IR 05000244/1989005
| ML17251A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1989 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A509 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-89-05, 50-244-89-5, GL-87-12, GL-88-17, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-85-45, NUDOCS 8906010342 | |
| Download: ML17251A510 (20) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244/89-05 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Location:
Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
March 13 through April 23, 1989 Inspectors:
Approved by:
~Summar C.
S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N.
S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna K. S. Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer, Region I T. A.
Reb owski, Senior Reactor Engineer, Region I
!dAm(-,,
C. J.
Cowg'11 ~Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A Ifate "
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of station ac-tivities including plant operations, maintenance, radiological controls, sur-veillance, security, periodic and special reports, loss of decay heat removal; action on previous inspection findings, and IE Bulletin follow-up.
Inspection activities consisted of 299 hours0.00346 days <br />0.0831 hours <br />4.943783e-4 weeks <br />1.137695e-4 months <br /> of inspection, including 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> of back-shift inspection, and eight hours of deep backshift inspection (between 10:00 p.m.
and 5:00 a.m.).
Weekend inspection was conducted on March 18, 1989.
Results:
Overall, the plant activities were conducted safely during this in-spection period.
Careful control of maintenance activities and timely and ap-propriate compensatory security measures were noted as licensee strengths.
Weaknesses were noted in post modification testing, effective communication between engineering and operations and the close out of NRC identified con-cerns.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, inspectors held discussions with and in-terviewed operators,.technicians, engineers and supervisory level per-sonnel.
The following people were among those contacted:
S.
Adams,. Technical Manager
~ J.
Bodine, Manager of Nuclear Assurance D. Fi lkins, Manager of HP & Chemistry M. Fowler, Coordinator, Nuclear Security Training, GNS A. Jones, Corrective Action Coordinator R. Marchionda, Director of Outage Planning
" T. Marlow, Superintendent Support Services R. Mecredy, General Manager Nuclear Production
" A. Morris, Maintenance Manager
- J. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator
~ T. Schuler, Operations Manager L. Smith, Operations Supervisor
" S. Spector, Superintendent Ginna Station
" J. Miday, Superintendent Ginna Production
- Denotes persons present at exit meeting on May 8, 1989.
2, Summar of Plant 0 erations At the beginning of the inspection period, plant power was approximately 87 percent and coasting down for the 1989 refueling outage.
The plant was shut down on March 17, 1989 for the annual refueling outage including the 10 year Inservice Inspection (ISI).
The reactor was defueled on March 26, 1989 and remained defueled through the remainder of the inspection period.
3.
Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected a
~
Plant 0 erations (71707)
The inspectors verified that the R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant operated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory re-quirements.
Portions of Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation man-agement control system were evaluated to ensure effective discharging of responsibilities for continued safe operation.
On March 17, 1989, operator s shut down the plant for the annual re-fueling outage.
The core was defueled on March 26, 1989 to conduct activities associated with the ten year ISI.
The shutdown and de-fueling activities were conducted smoothly and without incident.
Plant startup is scheduled for mid-Ma On March 28, 1989, the inspectors noted the new spent fuel pool cool-ing pump running with the local discharge flow gauge pegged high.
The licensee indicated the gauge was incorrect and would be replaced with a gauge with a broader range.
During further investigation the inspectors discovered the control room did not have a
pump curve to assure it was not operating in a runout condition.
The inspectors noted that engineering had the pump curve, but failed to forward it to the control room in a timely manner.
The inspector identified this deficiency to plant management and the licensee placed the curve in the control room.
On April 6, 1989, with the vessel defueled, the reactor cavity flooded and the vessel internals removed, a steady leak from the re-fueling cavity of approximately four gallons per minute was detected.
The exact source could not be identified with the cavity flooded; while vessel inspection was completed a plan was developed to put the internals back into the vessel and place the vessel head back on if cavity leak rate increased significantly.
The leak rate remained stable, the inspections were completed and 'the vessel was reassembled as scheduled.
After the cavity was drained, the source of the leak was determined to be a hole from a missing plug.
Additional inspec-tion failed to identify any other missing plugs or cracks anywhere in
~ the cavity.
The plug hole was repaired and at the end'f the inspec-tion period the cavity had not been reflooded.
Radiolo ical Controls (71707)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors periodically verified RWPs were implemented properly, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access control at entrances to high radiation areas was adequate, personnel used contamination monitors as required when exiting con-trolled areas, and postings and labeling were in compliance with regulations and procedures.
Activities inspected in the area of radiological control were adequate to meet license and regulatory requirements.
Maintenance (62703)
The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related mainten-ance activities to determine redundant components were operable, ac-tivities did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initi-ating work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade", appropriate radiological controls were implemented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly imple-mented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.'ortions of the following maintenance activity were ob-served by the inspectors:
Maintenance (M)-61. 1.2,
"MOVATS Testing of Motor Operated Valves", Revision 8, effective date March 28, 1989, observed April 19 & 20, 1989.
M-11.5K, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Major or Mechanical Inspection" Revision 13, effective March 30,1989, observed April 13, 1989.
M-37. 16A, "Manually Operated Grinnell Diaphragm Valve Inspection and Maintenance",
Revision 13, effective date February 9, 1989, observed March 15, 1989.
The licensee's guality Control (gC) inspector, observing the maintenance activity, found one of four bolts holding the valve bonnet to the body worn sufficiently to warrant replacement.
The replacement bolt could not be threaded into the body; cor-rective actions considered included use of a tap.
Careful in-vestigation by the mechanics revealed the worn bolt was a course thread, whereas the remaining bolts were fine thread.
The lic-ensee manufactured a bolt, performed an appropriate safety an-alysis, and reassembled the valve.
Actions by the gC and maintenance personnel were controlled, conservative, and adequate to ensure control of safety-related maintenance activities.
d.
Surveillance (61726)
Inspectors observed portions of surveillance test procedures to verify test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved proce-dures were used, work was performed by qualified personnel, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, and the system was correctly re-stored following testing.
Portions of the following surveillance activity were observed by the inspectors:
Periodic Test (PT)-10.2, Revision 10, "Station Battery 1B Ser-vice Test", effective date April 20, 1989, observed April 20, 1989.
e.
Licensee control of this surveillance activity was adequate to ensure operabi 1 ity.
~Securit (71707)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operational, Pro-tected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained, access con-trol during security turnover was adequate, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access and compensatory measures were implemented when necessar On March 30, 1989, a contract employee reported finding two wrenches, a rag, and an aerosol can in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
'uction pipe from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
The ob-jects were reported discovered approximately four inches into the pipe toward the RWST from a valve with internals removed for main-tenance.
The licensee initially believed the objects may have in-tentionally been placed into the pipe.
Surveillance by auxiliary operators and security personnel was initiated in areas containing vital systems and a manual personnel accountability system was im-plemented in specific work areas.
Licensee and local law enforcement investigators interviewed the six individuals with access to the work area and concluded the individual reporting finding the foreign mate-rial had fabricated the story.
The contract employee's access to the facility was terminated.
l Licensee actions to insure security of vital areas important to plant operation for the existing conditions were timely and appropriate.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713)
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspectors.
This review included the following considera-tions: reports contained information required by the NRC; test re-sults and/or supporting information were consistent with design pre-dictions and performance specifications and reported information was valid.
Within this scope, the following report was'eviewed by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating Report for February and March 1989.
The report was adequate to meet regulatory requirements.
Post Modification Testin (71707)
During inspection associated with mid-loop operation (discussed in section 4.), discrepancies between the existing permanent and newly installed, temporary Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level instrumen-tation were noted.
The newly installed channel varied with RHR flow since the instrument tap was located close to the RHR pump suction.
Operator s believed the channel was accurate at low flow, had confi-dence in the permanent channel indication (which did not vary with RHR flow), and were not concerned because procedures required reduced RHR flow during mid-loop operation.
The inspector s noted the operators lacked information to determine a
correction for the temporary channel indication based on RHR flow; in addit'ion, no criteria had been established to determine the RHR flow at which the temporary channel could be considered operable.
In response, the licensee began to collect data by varying RHR flow
rate, and discovered a small error in the permanent channel.
No safety significance was associated with the error since it was in the conservative direction and would have been discovered due to proce-dural requirements prior to entering mid-loop operation.
However, more thorough post modification testing of the installation of the temporary channel would have determined acceptability criteria for operability based on RHR flow; the error in the permanent channel would have been revealed in the process of determining the oper-ability of the temporary channel.
Prior to entering mid-loop operation, the licensee established ac-ceptance criteria of 600-800 gpm RHR flow, at which both level chan-nels would be operable and indicating the same value.
The error in the permanent channel was corrected by venting the associated trans-mitter.
The inspectors had no further questions regarding this matter.
4.
Loss of Deca Heat Removal (255101)
Licensee actions to prevent and respond to loss of decay heat removal with the reactor coolant system partially drained were reviewed as provided by the guidance in NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/101, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, and NRC, Region I Temporary Instruction 88-02.
Licensee re-sponses to Generic Letters 87-12 and 88-17, were reviewed to ensure the intent of the generic letter was met and to verify implementation of com-mitments contained in the responses.
Training records were reviewed and licensed operators were interviewed to verify all licensed operators received appropriate training before stand-ing watch during mid-loop operation.
Training was thorough and complete and operators were knowledgeable of proper identification and corrective actions for potential mid-loop operation problems.
Procedures and administrative controls were in place prior to mid-loop operation to control contai.nment penetrations and ensure containment closure.
Two core exit thermocouples, representative of core exit temperature, were required to be operable during mid-loop operation.
Thermocouple indica-tion was available in the control room; when the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS)
was operating, temperatures were alarmed and manual logging of the temperatures was required once per hour.
With PPCS not operating, manual temperature logging-was required at 15 minute intervals.
Proce-dural requirements for monitoring core exit temperature were adequate and were adhered to by control room operators.
During mid-loop operation, RCS water level was continuously indicated in the control room on two independent gauges.
Although one instrument was a temporary modification for the 1989 refueling outage, a permanent modi-fication is planned for the 1990 refueling outage.
Additionally, a
'lastic tube provided local indication for comparison purposes.
The in-spectors verified control room indications were logged at 15 minute in-tervals, and local plastic tube indications were logged twice per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift.
Testing, operations and maintenance with potential of perturbing the RCS were restricted by the Outage Planning Group and Operations Group.
The status of, and changes to equipment lineups were discussed at outage planning meetings held twice daily.
Appropriate cautions were noted in procedures, on the licensee's new video communication system, and at the daily outage planning meetings prior to, and during mid-loop operation.
Three methods of adding inventory to the RCS were available during mid-loop operation.
The preferred method was gravity feed from the RWST directly to the A RCS hot leg.
The second method was from the RWST via an available charging pump to the A or B
RCS hot legs.
The third method was from the RWST via an available safety injection pump to the RCS hot leg.
Prior to mid-loop operation, appropriate procedures were in place ad-dressing the three methods of adding inventory -to the RCS.
Procedures controlling installation and removal of the steam generator manways and nozzle dams during steam generator maintenance required RCS hot leg manways and nozzle dams installed last and removed first.
This provided the longest time for a hot side vent path through the steam gene-rators.
Prior to entering mid-loop operation, the licensee analyzed the use of the pressurizer manway and four conoseals as a vent path and estab-lished acceptable time periods after shutdown for their use.
The following procedures were reviewed by the inspectors:
0-2.3. 1, Draining And Operation At Reduced Inventory Of The Reactor Coolant System, effective 3-14-89 0-2.3. 1A, Containment Closure Capability In Two Hours During RCS Re-duced Inventory Operation, effective 3-14-89 AP-RHR.2, Loss Of RHR While Operating At RCS Reduced Inventory Con-ditions, effective 3-14-89 M-43.44. 1, Installation Of Steam Generator Nozzle Dams A/B Steam Generator Hot/Cold Leg, effective 2-13-89 M-43.44.3, Steam Generator Nozzle Dam Removal A/B Steam Generator Hot/Cold Leg, effective 3-19-89 M-48. 14, Isolation Of Bus 14 Undervoltage System For Maintenance, Repair Or If Applicable Modification, effective 3-14-89 The licensee's control of operation during mid-loop conditions and com-pliance with commitments appears to be adequate.
No unacceptable condi-tions were identified'
Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (50-244/84-17-01):
Recalibration of ef-fluent monitors and procedure revision to indicating acceptance criteria required.
The licensee revised procedures to include electronic calibra-tion data, plateau checks and acceptance criteria for calibration.
In addition, traceable check sources are used.
Procedures reviewed included Calibration and Maintenance of RMS Channels CP-211, R-11, Rev.
10, Con-tainment Particulate CP-210A, R'-10A, Containment Iodine, Rev.
2, CP-212, R-12, Containment Gas, Rev.
9, CP-213, R-13, Plant Vent Particulate, Rev..
8, CP-218, R-18, Effluent Monitor, Rev.
7, CP-210B, R-10B, Rev.
1, Plant Vent Iodine.
Vendor data on RM System Calibration Data was available on site in 1968.
The inspector found no inadequacies in procedures or methods of calibration.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-244/85-06-01):
Procedure describing method of troubleshooting has not been developed.
A Maintenance Depart-ment Guideline for Work Package Preparation, issued and implemented, on March 8, 1989, includes, in paragraph 6.0, the statement:
"All safety re-lated work, including troubleshooting requires a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved procedure.
Based on the licensee's commitment in this procedure this IFI is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50/244/85-06-03):
Evaluation required of coding error used to develop ECCS evaluation model.
The licensee sub-mitted the Westinghouse Report and analysis to NRR.
On April 5, 1985, NRR submitted additional questions which RGEE responded to on December 16, 1985.
The fuel load after the present outage incorporates 11 of the original fuel assemblies.
Discussion with NRR indicated no further con-cerns with Exxon fuel has been identified.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-244/86-02-05):
Mechanical surveillance pro-cedures dimension data sheets did not address the traceabi lity of dimen-sions and tolerances.
This item is addressed in two recent procedure re-visions for safety-related equipment.
Procedures M-11. 12. 1, Safety In-jection Pump Mechanical Inspection, Rev.
1 and M-11. 10, Major Inspection of Service Water Pump, Rev.
17, addressed specification of shaft runout, identification of measurement tools and identified weights of components to aid in rigging, and factory recommended pump diametric clearances.
The inspectors identified unresolved item has been addressed.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (86-09-01):
This item documents the licensee's actions in response to IE Information Notice No. 85-45, Poten-tial Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable Incore Flux Mapping System Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants.
The licensee analyzed the as-built flux mapping system and determined a modification was necessary.
The modification was designed and installed under EWR-4276 and is completely installed and in use.
The inspector reviewed the engineering design work
and the as-built configuration at the seal table and determined it was installed as designed.
Licensee actions regarding IE Information Notice No. 85-45 are complete.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (86-17-01):
Inspection Report 50-244/86-17 docu-ments the licensee's commitment to install a required baffle between two adjacent sprinklers in the auxiliary building.
The inspector reviewed EWR-4139 and visually verified installation of the baffle.
This item is closed.
The licensee has not vigorously pursued review, completion and status control of NRC identified items, unresolved items, and corrective actions in response to violations and bulletins.
The authority to task department managers with responsibility for tracking and completing the required ac-tions for review by the PORC has not been vested in one individual.
Un-addressed issues remain dating back to 1978.
No system exists that as-signs responsibilities and target completion dates, requires update in-formation from responsible managers, and receives information to close or address NRC open issues.
IE Bulletin Follow-u The licensee's reply to IE Bulletin 85-03 was reviewed to determine the
.
written response was submitted within the required time period, included required information, corrective action was adequate and management pro-vided dissemination of the bulletin and the response.
As requested by action item e. of Bulletin 85-03,
"Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Set-tings", the licenhee identified the selected safety-related valves, the valves'aximum differential pressures and the licensee's program to as-sure valve operability in their letters dated May 14, 1986, and April 4, 1987.
Review of these response indicated the need for additional infor-mation which was contained in the Region I letter dated September 9,
1987.
Review of the licensee's October 9, 1987, response to this request for additional information indicated the need for more information which was contained in the Region I letter, dated December 8,
1988.
Review of the licensee's January 6,
1989, response to this request for additional information indicates their selection of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valves'aximum differential pres-sures meets the requirements of the bulletin and the program to assure valve operability requested by action item e. of the bulletin is now ac-ceptable.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with senior plant management periodically and at the end of the inspection period to discuss inspection scope and finding Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with lic-ensee representatives, it was determined this report does not contain in-formation subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction '