IR 05000244/1989007
| ML17251A514 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1989 |
| From: | Dragoun T, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A513 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-89-07, 50-244-89-7, NUDOCS 8906020031 | |
| Download: ML17251A514 (12) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
SO-244/89-07 Docket No.
50-244 License No.
OPR-18 Priori ty Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Cor oration 49 East Avenue Rochester New York 14649 Facility Name:
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Ontario New York Inspection Conducted:
A ri 1 24-28 1989 Inspectors:
T.
ragou enior Radiation Specialist date Approved by:
M. Pasciak, ief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section at Ins ection Summar
Ins ection conducted on A ril 24-28 1989 Re ort No. SO-244/89-07
~d:
R i
- i t
di training and qualification of contracted HP technicians; control of outage work; ALARA; and control of locked high radiation exclusion areas.
Results:
No.v'iolations were identified.
90b020031 890524 DR ADOCK 05000244
DETAILS 1.0 Persons C~acted 1. 1 Licensee Personnel R. Smith, Vice President Nuclear
- R. Mecredy, General Manager, Nuclear Production
"W. McCoy, Director, Research and Science
"ST Spector, Plant Manager
- J. Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager
"D. Fi lkins, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- W. Goodman, H.P.
Foreman
"A. Herman, Health Physicist
- R. Marchionda, Director of Outage Planning
- J. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator
"M. Saporito, Supervisor Materials Engineering
- J.
F ~ Smith, Manager Materials Engineering N. Kiedrowski, Training Coordinator 1.2 NRC Personnel C. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector
- N. Perry, Resident Inspector
- R. Winters, Senior Reactor Engineer
- K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview on April 28, 1989.
Additional personnel were contacted or interviewed.
2.0
~Pur use The purpose of this routine outage inspection was to review the following elements of the radiation protection program:
~Training and gualification of Contracted HP Technicians
~ Radiological Control of Outage Work
~ALARA
~Control of Locked High Radiation Exclusion Areas 3.0 Trainin "and uglification of Contracted HP Technicians The training and qualification of the temporary HP technicians hired to assist with the extended inservice inspection ( ISI) outage was reviewed with respect to criteria contained in ANSI N18. 1 "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" and Technical Specification 6.3.
Performance of the qualification program was determined from interviews with the training coordinator and selected technicians, a review of selected training records and resumes, and a review of the following documents:
~Contract Technician Screen Exam
~Site Specific Training (Exam)
~ Form -TR-C. 1. 1A "Contract Radiation Protection Technician gualification Record" Revision
~Station Procedure A-103. 10 "Radiation Protection Technician Training and Responsibility Limits"
~Training Procedure TR C. l.l. "Contract Radiation Protection Technician gualification"
~ Lesson Plan HRC23C "Plant Orientation"
~ Lesson Plan HRC39C."Duties and Responsibilities of Contractor Radiation Protection Technicians" There were no classes in session during the inspection.
Within the scope of this review no violations were observed.
Strengths and weaknesses were noted as follows:
During Inspection 88-03 it was determined that the contractor HP technicians lacked experience and were technically weak.
The licensee indicated this would be remedied by applying the more restrictive qualification requirements of ANSI 3. 1-1987 rather than ANSI 18. 1-1971 invoked in the Technical Specifications.
For this outage the inspector verified that ANSI 3. 1-1987 was used to select contracted technicians.
This resulted in a more experienced technician workforce.
Only 2 of the 50 technicians failed the licensee's special screening exam.
There were 3 failures of the final exam.
In June of 1988 the qualification programs for in-house and contracted technicians were accredited by INPO.
This nationwide program ensures that certain performance standards are met.
The inspector noted that a senior contracted technician was the "area coordinator" for dayshift work in the auxiliary building.
Normally this oversight is provided by the permanent technician staff.
The licensee stated that management was aware of some technician shortage during this broad scoped ISI outage.
A proposal to increase the permanent staff by 8 technicians is under consideration.
Action on this matter will be reviewed in future inspections.
4.0 Radiolo ical Control of Work The licens'ee programs for the radiological control of work were reviewed with respect to criteria contained in 10 CFR 20 "Standards for Protection Against Radiation."
Performance relative to these criteria was determined from:
~observation of work in progress detours of the plant and radioactive materials storage areas preview of postings and signs
I'
preview of Special Work Permits (SWP)
and Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
preview of logs of management sign in/sign out for the radiologically cont~lied ar eas Within the scope of this review no violations were observed.
The licensee control of work is adequate.
Use of postings and warning signs, noted as a weakness during Inspection 88-03, has significantly improved in the plant with some minor problems noted in yard areas due to weathering during the winter.
Several months ago the licensee exerted a major effort to decontaminate the accessible areas of the Auxiliary Building and the Intermediate Building. This allowed entry in street clothes, eliminating the need for protective clothing.
As a result, line managers could provide better oversight of work.
A review of access logs showed this to be the case except for the HP Department.
Of the four HP supervisors, only one made routine entries into the controlled area.
A similar situation existed during the 1988 outage and was brought to the licensee's attention.
The licensee stated that two of the HP supervisors were recently incapacitated due to illness and injuries.
Licensee management also stated that the need for in-field oversight has been emphasized to HP supervisors.
This matter will be reviewed again in future inspections.
The inspector observed that walkways were mopped several times each shift.
The mop wipes are then checked for contamination and specifically for hot particles.
No hot particles were found other than around hot machine shop workbenches.
This was surprising considering the extent of the ISI which included the reactor pressure vessel and many motor operated reactor system valves.
Control of contamination was improved by the installation of sensitive hand and foot monitot s at the Containment Building hatch and automatic whole body friskers at the general area egress passage.
Protective measures specified on the SWPs and RWPs were generally adequate for the radiological conditions.
Technician coverage of work was adequate indicating an adequate staffing level late in the outage.
5.0 ALARA The licensee's ALARA program was reviewed with respect to criteria in:
~ 10'CFR 20.1 Purpose
~ Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10
~ Station Procedure A-1 '
ALARA Committee Operating Procedure
~Station Procedure A-1.6. 1 Documentation of "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) Program
Performance relative to these criteria was determined from:
~Revi~ ALARA Committee meeting minutes and recommendations
~ Interviews with the acting ALARA Coordinator, Planning Group Manager, Plant Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager, and Vice President-Nuclear
~Observation of work
~ Review of Engineering Work Requests (EWR), job planning packages, and ALARA estimates
~Observation of a "Planalog" plan of the day meeting
~ Discussions with QC personnel regarding surveillances Within the scope of this review no violations were observed.
The goal for the outage is 550 man-rem with worker doses running slightly ahead of projections due to underestimates of several ISI jobs.
About 350 man-rem have been accumulated thus far.
The inspector noted some weakness in follow up by the licensee on ALARA matters.
For example, early recognition of high exposure potential for certain EWRs by the Engineering Department is not translated into detailed planning to minimize exposure.
In addition, on site review by the Station ALARA Committee results in specific ALARA action items for each job.
However, there is no formal process to ensure that these action items are implemented.
The committee relied on its Secretary (the ALARA Coordinator) to follow through on the recommendations.
The ALARA Coordinator left due to an extended illness at the beginning of the outage and was replaced by a contractor.
The contractor was unaware of some of the informal mechanisms used by the permanent ALARA Coordinator.
The inspector also noted that some work packages did not arrive on site until a few months before the outage.
This does not allow adequate time for review or implementation of ALARA if the work requires special procedures or equipment.
Other recommendations regarding improvements in the ALARA program were provided during inspection 88-03 and 88-20.
The Vice President-Nuclear stated that in response to current and previous NRC comments a thorough review of ALARA programs will be conducted after the outage.
Upgrades and improvements will be undertaken to achieve an
"excellent", level of ALARA performance similar to that already achieved for steam.:generator work.
This matter will be reviewed in a future inspection';
6.0 Control of Locked Hi h Radiation Exclusion Areas The control of locked high radiation exclusion areas was reviewed with respect to criteria contained in
CFR 20.203 "Caution Signs, Labels, Signals and Controls" and Technical Specification 6. 13 "High Radiation Area".
Weaknesses in this program were noted during Inspection 50-244/88-03.
Compliance with the requirements was determined from:
~ Review of the key locker and sign out logs maintained in the control room
~ Review-of Procedure A-l.1 "Locked Radiation Areas"
~ Inspection of postings on locked high rad doors and tests of locking mechanisms Within the limited scope of this review, no violations were observed.
The control of locked high radiation area keys, a previously reported problem, appeared to be adequate.
All unoccupied areas designed as locked radiation areas were found to be secured.
7..0 Exit Interview On April 28, 1989 the inspector met with the personnel denoted in section 1.0.
The scope and findings of the inspection were presented at that tim I'