid penetrant tested with negative results.
Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during the report period.
The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of op'crating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings, and recording, annunciator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls, and vital areas controls.
Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities in progress and status of safety-related equipment or systems.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Intra spent fuel pit transfers using the NAC-1D cask have been completed.
The cask has been decontaminated with water and Turco six times, and with citric acid twice.
The cask has been allowed to sit for several days between decontamination efforts to see what levels of loose surface contamination might develop due to the "leaching out" process.
Some build up between decontaminations was noted early in the Turco and water cycles.
The cask was allowed to sit for several days unwrapped in the cask wash area between the Turco and citric acid decontaminations.
Detailed surveys of the cask during this. time detected no significant leaching.
The waiting period and surveys were repeated after the Citric acid decontaminations, again with no significant leaching effect noted.
, The cask was then wrapped in plastic and allowed to sit out in the weather for several days.
The plastic was then cut in numerous places and swipes taken of the cask surface.
No significant leach out was detected.
The cask is expected to be shipped back to the vendor during the next report period.
Unit 4 Outage On Tuesday August 25, 1981, at 12:58 p.m., Unit 4 was tripped from 100$
power by the two out of three overpower delta-temperature logic matrix in the reactor protection system when an NIS (Nuclear Instrumentation System)
signal was lost.
The cause of the trip was operator error.
Maintenance procedure 12307.3, "guality and Standard Calibration of the Nuclear Power Range Instrumentation Axial Flux Deviation Process Instru-mentation to OPSP and OTSP, and Nuclear Power Range Axial Flux Deviation
Alarm", was being utilized by an 18C Specialist to check the NIS currents on the power range channels.
In accordance with Appendix A of HP 12307.3, power range channel N-43 was removed from service.
Once this task was completed, the I8C Specialist inadvertently unlocked the cabinet back door of power range channel N-42 and proceeded to disconnect the signal cable.
At this point, the two out of four logic of the reactor protection system tripped the reactor due to N43 bistables being out of service and N-42 tripping on loss of signal.
All systems responded normally to the transient.
After the N-42 signal cable was reconnected, the trip was reset and a reactor startup was commenced in accordance with O.P.
0202.2,
"Unit startup - Hot shutdown to Power Operation".
In order to reduce the possibility of recurrence the cabinet doors in the control room have been more clearly labeled.
The 18C specialist involved in this incident has been advised of the seriousness of his error.
The licensee appears to have been responsive in reiteration of the existing policy on closely following critical jobs in progress.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte ~.
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