IR 05000250/1981028
| ML17341A880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1981 |
| From: | Falconer D, Jape F, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341A874 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-81-28, 50-251-81-28, NUDOCS 8202160711 | |
| Download: ML17341A880 (10) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/81-28, 50-251/81-28 Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Company P. 0.
Box 529100 Miami, FL 33152 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 License Nos. DPR-31, DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point facility near Homestead, Florida Inspectors:
M. Thomas
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D. P. Falcon Da e Signed ia. i/
Date Signed Approved by:
F. Jape, Section ief Engineering Inspection Br nch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on November 16-20, 1981 Areas Inspected, This routine, unannounced inspection involved 75 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Unit 3 outage activities and Unit 4 refueling activities.
Results Of the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in one area; one violation and one deviation were found in one area (50-251/81-28-01, Failure to implement material accountability and housekeeping during refueling with cavity open paragraph 5.a.); (50-251/81-28-02, Failure to close spent fuel pit doors during fuel handling operations paragraph 5.b.).
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. E. Yaeger; Site Manager
- J. K. Hayes, Plant Manager
~V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear D.
W. Jones, QC Supervisor
- J. P. Mendieta, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear
- S. M. Feith, QA Operations Supervisor
- P. W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor
- R. B. Cook, QC Engineer
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G. Mende, Reactor Engineering R. Seay, Maintenance Supervisor, Instrumentation 5 Control V. A. Kaminskas, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering Other licensee employees contacted included eight operators.
NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Vogt-Lowell, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 20, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The violation and deviation were discussed in detail.
The refueling fuel shuffle was completed prior to the completion of this inspection, and each item would.be evaluated before future fuel handling operations.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
Refueling Activities (Unit 4)
The inspectors witnessed fuel handling activities in the control room, containment, and spent fuel pool and reviewed procedures relating to refueling to verify that activities were being accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications, License requirements, and NRC requirements.
While witnessing the refueling activities the inspectors identified one violation and one deviatio ~
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The inspectors witnessed activities in the control room and the con-tainment during the fuel shuffle.
At the comp'letion of the fuel shuffle, the inspectors reviewed the fuel shuffle controlling proce-dure, accompanying data and surveillance results.
The inspectors verified the following:
1)
all fuel handling operations were performed in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures 2)
good housekeeping was maintained in the refueling area 3)
staffing was in accordance with Technical Specifications 4)
all refueling related precautions and limitations were observed and maintained during the fuel shuffle.
On November 16, 1981, the inspectors were informed by the licensee that both personnel air lock door s were discovered open at 5:26 p.m.
This violated Technical Specification 3. 10. 1 which requires containment integrity during refueling operations.
The incident was reportable and was turned over to the Resident Inspector for follow-up.
During a tour of the containment refueling area on November 17, 1981 to witness core shuffle fuel handling, the inspectors observed one screw driver, one pair of pliers, two discarded rubber gloves and a length of scrap pipe scattered about the manipulator crane deck.
Operating Procedure 16200, Manipulator Crane - Operating Instructions states that loose equipment tools or materials that could break or fall into the reactor shall not be kept on the manipulator crane and shall be kept clear of the reactor cavity.
Subsequent discussions with the licensee to discover the origin of these items revealed that no system of material accountability had been established for the refueling area while the reactor cavity was open.
equality Procedure 2. 10, House-keeping Operating Plants states that material accountability shall be applied when misplaced tools, equipment, material, etc.
may be detri-mental to the safety function of a system and when material accounta-bility is applied, all tool or materials shall be logged into and out of the area.
Technical Specification 6.8. 1 requires written procedures and administrative policies to be established, implemented and main-tained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5. 1 and 5.3 of ANSI 18.7-1972, Appendix "A" of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33.
The failure to maintain adequate housekeeping on the manipulator crane and to establish material control for the refueling area while the reactor cavity was open is a violation (50-251/81-28-01).
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Spent Fuel Pool Activities During the refueling fuel shuffle the inspectors witnessed fuel 'hand-ling operations in the spent fuel pit area in order to verify that activities were being performed in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations and approved procedures.
The inspectors verified that proce-dures relating to fuel handling operations included the following:
. 1)
A limitation on the number of fuel assemblies that could be out of safe geometry locations at the same time.
2)
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pit bridge crane interlocks or physical stops were tested.
3)
Provisions for verifying priol to fuel handling operations that the spent fuel area ventilation system was operating as required.
4)
Provisions for verifying that minimum water level requirements were monitored during fuel handling operations.
5)
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool storage area radiation monitors were operable.
6)
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up system was operable.
On November 16, 1981 the licensee damaged a burnable poison assembly, BP-47BP4, while inserting it into a fuel assembly in the spent fuel pit.
The burnable poison assembly was damaged when the spent fuel pit bridge operator moved the bridge before successfully unlatching the inserted burnable poison assembly.
The bridge operator had obtained indication from the spotter that the burnable poison assembly was unlatch and no binding had occurred.
The damaged burnable poison assembly was removed and replaced with an alternate assembly.
Symmetry considerations required the replacement of three other burnable poison assemblies.
The inspectors commented that increased scrutiny during those procedural steps requiring visual verification may eliminate similar problems in the future.
While observing fuel handling operations in the spent fuel'torage pit area on November. 17, 1981, the inspectors found doors propped open which lead into the spent fuel pit directly from the outside atmos-phere.
The inspectors brought this matter to the attention of the licensee.
During subsequent discussions with licensee personnel it was stated that one of the reasons the doors were propped open was for
'ersonnel comfort during fuel handling operations in the spent fuel pit.
The inspectors stated that leaving the doors propped open to the spent fuel pit during fuel handling operations was not the most conser-vative approach.
Section 14.2. 1 of the FSAR states that assumptions
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used for a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pit are conserva-tive because the auxiliary building doors are closed during movement of spent fuel.
The inspectors informed the licensee that leaving the doors propped open which lead from the spent fuel pit directly to the outside atmosphere during fuel handling operations is a deviation from the FSAR.
During discussion of this item at the exit interview on November 20, 1981, the licensee stated that past practices of opening the spent fuel pit doors during fuel handling operations will be evaluated prior to future fuel handling operations in the spent fuel pit.
The licensee also stated during the exit that the FSAR states that the auxiliary building (not the spent fuel pit) doors are closed, and therefore, did not consider the spent fuel pit doors being open, a
deviation.
Review of section 5.2.3 of the FSAR and from discussions with NRC regional management, it is the inspector's position that the spent fuel pit is part of the auxiliary building and the intent of the statement in FSAR section 14.2. 1 is to keep the spent fuel pit doors closed during fuel handling operations.
Therefore, by having the doors open during fuel handling operations is a deviation.
This will be identified as item 50-251/81-28-02, Fai.lure to Close Spent Fuel Pit Doors During Fuel Handling Operations.
6.
Plant Tour The inspectors performed a tour of Units 3 and 4 control rooms and the auxiliary building.
The inspectors observed control room activities involving THI related modifications and Unit 3 outage activities.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~
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