IR 05000244/1991002

Insp Rept 50-244/91-02 on 910104-0204.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiation Protection, Surveillance/Maint,Security & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification

ML17262A393
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	02/14/1991
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17262A392	List: IR 05000244/1991002 ML17262A391
References
50-244-91-02, 50-244-91-2, NUDOCS 9102270219
Download: ML17262A393 (61)

Text

U.S. NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Inspection Report No. 50-244/91-02 License: DPR-18 Licensee:

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)

Facility:

Inspection:

Inspectors; Approved by:

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant January 4 through February 4, 1991 T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N. S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B a II~l'Il Date SCOPE Resident inspection ofplant operations, radiation protection, surveillance/maint engineering/technical support, and safety assessment/quality verification.

nance, security, OVERVIEW D i: 0l <<p d& ff'

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a heater drain tank pump discharge valve failure.

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to better identify loose surface contamination and to decontaminate the Auxiliary Building.

Maintenance/Surveillance:

Fire Protection staff completed a detailed assessment ofthe reliability of all curtain-type fire dampers.

~Securit:

No discrepancies were identified during routine security checks.

En ineerin /Technical Su ort:

Good coordination between corporate/site engineering, operations, maintenance, and health physics was observed while completing a

station modification to the Residual Heat Removal System.

91022702ie Wi02i4 PDR ADQCy, 05600244

PDR

TABLEOF CONTENTS 0VERVIEW

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TABLEOF CONTENTS........................................

ii 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 1.1 Operational Experiences......

1.2 Control Room Observations 1.3 Rod Control System........

1.4 Engineered Safety Feature System

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2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS 2.1 Routine Observations 2.2 AuxiliaryBuilding Decontamination Program.....

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3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE 3.1 Heater Drain Tank Pump Discharge Valve Corrective 3.2 Surveillance Observations.................

3.3 Pressurizer Level Controller...............

3.4 Fire Protection Damper Inspection Maintenance

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4.0 SECURITY 4.1 Routine Observations

5 5.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT...................

5.1 Seismic Upgrade to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System

5 6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION 6.1 Periodic and Special Reports........................

6.2 Written Reports of Nonroutine Events 6.3 Unresolved Item (50-244/90-02-02) Procedure Adherence (Closed)

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7 7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE.........

7.1 Inspection Hours.......

7.2 Exit meetings 7.3 Enforcement Conference

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DETAILS 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 1.1 Operational Experiences The plant operated at approximately full power for the majority of the inspection period.

On January 29, 1991, an air line, which supplies the heater drain tank pump discharge air-operated valve, fractured at the fitting. The valve failed open as designed and the heater drain tank level decreased rapidly. When the air line was repaired and reconnected, the valve closed for several seconds due to the low tank level.

Both pumps tripped due to either low tank level or having the discharge valve and the recirculation valve closed at the same time.

The third condensate pump started and the condensate bypass valve opened, as designed, to maintain suction pressure to the feedwater pumps.

Operators took action by decreasing plant power approximately 10%.

The plant was stabilized and was returned to approximate full power two hours later.

1.2 Control Room Observations The inspectors found the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant to be operated safely and in conformance with NRC requirements.

Control room staffing was as required.

Operators exercised control over access to the control room.

Shift supervisors consistently maintained authority over activities and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.

Operators adhered to approved procedures and understood the reasons for lighted annunciators.

The inspectors reviewed control room log books for activities and trends, and observed recorder traces for abnormalities.

During normal work hours and on backshifts, accessible areas of the plant were toured; conditions and activities were observed with no inadequacies identified. The inspectors verified compliance with the Technical Specifications and audited selected safety-related tagouts.

Documents reviewed included Ginna Station Event Reports (A-25.1) 91-02 through 91-11. Each Ginna Station Event Report was reviewed for appropriate corrective action and observation of the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs).

No inadequacies were identified.

1.3 Rod Control System On January 7,

1991, while performing routine monthly surveillance PT-1, "Rod Control System," control rods in Group Two of Bank "D" did not respond to operator demand as required.

The rod control system was declared inoperable and the 6-hour action statement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.10.4.4 was entered.

Subsequently, operators mapped core flux and verified shutdown margin.

PT-1 was performed again, in conjunction with monitoring of signal outputs from the rod control system circuitry by Instrumentation and Control (1&C)

personnel.

All control rods satisfactorily responded to operator commands during this test.

Since the off-normal condition could not be duplicated, the rods were declared operable.

Operations management directed that PT-1 be performed daily to see ifthe problem would recur.

When performing this surveillance test the next day, January 8, 1991, the Group Two, Bank D rods again failed to appropriately respond.

I&C personnel monitoring the test attributed the

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cause to be a faulty MXR2 relay and Stationary Firing Circuit Card "M"in power cabinet 2BD.

Following replacement of these components, PT-1 was performed with satisfactory results.

Operators continued to perform PT-1 daily without incident through January 11, 1991, at which time the corrective maintenance was evaluated as successful and the frequency of exercising the rods (PT-1)..was returned to the normal monthly routine.

Inspectors closely observed the activities of operations and maintenance personnel to diagnose the cause of rod control system problems.

From these observations, the inspectors concluded that the testing and maintenance troubleshooting were well controlled and coordinated.

Senior site management was appropriately involved in this activity, providing good oversight and fostering a conservative, safety-conscious approach.

1.4 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions ofthe "B" Emergency Diesel-Gene'rator.

The inspectors confirmed that the lineup procedure matched the PAID (piping and instrument drawing) and the as-built configuration. The followingprocedure was reviewed:

T-27.2, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Pre-startup Alignment, Revision 35, effective September 14, 1990.

The following P&ID was reviewed:

33013-1239 sheet 2, Diesel Generator - B, Revision 3.

The procedure and P&ID were found to be very well constructed.

Documentation was easy to use.

No conditions which might degrade diesel-generator performance were identified.

2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS

.-2.1 Routine Observations The resident inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.

Through observations of ongoing activities and discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors determined that radiological controls were conscientiously implemented.

2.2 AuxiliaryBuilding Decontamination Program On January 21, 1991, the site Health Physics Department began an extensive and systematic program to survey and decontaminate the AuxiliaryBuilding. This effort was initiated as a result of switching from paper to cloth smears when performing contamination surveys.

Tests showed

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that the cloth smears are significantly (up to 50%) more efficient in retaining contamination, Using the cloth smears resulted in an increase in the number of contaminated areas that exceed the licensee's release limit of 500 dpm/100cmz.

Accordingly, a decontamination effort is underway to reduce these levels. To date, the AuxiliaryBuilding basement has been completed with work continuing on the Intermediate Level of the AuxiliaryBuilding.

The inspectors concluded'that the Health Physics Department has aggressively pursued more effective methods of identifying and controlling contamination.

3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE 3.1 Heater Drain Tank Pomp Discharge Valve Corrective Maintenance The plant transient which occurred on January 29, 1991 was due to the failure of the air supply line to the heater drain tank pump's discharge valve.

The supply tubing was found fractured completely through at the fitting. Maintenance personnel reconnected the tubing and the valve was restored to normal operation.

The suspected cause of the tubing failure was an overstressed fitting or a vibration induced failure, or a combination of the two. However, there is very little vibration at the location of the valve, and there is no history of similar failures at the plant. The inspector concluded that this was an isolated failure of little safety significance, and had no further questions.

3.2 Surveillance Observations Inspectors observed portions of surveillances to verify proper calibration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of work by qualified personnel, conformance to LimitingConditions for Operation (LCOs), and correct system restoration followingtesting. The following surveillance was observed:

Periodic Test (PT)-2.10, Safety Injection System Quarterly Test, Revision 5, effective November 9, 1990.

Activities in the control room during the surveillance were conducted in a professional manner, with good communications between workers.-

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

3.3 Pressurizer Level Controller On January 18, 1991, a control room operator identified that the pressurizer level controller was behaving erratically as indicated by a slight (-4%) increase in pressurizer level on the plant process computer.

Charging Pump "A" was switched to manual from automatic and the programmed level was quickly restored.-

INC personnel removed the controller and began a

series of tests to identify the unreliable component.

Following extensive troubleshooting and

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monitoring of controller output, the cause was attributed to a loose soldered connection in the circuitry that feeds the derivative module and to a-faulty transistor in the AC amplifier. Repairs were completed and the controller was returned to service on February 4, 1991.

Following installation, controller output was monitored by recorder to identify any additional problems, None were apparent.

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Through discussions with control room operators and review of recorder traces, the inspector determined'that control room personnel appropriately identified the slight increase in pressurizer level (about 4%) and expeditiously responded.

Corporate and site engineering staffs were appropriately involved in evaluating possible replacements in-kind for the controller.

By contacting the vendor, the RG&E staff were informed that an in-kind replacement was not possible due to the age of the controller.

The decision was made to proceed with identification and replacement of unreliable components, and the repair was carefully accomplished.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

3.4, Fire Protection Damper Inspection In response to Information Notices 83-69 and 89-52, a functional test ofall in-plant fire dampers was performed by the site Fire Protection Engineer.

Sixty-five of sixty-six dampers identified on structural drawings were inspected and tested using the methods specified in M-103,

"Inspection and Maintenance of Fire Dampers," and PT-13.26, "Testing of Fire Dampers."

Through this evaluation, the fire protection engineer determined that one damper was not originally installed as specified in the structural drawings (LER 90-011).

The damper was to be installed in ventilation ductwork (Penetration RR-113) between the relay room (safety-related)

and a Control Building stairwell (nonsafety-related).

The RG&E Fire Protection and Licensing departments evaluated this condition and determined that it was not contrary to regulatory (Appendix R and Technical Specification) or safety requirements.

However, RG&E Engineering recommended installation of the damper to increase overall fire protection.

The damper is scheduled to be installed under Engineering Work Request (EWR)

4882 in 1992.

Other discrepancies identified during the evaluation also are scheduled for correction within this time frame.

The inspectors concluded that the RG&E fire protection staff performed a detailed evaluation to assess the reliability of curtain-type fire dampers and are taking corrective actions to address discrepancies.

Test procedures were found to incorporate the testing guidelines addressed in the Information Notices to ensure that the dampers are capable of closing and latching under anticipated air flow conditions.

The inspector had no further question.0 SECURITY 4.1 Routine Observations During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, protected area and vital area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

5.0, ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT 5.1 Seismic Upgrade to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System During the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) conducted in the fallof 1989, the seismic qualification of 3/4-inch pressure relief lines to RHR Valves 850A and 850B was questioned.

The relief lines run from the bonnets of valves 850A/B to the suction side of RHR Pumps "A" and "B," respectively.

These lines are designed to prevent over-pressurization within each double-disk gate valve when RHR pump suction is transferred, using 850,A/B, from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the Containment Sump during the late'r sta s of a Loss of Coolant Accident.

To address the SSFI concern, RGB'orporate engineeri g analyzed the piping and support configuration to current seismic criteria.

The analysis con uded that three additional pipe supports were needed.

In support of this modification, a 10 C 50.59 review was performed, a work schedule was developed, a Station Modification procedure was

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developed, PEcID's were marked-up, and an ALARAreview was performed.,The installation was completed on February 4, 1991.

The inspectors evaluated RGBs overall control for this modification. Through review of the modification package, the inspectors determined that the licensee demonstrated a strong safety conscious attitude as evident by deliberately scheduling the modification late in the operating cycle to assure operability ofboth trains of the RHR System during the refueling outage.

While installing the pipe supports, the "B" RHR train was taken out of service since the "B" pump suction had to be drained down, placing the plant in a 72-hour LCO. Smooth coordination and clear communication was seen between the Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics and Results and Test Departments to minimize "B".pump down-time.

From initial work site preparation through post-modification testing, efficient, well thought out work practices were demonstrated, resulting in the "B" RHR train being out-of-service for about 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.

Based on observations ofwork-in-progress, review ofsupporting documentation, and discussions with cognizant RGB staff, the inspectors concluded that the site and corporate engineering staffs effectively interfaced and that the on-site departments were well coordinated in processing and completing the modificatio.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITYVERIFICATION 6.1

- Periodic and Special Reports Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed.

Inspectors verified that the reports contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.

The following report was reviewed:

Monthly. Operating Report for December 1990.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

6.2 Written Reports of No'nroutine Events Written reports submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes were properly identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.

The inspectors also assessed whether potential safetyconsequences had been properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72 were applicable and requirements of 10 CFR 73 had been met.

The following LERs were reviewed (Note:

date indicated is event date):

90-013, furbine Trip Due to AMSAC, December 11, 1990 90-014, Inadvertent Pressurizer PORV Inoperability, December 6, 1990 90-015, Emergency Diesel Start Due to Failed Safeguards Bus Undervoltage Circuit Card, December 12, 1990 90-016, Intermediate Range Trip During Bus 14 Transfer, December 12, 1990 90-017, Disabling of Safeguards Sequencing, December 12, 1990 90-018, Turbine Runback Due to Dropped Rod, December 20, 1990 90-019, Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level, December 21, 1990.

The events associated with 90-013,90-014, 90-018 and 90-019 were reviewed in NRC Inspection

'eport 50-244/90-28.

The events associated with 90-015,90-016, and 90-017 were reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-244/90-31.

The inspectors concluded that the LERs were accurate and met regulatory requirements.

No unacceptable conditions were identifie I i

4 6.3 Unresolved Item (50-244/90-02-02) Procedure Adherence (Closed)

This unresolved item was administratively opened to track corrective actions for all open items pertaining to procedure adherence.'

task force, consisting of all plant 'managers, revised Administrative Procedure (A)-503, Plant Procedure Adherence Requirements.

The revised procedure was put in place late in 1990 after plant personnel were trained on its contents.

The inspectors reviewed the training lesson plan, attended a task force meeting, and held discussions with various plant personnel.

The training was comprehensive and was taught to all plant personnel.

Plant personnel are now familiar'with the requirements of A-503.

No new significant procedure adherence problems have been noted.

Plant management'indicated that improvements and refinements will be made as necessary.

The inspectors concluded that the actions taken were adequate to address the procedure adherence concerns and had no further questions.

7.0 ADMINISTRATIVE 7.1 Inspection Hours This inspection included 4 backshift and 7 deep backshift hours.

7.2 Exit meetings At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.

In addition, NRC exit meetings were held for the followinginspections during this inspection period: 50-244/91-01 on January 10, 1991, and 50-244/91-04 on January 25, 1991.

7.3 Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region I offices on January 29, 1991. The conference dealt with the events surrounding the disabling of safeguards logic instrumentation and a subsequent plant trip on December 12, 1990, as described in NRC Inspection Report 50-244/90-31. RGB'ersonnel reviewed the event and the root cause evaluation, described their short and long term corrective actions, and provided their assessment of the event's safety significance.

Results of the enforcement conference will be documented in separate corr'espondence.

Handouts from the meeting are enclosed with this repor GINNA STAI ION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Inspection Report 90-3i January 29, 1991

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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Agenda introduction

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event review

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root cause evaluation

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short-term corrective actions

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longer-term corrective actions

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safety significance

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conclusions R. E. Smith J. A. Widay J. T. St. Martin J. A. Widay S. M. Spector G. J. Wrobel R. C. Mecredy

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE introduction

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review of event

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safety significance

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mitigating factors

EVENT OVERVIEW Plant Status

~ startup in progress control room staffing

EVENT OVERVIEW Circuit Card Failure

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undervoltage protection system maintenance work package developed

~ shift supervisor review and authorization

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control room foreman actions

EVENT OVERVIEW Diesel Generator Transfer NIS N-36 de-energized r

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reactor trip

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immediate operator actions

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safeguards logic power restored

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on-coming shift supervisor discovers problem

ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION Summary of Results

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human performance enhancement system inappropriate action to open switches

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root cause evaluation procedure change process

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analysis of contributing causes work control process

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HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT Barriers contributing cause planner's operational knowledge root

. cause M-48.14 technically incorrect contributing cause schedular review not technical U

contributing cause

's.s. role in release of equipment I

I contributing cause crf questioning attitude contributing cause switch labeling contributing cause mitigating cause incomplete planner's advice AR-L-31 inadequate problem identified oncoming s.s. review

ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION Conclusion

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corrective actions address results

SHORT-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Personnel

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senior management meetings

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policy on shift supervisors responsibilities

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SHORT-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Procedures

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alarm response procedures reviewed

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existing procedures quarantined

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operational review for all changes

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SRO level review of all maintenance work packages

SHORT-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Other control room cabinet labels

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PORC review and assessment

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independent assessment by Quality Performance

LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Introduction

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procedure process

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work packages

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contributing issues ongoing actions

LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Procedure Oevelopment and Changes procedure or changed drafted review by responsible. manager new procedure or 50.59 impact minor change or no 50.59 impact assign multidisc review I

perform multidisc review comments resolved 50.59 performed recommend PORC approval recommend PORC approval PORC approval Plant Manager approval

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PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGES New Procedure or Impacts 50.59 draft procedure or change responsible mgr review assign multidisc. review A 601.1+.2 g

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'erform multidisc review 3.2.5 (except criteria)

procedure corrections 3.2.6 perform 50.59 A 601.8 recommend PORC approval 3.2.7 PORC approval 3.2.8

+ 3.2.9 Plant Manager approval

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PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT AND CHAN.GES Policy lmprovemenfs draft procedure or change responsible mgr review assign multidisc review per form mu ltidis c rev iew I

procedure corrections operations required review on minor change path to assure plant operational requirements not impacted operations/non-bperations procedure c ange review che klist other-quarantine procedure rhview guidelines p er form 50.59 Irecommend PORC approval PORC approval Plant Manager approval

LONGER-TERM CORRECTlVE'CTlONS

, Critical Equipment Work Packages classify work package develop work package review work package P

schedule work package shift supervisor

,',authorization to proceed implementation

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LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Critical Equipment Work Packages Criteria classify work package A 1603.2 develop work package A 1603.3 I

review work package A 1603.5 schedule work package A 1603.4 shift supervisor authorization to proceed implementation A 160 J

CRITICAL E UIPMENT WORK PACKAGES Policy Improvements classify work package develop work package review work package schedule work package work order package requirement policy covers Technical, Operations, HP, SRO, Results and Test, QC, and schedule review requirements

'. authorization to proceed t

on-shift decision policy (Operations)

implementation

LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Contributing Issues

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alarm response requirements

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labeling

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information availability

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training

LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Review of Ongoing Actions

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procedure process

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work packages contributing causes

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incorporation of policies into procedures

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LONGER-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Review of Ongoing Actions (continued)

effectiveness reviews of short-term corrective actions

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effectiver3ess reviews of longer;term corrective actions

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continuing evaluation to assure

. responsibilities are clearly defined

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continuing refinement of review checklists

RRP SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE No Automatic Sl at Low Power Levels

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events of interest RCS de pressurization

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most limiting events large steam line break large break loss of coolant accident

SAFETY EVALUATION SLB Delay Sl for 10 Minutes a

negligible change in DNBR

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insignificant change in mass flow

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insignificant change in energy

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SAFETY EVALUATION LOCA Initiated from 9% Power

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acceptable results with 14 minutes Sl delay

< 2 minutes Sl delay demonstrated on simulator

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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Conclusions incident promptly identified and reported

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comprehensive root cause investigation

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broad corrective action program

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'event appears to be a single occurrence

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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Conclusions (continued)

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event duration was short

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event had operational significance

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low potential for public impact

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RG&E commitment to learning from this event

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