IR 05000250/1981008
| ML17341A513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Ignatonis A, Marsh W, Vogt Lowell R, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341A512 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-578, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.3, TASK-1.C.4, TASK-2.K.2.19, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-TM 50-250-81-08, 50-250-81-8, 50-251-81-08, 50-251-81-8, NUDOCS 8109090480 | |
| Download: ML17341A513 (12) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/81-08 and 50-251/81-08 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Tu key Point site near Homestead, Florida Inspectors:
A. J.
Ignaton s
C W.
C.
Mars 8C -d
. J.
ogt-oe Approved by:
C gn H.
C.
Dance, ection C ief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on June 26 - July 25, 1981 Areas Inspected 8'
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'ate igne This routine unannounced inspection involved 102 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of ( 1) followup on a previous inspection finding; (2) implementation review of post-TMI requirements identified in NUREG-0578 and NUREG-0737; (3)
followup on licensee event report; (4) surveillance test observations; and (5)
plant operations.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
810III090480 810819 PDR ADOCK 05000250 v 8 PDR
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H.
E. Yaeger, Site Manager
- J.
K. Hays, Plant Manager - Nuclear J.
E. Moore, Operations Superintendent
- Nuclear J.
P.
Lowman, 18E Department Supervisor
- D. W. Jones, gC Supervisor
- S. M. Feith, gA Supervisor J.
P. Mendietta, Maintenance Superintendent J.
C. Balaguero, Licensing Engineer B. A. Abrishami, Systems Test Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 29, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee was informed that the licensee event reports on Unit 4 snubber failure and
"4A" 4160 volt bus auto-transfer failure will be carried as Inspector Followup Items.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (50-250/81-10-01)
Failure to follow control of main-tenance on nuclear safety-related systems.
The inspector verified that mechanical maintenance personnel who are responsible in preparing safety-related Plant Work Orders use the revised g list for guidance.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
TMI Action Plan Follow-up (NUREG-0578 and NUREG-0737)
(Closed) I.C.2, Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures (NUREG-0578 item 2.2. l.c).
These procedures were reviewed by Division of Operating Reactors (DOR) personnel during a team inspection in-January 1980 and their acceptance documented in DOR Branch 1 safety evaluation report "Evaulation of Licensee's Compliance with Category
"A" Items of NRC Recommendations Resulting from TMI-2 Lessons Learned" dated April 7, 1980.
The inspector verified that formal shift turnover procedures are set forth in plant administrative procedure 0103.2 "Responsibilities of Operators on shift and Maintenance of Operating Logs and Records".
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(Closed) III.A.1.2, Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities (NUREG-0578 items 2.2.2.b and 2.2.2.c).
The licensees Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operations Support Center (OSC) existing facilities and plans for upgrading them were reviewed by the team inspection mentioned above.
The safety evaluation report dated April 7, 1980 documents the acceptable implement-ation of this item.
The inspector confirmed that the interim TSC is fully functional.
Construction for the permanent building which will house the final TSC has begun.
The on-site OSC continues to be the south assembly room in the plant administration building.
(Closed) I.C.3, Shift Supervisor Responsibility (NUREG-0578 item 2.2.1.a).
The DOR team inspection of January 1980 reviewed the licensee's procedures defining the shift supervisors responsibilities and found the licensee to be in compliance with the requirements as documented in the SER of April 7, 1980.
The inspector verified that the responsibilities of the shift supervisor as defined by plant administrative procedure 0103.2 are in compliance with this requirement.
(Closed) I.C.4, Control Room Access (NUREG-0578 item 2.2.2.a).
The DOR team inspection of January 1980 reviewed the plant procedures for controlling access to the control room and found them to be acceptable as documented in the safety evaluation report of April 7, 1980.
The licensee has placed even further restrictions on access to the control room to enhance the pro-fessional atmosphere of the location by reducing the numbers of personnel who have key card access to the control room and by redefining the sur-veillance area within the control room.
The surveillance area is cordoned off with "theater" type ropes and operator permission is required prior to crossing these barriers into the surveillance area.
Administrative procedure 0103.2 defines the surveillance area and the supervisors authority to impose his own additional access controls as he deems necessary to ensure
"...maintenance of a professional atmosphere appropriate to activities in progress in the control room...".
(Closed) II.K.2.19, Sequential Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Analysis.
Per the NUREG-0737 clarifi'cation of TMI Action Plan requirements, the licensees of all PWR operating reactors were required to submit. an analysis of sequential auxiliary feedwater flow to the following steam generators a loss of main feedwater by January 2, 1982.
NRR has determined that the licensee's need not take any further action in meeting this requirement since the generic concerns are not applicable to Westinghouse designed steam generators.
This matter was addressed in a letter from tir. Steven A. Varga of NRR to Dr.
Robert E. Uhrig of FPL dated July 1, 1981.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed.
The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the'ER forms were complete.
,Additionally, a more detailed review was performed to verify that corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions
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were involved, and violations of regulations or Te'chnical Specification conditions had been identified.
Comments are added as appropriate.
251-81-06, Auxiliary Feedwater System Supply Steam Line Snubber Failure 251-81-04,
",4A" 4160 Volt Bus Auto-transfer Failure With regard to LER 251-81-06, the snubber separated at the threaded joint connection to the adaptor plate.
The apparent cause of the failure was insufficient thread engagement of the snubber turn buckler into the adapator plate.
In addition, some of the threads were stripped.
Short-term corrective action involved modification of the adaptor plate to provide deeper thread engagement and welding of the joint.
Long-term corrective action will be based on the licensee's engineering evaluation to determine the feasibility of replacing the snubber end pieces with a stronger type.
The inspector will review this evaluation (251/81-08-01).
It should be noted that the failed snubber assembly was of a hybrid design in which the adaptor plate was made by Bergen-Patterson and th'e snubber by Pacific Scientific.
New replacement snubbers together with transition pieces for fasterning are manufactured by Pacific Scientific.
They appear to provide a
stronger restraint.
LER 251-81-04 addressed failure of the "4A" 4160 volt bus to energize on a
transfer from the auxiliary to startup transformer following reactor trip.
As a corrective action the report stated that testing of automatic transfer between the two transformers could not replicate the failure, the cause of failure of the bus to transfer has not been determined, and an evaluation was continuing.
Furthermore, not only did this failure occur on triarch 22, 1981 causing the reactor coolant pumps to trip on underfrequency following failure of the 4A 4160 volt bus transfer, but also it occurred again on April 11, 1981.
As of this report writing, on July 28,1981 Unit 4 reactor tripped from full power resulting from high flux trip (actually false signal from N42 channel).
During this transient the 4A 4160 volt bus failed to transfer again.
An LER update is expected and this matter will be carried as an (Inspector fol 1 owup item 251/81-08-02).
Surveillance Test Observations The inspectors observed one major surveillance test in its entirely and portions of several other surveillance tests.
The major test was the annual Residual Heat Removal System hydrostatic test performed on Unit 4 on July 9, 1981 per O.P.
3206.3,
"Residual Heat Removal System - Hydrostatic Test During Normal Unit Operation".
Inspectors verified the following aspects of this surveillance test:
procedure conformed to technical specification requirements and proper licensee review; test instrumentation was cali-brated; removal of the system from service; conduct of the surveillance test; restoration of the system to service; review of the test data for
,accuracy and completeness; Independent calculation of selected test results
al
data to verify its accuracy; Confirmation that surveillance test document-ation was reviewed and test discrepancies were rectified; test results technical specification requirements; testing was done by qualified personnel; and surveillance schedule for this test was met.
It should be noted that the above test is normally performed during refueling.
However, since the licensee expected to exceed the surveillance schedule in awaiting for the next scheduled outage, the test was performed at power.
The inspector observed portions of several surveillances to verify that the following objectives were being met:
testing was scheduled in accordance with technical specification requirements, procedures were being followed, testing was performed by qualified personnel, LCOs were being met, and system restoration was correctly accomplished following testing.
The surveillances observed were:
Test Procedure No.
Date Auxiliary Feedwater System-Periodic Test Unit 4 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Periodic Channel Functional Test 7304.1 12304.2 July 7, 1981 July 8, 1981 No violations or deviations were identified for the areas inspected.
Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a
regular basis.
Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during the report period.
The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included witnessing wor k activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings, and recording, annunicator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls, and vital area controls.
Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities in progress and status of safety-related equipment or systems.
On July 6, 1981 the inspector observed licensee receipt inspection of the NAC-1D spent fuel cask.
The empty cask arrived with plastic covering.
The trunions of the cask, however, were not covered which evidently resulted in higher external contamination levels as noted in the licensee's incoming survey map.
The incoming survey map indicated removable contamination levels in excess of DOT limits with highest level of 100,000 dpm/100 cm'
near the bed during transport.
DOT limit of surface contamination is 22,000 dpm/100 cm~.
The exit contimination survey of this shipping cask prior to transport to Turkey Point site met the DOP limits.
Due to this result and repeated instances of prior excessive contamination levels at other sites following shipment that resulted in a violation of the DOT Regulation
CFR 173.397 an Order has been issued restricting offsite shipment of this cask.
The affected spent fuel cask remains on-site.
On July 10,1981 the inspector attended, as an observer, a Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meeting chaired by the plant manager.
The inspector verified that a quorum of membership has been established and the meeting frequency met the Technical Specification requirements.
During the meeting, procedure changes, use of temporary operating procedure, and plant change modifications were discussed.
The inspector selected several items discussed to verify licensee followup.
They were temporary operating procedure TOP 1100, Diesel Fuel Oil During Steam generator repair - Special Instructions; (2) Plant/Change tlodification PCN 80-170, NIS Cable Replacement; and (3)
PCN 79-1328, Unit 3 Containment Sump Level Honitors.
The inspector has verified that the licensee followed up on the above discussed changes which were consistent with meeting decisions.
No violations were identified within the areas inspected.
On July 7, 1981 Bechtel Construction electricians of IBEll Union local chapter 349 formed an unauthorized picket line at the site boundary entrance.
The inspector, verified that the licensee plant staffing and on duty hours met the regulatory requirements, emergency communications equipment were operable, and that the licensee initiated contigency plans for manning the afternoon shift with qualified operators and supervisors.
The licensee had contacted the local law enforcement and no obstruction developed for personnel entering the site.
At about noon of the same day the picket has ceased and the workers returned to wor lII,II l~
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