IR 05000237/2025002
| ML25224A059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/2025 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25224A059 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2025002; 05000249/2025002 AND 07200037/2025002
Dear David Rhoades:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On August 5, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with H. Patel, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.
August 12, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000237 and 05000249 07200037 License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Ruiz, Robert on 08/12/25
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station,
Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish Measures for HI-TRAC Visual Examinations in Accordance with Applicable Codes, Standards, Criteria, and other Special Requirements Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000237,05000249/2025002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60859 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.158,
Control of Special Processes, when the licensee failed to establish measures to ensure that special processes, in this case Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) transfer cask nondestructive examinations, were controlled and accomplished using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes.
Failure of Undervoltage Relay Results in Failed Load Shed Function Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2025002-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71152A The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures when the licensee failed to perform or provide justification for not performing vendor recommended mechanical tests as required by the PCM [Performance Centered Maintenance] template in accordance with procedure ER-AA-200-1004, PCM Templates, Revision 1.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 27, 2025, the site experienced a trip of the 2C condensate/condensate booster pump, which resulted in a trip of the 2A reactor feed pump and reactor recirculation system runback to approximately 70 percent power. The 2C condensate/condensate booster pump breaker was found in an overcurrent condition. Following repair activities, the unit was returned to rated thermal power on June 3, 2025. On June 6, 2025, power was reduced to approximately 86 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on June 7, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 9, 2025, power was reduced to approximately 48 percent to perform rod sequence exchange and control rod recovery following maintenance. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on May 11, 2025. On May 16, 2025, power was reduced to approximately 71 percent to perform scram time testing, turbine testing, and repair activities associated with 3D1 feedwater heater. Following maintenance, the unit was returned to rated thermal power on May 22, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 division 2 core spray (CS) system while the division 1 low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system was inoperable for maintenance on April 2, 2025
- (2) Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) during the Division 1 LPCI work window on April 2, 2025
- (3) Unit 2 Division 1 LPCI after torus pumpdown activity on April 25, 2025
- (4) Unit 3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the 2/3 EDG was inoperable for maintenance on May 8, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone (FZ) 11.1.3, Unit 3 HPCI pump room elevation 476' on May 20, 2025.
- (2) FZ 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 general area elevation 545' on May 20, 2025.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 2 HPCI room.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating examinations and biennial written examinations administered between April 24, 2025, through May 23, 2025.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on May 23, 2025.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during rod sequence exchange on May 10, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed crew performance in the main control room simulator on June 17, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 HPCI booster pump fitting repair per WO 5540836.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 online risk green/fire risk blue due to planned division 1 LPCI work window on April 1, 2025.
(2)
(Partial)
Unit 2 emergent risk due to submerged glad seal leak off motor associated with the HPCI from April 5 - April 30, 2025.
- (3) Unit 3 online risk green/fire risk green due to planned EDG work window on April 22, 2025.
- (4) Unit 3 online risk green/fire risk blue due to planned division 2 LPCI/containment cooling service water work window on May 21 and 22, 2025.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (2) Unit 2 HPCI given post-maintenance oil leak identified in ARs 4849834, 4850655, and 4854009, (3)
(Partial)
Unit 2 HPCI system following gland seal leak off drain pump failed megger testing as documented in AR 4857081.
- (4) Unit 3 HPCI room temperature high as documented in AR 4870250 on June 3, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 HPCI system comprehensive test following maintenance work window in accordance with Work Order (WO) 5382349.
- (2) Unit 3 EDG low idle start per Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 6600-01 following maintenance work window on April 23, 2025.
- (3) Scram time testing of Unit 3 control rod drives J-14 and D-3 following accumulator replacement per WOs 5404784 and 5404785.
(4)2/3 EDG post-maintenance testing following maintenance work window on May 8 and 9, 2025.
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (2) Unit 3 reactor low pressure emergency core cooling system permissive calibration on May 30, 2025.
- (3) Unit 3 HPCI system operability and in-service test on June 18, 2025.
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) B Flex two-hour loaded diesel generator run on June 26, 2025, per DOS 0010-50.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
Unit 3 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
Unit 3 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024) Unit 3 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025) Unit 3 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025) Unit 3 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Review of licensee evaluation and corrective actions associated with EDG 2/3 load sequence issue during undervoltage testing as documented in AR 4813364.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed recent maintenance execution events documented in the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated emergency diesel generator 2/3 load sequencing issue during undervoltage testing and licensees response on October 29, 2024. Per IMC 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Power Reactors, the NRC considered whether this inspection sample should be the subject of a reactive inspection and determined that a reactive inspection was not necessary, as documented in ADAMS Accession No. ML24311A040. This issue was dispositioned in report section 71152A
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 3 unexpected loss of offsite power and licensees response on June 12,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60859 - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection
- (1) The inspectors conducted a License Renewal inspection for the HI-STORM 100 and HI-STAR 100 systems at the site. The inspectors were on-site from April 21 through April 25, 2025, to verify that:
- The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) license renewal program and supporting activities are consistent with regulation.
- The site has adequate programs planned or in place to implement aging management for the SSCs that require an aging management review.
- The license conditions added as part of the renewed Certificate of Compliance, regulatory commitments, aging management programs (AMPs),time limited aging analyses (TLAAs), and license renewal activities are implemented and/or completed.
- That age-related degradation is identified and adequately managed or corrected, as applicable.
The inspectors conducted the inspection through a combination of document reviews and on-site walkdowns. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- Administrative Controls for Aging Management.
- The sites use of Aging Management Operating Experience and Tollgates.
- All applicable TLAAs including Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) Fatigue and Fuel Cladding Integrity for the HI-STORM 100s, and Neutron Absorber Depletion and Fuel Cladding Integrity for the HI-STAR 100s.
- All applicable AMPs including the MPC, Overpack and Transfer Cask for the HI-STORM 100s, and the Overpack and Pad for the HI-STAR 100s.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Establish Measures for HI-TRAC Visual Examinations in Accordance with Applicable Codes, Standards, Criteria, and other Special Requirements Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000237,05000249/2025002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60859 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.158, Control of Special Processes, when the licensee failed to establish measures to ensure that special processes, in this case Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) transfer cask nondestructive examinations, were controlled and accomplished using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes.
Description:
The licensees ISFSI Aging Management Program requires multiple visual examinations of the transfer cask, formally named HI-TRAC, prior to use and at least once a year while in use.
Specifically, a VT-2 examination of the neutron shield shell surfaces while the shield is filled with water, and a VT-3 examination of the normally accessible surfaces of the HI-TRAC shall be performed. The normally accessible surfaces include the cask interior cavity, cask exterior surfaces, lid surfaces, and the cask bottom. On March 7, 2025, in conformance with OU-AA-630-101, Dry Cask Storage / ISFSI Inspection Surveillance Program, site personnel performed a visual inspection of the HI-TRAC neutron shield shell surfaces.
On April 10, 2025, site personnel performed a visual inspection of the HI-TRAC normally accessible surfaces.
The site procedural steps and associated American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code requirements applicable to these examinations included the following:
Step 2.7.5 of OU-AA-630-101, Attachment 7, HI-STORM 100 Aging Management Inspections, instructs the site personnel to perform an annual HI-TRAC Overpack inspection.
Step 2.7.5.1 states, in part, Perform VT-3 visual inspection in accordance with ASME Section XI, Article IWA-2213 of the HI-TRAC normally accessible surfaces for visual evidence of degradation of external surfaces in accordance with Attachment 2, step 1.7.3 of this procedure. Attachment 2, Dry Cask Storage Compliance Inspections, step 1.7.3 provides instructions for the VT-3 Inspector to inspect specific areas of the cask, look for specific criteria related to the condition of the surfaces of the cask in the areas to be inspected, and document the results. Additionally, step 2.7.5.2 of Attachment 7 states, in part, Perform VT-2 visual inspection in accordance with ASME Code Section XI, Article IWA-2212 for leakage when the shield is filled with water.
The site personnel used the 1995 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code with Addenda through 1997 for the visual examinations of the HI-TRAC. ASME Section XI, Article IWA-2200, Examination Methods, contains the requirements for visual inservice inspection under Subarticle 2210, Visual Examinations. Paragraphs IWA-2212, VT-2 Examination, and IWA-2213, VT-3 Examination, are paragraphs of IWA-2210. IWA-2210 requires that visual examinations must be in conformance with ASME Section V, Article 9.
ASME Section V, Article 9, contains additional requirements for visual examinations for when the referencing code section requires its use:
ASME Section V, Article 9, Paragraph T-921, Basic Requirements and Terms Used, discusses that the requirements under ASME Section V, Article 1, General Requirements, must also be followed. ASME Section V, Article 1, T-150, Procedure, covers the requirements for nondestructive examination procedures. T-150(c) states that nondestructive examination (NDE) procedures shall be demonstrated to the inspectors satisfaction.
ASME Section V, Article 9, Paragraph T-941, Written Procedure Requirements, contains T-941.1 which requires for visual examinations to be done in accordance with a written procedure. ASME Section V, Article 9, Paragraph T-941.2 specifies the information that written visual examination procedures must include. T-941.2 discusses, in part, that a written procedure shall include information on surface condition and the criteria for surface cleaning.
The procedure shall also include a reference to a cleaning procedure, or instructions for cleaning. Additionally, procedures shall specify whether direct or remote viewing is to be used.
ASME Section V, Article 9, Paragraph T-941.4 discusses how a visual examination procedure shall contain or reference a report which shows how the procedure was demonstrated to be adequate.
The inspectors identified that the licensee had not met the above ASME Code requirements for VT-2 and VT-3 examinations in that:
1. The licensee had not demonstrated OU-AA-630-101 prior to its use for a VT-2 and
VT-3 inspection of the HI-TRAC. Procedure demonstrations provide confidence that the associated NDE procedure can be used to detect flaws or defects in the material being examined.
2. OU-AA-630-101 did not contain information on the type of surface condition, criteria
for surface cleaning, instructions for cleaning or a reference to a cleaning procedure, and whether direct or remote viewing is used. This information further ensures that flaws and defects in the material being examined are detected.
3. OU-AA-630-101 did not contain or reference a report which shows how the procedure
was demonstrated to be adequate.
Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the issue in Issue Report (IR) 4860036.
In response to this issue, the licensee was planning to make the necessary revisions to the procedure to ensure that ASME Code requirements are met.
Corrective Action References: IR 4860036; NRC Identified ISFSI Aging Management Program Deficiencies; 04/24/2025
Performance Assessment:
None, The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) does not specifically consider violations of 10 CFR Part 72 in its assessment of licensee performance. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening Directions, this violation follows the traditional enforcement path and is assessed in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider violations associated with ISFSI under 10 CFR Part 72. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which involves 10 CFR Part 72 requirements using traditional enforcement.
Severity: Consistent with guidance in the NRC Enforcement Manual, Part 1, Section 1.2.6.D, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy violation examples, it should be assigned a severity level:
- (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
- (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the violation examples. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to Section 6.5.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level IV violation as the licensee failed to establish adequate controls over testing processes that are important to safety.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.158, Control of special processes, states, in part, the licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall establish measures to assure that special processes, including welding, heat treating, and nondestructive testing, are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, criteria, and other special requirements.
Contrary to the above, prior to April 24, 2025, the licensee did not establish measures to ensure that special processes, in this case, nondestructive examination, were controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, criteria, and other special requirements. Specifically, during the performance of a visual examination on the HI-TRAC, the site did not conduct a performance demonstration in accordance with AMSE Section V, Article 1, Paragraph T-150, Procedures. Additionally, the procedure, which was used to conduct the visual inspections, OU-AA-630-101, did not contain the type of surface condition and criteria for surface cleaning, cleaning instructions or reference to cleaning procedures, and whether direct or remote viewing is used as required in ASME Section V, Paragraph T-941.2. Furthermore, OU-AA-630-101 did not contain or reference a report of what was used to demonstrate the examination procedure was adequate as required in ASME Section V, Paragraph T-941.4.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure of Undervoltage Relay Results in Failed Load Shed Function Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2025002-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71152A The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures when the licensee failed to perform or provide justification for not performing vendor recommended mechanical tests as required by the PCM [Performance Centered Maintenance] template in accordance with procedure ER-AA-200-1004, PCM Templates, Revision 1.
Description:
On October 30, 2024, during the performance of procedure DOS 6600-03, Bus Undervoltage and ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] Integrated Functional Test for Unit 2-3 Diesel Generator to Unit 3, Revision 52, while Unit 3 was in Mode 5, Bus 33-1, a safety-related bus, did not load shed as expected during the test sequence. Licensee troubleshooting identified that undervoltage relay 127-1-B33-1 had not actuated as expected. This relay is in series with relay 127-2-B33-1, and both actuate upon a loss of voltage to safety-related bus 33-1, to cause the load shed action. Load shedding is essential to ensure that the emergency diesel generator is not overloaded when performing its safety-related function to repower bus 33-1. The licensee replaced relay 127-1-B33-1 and successfully completed testing, restoring the system to a functional status.
The licensee contracted PowerLabs to perform a failure analysis on General Electric relay 12IAV69A1A with serial number AIAV472000080 previously installed as relay 127-1-B33-1, which was documented in report DRE-76112, Failure Analysis of: Undervoltage Relay, November 5, 2024. This report documented that a disc internal to the relay failed to rotate due to the stationary contact impacting the rotational disc. After disassembly, PowerLabs determined that the stationary contact shaft diameter was 0.134 inches, which was smaller than the diameter of the clamp 0.138 inches holding the stationary contact in place. The report concluded that the difference in manufacturing diameters resulted in the stationary contact falling, then impacting the rotational disc, thereby preventing the contacts from closing. Subsequently, on April 8, 2025, Curtiss-Wright reported to the NRC a manufacturing issue associated with time delay relays supplied by them (ADAMs Accession No.
ML25100A099), which included General Electric time delay relay 12IAV69A1A installed at Dresden.
During review of the failure analysis and corrective action documents, the inspectors noted that a similar condition was encountered by the licensee during performance of DOS 6600-03 on October 27, 2020, as documented in AR 4380004, UV Relay Did Not Actuate During U3 Div 1 UV. Specifically, during testing, relay 127-1-B33-1 failed to close and the load shed function did not occur. A failure analysis performed by PowerLabs of General Electric relay 12IAV69A1A with serial number 0000305200 installed in the plant as relay 127-1-B33-1 documented in report DRE-76027, Failure Analysis of: HFA151A Auxiliary Relay Manufacturer: General Electric, December 11, 2020, that the disc experienced mechanical resistance to movement during rotation that prevented the closing of the relays contacts.
The resistance to movement was revealed during physical manipulation of the rotation disk through its full range of motion. The licensee determined the failure mechanism was due to foreign material that prevented the disc from rotating and prevented the contacts from closing. The licensee corrected the condition by replacing the relay and completing the surveillance on October 28, 2020.
The inspectors reviewed the vendor documentation to understand Dresden maintenance practices as compared to those recommended by the vendor. Inspectors reviewed GEI-90810D, Voltage Relay Type IAV69A and IAV69B, Revision 0 and noted that in the section titled Periodic Check and Routine Maintenance, the text stated in part that until the user has accumulated enough experience to select the test interval best suited to his individual requirements it is suggested that the following points be checked at an interval of from one to two years. Repeat the visual and mechanical inspection described under section on Acceptance Tests. Inspectors reviewed the section Acceptance Tests, and noted that the manual stated under mechanical test, in part, to rotate the time dial to No. 7 setting and check the disk rotates without binding or touching the drag magnet or U-magnet.
The inspectors asked when the vendor recommended mechanical checks were being completed and were told they were performed only during calibration prior to relay replacement on a 4-year periodicity. The inspectors asked for the work order, procedures or other documentation showing that these mechanical checks were being completed, but were told the maintenance was not documented anywhere and was left up to skill of the craft to complete.
On January 29, 2025, the inspectors reviewed procedure ER-AA-200-1004, PCM Templates, Revision 1, and noted step 4.2.14 stated to review available vendor recommendations for the component type addressed by the template. For any vendor recommendations where there is a documented basis for the recommended scope and frequency of the tasks prescribed in the template and the PCM Template is more or less conservative then document the basis for the PCM Template recommendation. The inspectors reviewed PCM Template Relays - Protective and noted that the PCM Template had not addressed the above vendor recommendations contained in GEI-90810D.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included, but were not limited to, relay replacement, failure analysis, and system restoration.
Corrective Action References: AR 4380004, UV Relay did not actuate during U3 Div 1 UV, and AR 4813364, Bus 33-1 Loads did not load shed during UV (DOS 6600-03)
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to either implement ER-AA-200-1004 step 4.2.14, to document the basis for the PCM Template recommendation when the scope was less conservative than prescribed or to provide a basis for not performing the vendor recommended actions, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failure to incorporate vendor recommended maintenance, or provide sufficient justification for non-performance, led to the failure to identify the deficient condition.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors dispositioned the finding per Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality..
Specifically, the inspectors answered yes to question 3.a., Does the degraded condition represent a loss of PRA functionality of one train of a multi train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time? The finding screened into a Detailed Risk Evaluation.
A senior reactor analyst performed a Detailed Risk Evaluation using SAPHIRE version 8.2.11 and the Dresden SPAR model version 8.82 to assess the significance of the finding.
The following assumptions and factors were considered in the quantification:
a.
The exposure time for the finding was 1 year. The basis for this assumption was that the component was last tested approximately 4 years ago and the maximum permissible exposure time is 1 year per the Risk Assessment of Operation Events (RASP) handbook, Volume 1, Section 2.7 (ML17348A149).
b.
The finding was modeled as a failure of the division I emergency diesel generator (EDG 2/3) sequencer by setting basic event EPS-SEQ-FO-DG23 to TRUE. The basis for this assumption was that the finding was associated with an undervoltage relay that monitors voltage on the division I safety-related bus (33-1) and resulted in a loss of function for the sequencer to appropriately load EDG 2/3 during undervoltage testing. However, bus 33-1 is also equipped with degraded voltage protection that would have shed bus 33-1 loads, started EDG 2/3, and loaded EDG 2/3 automatically to bus 33-1 during undervoltage conditions associated with loss of coolant accident (LOCA) scenarios. Therefore, loss of offsite power (LOOP) scenarios were quantified for this evaluation, but LOCA scenarios were not since there was no loss of EDG 2/3 sequencer function during these conditions. This was considered a bounding assumption because the degraded voltage protection results in a delayed EDG 2/3 response for LOOP scenarios, not a catastrophic failure. Credit for the degraded voltage protection was considered as part of recovery (additional discussion in the next bullet).
c.
The finding was considered to be recoverable consistent with the RASP handbook, Volume 1, Section 3.3 and 6.0. The basis for this assumption was the degraded voltage protection would have shed bus 33-1 loads, started EDG 2/3, and loaded EDG 2/3 automatically to bus 33-1 during LOOP scenarios, but would have been delayed by a 5-minute timer. EDG 2/3 sequencer recovery probability was applied by setting EPS-XHE-XL-SEQ to a screening value of 0.1. This was considered a bounding assumption because failure of the automatic function is annunciated in the main control room, and procedures exist to manually recover EDG 2/3, and the degraded condition would not have prevented the recovery action.
d.
Credit was given for the hardened containment vent system and for diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX).
e.
Common cause failure was considered as a result of the finding.
The resultant change in core damage frequency was estimated to be less than 1E-7/year.
Therefore, LERF was not required to be evaluated consistent with IMC 0609, App H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, and the finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (green). The dominant core damage sequences included a weather-related LOOP with a failure of emergency power systems, failure of high-pressure injection, and failure to recover power sources in four hours, leading to core damage.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, states that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, states, in part, Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
The licensee established Procedure ER-AA-200-1004, PCM Templates, Revision 1 to address creating and revising PCM Templates where PCM Templates establish generic component or system templates that identify the specific tasks (condition monitoring, time directed, or surveillances) and frequencies recommended for components to minimize consequential failures based on criticality of the component, how often its used, and the environment in which it operates. Procedure ER-AA-200-1000, Revision 1, Step 4.2.14 requires, review available vendor recommendations for the component type addressed by the template. For any vendor recommendations where there is a documented basis for the recommended scope and frequency of the tasks prescribed in the template and the PCM Template is more or less conservative then document the basis for the PCM Template recommendation.
Contrary to the above, from October 31, 2020 through October 30, 2024, the licensee failed to implement procedures recommended in Reg. Guide 1.33 when they failed to document the basis for not performing vendor recommended mechanical tests. Specifically, the licensee PCM Template for Relays-Protective states in part, Calibration should include the following:
Performing the type-specific tests, as per OEM recommendations. The licensee failed to provide justification for not performing vendor recommended mechanical tests as required by the PCM Template.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Adverse Trend Observed in Maintenance Work Execution and Corrective Action Program Documentation 71152S The inspectors performed a semiannual review of issues entered into the corrective action program (CAP) over the period of January 1, 2025, to June 30, 2025. The inspectors focused on the area of maintenance work practices to identify any potential trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors reviewed the following issues related to procedure use and adherence by maintenance personnel:
AR 4849160, NRC Question While watching maintenance work associated with the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, the inspector questioned whether the thread sealant being used by workers was appropriate for the application. Although the associated work package required the use of one sealant, maintenance technicians opted to use a sealant rated for a higher heat without realizing it was not appropriate for use in safety-related systems. The licensee implemented the use of the correct sealant before restoring the system to operable.
AR 4849834, HPCI Oil Leak The inspectors reviewed a CAP entry documenting a 1 gallon per minute oil leak from the Unit 2 HPCI lube oil system. The leak was identified during a post-maintenance surveillance and after work was performed on the lube oil system. The leak originated from a loose compression fitting that was touched during the work. Subsequent event investigation revealed that maintenance technicians failed to perform appropriate independent verification of fitting tightness as required by the continuous use procedure. The system was inoperable at the time the leak was identified, and the licensee tightened the fitting before restoring the system to operable.
AR 4857723 Calibrations reperformed Maintenance technicians incorrectly calibrated six of eight differential pressure indicating switches during a low-pressure coolant injection calibration activity. The switches were calibrated using incorrect data recorded within the continuous use maintenance procedure.
The inspectors determined that at no time were the switches calibrated outside of the technical specification limits. The licensee reperformed the calibrations for the impacted switches.
Based on these ARs, the inspectors observed maintenance work during the quarter and noted two additional issues. First, the inspectors watched a low-pressure ECCS permissive pressure switch calibration. During the work, the inspectors observed maintenance technicians measuring data in a manner that did not follow the steps prescribed by the continuous use maintenance procedure. The inspectors provided this feedback to managers who were also observing the activity, and work was stopped as a result. Although the licensee documented the need to revise the continuous use procedure governing the calibration activity in the CAP (AR 4870385), they did not document the procedure use and adherence concern observed by the inspectors. The inspectors did not identify any operability concerns associated with the associated ECCS equipment as a result of the procedure use and adherence issue.
Additionally, the inspectors observed a flexible coping strategies (FLEX) diesel test.
Maintenance technicians supported this run through operation of a load bank connected to the FLEX diesel. Inspectors noted during the run that maintenance technicians used the wrong version of the continuous use procedure to connect and operate the load bank and provided this feedback to the supervisor observing the work. The supervisor verified that the steps performed by the maintenance technicians were not materially impacted by the difference in procedure revisions.
The inspectors evaluated these events in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP)71152, Problem Identification and Resolution and against the success criteria documented in Section 03.04 of that procedure. Based on the examples described above, it is not clear to the inspectors that maintenance personnel are entering conditions in the licensees CAP at a low threshold. Multiple procedure use and adherence examples described above were not entered into the licensees CAP. Further, AR 4857723 Calibrations reperformed was only entered into the CAP after inspectors discussed the issue with site management and the plant general manager intervened. This observation is associated with cross-cutting aspect Identification (P.1): the organization implements a CAP with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program.
In addition, the above examples were utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee audits and self-assessments. The inspectors reviewed several assessments documented in the CAP including AR 4753800 TREND IR: Work Control Stream Analysis, AR 4777914 Trend IR: Maintenance Craft and FLS performance summary and AR 4830183 NSA-DRE-25-03 Dresden Maintenance Audit. Assessments documented in 2024 within ARs 4753800 and 4777914 identify the need for improved supervisor coaching, correction, and documentation to address an adverse trend observed in maintenance execution.
Corrective actions associated with these observations were documented in the CAP.
The nuclear oversight audit documented in AR 4830183 covered the period from April 14 through April 25, 2025. Auditors observing work were guided, based in part on previous maintenance execution trends identified by the licensee, to focus on pre-job brief execution and management observations. The inspectors noted this assessment did not identify a negative trend in maintenance execution but noted that at no time did auditors observe jobs at the same time as inspectors.
The four examples of ECCS maintenance work described above reflect performance deficiencies. Specifically, during the work described above, the licensee failed to follow approved continuous use procedures and instructions governing maintenance of safety-related equipment. These four performance deficiencies also reflect violations of technical specifications. Specifically, Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance further addresses maintenance procedures and documented instructions that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. The failure to follow continuous use procedures governing ECCS system maintenance is thus a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a.
The inspectors determined that these four performance deficiencies were minor because they did not adversely impact the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the procedure use and adherence issues noted above did not impact operability of the associated ECCS systems or were identified and corrected while the impacted ECCS system was already out of service for maintenance.
Given that these violations are minor in nature, the failure to comply with Technical Specification 5.4.1.a is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 5, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to H. Patel, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 23, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial licensed operator requalification inspection results to C. Joseph, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 16, 2025, the inspectors presented the ISFSI license renewal inspection results to H. Patel, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4517645
HI STAR/Cask Inspection Pad AMP Insp WR
08/18/2022
4517646
08/18/2022
4542698
HI STAR 100/ISFSI AMP Inspection Results
2/14/2022
4777097
Circumferential Discoloration on MPC 68-018
05/29/2024
4777102
General Corrosion on Interior of HI-STORM 100-010
05/29/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
4777104
Flake-Like Deposit Near MPC 68-018's Circumference Weld
05/29/2024
4859600
NRC Identified - Conditions Noted on Casks
04/23/2025
4860029
NRC Identified - East 72.212 Report Requires
Evaluation/Update
04/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4860036
NRC Identified ISFSI Aging Management Program
Deficiencies
04/24/2025
Engineering
Changes
638919
Aging Management (AMP) HI-STORM / MPC Selection
Evaluation 68-018 Multi-Purpose Canister /
100-010 HI-STORM Classic 100
04/05/2024
HI-2240711
Multi-Purpose Canister Exterior and HI-STORM AMP for
Dresden 2024
07/26/2024
Miscellaneous
Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR)
HI-TRAC Overpack Annual Inspection Checklist
04/10/2025
EN-DR-408-4160
Radiological Groundwater Protective Program Reference
Material for Dresden Clean Energy Center
Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination
(NDE) Personnel
Structures Monitoring
Use of Operating Experience for License Renewal
Implementation/Aging Management
HSP-320
Standard Remedial Work Practices of Safety Significant
Components
Conduct of Maintenance Manual
Spent Fuel Loading Campaign Management
60859
Procedures
Dry Cask Storage ISFSI Inspection Surveillance Program
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Aging
Management Program
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
Procedures
QCP 17200
Dry Cask Inspection Instruction Document
Radiation
Surveys
RP-DR-300-102
Attach 1
HI-STAR Radiation Survey 100-004
10/03/2022
4837811-01
Y Com HI-STAR FSAR Required Radiation Survey
10/03/2022
286914
HI-STAR Cask AMP Inspection WR
09/26/2022
286915
HI STAR/East ISFSI Pad AMP Visual Inspection WR
10/19/2022
21206
Initiate ISFSI Repairs as Indicated
04/23/2025
5338229-01
HI-STORM 100 Aging Management (AMP) Inspections
05/30/2024
27169
HI-STAR 100 AMP Casks & ISFSI Pad Visual Inspection
10/25/2024
60859
Work Orders
5560974
D2/3 12M COM AMP HI-STORM 200 Overpack and
HI-TRAC Visual INSP
08/01/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
4849834
HPCI Oil Leak
03/27/2025
M-173
Diagram of Corrosion Test Diesel Start-up Air Piping
BJ
M-29
Diagram of L.P. Coolant Injection Piping
M-355
Diagram of Service Water Piping
SU
M-41
Diagram of Turbine and Diesel Oil Piping
AI
M-478
Diagram of Diesel Generator Lube Oil Piping
J
M-51
Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
CY
M-517
Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System
J
Drawings
M-518
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
G
DOP 1400-E1
Unit 2 Core Spray System Electrical Checklist
DOP 1400-M1
Unit 2 Core Spray System
DOP 1500-01
Preparation of Low Pressure Coolant Injection for Automatic
Start
DOP 1600-02
Torus Water Level Control
DOP 6600-01
Diesel Generator 2(3) Preparation for Standby Operation
DOP 6600-E1
Unit 3 Standby Diesel Generator
DOP 6600-M1
Unit 3 Standby Diesel Generator Checklist
Procedures
M-27
Diagram of Core Spray Piping
AAO
Procedures
119 U3RB-22
Unit 3 HPCI Pump Room Elevation 476'
24 U3RB-26
Unit 3 General Area Elevation 545'
Corrective Action
Documents
UNEXPECTED ALARM: Suspected Faulty Level Switch
04/08/2025
DAN 902(3)-3 H-
Procedures
DOA 0040-02
Localized Flooding in Plant
Miscellaneous
TQ-AA-150-F25
LORT Annual Exam Status Report
05/27/2025
Bar Rack Plugging and DOA Entries
07/30/2022
Training Exam Security Procedural Non-Compliance
05/22/2025
NRC 71111.11 Daily De-Brief Exam Security Item
05/23/2025
TR 231219-007
Establishing Heat Up Rate
2/19/2023
TR-230428-001
Bar Rack Plugging Training
10/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
TR-240524-008
Site Wide Training on Fire Protection Concepts
11/29/2024
25 Operating Test Sample Plan
Medical Records for 10% of Licensed Operators
N/A
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Attendance
Records
23-2025
Second 2023 Simulator Review Board Meeting Minutes
09/15/2023
First 2024 Simulator Review Board Meeting Minutes
04/03/2024
Second 2024 Simulator Review Board Meeting Minutes
10/11/2024
Reactivation Of License Log
01/11/2024
Reactivation of License Log
01/15/2024
OPEX-AE
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-AW
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-AY
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-C
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-I
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-O
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-P
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-Q
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-S
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
OPEX-V
Dynamic Simulator Scenario
Miscellaneous
P0-6600-09
In Plant Job Performance Measure
P2-0300-01
In Plant Job Performance Measure
P2-1300-02
In Plant Job Performance Measure
P2-1600-01
In Plant Job Performance Measure
P3-0300-01
In Plant Job Performance Measure
P3-1600-01
In Plant Job Performance Measure
S-0500-07
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-1500-10
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-5400-02
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-5650-01
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-7500-02
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-7500-02
Simulator Job Performance Measure
S-AR-04
Administrative Job Performance Measure
S-EP-45
Administrative Job Performance Measure
S-RD-14
Administrative Performance Measure
TQ-AA-224-F100
Remedial Training Notification and Action on Failure
03/27/2023
TQ-AA-224-F100
Remedial Training Notification and Action on Failure
08/24/2023
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - 2024 Initial License Exam
Scenario 1
01/30/2024
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - 2024 Initial License Exam
Scenario 2
01/31/2024
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - 2024 Initial License Exam
Scenario 3
01/31/2024
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - 2025 Initial Licensee Exam
Scenario 1
01/13/2025
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - 2025 Initial License Exam
Scenario 3
01/14/2025
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - Out of the Box Scenario
Evaluation 25-02B
2/25/2025
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - Out of the Box Scenario
Evaluation 25-02A
2/28/2025
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - Out of the Box Scenario
Evaluation 25-01A
01/24/2025
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Scenario Based Testing - Out of the Box Scenario
Evaluation 25-01B
01/10/2025
Written Exam
Week 5 Biennial Written Exam (RO)
03/17/2025
Written Exam
Week 5 Biennial Written Exam (SRO)
03/25/2025
Written Sample
Plan
23-2025 LOR Written Sample Plan
04/28/2025
Operator Training Programs
Examination Security and Administration
Procedures
Simulator Management
Self-Assessments PI-AA-126-1001-
F-01
Pre-NRC 71111.11 Inspection Licensed Operator
Requalification Training Assessment
01/31/2025
Post Event Testing - U2 Scram After A FRV Fail Open
01/10/2023
RWM Locked up During ILT NRC Exam
11/02/2023
- 1 Overhead Monitor Blanking out and Returning During ILT
NRC Exam
04/24/2023
2A ASD HMI Monitor Blanks Out
04/24/2023
Safety Valve EPN Incorrect on Temperature Recorder
06/07/2023
Correct Modelling of ASD Power Supplies/Computer UPS
Distribution
11/17/2023
EC 638685, Feedwater Regulating Valve SPV Elimination
Modification
11/26/2023
EC 637768 D2 SDC Isol Logic from IB to ESS Power
11/26/2024
Condenser Vacuum Response to Transients
11/26/2024
IRM/SRM Detector Drive Controls
11/13/2023
Add Malfunctions for Failure to Auto-Start Core Spray
Pumps
2/18/2023
3B IAC Indicates/Operates Differently
2/23/2023
Rod Worth Minimizer Insert/Withdraw Error on Half Scram
04/10/2024
EC 625161 Replacement of 3C IAC
04/17/2024
2A & 2B Recirc Drive Trip Alarms Not Labeled Properly in
SmartAction List
05/23/2024
Correct Alarm Tile 902-4 E-6 in JADE
05/23/2024
2C RFP on Bus 22 Running without Suction Pressure
05/23/2024
U2 EDG Incorrect Indications
05/23/2024
DW & Torus Purge Fan Control Switch Faulty
05/23/2024
Iso Condenser Makeup Pumps Capacity
10/02/2024
Work Orders
U2/3 Mn Chimney Sping (2/3-1740-202) and U2/3 Rx Vent
Stack (2/3-1740-203) Do Not Align with the Expected Values
10/17/2024
Miscellaneous
TM-250529-025
Dresden Operations Training OBE-25-04A
NF-AB-720-F-1
Control Rod Sequence Review and Approval Sheet
05/10/2025
Procedures
ReMA Plan D329-010
05/10/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4849160
NRC Question
03/26/2025
Protected Equipment List
3/31/2025
OP-DR-201-012-
1001
Dresden On-Line Fire Risk Management
Procedures
On-Line Work Control Process
HPCI Oil Leak
03/27/2025
U2 HPCI Fast Start (DOS 2300-07) Complete w/ Portions
Unsat
03/30/2025
U2 HPCI GSLO Drain Pump Wetted due to Sump High Level 04/07/2025
U3 ECCS Room Coolers Inlet Pressures Low OOT
05/07/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
TR 3-1631-01 Point 18 HPCI Room Temperature at 100 deg
F
06/02/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: HPCI Basis for Room Temp of 120F in Station Proc
06/11/2025
A
Unit Daily Surveillance Log
150
DAN 923-5 H-1
U2 HPCI PP AREA TEMP HI
Procedures
DOS 2300-03
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability and
Quarterly IST Verification Test
24
D2 2y TS HPCI Pump Comprehensive Oper Test and IST
Surv
03/28/2025
Work Orders
OP D2 2Y PM HPCI Fast Initiation Test
03/30/2025
Temp Indicator U3 D/G Engine Clg Wtr Engine Outlet
Broken
04/26/2024
Packing Leak on Core Spray Valve 3-1402-24A
11/25/2024
Tachometer Needs to Be Replaced
04/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CCP-B FLEX Generator Warning Alarm
06/26/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
DIS 1500-01 and DIS 1500-36 Procedure Revision
06/03/2025
Resulting from
Inspection
Drawings
2E-3346 Sh 2
Schematic Diagram 4160V Bus 34-1 Standby Diesel 3 Feed
& 24-1 Tie Breaker
Engineering
Evaluations
ECR 467529
Unit 2 and Unit 3 Rx Low Pressure (350 psig) ECCS
Permissive Take Circuit 1 and Circuit 2 Trips Together
05/30/2025
Procedures
OP-DR-300-101
Average Scram Time Determination
QO 5640586-01
OP D2/3 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability
05/09/2025
OPS PMT 2/3-6601-ASR3, 2/3 EDG Emerg Auto-Start Relay
05/09/2025
OP PMT 2/3 EDG (Maintenance Run + DOS 6600-01)
05/09/2025
D2/3 1Y FLEX Diesel Generator B Loaded Run
06/26/2025
OP D2/3 San TS Diesel Generator Fast Start Operability
Surv
05/9/2025
OAP Replace Relay Prot UV Bus 34-1
(127-1-B34-1 & 127-2-B34-1)
04/23/2025
OAP Bench Cal Relay Prot UV Bus 34-1
(127-1-B34-1 & 127-2-B34-1)
04/25/2025
(3-159-1-SD3 & 3-159-2-SD3)
04/25/2025
OAP Bench Calibrate Relay Prot OV EDG (3-159-1-SD3 &
3-159-2-SD3)
04/23/2025
D3 QTR TS Div 1 Core Spray Pmp Test for IST Surv
05/6/2025
EWP IM D3 QTR REACTOR LOW PRESSURE (350 PSIG)
ECCS PERMISSIVE
05/30/2025
OP D3 Qtr TS HPCI Pump Oper Test and IST Surv
06/19/2025
Work Orders
OP D3 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability
04/23/2025
MSPI Emergency AC Power Prepared Data Package
04/01/2024
through
03/31/2025
MSPI High Pressure Injection Prepared Data Package
04/01/2024
through
03/31/2025
71151
Miscellaneous
Operations 2024 PI Data Package (Unplanned Scrams,
Unplanned Power Changes and Scrams with Complications)
01/01/2024
through
2/31/2024
Drawings
Schematic Diagram Engine Control and Generator Excitation BD
Standby Diesel Generator 2/3
Schematic Diagram 4160V Bus 33 Main and Reserve Feed
GCBs
Schematic Diagram 4160V Bus 33-1 Undervoltage Relays
Control Switch Development
4753800
TREND IR: Work Control Stream Analysis
2/28/2024
4777914
Trend IR: Maintenance Craft and FLS Performance
Summary
05/31/2024
4830183
NOSA-DRE-25-03 Dresden Maintenance Audit
05/26/2025
4849160
NRC Question
03/26/2025
4849834
HPCI Oil Leak
03/27/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
4870385
DIS 1500-01 and DIS 1500-36 Procedure Revision
06/03/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4857723
Calibrations Reperformed
04/16/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
4872651
Unexpected Alarms and Response from TR-32 Trip
06/12/2025