IR 05000244/1991005

Insp Rept 50-244/91-05 on 910205-0311.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Surveillance, Emergency Preparedness,Security,Engineering/Technical Support & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification

ML17262A427
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	03/22/1991
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17262A426	List: IR 05000244/1991005 ML17262A425
References
50-244-91-05, 50-244-91-5, NUDOCS 9104030029
Download: ML17262A427 (92)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Inspection Report 50-244/91-05 License: DPR-18 Licensee:

Facility:

Inspection:

Inspectors:

Rochester Gas arid Electric'Corporation (RG&E)

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant February 5 through March 11, 1991 T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N. S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna A.. Bo giovanni, sident Inspector, Zion Approved by:

4>r E. C. McCabe, Chief, Rea or Projects Section 3B INSPECTION SCOPE Date Plant operations, radiation controls, maintenance/surveillance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, and safety assessment/quality verification.

INSPECTION OVERVIEW P~fi:D 'g l, p p duff l ly<<gl runbacks resulting from two losses of an offsite power line.

Also, upon loss of Emergency Bus 18 during a surveillance, operations properly declared an Unusual Event and initiated a power 'reduction.

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This has decreased personnel contaminations doing work in the building.

aintenan

/ urveillance:

The Emergency Bus 18 loss was promptly evaluated and corrected.

Also, after storm-caused damage, affected plant systems were expeditiously repaired.

Emer enc Pre aredness:

Upon activation of the county Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) due to a severe ice storm, Emergency Preparedness personnel promptly reported to the EOCs to communicate and coordinate as necessary.

$~zur~it: A lightning strike temporarily disabled portions of the security system, and site security appropriately implemented compensatory measures.

En ineerin /Technical Su ort; Corporate and site engineering thoroughly evaluated the loss of Emergency Bus 18.

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ADOCK 0.-,000204 PDFl

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TABLEOF CONTENTS INSPECTION OVERVIEW e

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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~... ii 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 1.1 Operational Experiences.....

1.2 Control Room Observations 1.3 In-Plant Observations

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"2,0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS 2.1 Routine Observations 2.2 Auxiliary Building Decontamination Program...

2.3 Turbine Building/Intermediate Building Tour....

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3 3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE.................... '........

3.1 Loss of Bus 18 Corrective Actions........................

3.2 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve MFWRV-BReliability..........

4.0 'MERGENCYPREPAREDNESS........................,....

4.1 Ice Storm Aftermath.............,...................

5.0 5.1 Routine Observations 5.2 Lightning Strike

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6.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT........,..............

6o 1 Plant Modifications

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6.2 Unresolved Item (50-244/90-03-04) UFSAR and Technical Specification Discrepancy (Closed)

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7.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION 7.1 Periodic Reports 7.2 Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Board Meeting 7.3 Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Ginna Outage Planning Committee (GOPC) Meetings

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8.0 ADMINISTRATIVE.........

8.1 Outage Management Meeting 8.2 Inspection Hours.......

8.3 Exit Meetings ~........

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DETAILS 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 1.1 Operational Experiences The plant operated at approximately full power for most of the inspection.

On February 14, 1991, a small steam leak was discovered on the exhaust line from the high pressure turbine.

The leak was not bad enough to warrant a plant shutdown.

A band was placed over the leak to slow and redirect the steam emitted.

The piping around the leak was ultrasonically tested and found to be sound.

The leak was monitored for any increase; none was noted. It was'ecided that repairs would be accomplished during the upcoming outage.

On February 15, 1991, during the monthly surveillance of the "A" emergency diesel generator, voltage to Emergency Bus 18 was lost while operators were synchronizing the generator to the bus, A Technical Specification required plant shutdown was then initiated due to the loss of both service water pumps in one train.

An Unusual Event was declared.

because the Technical Specification 3.3 Limiting Condition for Operation was exceeded for a plant safety system, requiring a plant shutdown.

The power decrease was stopped'at about 80% power after normal power was restored to Bus 18.

Plant power was returned to approximately full power over the next several hours.

As a conservative measure, the Unusual Event was not declassified until February 16, 1991, after a detailed examination and testing of Bus 18 components was performed and the "A" emergency'diesel generator was successfully synchronized to Bus 18.

On March 4, 1991, at 1:48 a.m., the plant experienced an unplanned power reduction due to offsite system problems caused by a severe ice storm.

An ice-laden tree fell onto Circuit 751, one of the two offsite power supply lines, resulting in an automatic turbine runback from 97% to 78% power.

No complications were experienced and the plant quickly stabilized at the reduced power level.

Power was slowly increased to about 88% over the next several hours.

As a result of reduced electrical loading on the grid due to storm damage, the plant responded to a power control dispatcher's request by reducing electrical generation to 75%, remaining there until March 6, 1991.

At about 8:00 p.m., March 6, 1991, power was slowly increased, achieving 97% power by 6:00 p.m.

In response to xenon build-up, power was reduced to 80% later that day. At 2:48 a.m. on March 7, 1991, offsite power was again temporarily interrupted to Circuit 751, resulting in a plant runback to 60%

power.

Plant primary and'econdary equipment responded smoothly to the transient.

Over several days, power was slowly escalated to 92%, at which point end of core life coast down operation began.

The annual refueling outage was scheduled to begin on March 15, 1991.

1.2 Control Room Observations I

The inspectors found the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant to be operated safely and in conformance with NRC requirements.

Control room staffing was as required.

Operators exercised control over access to the control room.

Shift supervisors consistently maintained authority over activities and provided detailed turnover briefings to relief crews.

Operators

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adhered to approved procedures and understood the reasons for lighted annunciators.

The inspectors reviewed control room log books for activities and trends, and observed recorder traces for abnormalities.

The inspectors verified compliance with Technical Specifications and audited selected safety-related tagouts.

During normal work hours and on backshifts, accessible areas of the plant were toured.

No inadequacies were identified.

Documents reviewed included Ginna Station Event Reports (A-25.1) 91-12 through 91-32.

Each Ginna Station Event Report was reviewed for appropriate corrective action and observation of the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs).

No inadequacies were identified.

The inspectors determined that actions taken in response to the loss of Emergency Bus 18 on February 15, 1991 were appropriate.

A plant shutdown was initiated as required by Technical Specifications, and operators remained cognizant of maintenance work on Bus 18.

1.3 In-Plant Observations During a plant walk-through on February 12, 1991, the inspectors noticed auxiliary operators performing a breaker tagging operation.

One operator apparently made an error, and went to investigate its consequences.

The inspectors contacted the control room and were informed that the operator had inadvertently opened the Instrument AirCompressor 1A breaker instead of the Chiller Compressor 1A breaker.

This caused Instrument Air Compressor 1A to trip and the standby compressor to automatically start.

The auxiliary operator had recognized his error, and went to the instrument air compressors to verify proper response of the system.

He also immediately informed the control room of his mistake.

The operator was later counselled about the need to self-verify actions, and an Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) investigation was initiated.

The HPES concluded that this was an isolated instance of an operator rushing a job and not adequately performing self-verification (i.e., not verifying, beforehand, that the correct breaker was being tagged and opened).

The inspectors noted that the two breakers were located diagonally next to each other and that the labeling was very similar.

The inspectors concluded that the operator's actions, after noting his mistake, were appropriate.

This lapse in self-verification was assessed as an isolated instance.

2.0 RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS I

2.1 Routine Observations The resident inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings

and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.

Through observations of ongoing activities and discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors concluded that radiological controls were conscientiously implemented.

2.2 AuxiliaryBuilding Decontamination Program Following the use of new and improved survey methods to identify loose surface contamination, the site Health Physics Department initiated an extensive effort to decontaminate aH levels of the AuxiliaryBuilding. This program, started in January 1991, was completed in early March 1991

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The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of this effort by observing work in progress, reviewing survey documents, and interviewing cognizant individuals.

Based on this review, the inspectors concluded that the contamination levels in the AuxiliaryBuilding have been systematically reduced.

This has resulted in a significant decrease in the number of personnel contaminations during work in the AuxiliaryBuilding.

2.3 Turbine Building/Intermediate Building Tour On February 28, 1991, the inspectors toured the turbine building and the intermediate building, carrying a radiation monitor.

Areas where small main steam leaks exist were examined for any increase in radiation levels above background.

Allareas examined were at approximately background levels.

No postings were observed and none were found to be required.

The inspectors concluded that all areas examined were in good condition.

3.0 MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE 3.1 Loss of Bus 18 Corrective Actions When Emergency Bus 18 lost voltage on February 15, 1991, station electricians were called in to investigate.

They determined that, as soon as the diesel generator breaker was closed, it tripped open.

The 4160 volt and 480 volt normal supply breakers also tripped open.

Relay targets were checked with the following abnormalities found: the 50G Instantaneous Ground Overcurrent relay on the 4160 volt breaker for Bus 18 transformer had operated, and there was an instantaneous target on the "A" diesel generator breaker amptector on Bus 18.

Plant management determined that emergency maintenance was warranted, so the normal work controls was waived, as allowed by the work control system.

Written work instructions were developed with procedures used as guidance.

Since the breakers were tripped and Bus 18 was isolated, procedures were appropriately used as guidance to verify that equipment was safe for work, Electricians focused attention first on thorough testing of Bus 18 and Station Service Transformer 18, in order to restore Bus 18 via its normal supply. Testing proved that the normal supply components were in good condition.

Bus 18 was restored through its normal supply, and the remaining maintenance was performed under the normal work control syste I S

Under the normal work control system, work orders were written to test the integrity of the

"A" diesel generator and cables, test the "A" diesel generator breaker on Bus 18, and test the voltmeters and the synchroscope for the "A" diesel generator and Bus 18.

Testing showed all of these to be in good condition, with only minor adjustment of an alarm switch on the breaker needed.

The surveillance test on the "A" diesel generator was reperformed and operability was verified.

Suspecting that the "A" diesel generator may have been unintentionally synchronized to Bus 18 out of phase, plant management had additional testing performed on the diesel on February 27, 1991.

The diesel generator was synchronized to Bus 18 twice by 2 different operators and data was recorded to try and identify any discrepancies and potentially

. determine a root cause for the event.

Although the results of the additional testing were not available for review prior to the end of the inspection, Ginna personnel indicated that minor discrepancies were found with the way different operators synchronize the diesel generators.

Potential corrective actions were not finalized prior to the end of the inspection, but the inspectors determined that operators were aware of the identified potential discrepancies.

The inspectors had no further questions on this event.

3.2 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve MFWRV-BReliability On March 1, 1991, control room operators observed several small level oscillations in Steam Generator SG-B.

One level increase actuated the SG-B narrow range high level alert alarm (58%) before the MFWRV-B responded to return the level to programmed level (52%).

Operator intervention was not required to correct this oscillation. A Maintenance Work Request was issued by operations to investigate and repair the valve.

The inspector discussed valve reliability with site maintenance management and corporate engineering.

Through these discussions, the inspector determined that the RG&E engineering staffs have monitored the valve's performance and have scheduled replacement of the transducer and positioner in the valve's controller in conjunction with installation of the Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System modification.

The inspector concluded that the RG&E site engineering staff is well informed and has been appropriately involved in assessing and resolving problems with MFWRV-B.

4.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 4.1 Ice Storm Aftermath A severe ice storm swept through Wayne and Monroe counties and surrounding areas on March 3rd and 4th, 1991.

As a result of the extensive damage to transmission lines and power distribution equipment caused by the storm, the counties activated their Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs).

RG&E personnel manned stations in the EOCs to coordinate and communicate actions to restore power.

The RG&E Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff soon

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determined that the siren system was not to be considered reliable because of storm damage.

As compensatory action, local fire department and law enforcement personnel were briefed by EP personnel on "Route Alert" measures that would be implemented ifan emergency occurred at Ginna.

The briefings consisted of map review and methods and frequencies of notification. During this period, telephone and radio communication was available between the plant and EOCs.

To assess the operability of the siren system, RG&E is verifying that each individual siren is receiving power (Silent Test) and, following completion of this test, willconduct an actuation of all sirens.

The full actuation is scheduled for March 19, 1991.

Throughout the storm emergency period, the RG&E site maintained good lines of communication with the NRC staff, apprising the NRC of plant conditions.

The inspector had no further questions.

5.0 SECURITY 5.1 Routine Observations During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, protected area and vital area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

5.2 Lightning Strike On March 2, 1991, a lightning strike temporarily disabled part of the site security system.

Through interviews with cognizant individuals and observations of licensee response, the inspector concluded that compensatory measures were promptly initiated to assure proper security coverage.

-Repairs were quickly completed to restore full use of affected systems.

6.0 ENGINEERING/TECHNICALSUPPORT 6.1 Plant Modifications The inspector reviewed modification Engineering Work Request (EWR) 4068C, Radiation Monitoring System Upgrade, Phase 3. - Replacement of Channels R-15 through R-20, to assess modification activities.

This review included interviews with personnel responsible for tracking and assembling the packages, assessment of the adequacy and thoroughness of the design review, and observations during installation of the modificatio l

The inspector reviewed the design package.

NRC approval was not required prior to installation.

PORC had reviewed the design, proposed installation and testing.

The design was found to be in accordance with commitments and design criteria, and was controlled with approved procedures.

The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation and the 10 CFR 50.49 evaluation were found to be adequate.

'No discrepancies were observed.

The inspector observed portions of the installation to verify that: approved procedures were provided to the personnel and were being followed; appropriate oversight by quality control personnel; and control room personnel were knowledgeable on the scope and status of the modification.

The inspector also reviewed selected field change requests and verified that discrepancies between the as-built configuration and the design documentation used during the design phase were identified and properly tracked to resolution.

Some of these included wires in the cabinet not identified in design diagrams, changes to the location of a monitor due to physical constraints, and a procedure discrepancy which caused work to be stopped when the technician lifted a lead and caused an unexpected alarm.

The discrepancies received appropriate and timely addressal, No further concerns were noted.

6.2 Unresolved Item (50-244/90-03-04) UFSAR and Technical Specification Discrepancy (Closed)

This item concerned a discrepancy in the UFSAR (Updated Final Safety Analysis Report) and Technical Specifications about when certain nonessential emergency diesel generator trips are bypassed.

Both documents stated that= the trips are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus.

This discrepancy was not previously identified by RG&E because the surveillance test governing this TS requirement was conducted concurrent with the insertion of a Safety Injection actuation signal, which also. causes a bypassing of these same nonessential emergency diesel generator trips.

Corporate and plant engineering personnel concluded that the UFSAR and the Technical Specification were incorrect and determined that the existing trip bypass logic was adequate.

A corrected Technical Specification amendment was submitted to the NRC on June 29, 1990, and is currently under NRC review.

The error in the UFSAR was corrected during the December 16, 1990 annual update.

The inspectors reviewed the changes and concluded that the corrections were appropriate.

The error in the TS and USFAR appears to have occurred during initial development of the TS and could not have been detected by the surveillance test in use since that time.

The incident appeared to be an isolated deficiency in the TS and did not represent any noteworthy safety concern.

The inspectors had no further concerns in this matter and considered this matter close.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION 7.1 Periodic Reports Periodic reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical'pecification 6.9.1 were reviewed.

Inspectors verified that the report contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.

The following report was reviewed:

Monthly Operating Report for January 1991.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

7.2 Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Board Meeting The inspectors attended portions of a meeting of the RG&E Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Board on February 13, 1991.

The board heard presentations from plant personnel regarding the plant trip and the disabling of Engineered Safety Feature logic which occurred in December 1990.

The meeting was well attended and there was good interaction between the board members and the presenters.

The inspectors noted that, due to presentations being scheduled late in the meeting, there was little time for the board to adequately review the planned long-term corrective actions at that time, though board members were given a copy of the planned corrective actions.

As a follow-up, the board met on March 12, 1991 via telephone conference call and discussed long-term corrective actions.

The board agreed to conduct reviews for effectiveness of the long-term corrective actions during future meetings.

The inspector had no further questions.

7.3 Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Ginna Outage Planning Committee (GOPC) Meetings During the inspection period, the inspectors attended PORC and GOPC meetings.

The meetings were held mainly to discuss the status of items related to the upcoming annual refueling outage, scheduled to start on March 15, 1991.

The inspectors noted that the meetings were well planned and efficient, and concluded that the meetings were effective in preparing for the upcoming outage.

8,0 ADMINISTRATIVE 8.1 Outage Management Meeting A meeting was held on March 7, 1991 in the NRC Region I offices between RG&E and NRC management to discuss the scope of the 1991 annual refueling outage, scheduled to begin on March 15, 1991.

Attachment 1 to this report lists meeting attendees.

RG&E

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management discussed the outage schedule, planned maintenance activities, modifications to be completed, and licensing activities.

Handouts from the meeting are attached to the inspection report.. (Attachment 2)

A concern was raised regarding the content of the Outage Management Guidelines (OMGs).

The guidelines are used to develop schedules and plan outage activities. It appeared that the guidelines might not sufficiently address the importance of reactor safety during the outage.

Guideline OMG-9 contains underlined steps indicating that they cannot be changed since they are commitments which must be met, These steps address specific concerns that must be followed during the scheduling of activities to increase plant safety margin.

Additionally, OMG-3 is being modified to address reduction of the risk of core damage during the outage.

Added steps address what specifically contributes to increased risk and how risk reduction should be accomplished.

8.2 Inspection Hours This inspection included 9 backshift and 9 deep backshift hours.

8.3 Exit Meetings At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.

In addition, an NRC exit meeting was held for the inspection on February 15, 1991: 50-244/91-0 ATTACHMENT1 Meeting Attendance Lists RGAE/NRC Pre-Outage Briefing on March 7, 1991 Name Or anizati n

Title Thomas Marlow Richard Marchionda Paul Wilkins Robert C. Mecredy George Wrobel Stanley M. Spector Peter O'onnell Ebe C. McCabe Norm Blumberg Wayne Hodges Alan Finkel Jim Wiggins Jon'Johnson Gordon Edison

'om Moslak RG&E RG&E RG&E RG&E RG&E RG&E NRC:RI NRC'RI NRC:Rl NRC:RI NRC:RI NRC:RI NRC:RI NRC:NRR NRC'RI Support Services Superintendent Director, Outage Planning Dept. Mgr., Nuc. Eng. Services VP, Ginna Nuclear Production Mgr. Nuc. Safety & Licensing Plant Manager, Ginna Radiation Specialist.

Chief, RPS-3B Chief, Op Programs Sect.

Director, Reactor Safety Senior Reactor Engineer Deputy Director, DRP Project Branch 3 Project Mgr., by Phone Ginna Sr. Resident Inspector Inspection Report 91-05 Exit March 12, 1991 Name Title

. Tom Moslak Paul Gorski Robert E. Wood Mark E. Cavanaugh Steven T. Adams Thomas L. Harding Duane Filkins Terry Schuler Joseph Widay Clair Edgar John St. Martin SRI-NRC Mgr. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, Nuclear Security Fire Protection Eng.

Technical Manager Modification Support Coordinator HP-Chem Mgr.

Operations Manager Superintendent Ginna Production Mgr. Electrical/I&C Corrective Action Coordinator

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ATTACHMENT TO 50-244/91-05.

GINNA STATION

$997 OUTAGE March 7, J991

1991 OUTAGE Agenda

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introduction

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overview and schedule

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maintenance activities

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modifications

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licensing activities

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other

~.conclusions R. C. Mecredy R. A. Marchionda T. A. Marlow P. C. Wilkens G. J. Wrobel S. M. Spector R. C. Mecredy

1991 ANNUAL OUTAGE OUTAGE INFOEQGLTION PACKAGE

Outage Planning Section Organization Chart (during outage)

Plant Manager Outage P,lanning Director I

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Fmtctloas

~ Direct all activities during annual refueling outage

~ Chair daily outage meetings

~ Direct scheduling activities

~ Conduct plant inspection tours

~ Cootdinate reelution ofproblems Products

~ Annual refueling outage work completed safely, on schedule, and within budget,

~ Priorities forand ptogress ofdaily activities confinaed and problems identified

~ Priorities and critical path scbcdulcs sct foroutage works; detailed phns tefincd and adjusted to optimize start and completion dates

~ fdentify and ditect cortectioa ofunsafe conditions, improper work practice, conQlcting work

~ Ptoblema ofmaterial avaihiPility, schedule or work conQicts, priority, hck ofresources or technical or emergency questions ate resolved quickly and safely Materials, Procurement, and Budget Manager Superintendent Support Superintendent Glnna Production

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Outage Planning Section Organization Chart (non-outage)

Plant Manager Materials, Procurement, and Budget Marlager Superintendent Support Superintendent Glnna Production Outage Planning Director Corrective Action Coordinator Safety Coordinator Fttactloaa

~ Dicect plaaaiag and scbcduliag ofannual refueling outage

~ Chair Ginna Outage Phaning Committee and attend special outage phnaing mcctings

~ Coaduct plaat inspection tours

~ Monitorand evaluato industry experienc

"~ Participate in hag-range planniag snd chairs daily MOPAR meetings Products

~ Completed and approved long-range outage plaas and schedule

~ Approved outago goals, staadscda, aad pcocedurea

~ Detailed preparations foroutage completed on schedule:

- EWRs and modification packs@% approved

- Temporary and penaanent fscHitics prepared

- Staging areas ready

- Contract suppoct permnncl selected aad hired oa timo

~ Support group pcocechtres approved

- Procuremeat actions completed and peeper materials available oa time

- Training, reaoctrees, axl schedules sot

~ Identified problems with plant materia conditions to be corrected during equipmeat outage

~ Actions taken to benefit from tho experienc ofothers and avoid costly mistakes

'tcgratcd livingschedule maintaiaed forlong~go and

'ear term

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R.

E.

GINNA 6 YEAR PERFORMANCE YEAR OUTAGE LENGTH AVAILABILITY FORCED OUTAGE RATE 1984 71.4 78 '

3 '

1985 36 '

87 '

1.6 1986 42.5 87 '

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1987 31 '

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4 1988 35 '

86 '

3'5 1989

74 '

4 ~ 73 4'990

84 '

4.2

• AVERAGE INDUSTRY FORCED OUTAGE RATE, 1985 TO 1989:

10.12 (Data published in NUREG-1272)

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OUTAGE OBJECTIVES SAFETY GOAL ACTUAL ACHIEVED Lost time accidents Man-Rem exposure Contaminations

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~13 YES YES NO QUALITY

> 904 PM's Completed

> 904 CM's Completed

> 904 Material insp.

Comp.

90

92e68 92.38 YES YES YES REGULATORY

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3 license Event Reports

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YES PLANT IMPROVEMENTS

> 904 Scope Mod. work OPERABILITY

~6. 5

~E St@rtup outage problems.

Problem free run

0 YES

~60 DAY

)60 DAYS YES CORPORATE ( 109 Adjusted sched. slip ~2

~4 NO

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j IS (

, GINNA OUTAGE MAJ V TIES SHUTDOWN~

MARCH 15 ~

199 1 COOLDOWN AND RCS CLEANUP STEAM GENERATOR EDDY CUEGKNT TESTING STEAM GENERATOR REPAIRS, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE REMOVAL REFUELING, 32 ASSEMBLIES REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL INSPECTION MAIN TRANSFORMER COOLER REWIRE MAIN GENERATOR INSPECTION RING REPLACEMENT DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM INSTALLATION 34 MODIFICATION PROJECTS 1000 PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

PRESSURIZER INSULATION REPLACEMENT 350 NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONS

J CS

G)l44A STAT)QV A)60'1991 S~RY BARCHART APR) L 16 17 F

5 1829202122232425262728293031

2

0

6

N T

il T

F S

H T

il T

F S

S

T ll T

F

5 B

10

12 13

H T

N T

F

5 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 T

M T

F

5 N

T 1I T

F

~) ~~

18HARQ1 I

1&QAQ1 1%WQ1 A

SASSb%3LY I

10fAAQ1 ON AL 4.

)NSP I

SG EOOY I

I 26HARQi 31HARQi A RCP ~

INSPECT)ON I

2SeW1~ 3CHIR9i ASSEt%3LE REACTOR SG EV)KG/PLUGGING I

suan ~ masx A RCP REASSEH3LY i

SSLRIZER NI INSLLATlON )NSTALLA$304-I 14APR91

.

16APR91 TEST)NG

)LL C VENT RCS/SAFEGUARDS I

seueoi ~ xs msi RCS HEATLP/ESTB DKN/HYPO/MAWBQ3SLE I

18APR91

~ ~

2OAPR91 CE CLEAPlt4a 20APRQ1 ~ 21APR91 tKATLP IO 547 DEG/CR)T) CAL)TY TEST)NG I

21APRQ1 ~ 22APRQi REACTOR STARTUP/PHYS)CS TEST)NG/kEATLP SECONDARY I

22A+Il01~ 264+RSI LPI)T ON L)NE/FLUX NA~/PHR TO )CCX LEGENO EVENT CR) T) CAL

I

OUTAGE MANPONE Ginna Employees Ginna Contract RG&E Employees Outage Contract Total 293

550

~50 1387 HEAL H PHYSICS Ginna Employees Ginna Contract Outage Contract Total

10

78

-

OUTA E MANPOWER Number of People on Site 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

1

S

6

7

9 10, 11

1

S

6

7

9

11

I AM I

PM I

Time of Day PEOPLE ON SITE

OUTAGE RISK ISSUES 1)

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY 2)

AUTOMATIC INITIATIONS 3)

RCS INVENTORY 4)

STEAM GENERATORS 5)

RCS BOUNDARY 6)

CONTAINMENT

RISK REDUCTION ME H S

1) INTEGRATION OF SCHEDULE PERFORMED AT SRO KNOWLEDGE LEVEL 2)

SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT GUIDED BY FORMALIZED PROCEDURES 3)

RESPONSIBILITXES FORMALLY DEFINED 4)

PROVIDE "DEFENSE IN DEPTH" BY MAXIMIZING.AVAILABLE SAFEGUARD EQUIPMENT AND POWER SUPPLIES 5) MINIMIZE TIME AT REDUCED INVENTORY CONDITXONS 6)

RESTRXCT ACTIVITIES DURING REDUCED INVENTORY CONDITIONS 7)

SCHEDULE REVIEWED TWICE DAILY BY MANAGERS, SUPERVISORS AND FOREMEN 8)

INCRFWSED COMKJNICATZON DURING TIMES OF HIGHER RXSK 9)

ADDITIONALOPERATOR TRAINXNG

R.E.

GINNA STATION NRC PRESENTATION MARCH 7, 1991 MAJOR MAINTENANCE

Work Orders Major Activities

Steam Generator

l g P

R.E.

GINNA STATION NRC PRESENTATION MARCH 7, 1991

-

KING OF PRUSSIA 1.

Breakdown of Mork Orders Preventive Corrective Other

~AS

+ 00

~Un tanned 7ataS IKC Mechanical Pipe HVAC Electrical

328 106 129

78

2

0 119

'

3

5

47

48

40 433 119 302

124 Total 1008 2.

Man-Hours (does not inlcude Site Services and support for S/G, Turbine, etc.)

Prorated for IKC Mechanical

.Pipe HVAC Electrical 2,695 4,263 4,006 754 1 407 3, 024 4,697 4,763 754 2 077 13,125 15,315

2991 XSO MAJO MA NTENANC CT VI XES Instrumentation a Cont o A astat rela re lacement

INCORE Thimble Tube Clean n APE N-5 Calibratio conce n v t st-t 88 onse Idle current adjust Main Turbine EHC S

stem:'hange earth 4 in-line filters Fabricate flush plates, change oil, flush system Modification (TSR4 9036)

to install new pumps and piping Inspect accumulators 20ET Solenoid valves ZNCORE Thermocou le CONAX connections INCORE Det t Drives

1991 AI&O MAJOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES Valves Primar

& Seconda Valve CM

& PM Ginna Pi e Sho 7 AOVS 12 Checks 6 Manual 3 MOVs 35 Valve replacements Ma'or Re acks Main'steam isolation Main steam check Pressurizer spray Feedwater control Valve refurbishment 27 motor operators (12 scheduled for DP testing)

MOVs 2 AOVs 7 Checks 8 Manual Secondar valve PMs 16 AOVs 7 Checks 10 Manual

S

1991 AI&O MAJOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

Pum s Motors 6 Drivers 1A RCP Ma or Seal Ins ection 1A RCP Motor Ma'or Ins ections:

lA Main Feedwater Pump 1A Condensate Pump 1C Charging Pump Drive

LV

1991 AI&O MAJOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIE8 Pum s Motors

& Drivers (continued)

Motor Ins ections:

A Aux Bldg Exh Fan A Condensate Pump B Condensate Pump B Aux FW Pump B Aux FW Pump Oil Pump C Charging Pump B Component Cooling Pump B D/G Air Compressor A D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pump I

B D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pump B EH Oil Pump A

& B Diesel Generator Annual Ins ection

1991 AI&O MAJOR MA1NTENANCE ACTIVITIE8 Electrical Main Generator Ma'or Ins ection Change retaining ring from 18-5 to 18-18 (moly-chrome)

Re lace cell 23 of >>B>> Batte with s are Refurbish 8 are RTB and Re lace

>>A>> RTB

1991 AISO MAJOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES Miscellaneous containment Coolin Coil Tube Side Cleanin uarantined Procedures and 0 erations Review Checklist Steam Generator Current S/G Status 1991 Inspection Plan 1991 Repairs

"U" Bend Sample

R.E.

GINNA STATION 1991 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGS AND SLEEVING STATUS IIAIt S

G IIBtt S

G Tubes Plugged 0 Tubes Plugged Tubes Sleeved 0 Tubes Sleeved 197 6.

05%'23 6.84%

332 10. 18>

833 25.55>o TOTAL "A B" S G AVERAGE Plugged 529 =

8.114 Sleeved 1056

16.194 PRED1CTED NEW DEFECTS A" S/G

"B" S/G = 225

Gixma Station A.

Annual Differential Hot Leg (Five days)

"

~lqyl g g

~llgll 8 8 Cold Leg (Three days)

~II@II 8 Q

~15+11 8 Q 1.

Previous ID/OD > 20< TW 2.

RenahMer to 41 TSP H (100%)

3.

F/L Exam - Randan 20<

4.

Thmugh Sleeve -.610 probe 5.

Sleeved Tubes - 20% F/L

1605

" 425 221 2044 575

4251 1712

5751 502 B.

Sleeve Elms (.610/MRP) - 1 day 1.

Ra~n 20% - installed C.

MRPC - 1 day 1.

~&~ bends 171 713

79 713

2.

Indication Verification/Characterization

<

100 D.

1991 Installed Sleeve Base1ine 1 day

< 100

Includes

~%'~ bend MRPC ezams (Item C)

2 Recg6res different probes Includes 5 F/L low mv sleeve exams

R ED GINNA STATION 1991 REPAIRS 1991 Ojective is to maintain the same number of "operable" tubes Remove the last two (2) Westinghouse explosive plugs 27" rigid sleeve. installation Curved sleeve installation 30" rigid sleeve installation Mechanical plugs, installation and removal operations Welded plug installation

J

RoE ~

GINNA STATION

'~U'~ BEND SAMPLE S~CARY Back round

0 S/G Pressure decrease Suspect fouling 1990 Sample t'

Support chemical cleaning in 1992 Remove

"U" Bend specimen Analyze specimen Volume of deposit Thickness, density Chemical composition Removal

"U" Bend above sixth support

'I

ENGINEERING 1991 Outage Mocfifications ISI Erosion/Corrosion

1991 OUTAGE MODIFICATIONS Second Year of Fluor Daniel Contract 34 Total Modifications Approximately 45,000 Craft Hours

,

Ginna Refueling Outages Total Craft Hours Thousands 120 100 l

60

20 0 '983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

- 1991 mm Craft Hours

~ losoasoe TOTAL IafRI te IRC JaR JsR 3I

I~

I990 l99l JIR Jae fll fIA fll Ill eaA eiR eiA RsA IPA IAA apA tl

~,

II IA

~

II I9

I

~

l5 IPA sPA Rof Raf Rle RII Joe Jll JPI JAI JA

5

20 tf

Il ll te I

I

~~ale eel.a A iosoore S a\\sos loa I98S.ION Poeieal Stool 'SIPAI II ee

~oe sal fioiso IIJR91 IS 59 4666 ALL COHSI4UCIIOH KOOIFICATIONS TOTAL HANHOU4 SUHHA4Y Soeel I el

Asl~ Dei ~

tLARII IP 99

~lsi Cse ~

I%fee I ~I IIIIIIOIRIFL ICOIFICIIIDeIISII If SINII

1991 SELECTED MODIFICATIONS t

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR

~ EWR 3596 3797 4068C 4218 4324C 4526 4658 4773 4968 5097 5156 Diesel Generator Air System Control Rod Position Indication Rad Monitor System Upgrade CV Inst/Sample Tube Support SG Blowdown Diesel Fuel Oil System SW Fouling Adv Digital FW Control System Transfer DC Non 1E Loads CV Recir Fan Structure Pressurizer Insulation

4$

ADVANCED DIGITAL FEEDWATER SYSTEM

~ Feedwater System Causes High Percentage of Trips

~ Existing System No Longer Supported,

~ ADFCS Design Features Automatic control from 2% to 100%

power Double and triple sensor redundancy No single failure of component will result in loss of control signal

~ ADFCS Testing FAT included

RG&E personnel All software tested with simulated inputs and outputs

-- Fault testing for open, short, ground

. Pre-op test to repeat FAT,

+ controls, alarms, indicators Startup tests will perturb levels

~ Spare System Used for 5 Weeks I&C Training

I

lS

1991 SELECTED MODIFICATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION (MRPI)

Enhance faulted detector resistance Eliminate problems from August 1989 PRESSURIZER INSULATION Change necessary to support ISI Asbestos replaced with reflective Heater connections to be checked and refurbi

1991 ISI PROGRAM Second Outage in 3rd Interval Class

Components:

~

128 exams on 83 components

~ Rx vessel nuts, studs, closure head weld

~ Pzr circumferential

+ longitudinal welds

~

RCP flywheel Class 2 Components:

t 112 exams on 89 components

- Class 3 Components:

~ 54 components High Energy Components:

~

welds, 7 supports Pressure Tests:

~ 49 leakage exams Snubbers:

~

149 exams, 14 functional tests

E

'

CS

EROSION/CORROSION EROSION/CORROSION

~ Integrated program developed with NES, Tech Engineering, MEIS, 'Maintenance

~ Component selection based'upon computer selection and engineering review

~

164 exams planned ISI and E/C SUPPORT

~ Approximately 85 total people including SG exam

~ 1/2 are RGBE

a

%II

LICENSING ISSUES 1991 OUTAGE COMPLETED:

~ Digital Feedwater Removal of Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismate DESIRED:

~ MOV 856

~ p

~ lsl Relief Requests IST pump and Valve Testing

~ CpypL 2009 vs. 2006

~

CORE RELpAD

FAs Bottom Nozzle Design Minimize Core Leakage

UPCOMING

~

LTOP Mass Injection Case Deletion

~

Reg Guide 1.97 Exceptions 0737 Supplement J'

CIVs Into UFSAR

e sl l

SPRING 1991 REFUELING OUTAGE ALARABudgef Man-Rem Est.

Steam Generator Inspection/Repair 2.

Steam Generator Tube Pull 150

3.

Other Maintenance 4.

Refueling

5.

Pressurizer Insulation

\\

6.

Blowdown Line Modification

15 7.

Digital Feedwater Control 8.

Other Modifications

Total 399

C I)

'

s

SPRING 1991 REFUELING OUTAGE Control of Contractors

~

report to Ginna management organization a

training and qualifications

~

site specific training

~

plant liaison supervision

~

PORC approval of contractors'rocedures

~

key decisions remain with Ginna management

SPRING 1991 REFUELING OUTAGE Maintenance Work Pa.ckage Review

~

reviews on schedule for completion

~

establish SRO level review capability

~

comply with 12l90 incident commitments

~

allocate personnel to high priority reviews

1991 OUTAGE Conclusions

~

shut down on March 15

~

planned for 39 days

~

several significant projects

~

scope of work consistent with previous outages

~

plant and industry experience incorporated

~

anticipate successful outage/post-outage operation

c