IR 05000244/1989006
| ML17250A912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1989 |
| From: | Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17250A910 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-89-06, 50-244-89-6, NUDOCS 8908090366 | |
| Download: ML17250A912 (24) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244/89-06 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Faci 1 i ty:
Location:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
April 24 through May 31, 1989 Inspectors:
C N
T K
T S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna A. Moslak, Resident Inspector, Three Mile Island S.
Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer A. Rebelowski, Senior Reactor Engineer Approved by:
e D.
Ins ection Summar R. Haverkamp, Chief, actor Projects Section
Date Routine inspection by resident and regional inspectors ( Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-06)
Areas Ins ected:
Station activities including plant operations, maintenance, radiological controls, surveillance, physical security, periodic and special reports, written reports of nonroutine events, start-up activities, emergency safety features system walkdown, and action on previous inspection findings.
Inspection activities consisted of 219.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of inspection, including 39.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection, and 11.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of deep backshift inspection (between 10:00 p.m.
and 5:00 a.m.).
Weekend inspection was conducted on May 6, 1989 and holiday inspection was conducted on May 29, 1989.
Results:
Overall, plant activities were conducted safely during this inspec-
.
tion period.
Control room activities during start-up were well controlled, and approved procedures were followed.= However, during the recent outage ending May 31, 1989, control room operators were not always aware of the status of maintenance activities.
A weakness was noted in the control of current pro-cedure usage ( section 3.d.).
A violation was noted regarding the failure to control access to a vital area (section 3.e.).
DETAILS Persons Contacted During this inspection period, inspectors held discussions with operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.
The following people were among those contacted:
" S.
Adams, Technical Manager
" J.
Bodine, Manager of Nuclear Assurance
" D. Fi lkins, Manager of HP & Chemistry A. Jones, Corrective Action Coordinator
" R. Marchionda, Director of Outage Planning
" T. Marlow, Superintendent, Support Services R. Mecredy, General Manager, Nuclear Production
"-A. Morris, Maintenance Manager J. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator
" T. Schuler, Operations Manager L. Smith, Operations Supervisor
" S. Spector, Plant Manage..
Ginna Station
" J. Widay, Superintendent, Ginna Production
"Denotes persons present at exit meeting on June 29, 1989.
t C
Summar of Plant 0 erations At the beginnin'g of the inspection period the plant was shut down for the annual refueling outage with the reactor defueled.
On May 4, 1989, the B
pump breaker failed to open from th'e main con-trol board switch; the breaker was manually tripped locally.
The cause of the failure for the breaker to open was a mechanical linkage (to auxiliary switches)
which fell off due to a missing snap ring.
On May 6, 1989, the A emergency diesel generator automatically started and tied to Bus
as required when the normal supply breaker tripped open.
While testing Bus 12A differential relay, an electrician opened the wrong link due to a procedural typing error.
This action caused the normal supply breaker to Bus 14 to open.
Refueling activities were completed on May 7, 1989 and the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test was successfully completed on May 16, 1989.
While performing the Plant Safeguard Logic Test, on May 18, '1989, a Safety Injection (SI) signal occurred due to pressurizer low pressure.
Instru-mentation and Controls ( IEC) personnel mistakenly reset the bistables and since the Reactor Coolant system (RCS)
was vented, a low pressure SI sig-nal resulted.
At the time of the signal, most safeguard equipment was out of service with control switches in the pull-stop position; the B SI pump was running for accumulator filling and the RHR pump was running for shut-down cooling.
The equipment and system response to the SI actuation was as expected for the outage condition of the plant.
The Boric Acid Storage
~
Tank (BAST) supply valves automatically opened, and since the Refueling Mater Storage Tank (RWST) supply valves were open supplying suction to the SI pump, water from the RWST gravity fed to the BAST, slightly diluting the BAST.
Additionally, only the A train of SI actuated and no contain-ment ventilation isolation signal was generated.
The containment venti-lation isolation signal was not generated due to a modification being in-stalled.
The B train of SI failed to actuate due to temporarily routed wiring inhibiting the correct operation of a relay.
Both conditions were corrected prior to resuming performance of the test.
The plant was taken above cold shutdown and the RCS hydrostatic test was performed on May 23, 1989.
The reactor was taken critical on May 29, 1989 and operators attempted to synchronize the generator to the grid on May 30, 1989.
The generator breaker immediately opened when closed and the turbine tripped.
Open slide links at the main transformer were determined to have caused the turbine trip.
The links were closed and the generator was successfully synchronized to the grid on May 30, 1989.
The turbine overspeed test was successfully performed on May 31, 1989.
At the close of the inspection period plant power was approximately 50 percent; licen-see investigation of the root cause of the open slide links at the main transformer, and the determination of corrective action, was still in pro-gress'~
3.
Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected a.
Plant 0 erations (71707)
The inspectors ensured that the R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant oper-ated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory require-ments.
The inspectors observed portions of the plant startup, main turbine generator synchronizing, and turbine overspeed testing.
Ac-tivities conducted in the main control room were performed in a con-trolled manner and approved procedures were followed.
In general, good plant management oversight was exhibited.
In particular, during main turbine generator synchronizing, although the control room was somewhat congested, the shift supervisor maintained a
good overall knowledge of plant activities, and ensured that main control board operators maintained good system awareness and kept in good communi-cation with each other.
While performing a routine tour of the emergency diesel generator room the inspectors observed a person on top of the A emergency diesel generator, cleaning the engine.
At the time, the diesel was aligned for automatic starting.
Although the person cleaning the engine was aware the engine could automatically start without warn-ing, main control room operators were unaware of this activity.
The inspectors determined, through questioning control room operators, that they were not always completely aware of the status of mainten-ance activities in progress.
Although a maintenance planner coordi-nates maintenance activities with control room personnel daily, the
inspector considered that additional management attention was warranted to ensure that control room personnel are aware of the status of plant maintenance activities to ensure personnel safety and provide status information to operators on systems potentially needed in an emergency situation.
In response, site management acknowledged the inspector's observation and comment and indicated that additional management at-tention would be given to the matter.
The licensee effectiveness in communicating the status of maintenance activities to control room personnel will be monitored during routine resident inspections.
b.
Radiolo ical Controls (71707)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors periodically toured the radiological control area (RCA) and observed outage activi-ti'es in progress, as well as the general radiological condition of the RCA to verify that radiation work permits were implemented properly, that access control at entrances to high radiation areas was adequate, that personnel used contamination monitor's as required when exiting controlled areas, and that postings and labeling were in compliance with regulations and procedures.
Activities inspected were adequate to meet license and regulatory requirements.
No concerns were identified.
c.
Maintenance (62703)
he inspector observed portions of a safety-related maintenance acti-vity to verify that redundant components were operable, activities did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operati'on, required admini-strative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the
"skills of the trade",
appropriate radiological controls were imple-mented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
Portions of the following maintenance activity were observed by the inspectors:
Maintenance (M)-15. 1,
"A or B Diesel Generator Inspection and Maintenance",
revision 30, effective date April 23, 1989, ob-served May 6, 1989.
Good management oversight for this maintenance activity was exhibited and control was adequate to ensure conformance with requirements.
d.
Surveillance (61726)
Inspectors observed portions of surveillance test procedures to verify that test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, work was performed by qualified personnel, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met,. and that the system was correctly restored following testing.
Portions of the following sur-veillance activity were observed by the inspectors:
Refueling Shutdown Surveillance Procedure (RSSP)-6.0, revision 16, "Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test", effective date May 1,
1989, observed May 16, 1989.
Licensee control of this surveillance activity was adequate to insure operability.
RSSP-2.3,
"Emergency Diesel Generator Trip Testing", effective May 13, 1989, observed May 16, 1989.
While licensee personnel were preparing to perform this surveil-lance activity, the inspectors noted an old revi sion of the pro-cedure in use.
Administrative Procedure (A)-503, Plant'Proce-dure Adherence Requirements, requires the latest approved revi-sion of the procedure at the time of the start of the job shall be used.
When the inspectors questioned the personnel performing the test about the procedure's revision, the activity was halted.
The activity was restarted only after the proper revision was obtained and checked.
There was no safety significance in this instance since the new revision incorporated changes
.marked on the old revi si on.
The personnel involved in this activity were counseled and all department personnel were reminded to check for the latest revisions prior to conducting the activity.
No Notice of Violation will be issued for this violation since it is considered an isolated instance, corrective action has been initiated, and the violation has minor safety significance (NO VIOLATION 50-244/89-06-01)
.
~Securi t (717D7)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified that detection equipment was operational, Protected Area ( PA) and Vital Area (VA) barriers were well maintained, access control during security turn-over was adequate, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or es-corted access and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.
THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.
IT IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
This is a violation (VIOLATION 89-06-02).
In addition, licensee security event reports to the NRC which docu-ment these instances of inattentiveness did not address the cause of the inattentiveness or corrective actions.to avoid recurrence.
Since response to the Notice of Violation will address the cause and cor-rective actions,
.the licensee will not need to resubmit these re-ports.
Future security event reports will be reviewed as a par t of the routine inspection program to determine whether the licensee ad-dresses root cause and corrective actions.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713)
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9
~ 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspectors.
This review included the following considera-tions:
reports contained information required by the NRC; test re-sults and/or supporting information were consistent with design pre-dictions and performance specifications and reported information was valid.
Within this scope, the following report was reviewed by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating Report for April 1989.
The report was adequate.
Review of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events (90712)
Written reports submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes properly identified and corrective actions appropriate.
The inspectors, also determined whether assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted on-site follow-up, reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were applic-able, and requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been properly met.
The following LER was reviewed and found to be satisfactory (Note:
date indicated is event date).89-001, April 12, 1989 Steam Generator Tube Degradation Due to IGA/SCC Causes Q.A. Manual Reportable Limits to be Reached.
Start-u Activities (71707)
During normal and backshift hours, the inspector observed control room operations and activities conducted within the plant in pre-paration for plant start-up.
Activities covered included plant heat-up, steam generator crevice cleaning, alignment of various pri-mary systems, including the Safety Injection System, and general plant housekeeping.
The following observations were made:
On May 24, 1989, the inspector witnessed plant heat-up and formation of a
steam bubble in the pressurizer.
Through review of selected records, interviews with licensee representatives, and examination of control room instruments, the inspector determined that'the licen-see performed thi s activity in accordance with a controlled proce-dure, 0-11, Revision 95, "Plant Heat-up from Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown" and complied with the Technical Specifications relevant to this evolution.
In particular, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat-up rate was maintained at less than 50 degrees F/hr, pressurizer heat-up rate was less than 100 degrees F/hr and the pressurizer-to-RCS tem-perature difference was maintained at less than 200 degrees F
~
Following bubble formation in the pressurizer,'he licensee commenced crevice cleaning of the steam generators.
Various aspects of this activity were observed on May 25, 1989 and the licensee performed this operation in a controlled, deliberate manner in accordance with Operating Procedure 0-10, "Crevice Cleaning".
On May 25, 1989, the inspector toured the reactor building to assess general material conditions.
Overall, the housekeeping in the reac-tor building was satisfactory.
Work areas were clean an'd material to be removed was staged at the equipment hatch.
The licensee was in-formed of what appeared to be a weakness in the control of combust-ible material; a large ( 10'
10') unpainted, wooden crate appeared to be constructed of untreated wood.
The crate, containing reactor vessel 0-Ring seals, was permanently stored in the reactor building during all modes of operation.
Licensee representatives informed the inspector that although the wood was not conspicuously marked indi-cating it was treated with fire retardant, procurement documentation was available to prove the material met fire protection requirements.
The inspector had no additional concerns regarding this matter.
In general, startup activities were conducted safely.
En ineered Safet Feature ESF S stem Walkdown (71710)
On May 25, 1989, the inspector conducted a review of valve line-ups maintained in the "Plant Start-up Primary Side" log, accomplished prior to plant heat-up,.
The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector.
The procedures were signed off, an independent veri-fication was performed when required, and the documentation was com-plete.
0-1 S-3.2A S-2.1A S"4.2.1 S"8A S-3.1B Plant Start-up Chemical and Volume Control System Pre-start-up Alignment Pre-start-up Line-up of Reactor Coolant Pumps Waste Gas System Valve Alignment for Auto Operation Component Closed Cooling Water System Start-up and Normal Operation Valve Alignment Pre-Operational Line-up System Line-up
S-3. 1D S-29.1 0-7 S-2.5B
Reactor Make-up System Line-up Pre-Alignment of Reactor Vessel Over Pressure Protection System Nitrogen Supply System Alignment and Operation of the Reactor Vessel Over Pressure Protection System RCS <350 degrees F and 410 psig Restoring the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Service After Maintenance To confirm the valve line-up for the Safety Injection System (SIS),
the inspector conducted a walkdown of selected components.
Valve positions were verified as required per S-16A, Revision 39, "Safety Injection System Alignment" and SIS Flow Diagram 33013-1262.
The system alignment for the SIS pumps and supporting systems i.e.,
Com-ponent Cooling Water, and Service Water Systems, was as required per procedure.
The general condition of the pumps and valves, including their identification tags, was satisfactory.
4.
Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed) Bulletin ( 50-244/79-BU-13):
Feedwater cracking experienced in industry feedwater'ystem piping.
Licensee actions taken in response to IE Bulletin 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater Piping, were reviewed and ap-peared to be comprehensive.
Long term measures to monitor feedwater pipe crhcking will be reviewed as a part of the routine core inspection pro-gram.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Bulletin ( 50-244/79-BU-17):
Industry experienced pipe cracks in borated water systems.
This item, updated in Inspection Report 50-244/
86-18, remained open pending replacement of schedule 10 piping with schedule 40 piping.
The intended replacement was due to three small in-dications not associated with stress corrosion cracking in one of three sections of pipe examined.
After further analysis, the licensee concluded that pipe replacement was not warranted.
Licensee analysis was reviewed, and the conclusions appeared appropriate.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Bulletin ( 50-244/79-BU-22):
Review support base plate designs using concrete.
This item was opened to insure inspector review of lic-ensee response to Revision 2 of IE Bulletin 79-02.
The licensee response was reviewed and appeared adequate to address the concerns of IE Bulletin 79-02.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-244/79-06-03):
Review of 'licensee snubber surveillance program.
During the 1988 and 1989 refueling outages, extensive changes in snubber configuration have occurred requiring changes to Technical Specifications and in-depth review by NRR.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-244/83-17-04):
Safety Injection pumps exhibit elevated bearing temperatures.
During the 1989 refueling outage, modifications were performed to the Safety Injection system which address concerns identified in this item.
This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (50-244/85-06-03):
This item concerned the remaining issue of the licensee's response to Generic Letter 83-28,
"Re-quired Action Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events".
To
.
close out this item the licensee was required to submit a schedule, which outlined testing of the reactor trip breaker while at power, to the NRC.
On April 4, 1989, the NRC staff approved a Technical Specification change which detailed the licensee's scheduled testing of their breakers.
The licensee has updated procedures to include the revised training schedule.
No further review is required on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (50-244/85-06-05)
Review Generic Letter 83-28 response.
This item did not document a safety concern or unresolved iss'ue; Generic Letter responses are reviewed through other routine NRC activities.
This item is administratively closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/85-09-01):
Licensee to meet with West-inghouse to determine cause of control rod bank worth prediction inac-curacies.
Results of reactor physics testing after the 1989 refueling outage indicate that rod bank worth prediction inaccuracies are within acceptable limits as a result of improved prediction methods.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/85-18-02):
Review weak QC procedure in environment laboratory.
Health Physics procedure HP-10. 1, "Quality Con-trol of Counting Systems",
revision 17, effective December 1,
1988 was reviewed to verify that background checks of counting systems were incor-porated.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (50-244/85-24-01):
The licensee could not readily monitor low flow conditions when experienced on toxic gas moni-tors.
These low flow rates were addressed in engineering work request 3595 (Control Room Ventilation Nonitors).
The modifications were dis-cussed in December 14, 1988 and January 16, 1989 meetings between design liaison and engineering.
The changes discussed with the inspector in-cluded problems encountered in obtaining materials and instrumentation.
The present schedule calls for completion by ear ly fall of 1989.
Present licensee actions include daily rounds monitoring of the local panel at frequent intervals to ensure early identification of loss of flow to toxic monitoring instruments.
The inspector observed the above panel during the period on site and found no anomalies.
The licensee's action to resolve this concern appears acceptable.
The final modification is subject to routine followup.
This.item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-244/86-01-01):
Review final engineering resolution of Anker-Holth snubber concerns.
During the 1988 and 1989 re-fueling outages, extensive changes in snubber configuration have occurred requiring changes to Technical Specifications and in-depth review by NRR.
This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow.Item (50-244/86-02-07):
This item concerned the failure of the licensee to correct for electrolyte temperature deviations and level changes when performing electrolyte measurements for the safety related battery banks.
Compensating for electrolyte temperature vari-ations and level changes is required by the vendor's instruction manual.
Another concern was omission of battery cell connection resistance, an IEEE 450 good practice for establishing battery operability.
In response to these concerns the licensee revised battery surveillance procedures for electrolyte concentration measurement to adjust measured electrolyte concentration for electrolyte temperature and level changes.
The licensee revised station procedures PT-10.2,
"Annual Station Battery Service Test" to require measurement of battery terminal resistance and comparison of readings obtained to a required value.
'No further action is required on this item.
(Closed) Violation (NC4) (50-244/87-16-02):
Corrective action for iden-tified fuse problem was inadequate.
DC fuses are now included in the Configuratior Control Program.
Nonconformance Reports (NCR's) are used to document and disposition DC fuse anomalies.
The inspector reviewed the following licensee letters:
3/29/89-2/7/89 8/29/88-2/11/88-2/29/88-1/15/88-1/8/88 8/6/87 6/17/87-8/26/87-EWR 4525 Offsite Power Reconfiguration affected CCD Drawing CAR-87-09 Correspondence on technical Design Analysis performed and use of each evaluation Tracking of CCD modifications Design Analysis ¹9 DC Voltage Regulation NRC response to licensee response to NRC Inspection Report 50-244/87-23 Licensee response to NRC Report 50-244/87-23 Licensee preliminary review of responses to NRC Report Inspection 50-244/87-23 Licensee response to SRI request for technical information on DC fuse program DC. Fuse requirements Response to NRC Inspection Reports 50-244/87-16, 50-244/87-02 The licensee's program established proper fuse sizes in control panels, and reviewed and analyzed the longest cable runs for proper cabling fuse size.
Fuse reference charts to control changes and indicate fuse sizing updates, were in place at Motor Control Centers.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/87-23-02):
Review of fuse coordination and cable sizing is required.
The inspector reviewed a
number of PORC approved, detailed licensee evaluations.
PORC concluded the discrepancies identified in the Design Analysis did not, involve an unreviewed safety question.
The DC Fuse Upgrade Evaluation (EWR 3341)
has been essentially completed.
Additional evaluation activities were completed during the 1989 refueling outage.
This item is close (Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/87-23-03):
The licensee failed to iden-tify significance of fuse anomalies for safety impact and were not cor-rected in a timely manner.
Although significance of Ginna fuse anomalies was not immediately recognized, the licensee has since conducted an engi-neering review of fuse coordination and developed a program to ensure pro-cedural control of installed fuses and corrective action for identified anomalies.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/87-23-01):
Seismic supports for safety-related batteries could not be inspected for deterioration of wood sup-ports.
The inspection of battery supports viewed determined that spaces could be observed for deterioration due to the removal of the open cell Styrofoam sheets.
After a technical review of Procedure EM-6.6.6, PORC approved the replacement of the A 8 B battery wood block spacers.
The seismic supports are inspected on a quarterly basis per procedure PT-11, Rev.
and Station Battery Service Test PT-10.3.
The seismic adequacy of battery spacers was determined by licensee's EWR 3891, Rev.
0 and found adequate.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
This item is closed.
<Closed) Violation (50-244/87-27-01):
Corrective actions for effectively implementing a drawing program that reflects as-built conditions.
The licensee has generated a program to reconcile station system piping and ingtrumentation drawings and a process to maintain drawings that will re-flect ongoing design changes.
Project procedure EWR 3391 E documents methods to accomplish this task including field verification, inputs from control room operators, operations liaison, project coordinator for Bal-ance of Plant (BOP)
and reviewing inputs to the Computer Aided Design pro-cess.
Based on licensee identification of the increased scope of the required drawings and estima-'ed time for the verification walkdowns, the time frame for completion of this project has been changed from July 1988 to January 1990.
The inspector reviewed the status of the project and concluded that project manpower is adequate and a realistic conclusion of this project will be attained as scheduled.
In response to the inspector's request, the licensee committed to update the response to the violation to include details of project performance/completion status on a bimonthly interval and to extend the project task completion date to January 1,
1990.
This item is subject to periodic NRC review during subsequent inspections.
This item is closed.
A prior inspection report (see 50-244/89-05)
noted the licensee's lack of.
a program for addressing open issues identified by the NRC, but during this inspection period the licensee implemented a program.
Though the program is not yet formalized, there is an NRC Open Item Coordinator and a
part-time contract employee presently preparing closeout packages.
A com-puter database now exists which tracks NRC open issues.
The NRC Open Item Coordinator uses the computer database, assigns responsibilities for the
~
open items, sets target completion dates, assembles closeout packages and provides periodic status reports to plant management.
This indicates in-creased attention by plant management to the corrective action program.
5.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with senior plant management periodically and at the end of the inspection period to discuss inspection scope and findings.