IR 05000244/1989019
| ML17250A924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1989 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17250A923 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-89-19, NUDOCS 8908140279 | |
| Download: ML17250A924 (18) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULAIORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244 89-19 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Co ration 49 East Avenue Rochester New York 14649-0001 Facility:
location:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Pcarer Plant Ontario New York Inspection Conducted:
Jul 17 to 21 1989 Inspection at:
Ontario Webster and Rochester New York Inspector:
C. G.
to, ency edness Special est, paredness Section, FRSSB, DRSS C. Marschall, SRI, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Approved by:
W.. Za, Chief, Emergency Pre Section, FRSSB, DRSS ion 50-244 89-19 ion on Jul 17-21 1989 ion Re rt No.
emergency preparedness program.
, safety inspection of the licensee's Results:
No violations were identified.
%he licensee demonstrated the striate to maintain and implement an acceptable emergaxV preparedness program.
Se0804 PbR ADOCR 0 000244
1.0 2.0 Persons Contacted The following Rochester Gas and Electric (RGE), Nev York State, Monroe and Wayne County personnel were contacted.
J. Bar~mski, Director, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercises, N.Y. State ~ency Management Office
- D. Burke, Corporate Nuclear Emergency Planner, RG&E
- R. Cabell, Manager, Ginna Trainirq, RG&E
- D. Filkins, Manager of Health Physics
& Chemistry, Ginna Plant N. Kiedrowski, Traipsing Instructor, Health Physics and Chemistry, Ginna Training, Training Division R. Kober, President, RG&E S. Macalusco, Acting Director, Office of Emergency Management, Monroe County
- R. Mecredy, General Manager, Nuclear Production, RG&E
+G. Meir, Manager, Training Division, RG&E M. Neis, Supervisor, Technical Training, RG&E
- B. Quinn, Corporate Health Physicist, RG&E
~R. Smith, Vice President, Production and Engineering, RG&E
- B. Snow, Chief Engineer, RG&E
- S. Spector, Plant Manager, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, RG&E
~R. Watts, Director, Corporate Radiation Protection
+J. Wideman, Director, Office of Emergency Management Wayne County
- R. Woods, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- Denotes persons present at exit meeting on July 21, 1989.
'Ihe inspector also obsexved the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel.
Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Items The following items were identified during previous inspections.
Based upon obmmmtions, reviev of procedures and discussions with licensee personnel by the in~mtors, the following inspector follcar up items have been resolved.
(CZOSED)
(50-244/88-14-01)
NOV:
The licensee failed to evaluate for adequacy the State/County interface and to offer copies of this evaluation report to the State/Counties as rec~~ by 10 CFR 50.54(t).
A review of the current reviev/audit indicated the interface was evaluated and copies= of the report were sent to the State of Nev York, and Monroe and Wayne Counties.
(CLOSED)
(50-244/88-14-02)
UNR:
Basis for field team procedures for the collection of radioiodine were not available and the collection times were inordirately long.
The licensee has developed a basis document and reduced the collection time significantl.0 (CIDSED)
(50-244/88-14-08)
UNR:
'Ihere are inconsistencies for the default values for slaw and rapidly breaking accidents and iodine-noble gas ratios.
Agreement has been reached with the State and Counties as to the default release time durations, and a iodine-noble gas ratio of 0.0001 will be used as a default value until a aeasu~
value can be obtained.
'zation
%he EPP organizational structure was reviewed, personnel were interviewed and EPP activities were identified to determine if the licensee has developed, maintains and implements an emergency preparedness pe~on (EPP)
recpuxed by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which meets the standards of 10 CYR 50.47(b)
and Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
As a result of a reorganization, fossil and nuclear production activities were separated and additional positions added to nuclear production.
'Ihe position of Director, Corporate Radiation Protection (DCRP) was created and filled by an emerg~ preparedness experienced Health Physicist.
'Ihe DCRP is one of four Doctors reporting to the General Manager, Nuclear Production.
'Ihe Corporate Nuclear Emergency Planner (CNEP)
reports to the DCRP.
'Ihe PEP will retire next year.
A successor has nat yet been selected.
RG&E managers also stated that they are ~tted to establishing and fillingthe position of Site Emergency Planning Coordinator.
4.0
'Ihe General Manager, Nuclear Production, Vice President Production and Engineering, and the Chief Engineer maintain Emergency Preparedness Om anization staff qualifications and participate in drills and exercises.
In addition, they were involved in the reorganization and staffing action to create and fillthe DCRP position and seek a successor to the incumbent C5EP.
'Ihe Vice President Production and Engineering discusses EP on a generic basis with the~ of Dimc~rs and Bt"&E executives.
Consideration is being given to pressing EP during the course of the monthly RG&E managers meeting.
Based on the abave findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
Tra
'PI'pI,'ctivities, trainirq records, lesson plans, ~ency ~nse Organization (ERO) qualification roster, and the traudnq matrix were studied and Training Department (TD) staff interviewed xn order to verify &mt emergency preparedness training is in campliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)
and Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 5.0 EET is the ~nsibilig of five RG&E organizations.
Training records are retained for plant life by Central Records.
RG&E management is aware of this multiple organization approach to EPZ and is reviewing the feasibility of consolidation.
Select lessons plans were reviewed and found to be satisfactory.
Training records were also reviewed to determine the number of ERG staff currently qualified.
The number of senior ERO managers qualified provides defense in depth.
'Ihe number of staff qualified for field teams is half the number considered desirable (19 vs.
36).
The 12 Health Physicists on staff might not be available for field team assignments so field teams are staffed by non-Health Physicists.
Reactor operators receive one day (per training cycle) on simulator training in accident classification and Protective Action Reccmmendation development.
The on-simulator training is in addition to classroam training.
Based on limited observations made during an NRC observed practice exercise held on July 19, 1989, EPI'ppears to be effective.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
An independent review/audit is required at least every twelve months by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which includes detenoination for adequacy of the licensee state/local gaverrment interface and the availabili@ of the
~ts of this study to state/local governments.
To ascertain ifthis requinment was met, the audit/review report and audit procedures were checked.
6.0 Audits of the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (NERP) and emergency preparedness activities are conducted in accordance with RG&E Quality Assurance Procedure No.
QA 1808.
'Ibis Procedure references nine pertinent donm~ts including Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.54.
Sixteen audit areas are listed including evaluation of the interfaces with the State and County gavernments.
A series of audit requirements has been developed which must be addressed.
The nxyxired audit was performed and the State and Counties sent copies of the evaluation of the znterface adequacy.
Ihe Directors of the Monroe and Wayne Cmnty Offices of Emergency Management confirmed receipt of this report and expressed satisfaction with the support provided by RG&E.
A review of the audit report indicated it satisfactorily addressed the other areas audited.
Based on the abave findings, this portion of the licensee's ~ency plan is. acceptable.
Action Zevels EAZs To determine if the FAZs meet the standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4), the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, the guidance of NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice No. 28 of
1983 (I&E IN 83-28),
and Planning Standard D and Appendix 1 to NURlM-0654~ EAIa were reviewed and discussed with operators and EPP personnel o
Bnergency Action Zavels (EALs) have not changed since the last inspection.
'Ihey track the guidance given in NUR1M-0654 and list both events and symptoms.
'Ihese EAIS are those developed by the Owner's Group.
'Ihe licensee ~nizes the need to up date these and intrcxluce human factor engineering into the formatting of the revision.
A schedule for this has not been set.
'Ihe EAIs were reviewed and discussed during a meeting between the licensee arxl the County Offices of Enmrgency Management and N.Y. SBX).
~ on the abave findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
7.0 Plans and Procedures 8.0
'Ihe Nuclear ~ency Response Plan (NERP), was reviewed to determine ifit meets the requirements. of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (16) and 50.54(q),
and the remi:eenents of Section IV.G of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
'Ihe NERP was reviewed and found to be consistent with federal standards, requirements ard guidance with one exception concerning EOF procedure review which was identified in NRC RI Inspection Report 50-244/88-14 (50-244/88-14-03)
.
Ihis finding was classified as unresolved (UNR).
EOF procedures have not been classified as station procedures and as such are not subject to review by the Plant Operating Reviewing Cammittee (PORC)
or one of the PORC's subcxznmittees.
EOF procedures have been reviewed by a policy review committee called the Milestone Cammttee.
Lhe licensee is ta)cing steps to place the EOF procedures under PORC review.
Certain EOF procedures will be PORC reviewed before the August 1989 annual exercise.
'Ihese actions will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
Except as noted above, this area is acceptable.
Protective Action E~nendations PARs
'Ihe standards and requirements for PARs are given in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)
and Section IV.B of Apperxlix E to 10 CFR 50.
Applicable guidance is fourxl in I&E IN 83-28.
PARs were reviewed and cLLscussed with licensee staff in order to verify that these requirements are met ard PARs are consistent with federal guidance.
PAR development methodology is described in Site Contingency Procedure (SCP)-240.
'Ihis procedure incorporates the logic of I&E IN 83-28/
however, the two out of three barrier failure rule could be more clearly described.
Ihe licensee agreed to evaluate this point.
Containment high rankle monitor readings which indicate fuel failure are listed.
Ihe U.S.
Env~nmental Prot~ion Agency's Protective Action Guide dose and dose
9.0 10.0 ccattmitment values are listed.
The procedure lists values for Evacuation Time Estimates and correlates off sxte sectors for which protective action might be reccattmended with wird direction ard plant corditions.
'Ihe licensee reviewed PARs with N.Y.S. and County OEM personnel.
PARs were discussed with senior shift reactor operators who stated they would make and ccatmnnicate PARs to the qcvernment in the event a rapidly breaking accident were to occur without first clearing these with RQ&E management.
Based on the above firdiags, this portion of the licensee's ~ency plan is acceptable.
nse Facilities ERFs ERFs are designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (8) and (b) (9),Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Supplement 1 to NUKE% 0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Equipment, status boarxls, ccattttnnications systems, plans, procedures, habitability and access control provisions were chec9o4 for the Control Rocan (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Environmental Survey Center, and the Emergency Operations Center (EOF).
'Ihe Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC)
and En~ency Operations Facility (EOF), were checked on a sampling basis.
Status boards, controlled copies of the NERPS, ccattmunication systems and equipment were maintained in a state of readiness.
The use of the reconfigured EOF was observed during a practice exercise.
Space was adequate, information mcved without difficulty, and ccatttaunications were effective.
'Ihe relocated dose assessment area was uncrowded and noise level reduced over that of the former dose assessment area.
'Ihe location of ccatanunicators in a roam further reduced noise level.
Based on the abcve findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
Off-Site Activities Off-Site activities were reviewed, and State and Caunty personnel interviewed, and appropriate records reviewed to deteanine if the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5) and (b) (12) and the requirements of Section IV.D.3 and IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 are met.
The appropriate staffs of both Counties and N.Y. SBK were trained in dose assessment methodology and have participated in a table top exercise.
Medical training as rectuired was provided to afrite personnel including the staffs of supporting hospitals.
Letters certifying this training have been sent to SM3 by the Counties for retrananittal to FBQ;II.
Siren test results for 1988 irdicate greater than 90% electro-mechanical, positive response on test.
The
licensee will expand the remote feed-back, testing capability to all of the 96 sirens; 25 are now so equipped.
A completion date for this up grade had not been established.
All letters of A~nent (IDA) save one are curmnt; this IDA is being updated.
Evacuation Time Estimates will be updated in 1990 or later when the 1990 census data becomes available.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
11.0 Public Information Public information docuamnts and briefing activities were reviewed to deteraune if the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (7) and Section IV.D.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 are met.
Inserts instructing the public what to do in the event of an emergency have been placed in the phone books for Wayne County and the City of Rochester (Monroe County).
Calendars containing similar information have been sent to each household'n the ten mile Emergency Planing Zone.
Briefing packages have been developed for transients and sent to locations where transients may reasonably be expec~ to see them.
A mass media briefing package has also been developed and distributed.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
12.0 Securi Pre Interface 13. 0 I
is in place,Section II.D.59 of Appendix B to 10 CFR 73 and NUBEG/CR-3251 were consulted, and security personnel were interviewed.
Coordination meetings are held between the staffs of the site ~ity organization, ~ency prepm~s and reactor operations.
All required emergency and security/safeguards notifications are made by the Control Room.
Security performs it's own training and maintains the training records.
Security officers are radiation worker qualified and trained in acccmtability as well as sash and rescue.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's ~ency plan is acceptable.
to Act~1 Unusual Events Docuaantation associated with actual Unusual Events (UEs) was reviewed on a sampling basis to detune if the licensee complied with 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4) and (b) (5), and the requirements of Sections IV.B and F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50
14.0 Records for declaration of actual Unusual Events (UEs) declared since August 1988 were reviewed.
Based on this review, classifications were determined to be correct, with initial and follcar-up notifications made to off-site authorities within the required time.
Wo of the UEs were based on security related events.
Another UE was based upon medical conchs (transportation, off-site, of a potentially contaminated pere).
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
Drill To determine if the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)
and Section V of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were met, the inspectors observed a
practice exercise on July 19, 1989.
'Ihe practice exercise was conducted in the same manner as the annual evaluated exercise.
'Ihe scenario was written to ~Cue declaration of all four Emergency Action Levels.
PARs were needed as were protective actions.
N.Y. SEC), nine other State agencies, and Monroe and Wayne Counties participated.
SBK and the Counties sent players to the EOF.
TSC, EOF and Joint Bnerg~ News Center (JENC) activities were observed by the NRC inspectors.
Activation and staffing of these was prompt.
Accident classification was co~ as were PARs.
Dose assessment was done without error.
The reconfigured EOF functioned satisfactorily.
the JENC was fully staffed; the N.Y. State Police sent an Information Officer.
Personnel fram the Counties were also present.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency plan is acceptable.
15. 0 Dose Assessment
'Ihe stanhuz3s, requirements, and guidance for dose assessment are given in 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9), Sections IV.B and IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Regulatory Guides 1.23 and NUM3G-0654, Rev.
1, Appendix 2.
Facilities were inspect<6, records were chec3o4 and personnel interviewed to verify that these requ~nents were met.
Channel calibration records for meteorological urer sensors, containment high range monitors, and vent monitors were chewed as were records for portable survey apipment.
Records for instruments checked indicated they were in calibration.
Operability was also checked whenever feasible and these instruments deterauned to be operable.
Observation of dose assessnent activities carried out during the practice exercise indicated effective training and ~nse to procedures.
Field teams were dispatched and radio controlled.
The
recently ~lished ERO position of Dose Assessment Liaison provided an effective interface between the licensee's dose assessment group and their governmental counterparts.
%he licensee, State arxl Counties have agreed to adopt a common method for identifying the location of field team.
'lhe method to be used has not been developed.
Default release times for rapidly breaking and slow breaking accidents have been agreed to by the State and Counties.
An exit meeting was held with the licensee personnel identified in Section 1 of this report to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection as detailed in this report.
'Ihe licensee was advised no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified.
Licensee management ackncvledged these findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate corrective action regarding the items identified.
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspector provide any written material to the license j~