IR 05000244/1991019
| ML17262A620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1991 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17262A619 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-91-19, NUDOCS 9110220159 | |
| Download: ML17262A620 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlVBCISSION
REGION I
Inspection Report 50-244/91-19 License: DPR-18 Facility:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)
Inspection:
Inspectors:
August 13 through September 30, 1991 T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N. S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna P. P. Sena, Reactor Engineer, DRP E. C. Knutson, Reactor Engineer, DRP, Region I R. S. Barkley, Project Engineer, DRP, Region I Approved by:
William J.
i Reactor Projects Section 3B Date INSPECTION SCOPE Plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance/surveillance, emergency preparedness,
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security, engineering/technical support, and safety assessment/quality verification.
I INSPECTION OVERVIEW P~IQ I: Dp pd M
d lyp R'l lb
'd cooler on the "A" Main Feedwater Pump, that experienced a service water leak.
Subsequently, normal power operations were resumed.
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contamination and dose rates in the Residual Heat Removal Pump Room.
Main enance Surveillance:
A service water leak in the motor cooler coil to the D-Containment Recirculation Fan was expeditiously repaired.
Motor coolers for all containment recirculation fans are scheduled for replacement during the next refueling outage.
En ineerin /Techni
rt: Scaffolding erected in the A-EDG room was properly evaluated and erected.
Groundwater intrusion in the Intermediate Building is being adequately controlled and evaluated.
, 110220i59 9ii010 PDR ADO'5000244 PDR
INSPECTION OVERVIEW.............. ~....................,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS n
1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS...................
1.1 Operational Experiences 1.2 Control ofOperations................
1.3 Calorimetric Calibration of Nuclear Instruments 1.4 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns 1.4.1 Emergency Diesel Generators 1.4.2 Safety Injection System 2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS.....................
2.1 Routine Observations.......................
2.2 Decontamination Activities....................
3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE,.................
3.1 Corrective Maintenance 3.1.1 Service Water Leak in D-Containment Recirculation Cooler Coil
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3.1.2 Service Water Leak in the A-Main Feedwater Pump Cooler
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3.2 Surveillance Observations 3.2.1 Safety Injection System Monthly Test 3.2.2 Radiation Monitoring System/Auxiliary Feedwater System/Nuclear Instrumentation
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Fan Motor
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5 4.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 4.1 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise
6 5.0 SECURITY 5.1 Routine Observations 6.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT 6.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room A Scaffold 6.2 Groundwater Intrusion
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7.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION.
7.1 Periodic Reports................,...
7.2 Licensee Event Report (LER)............
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8.0 ADMINISTRATIVE......................
8.1 Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection 8.2 Exit Meetings.........
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1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS DETAILS 1.1 Operational Experiences The plant operated at approximately 97% power throughout the inspection period with one exception.
On September 4th, power was reduced to 48% to replace the lube oil cooler for the A-Main Feedwater Pump because of a service water leak.
Following post-maintenance testing of the new cooler, power was escalated to 97% on September 5th.
1.2 Control of Operations Overall, the inspectors found the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant to be operated safely and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
Control room staffing was as required.
Operators exercised control over access to the control room.
Shift supervisors consistently maintained authority over activities and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.
Operators adhered to approved procedures and understood the reasons for lighted annunciators.
The inspectors reviewed control room log books for activities and trends, observed recorder traces for abnormalities, verified compliance with Technical Specifications and audited selected safety-related tagouts.
During normal work hours and on backshifts, accessible areas of the plant were toured.
No inadequacies were identified.
Following the return to service of the A-MFWPump on September 5th, portions of the power escalation from 48% to 97% were observed from the Control Room.
Good face-to-face and phone communications were observed, as was demonstrated when placing the condensate booster pumps in service, Throughout the power escalation, Control Room Operators adhered to procedures.
1.3 Calorimetric Calibration of Nuclear Instruments During the power escalation, the inspectors confirmed operator compliance with operating procedure (O)-6.3, "Maximum Unit Power," when a secondary calorimetric calibration of the power range nuclear instruments was conducted. At approximately 95% indicated reactor power, power ascension was halted due to a mismatch between the four power range channels.
Based on power indications from the high pressure turbine and main generator output, actual reactor power was believed to be approximately 90%.
As a result, a secondary calorimetric calibration of the power range nuclear instruments was performed.
Because actual power was believed to be 90%, the fully automatic computer calorimetric calibration program was not used; due to imprecise feedwater flow inputs under less than full flow conditions, this program cannot be used below 95% power.
Instead, high accuracy Barton flow gauges were used to obtain manually recorded feedwater flow data, and calculation of reactor power was performed by an operator.
The calorimetric calibration yielded a calculated reactor power of about 91%.
The operator subsequently performed a Delta-T Thermal Check in accordance with 0-6.3 to
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The operator subsequently performed a Delta-T Thermal Check in accordance with 0-6,3 to correlate coolant temperature change across the core with thermal power.
Since the deviation between Delta-T thermal power and the calorimetric calculation was less than 5%,
the gains of the power range channels were adjusted to agree with the calorimetric data.
Per the procedure, had the calorimetric data differed from the Delta-T correlation by greater than 5% of full power, no power increases would be permitted until the Reactor Engineer evaluated the cause.
The inspector noted good procedure adherence in performing the secondary heat balance calculations.
1.4 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns 1.4.1 Emergency Diesel Generators The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of both Emergency Diesel Generators,EDG-A and EDG-B, and associated support systems, including service water, fuel oil, lube oil, air start, and jacket water.
The inspectors confirmed that the lineup procedures matched the P&ID (piping and instrument drawing) and the as-built configuration.
The following procedures were reviewed:
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T-27.1, A-Emergency Diesel Generator Pre-startup Alignment, Revision 40, effective
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August 2,1991, observed August 29, 1991..
T-27.2, B-Emergency Diesel Generator Pre-startup Alignment, Revision 40, effective August 1,1991, observed August 29, 1991.
The following P&IDs were reviewed in support of these walkdowns:
33013-1239 sheet 1, Diesel Generator-A, Revision 6.
33013-1250 sheet 1, Station Service Cooling Water, Revision 9.
The procedure and P&IDs were found to be well constructed and documentation was easy to use.
Minor deficiencies noted by the inspector were turned over to the licensee for correction.
No condition which might degrade diesel generator performance was identified.
1.4.2 Safety Injection System The inspectors performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Safety Injection System.
The inspectors confirmed that the lineup procedures matched the P&ID and the as-built configuration.
The walkdown was performed using procedure S-16A,
"Safety Injection System Alignment," Revision 43, effective December 12, 199 The system lineup, system lineup procedure and the labeling of the system was found to be adequate.
The inspectors did note that the cooling coil for the 'C'afety Injection pump had been tagged out of service for a period of over 16 months due to a service water leak, although the cooler fan remained in service.
The inspectors discussed the tagout of the cooler with operations personnel and determined that the operability of the cooling coil was not necessary for ensuring operability or environmental qualification of the 'C'afety Injection pump and that the repair of the cooler was properly tracked in the maintenance request system (Maintenance ID Tag 007165).
Overall, the inspectors found the material condition and radiological cleanliness of the system and the surrounding areas, including the locked high radiation area examined, to be good.
2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS 2.1 Routine Observations The resident inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.
Through observations of ongoing activities and discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors concluded that radiological controls were conscientiously implemented.
No inadequacies were identified.
2.2 Decontamination Activities The inspectors conducted an extensive tour of the auxiliary and intermediate buildings to verify radiological conditions and controls as well as equipment operability. With the exception of the Residual Heat Removal Pump cubicle, few areas of the plant were found to have any contamination.
Those portions which were contaminated were limited to very small areas surrounding equipment.
Radiation levels overall were found to be quite low, particularly for a plant of this vintage.
The only significant floor area containing notable levels of contamination and general area radiation above background was the Residual Heat Removal Pump cubicle.
Over recent months, Health Physics personnel have aggressively reduced loose surface contamination levels and lowered dose rates in this cubicle, resulting in
't being downgraded from a "Locked High Radiation Area" to a "High Radiation Area."
This area was found appropriately posted and barricaded with current survey data in place.
3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE 3.1 Corrective Maintenance 3.1.1 Service Water Leak in D-Containment Recirculation Fan Motor Cooler Coil On September 3rd, control room operators observed that the A-Containment Sump was fillingat an unusually high rate (about 10 gallons per hour).
Operators verified that no abnormal increases in reactor coolant system leakage was occurring as indicated on in-containment radiation monitors, the containment dewpoint monitor, and containment recirculation fan dumps.
Based on these indications, operators suspected a service water leak
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and implemented Abnormal Procedure, AP-SW.1,"Service Water Leak."
Per the procedure, each of the containment recirculation fan motor coolers was separately isolated to identify the leakage source.
The D-containment recirculation fan motor cooler coil was found to be leaking and was subsequently isolated and the fan was declared inoperable.
In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.1, a seven day action statement was entered to repair the leak.
Additionally, the licensee prepared a report to be submitted to the NRC within 14 days to comply with a commitment made in response to IE Bulletin No. 80-24 "Prevention of Damage Due To Water Leakage Inside Containment."
Work Package No. 910554 was prepared to repair the leak. Following repressurization, the initial two attempts at soldering failed and small leakage continued.
The cause of these subsequent failures was attributed in part to pressure spikes while performing post maintenance testing,PT-2.7, on the cooler.
The cooler was successfully repaired by brazing on September 8th, repressurized, and returned to service.
The underlying cause of the failure was determined to be "U" bend thinning of the cooler coil aggravated by pressure spikes during performance of PT-2.7.
Through observation of the response by the operations and maintenance departments to identifying and repairing the service water leak, the inspector concluded that prompt, comprehensive actions were taken to address the problem.
As a result of the closely coordinated repair effort, the licensee's Results and Test Group identified procedural valve sequencing weaknesses while performing PT-2.7 that resulted in spikes in service water pressure in the cooler.
A review of operating and testing procedures associated with the service water system is to be conducted to identify and correct steps that could result in similar pressure surges.
Additional measures taken include, site management expediting the purchasing of a spare fan motor cooler to serve as a replacement, ifnecessary, and replacing all containment recirculation fan motor coolers during the next refueling outage.
These prudent actions by RG&E management adequately address improving the reliability of the containment recirculation fans.
3.1.2 Service Water Leak in the A-Main Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Cooler On September 4th, while conducting routine verifications, an Auxiliary Operator reported to the control room that the oil level in the A-Main Feedwater (MFW) pump oil reservoir had increased and appeared "milky." Upon examining the oil reservoir, the Shift Supervisor directed that the load be decreased at 1% per minute and that the A-MFWpump be secured when 50% power was reached.
Subsequent investigation revealed a service water leak in the A-MFWpump lube oil cooler.
The leaking cooler was replaced with a spare cooler, the lube oil system was flushed, post-maintenance testing was performed to verify proper flow and leak tightness, and the system was returned to servic '
The inspectors observed various phases of the cooler replacement and determined that there was good coordination between operations and maintenance personnel.
Actions initially taken by control room personnel in response to conditions found in the lube oil reservoir were timely to preclude damaging the A-MFWpump.
3.2 SurveBlance Observations 3.2.1 Safety Injection System Monthly Test A portion of Periodic Test (PT)-2.1M, Safety Injection System Monthly Test, Revision 5, effective July 1, 1991, was observed on September 5, 1991.
This test verifies the discharge pressure of all three pumps under recirculation flow conditions, and also tests the system check valves for backleakage from the Reactor Coolant system.
Additionally, pump operability from both emergency buses is verified.
Upon completion of the discharge pressure test of Safety Injection (SI) pump "C", abnormal noise from the pump was noted by the operators as the pump coasted down.
Since the next portion of the periodic test was to verify SI pump "C" operability from its alternate emergency electrical bus, testing was interrupted to assemble personnel to evaluate the abnormal noise when the pump was secured.
The pump subsequently operated normally and no abnormal noise was noted after it was secured.
To test all possible causes, the operators requested that pump power be shifted to its normal power supply; this had been the system configuration when the abnormal noise was noted.
This was evaluated by control room personnel to be an acceptable operational deviation from the in-progress testing.
Power was shifted to the normal supply and the pump was again started and stopped, with no abnormalities noted.
Test conditions were then reestablished and the periodic test was completed satisfactorily.
The one-time occurrence of the abnormal noise, along with actions taken in response, were recorded in the remarks section of the test document.
The inspector noted that Results and Test (R&T) personnel prudently evaluated the abnormal sound promptly after it occurred.
R&T personnel closely adhered to procedural steps when carrying out the surveillance.
3.2.2 Radiation Monitoring System/AuxBiary Feedwater System/Nuclear Instrumentation Inspectors observed portions of surveillances to verify proper calibration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of work by qualified personnel, conformance to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), and correct system restoration following testing.
The following surveillances were observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-17.2, "Process Radiation Monitors R-11 - R-22, Iodine Monitors R-10A and R-10B," Revision 84, which referenced procedure P-9, "Radiation Monitoring System," Revision 6 '
PT-16Q, "AuxiliaryFeedwater System-Quarterly." Revision 10, effective July 11, 1991.
PT-6.3.2, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System Channel 42, Revision 23, effective August 9, 1991, observed August 29, 1991.
PT-6.3.3, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System Channel 43, Revision 23, effective August 1, 1991, observed August 29, 1991.
The surveillance procedures were conducted by qualified personnel with good management oversight.
No unacceptable conditions were identified. A minor labeling discrepancy in procedure P-9 was noted by the inspector due to the recent renumbering of a radiation monitor, but was promptly remedied by Operations supervision when identified.
Another labeling discrepancy was noted during performance of PT-16Q in which identification tags for two instrument root valves for the DC oil pump disagreed with tag numbers stated in the procedure.
Upon identifying the discrepancy, R&T personnel appropriately stopped the test, consulted with Site Engineering management, traced the instrument lines to identify valve function, and processed a Procedure Change Notice to correct the procedure.
Subsequently, the test was resumed and successfully performed.
No other deficiencies were identified.
4.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 4.1 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise On September 11th, RG&E conducted a full participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
The Ginna simulator was used to direct the exercise.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed offsite activities.
The State of New York, Wayne County, and Monroe County participated at the Emergency Operations Facility and the Joint Emergency News Center.
An NRC inspection team evaluated site and corporate performance and documented findings in Inspection Report 50-244/91-21.
5.0 SECURITY 5.1 Routine Observations During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, protected area and vital area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie On August 15th, an inspection was made of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).
Both the CAS and SAS were found to be properly staffed and well maintained.
6.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT 6.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room A Scaffold Due to previous concerns identified with Battery Room scaffolding (NRC Inspection Report 50-244/91-14), the inspector observed the installation of scaffolding encompassing the Emergency Diesel Generator EDG-A. The inspector verified the installation to be in accordance with engineering specified seismic guidelines.
Proper clearance was observed for the operation, maintenance, and testing of EDG valves, instrumentation, control panels, and supporting components such as the fuel oil transfer pump and air start compressor.
The inspector noted the use of perforated metal decking which prevents blockage of water flow in the event of fire suppression system actuation.
6.2 Groundwater Intrusion During a tour of the intermediate building, the inspectors noted evidence of water intrusion into the area surrounding the outside perimeter of the containment building at the access point to the lower tendon grease ports.
While the area is now well drained due to ongoing modifications in the area to control groundwater intrusion (Reference:
EWR 5327,
"Intermediate Building Sub-basement Groundwater Collection System" ), the inspectors questioned the potential impact of this intrusion upon the corrosion of the lower end of the containment tendons and the containment liner.
Subsequent discussions with RG&E corporate engineering personnel revealed that in June, 1990, an NRC inspection group involved with the plant life extension program toured this area and had raised similar questions regarding this area.
These concerns are presently being tracked by NRR under TAC 67427.
A review of these outstanding NRC questions and the actions taken in response by RG&E indicate that these concerns are being appropriately addressed by RG&E Engineering.
The actions taken by RG&E to date have been effective in limiting groundwater intrusion into the area and have ensured proper drainage from the area to avoid the pooling of water in the area which once covered the lower tendon grease fillports and also caused significant water in-leakage into the Residual Heat Removal Pump Room.
The inspectors had no additional concerns about this matter.
7.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION 7.1 Periodic Reports Periodic reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 &.2 and 6.9.1.4 were reviewed.
Inspectors verified that the reports contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.
The following reports were reviewed:
Monthly Operating Report for July and August 1991.
Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for January-June 1991.
Na unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.2 Licensee Event Report (LER)
An LER and Special Report submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes were properly identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The inspectors also assessed whether potential safety consequences were properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, and applicable requirements of 10 CFR 72 were met.
The following was reviewed:
91-007, Safeguards Buses Undervoltage Relay Actuations Due to Failed Solid State Switches Causes Automatic Starts of the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator.
Special Report in accordance with IE Bulletin No. 80-24 for Service Water Leak Inside Containment.
The inspectors concluded that the reports were accurate and met regulatory requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.0 ADMINISTRATIVE 8.1 Backshift and Deep Backshift Inspection During this period, backshift inspections were conducted on the following dates:
August 29, September 5, 26, and 30.
Deep backshift inspection was conducted on September 2.
8.2 Exit Meetings At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
The following additional NRC exit meetings were held with RG&E management during this inspection.
Regional Administrator Site Visit on August 14, 1991.
Radiological Controls Inspection 50-244/91-17 on August 16, 1991.
Reduced Inventory Controls (Generic Letter 88-17 followup) 50-244/91-18 on August 16, 199 '
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Inservice Inspection Program 50-244/91-10 on August 30, 1991.
Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise 50-244/91-21 on September 12, 1991.
Security Program 50-244/91-22 on September 13, 1991.
The exit meeting for inspection report 50-244/91-19 was held on October 1, 1991 with the following individuals attending:
Name Title Thomas Moslak Clair Edgar John Fisher Paul Gorski Andy Harhay Michael Lilley Thomas Marlow Fred Mis John St. Martin Terry Schuler Joe Widay Robert Wood Sr Resident Inspector-NRC Mgr. Electrical/I&C-RG&E Maintenance Planning & Scheduling-RG&E Mgr. Mech. Maintenance-RG&E Mgr. HP & Chemistry-RG&E Mgr, Nuclear Assurance-RG&E Superintendent, Ginna Production-RG&E Supervisor, Health Physics-RG&E Corrective Action Coordinator-RG&E Operations Manager-RG&E Plant Manager-RG&E Supervisor Nuclear Security-RG&E
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