IR 05000237/2025010

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Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000237/2025010 and 05000249/2025010
ML25119A186
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  
Issue date: 04/30/2025
From: Robert Ruiz
NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1
To: Rhoades D
Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear
References
IR 2025010
Download: ML25119A186 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2025010 AND 05000249/2025010

Dear David Rhoades:

On March 21, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with H. Patel, Plant Manager and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional April 30, 2025 Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000237 and 05000249 License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000237 and 05000249

License Numbers:

DPR-19 and DPR-25

Report Numbers:

05000237/2025010 and 05000249/2025010

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2025-010-0052

Licensee:

Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

Facility:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Location:

Morris, IL

Inspection Dates:

March 03, 2025 to March 21, 2025

Inspectors:

K. Henry, Regional Governmental Liaison Officer

M. Porfino, IEMA Resident Inspector-Dresden

N. Shah, Senior Project Engineer

C. St. Peters, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Robert. Ruiz, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Identify a Condition Adverse to Quality with the Local Power Range Monitors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2025010-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152B The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, when the licensee failed to identify as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ), that the transformers used in the local power range monitor (LPRM) power supplies were of unanalyzed design, and therefore, a potential operability issue affecting the safety-related average and oscillation power range monitoring systems.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
  • Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the electrical distribution system.
  • Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
  • Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the corrective action program (CAP), that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the CAP as required by station procedures. Workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that they were encouraged to use it to document issues. During plant walkdowns, the team observed that issues were being identified in the field and that they were being properly addressed in the CAP. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV), for the failure to identify a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) via the CAP, associated with the safety-related local power range monitors (LPRM). This issue is discussed in more detail later in the report.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors noted that issues were properly screened with most either classified as CAQs or Non-Corrective Action Program (NCAP) items. Through a selective review of CAP and NCAP items, the inspectors found no issues either with the assigned level of evaluation or the proposed CAs. Issues having potential operability concerns were properly addressed through the screening process and during control room observations and accompaniment of non-licensed operators during daily rounds. The inspectors did not identify any significant operator workarounds or similar deficiencies.

The inspectors did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP and corrective actions were appropriate and timely scheduled.

Issue evaluations were generally sound and of good quality. Most issues were screened as low significance and were assigned a work group evaluation (the lowest level of review);more significant issues were assigned a Corrective Action Program Evaluation (CAPE) or if highly significant, a root cause evaluation. Through a selective review, the inspectors verified that the assigned evaluations were consistent with the significance of the issue as defined in the licensees process.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed issues in the CAP to ensure appropriate classification and prioritization of the problems resolution commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Corrective actions were assessed to ensure they were appropriately focused to correct the problem identified and to address the root and contributing causes of significant conditions adverse to quality and conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors reviewed completion of CAs to validate they were completed according to the action plan, in a timely manner, and were effective at addressing the issue and preventing future issues. For NRC-identified issues, the inspectors evaluated whether prior attempts by the licensee to remedy the problems were adequate.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements.

One finding with an associated non-cited violation was identified.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Operating Experience The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC Operating Experience (OPEX) information for station applicability. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee assigned actions in the CAP to evaluate the potential station impact. During interviews, licensee staff stated that operating experience lessons-learned were communicated during work briefings and department meetings and incorporated into plant operations.

The OPEX Review template states that If there are no Operability Concerns, mark this section as N/A with a short answer as to why. The inspectors noted that for OPXR ATI Assignment #4671637-02, section three, operability concerns, N/A was selected but no reason was listed as to why. Subsequently, licensee staff stated that the OPEX was evaluating the applicability of an administrative vulnerability and there was no system or equipment operation evaluated in the review; however, the failure to follow the template was not discussed in the response. The improper completion of the OPEX review was documented as IR 4846746. The inspectors also noted that the operating experience was appropriately reviewed as a potential precursor during CAPE and root cause evaluations.

No findings or violations were identified.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Licensee Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified. The Maintenance Rule Database was not updated to reflect an April 2023 change to the classification for the U2/U3 low pressure coolant injection/containment cooling service water (LPCI/CCSW) function 15-6 from low to high safety significance. This update was required by Step 4.2.2.2 of ER-AA-320, Maintenance Rule Implementation per NEI 18-10. This was also a missed opportunity, as the most recent assessment of the maintenance rule program (AR 2466136-91 Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment #15 ) mentioned the change in the function significance, but did not identify the database discrepancy. The failure to follow procedure ER-AA-320, was considered a minor violation, as the Team did not identify any examples where a maintenance rule issue involving this function had been inadequately assessed since the change was made. This was also consistent with example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated October 26, 2023. The licensee documented this issue as IR 4846830, with an assigned action to verify that LPCI/CCSW maintenance rule issues occurring after the 2023 change were properly evaluated.

One minor violation was identified.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of a chilled work environment.

Workers expressed favorable opinions of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) during interviews. While most workers felt no need to engage the ECP, the inspectors noted that there were still several issues documented in the program. Through a selective review, the inspectors concluded that these issues were appropriately handled and identified no adverse trends. The inspectors did note, however, that some radiation protection staff were unaware of the ECP, in spite of several signs posted throughout the station describing the ECP. This was discussed with the ECP coordinator who planned to address this during routine plant department outreach meetings.

During the staff interviews, there was a consistent theme that lower-level CAP issues, even those involving conditions adverse to quality (CAQs), were not addressed timely. There was a perception amongst interviewees that station management didnt see resolution of these issues as a priority, resulting in their being allowed to languish. One example of this was a long-standing open corrective action to replace an incorrectly installed seal purge line on the 3B reactor recirculation pump. This issue, which was documented in IR 590514 as a CAQ, was identified in 2007 and its associated corrective action to re-align the line has been continuously extended, with a current due date of 12/30/2025. Based on licensee evaluation, the misalignment posed a low risk to the pump operation and long-term reliability; however, it was still considered a CAQ as the pump, and by extension the seal purge line, were considered safety-related components. The failure to address this issue for such an extended period lends credence to the staff's continuing view that the station is tolerant towards long-standing issues which, over the long-term, could challenge the site safety culture. The licensee documented this issue as IR 4847173.

No findings or violations were identified.

Failure to Identify a Condition Adverse to Quality with the Local Power Range Monitors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2025010-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152B The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, when the licensee failed to identify as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ), that the transformers used in the local power range monitor (LPRM) power supplies were of unanalyzed design, and therefore, a potential operability issue affecting the safety-related average and oscillation power range monitoring systems.

Description:

The LPRMs are safety-related components that measure neutron flux at various locations within the reactor core. They feed signals into the average power range monitors (APRMs)which provide control room indication of average reactor power and generate an automatic shutdown of the reactor should reactor power get too high. At least 50 percent of the LPRM signals are required for each APRM to be considered operable. The LPRMs also input into the Oscillation Power Range Monitors (OPRM) which are used to monitor for reactor flux instabilities which could challenge fuel design limits. Like the APRMs, the OPRMs provide control room indication and generate automatic reactor shutdown signals should reactor power conditions challenge the fuel design bases.

In 2017, the licensee identified obsolescence concerns with the LPRM circuit cards and power supplies; in that the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was no longer manufacturing them or providing support. In response, the licensee decided to have another vendor re-engineer the components to the OEM specifications. Since they would be in effect using the same components, the licensee considered this as an Item Equivalency instead of a Design Change. Subsequently, the licensee replaced the OEM components with the re-engineered, equivalent components. This action was also done at the Quad Cities and LaSalle nuclear power stations, as they utilized the same system and had the same obsolescence issues.

On March 13, 2024, the licensee-initiated Issue Report (IR) 4757787 to document an adverse trend in LPRM failures. Further troubleshooting identified that the issues were related to the re-engineered LPRM circuit cards and power supplies. The affected components were sent to the vendor for failure analysis. On February 6, 2025, the licensee documented that the vendor had identified that the issue was premature failure of the power supply transformer due to increased temperature during operation. However, the IR was closed without any additional detail regarding the cause of the increased temperature nor any CAs.

On March 4, 2025, during subsequent conversations with licensee engineering staff, the inspectors learned that the heating was due to the power supply transformer being of a different design than the OEM. Specifically, the OEM transformer comprised two bobbins with separated primary and secondary coils, while the re-engineered transformer consisted of a single bobbin where the primary and secondary coils overlap. As a result, the re-engineered components were not equivalent and therefore, were of unanalyzed design. The inspectors identified that the premature failure of the LPRMs from overheating, due to the power supply transformers not being equivalent to the OEM, was not identified as a CAQ by the licensee. Therefore, there were no formal CAP actions to evaluate and correct the potential operability/functionality impacts from the unanalyzed design.

The inspectors reviewed the Item Equivalency Evaluation that had been performed for the circuit boards and power supplies prior to their installation and noted that the vendor had documented that due to there being no OEM specifications for the transformer, the vendor had built a replacement having the same physical dimensions and using equivalent functional parameters. It is unknown if the licensee was aware of the differences in construction between the OEM and re-engineered transformer; however, the re-engineered components were accepted and installed as equivalent.

Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the issue in the CAP and was working with the vendor to develop a replacement transformer and assessed that sufficient LPRMs were available to ensure the operability of the APRMs and OPRMs.

Corrective Action References: The licensee documented this issue in the CAP as IRs 4843976 and 4843370. Subsequently, the vendor issued a Part 21 on these power supplies, after identifying several additional failures at Quad Cities and LaSalle. This Part 21 was documented as AR 4848680.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to identify a CAQ as required by station procedures, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, step 4.1.2 of PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, revision 9, states in part that, If at any time a SCAQ or CAQ or any question of either current or past Operability/Reportability arises, then initiate an Issue Report in accordance with PI-AA-120. As stated, the LPRM transformers were not equivalent to the OEM and therefore, were of unanalyzed design. This was a CAQ, as it potentially affected the operability and functionality of a safety-related component. Therefore, an IR should have been initiated in the CAP once the licensee became aware of this design discrepancy.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the LPRMs feed into both the APRMs and OPRMs, both of which have safety functions to monitor reactor power and provide both control room indication and automatic reactor shutdown signals should conditions warrant that could challenge the fuel design limits.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," Section C, and answered No to all of the screening questions. Therefore, the finding screens to very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a CAP with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the licensee failed to initiate an IR after identifying that the transformer used in the re-engineered LPRM power supplies was not an equivalent component and therefore posed a potential operability issue as it resulted in an unanalyzed design condition.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and nonconformances, are promptly identified.

Contrary to the above, between February 6, 2025 and March 10, 2025, the license failed to identify a condition adverse to quality associated with the safety-related LPRMs. Specifically, when the licensee learned through a failure analysis that the transformers used in the replacement power supplies for the safety-related LPRMs were not equivalent to the OEM and that these transformers caused the power supplies to overheat and fail, the licensee failed to enter the non-equivalent design into the CAP until after being questioned by the inspectors on March 4, 2025.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On March 21, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to H. Patel, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

25499

Results of In-Line Inspection for Unit 3 CCSW Buried Piping

4055891

No Procedural Guidance for ADS Inhibit Failure

22239

U1 DOP 5750-29 Procedure Revision Required

246593

FRAC Tank Contents Sent to Floor Drain Unfiltered

259869-90

Dresden Review of IRIS 471626-MRC 01/21/2020

274841

FME: FM Retrieved from 2D Shutdown Cooling Heat

Exchanger

290588

Dose Rate Alarm While Working in the Radwaste Basement

299223

NDE-UT Results Below Minimum Required Thickness

4365128

Elevated Temperatures on 2/3 EDG Clg Wtr Sys

4381233

Bus 33-1 Cubicle Has High Closing Coil Resistance

4403530

Count Room Laboratory Humidifiers

24280

Obsolescence of GE CR124 Overload Relays

25847-15

CAPE to Design Mech Eng. to Determine Cause of U3 "A"

MSL Inboard MSIV Partially Closed. Address Known Risks

for Other MSIVs and Actions to Prevent Recurrence

26543

Breaker From Bus 30 to Bus 20-3 Would Not Close

4439802

EC for U2 SLMS System Upgrade

4444309-19

Dresden Review of IRIS 502279-MRC 12/13/2021

4453378

U3 Auto Scram due to TR3 Failure and Fire

4454158

U3 EDG Failed To Start

4454768

4.0 Critique-Fire Brigade Response to MPT-3 Fire

4459334

2B MSIV Close Time Was Slow

4459334

2B MSIV Close Time Was Slow

4465446

OPEX Review of IRIS Report 490985

4470594

Missed Opportunity for Thermography Dat Analysis

4471720

RT-3 Trouble

4476471

SBO Bus 61 FD to Bus 24 HCAR-IV Needs to be Replaced

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

4484453

U2 EDG Circ and Turbo Pump Breaker Tripped at MCC 28-3

4487470

Failure Analysis for Siements MPT 3 H3 Bushing Not

Performed

4494317-03

Engineering to Complete SA for CRDs

4497371

Trend IR: DC System Grounds

4504957

Evaluate Degraded U3 125VDC Battery Cables

4504959

Evaluate Degraded U3 125VDC ALT Battery Cables

4504995

Evaluate Degraded U3 250VDC Battery Cables

4513269

AO 3-1601-24 Valve Stem Sheared While Performing

DIS 1600-24

4513269

AO 3-1601-24 Valve Stem Sheared While Performed

DIS 1600-24

4513674

2/3 Lift Station Battery Performance Test Results

4513810

AO 3-1601-62 Failed to Open

4513848

Bar Rack Plugging DOA Entries

4513848

Bar Rack Plugging DOA Entries

4514409

Licensee Renewal Implementation Program Routine Taks #4

4533061

MOV 3-1501-20B As-Found Unsat Criteria for Low CST

Thrust

4534332-16

Dresden Review of IRIS 542867 01/17/23

4534332-18

Dresden Review of IRIS 540504 01/24/23

4534332-22

Dresen Review of IRIS 543604 2/7/23

4534332-36

Dresden Review of IRIS 566271-MRC 09/07/23

4534332-39

Dresden Review of IRIS 54644 03/14/23

4534332-65

Dresden Review of IRIS 560600 06/26/23

4535914

Cranes Handling Fuel Need to Have Manual Lowering

Means

4539818

Unexpected Load Drop

4539877

2A LP Turbine Steam Sealing Line Leak (update to IR 4509999

4540536

MRULE A1 Determinations Performed Incorrectly

4544622

Cables to Bus 37 Have an Acrid Odor

4545056

Steam Leak Identified in 2B SJAE Room

4550338

MSIV Post Packing LLRT

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

4550338

NRC ID WO Lacked Evaluation for LLRT [Local Leak Rate

Test] PMT [Post Maintenance Test] of MSIV [Main Steam

Isolation Valve] Packing Replaced

4551420

2/3 EDG Feed to Bus 33-1 Breaker Cubicle Racking Issue

4552509

Cyber - NRC Observation - CC-AA-606 Scope

4553868

LORT DEP Not Included in PI Submissions

4555262

Trend IR: Burnishing Relay Contacts

45557716

Elevated Iron and Copper in U2/3 EDGJCW System

4555864

IC Pumphouse TIC Not Procured SQAD-7 Requirements

4556532

Operating Experience Applicable for Recirculation Oil

Leakage-Managing Risks

4557966-01

CC-AA-601 : assignment list 2023

4557966-02

List of PCRA for CC-AA-601

4558782

NOS ID: WHR Issues in Maintenance

4560811

Clinton NRC Cyber Security Inspection Issues

4560825

SPC 04461720-30 Failure Analysis of MPT 3 Thermoplate

Result

4560825

SPC 04461720-30 Failure of MPT 3 Thermoplate Result

4561068

Trend IR: U2 RBCCW [Reactor Building Component Cooling

Water] High Leakage Rate

4561990

3-0203-3A PS Controller OOT

4562297

Transducers Mounted in 903-29 Panel Without Seismic

Review

4562451

NRC CS - Firewall Tuning Not Documented

4562593

Unusual External Force on Pump-3C Condensate Pump

4563898

Unexpected Response during Dis 287-01 on D2

4563898

Unexpected Response during DIS 287-01 on D2

4564021

Receipt of NRC PI&R Insp Rpt 2023010 - Finding

23010-01

4564026

Receipt of NRC PI&R Inspection Report 2023010-Violation

23010-03

4564037

Receipt of NRC PI&R Inspection Report 2023010-Violation

23010-03

4564041

Receipt of NRC Inspection Report 2023010-Vilation

23010-04

4666025

23 NRC Graded Exercise TSC Performance

4670279

LMS Inaccuracies Regarding NRC RO and SRO License

Dates

4671637

OPXR to Maintenance Planning to Review the OE in IRIS

549630

4671637-03

OPXR to Chemistry to Review the OE in IRIS 549630 and

Verify No Similar Issues Exist with their Dynamic Procedures

4672099

MPT-3 Degraded Cables

4672164

D3M21 Chemistry Samples Showing Elevated Dose

4681273

Unexpected Alarm 903-6 H-9, 3C RFP Brg Oil Press Lo

4681519

U3 Reactor Building Fire Protection Supply Header Leak

4681955

Review of Station Events Requiring IRIS Reporting

4681967

NRC 1Q23 Inspection Report 2023001

4683443

Train Alignments of 3C CD/CB Pumps

4684857

3-1599-80C Broken Hand Wheel

4685104

3C CCSW Pump Diff Press at High End of Acceptable

Range

4686063

Trend IR for Past Late PMs in Maintenance

4686063

Trend IR for Past Late PMs in Maintenance

4688524

3A CCSW Pump Inboard Seal PI 3-1541-5A Possibly

Plugged

4688989

U2 125VDC Alt Batter Feed Ckt Breakers, SR Components

Req'd

4688989-07

Perform CAPE on U2 125 VDC Alt Batt Feed Ckt Bkrs, SR

Comp

4690019

NRC ID : Documentation for DOS 6600-08 Incomplete

4691476

NRC Identified: Frisker Probe Marked Broken

4691637

23 CETI: ASME Code Related Component ISI/ANI

Documentation

4692850

U2 Target Rock (2-0203-3A) Temperature Increase

4694214

HPCI Signal Converter Servo Amp Hardening Opportunity

4695296

23 CETI-NRC ID: Issue with Uncertainty Not in ECCS

[Emergency Core Cooling System] Testing

4695924

23 Guided Wave U3 CCSW Inspection Results

4700056

3-0203-3B Pressure Controller Switch Out of Tolerence

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

4700263

Issues Attempting to Perform SAWA Performance Test

4700513

Dresden Review of IRIS 563905-MRC 9/11/23

4700513

Dresden Review of IRIS 566713-MRC 09/07/23

4700513-20

Dresden Review of IRIS 569732-MRC 10/10/23

4700948

Part 21 GE Hitachi Ultra High Duty and Medium Duty Control

Rods

4701702

Perform Level 3 OPEX Review of WANO SER-2023-02

Complete Form

4701772

2/3 RB Breaker (24-1 cube 1) Will Not Rack Full In

4702234

Temporary Patch Leak on Fire Piping Downstream of

2/3-4199-176

4702817

Receipt of NRC CETI [Comprehensive Engineering Team

Inspection] Inspection Report 2023011-Violation 2023011-01

4702820

Receipt of NRC CETI Inspection Report 2023011-Violation

23011-03

4703442

3D CCSW Pump Inboard Seal Leak

4705130

U3 EDG Fire Door Inoperable

4711018

U2 RPS EHC CV Pressure Switches Hydraulic Braided

Hoses

4713088

MOV 2-1501-32A Degraded Grease

4714001

APS ID'd Valve Assembly Installed in Wrong Location

4714653

Rebuild ERV Pilot Valve 2-0203-3D-PIVL

4715155

287-106B Relay Required Burnishing

4716981

Unexpected Alarm: 902-4, D-23 2A Target Rock Relief Valve

INOP

4717468

Transfer Time of MCC 28-7/29-7 From Bus 29 to Bus 28

OOT

4717499

U2 Div 2 CCSW Supply to SW Flow Low During DOS

1500-12

4717529

CCSW Support M-1164D-129 Post VT3 Exam Recordable

Indication

4718350

D2R28 LL: Unexp High Therm Limits During U2 Power

Ascension

4718861

Air Void Identified U2 HPCI [High Pressure Core Injection]

during 1M Periodic Verification

22035

Biocide Chemical Leak on EDG Diesel Piping

23409

Security - (2) Perimeter Term Boxes Failed Tamper Testing

27126

4kV Circuit Breaker Trend IR for Last 6 Months of 2023

4730727

SPC 04696436-03 Failure Analysis of U2 EDG Control

Switch

4733144

OPEX Review-Gasket Selection

4736846

U3 CCSW Vault Test Door Warped

4740605

3Q2023 NRC Report-NCV 05000237,05000249/2023003-01

4740607

3Q2023 NRC Inspect Rpt-NCV 05000237,05000249/2023003-02

4741885

Offgas Release Rate Errors Identified (APEX software)

4750761

Wiring Discrepancy Identified during Verification

4750971

U3 CCSW Pump Vault Flood Protection Leakage Test

Results

4751884

TRNG ID : Level 3 OPEX Review

4753182

U3 HPCI GLSO MCC Wiring Degradation

4753182

U3 HPCI GLSO MCC Wiring Degradation (2/26/24)

4754250

U3 HPCI Aux Cooling Water Pump

4757240

D2 Emergency Diesel Generator Resistor Mounting

4758041

Unit 3 Drywell Pressure Response

4758041-15

Perform CAPE on 04758041 Unit 3 DW Pressure

4760311

OPEX Review--Sequoyah NRC Inspection Report and

Finding

4760717

Unit 3 Feedwater Iron in Action Level 1

4761885

Perform Site OPEX Level 3 Evaluation for IRIS 575027

4761938-04

NRC Functional Engineering Inspection Aging SSCs

71111.21N.04

4762585

U3 CCSW Vault Penetration High Leakage

4763657

Resolution To Air Void in U2 HPCI Discharge

4763825

U3 Instrument Air Compressor a(1) Action Plan

4764162

3-1501-1A Has Back Leakage to Bay 13

4769600

U3 Battery Charger Load Bank Faulted during Testing

4771001

Buzzing Sound Heard from U2 125 VDC Alt Charger

4771800

3A SDC Pump Breaker Closing Coil Continuity High

4773245

24 NOS CAP Audit

4775724

3.3.e Required Actions Not Met

4776882

Preparation for NRC PI&R Inspection

4780148

U2 CCSW Vault Test Door Cracked Welds

4780342

2-0203-3B ERV Tailpipe Temperature Rising

4781967

Leak Downstream of Discharge Flange on 3A Closed

Cooling Service Water Pump

4783211

U2 HPCI MGU

4785519

IER L4 24-1 Human Performance Errors Leading to Events

47880262-04

Dresden Review of IRIS 590375-MRC 07/10/24

4788577

EO Rounds: Load-Bearing Scaffold Pole on LPCI/CS Piping

4789300

EP Exercise Critique Comments

4789511

U2 Discharge Canal Temperature Recorder-EPN: 2-4450-66

4790201

Met Tower to MCR Equipment Going Obsolete

4790409

ERV Stainless Steel BOA Found in Degraded Condition

4791758

Breaker Failed to Stay Shut

4792614

IRIS 596925 Degrading Condenser Vacuum - Site OPEX

Reviews

4792614-09

Level 3 OPEX Evaluation : IRIS 596925 - Prairie Island Unit

2, Degrading Condenser Vacuum Results in Power Reductio

4796772

Potential Trend IR: Unit 2 Drywell CAM Equipment Failure

4797011

2Q24 NRC Integrated Inspection Report-NCV 2024002-01

4797051

2Q24 NRC Integrated Inspection Report-NCV 2024002-02

4797062

NRC Integrated Inspection Report-NCV 2024002-03

4797062

3Q2024 NRC Integrated Inspection Report-NCV 2024002-03

4797345

Water Leaking onto Cable Tray in U3 Moisture Seperator

Area

4797345

Water Leaking onto Cable Tray in U3 Cable Seperator Area

4799921

Erratic Offgas Flow during Unit 2 Downpower

4799972

Vacuum Leakage on 2-3103-B3 Heater at Reduced Power

4800029

Leakage Identified on 2-3099-113A

4803442

2/3 Diesel Fire Pump Failed Overcrank Test

4804468

Elevated Conductivity for Unit 3 Condensate Pump

Discharge

4806177

EPID: ERO Min Staff Individual Lives Outside Response

Time

4806275

Receipt of NRC Finding/NCV : Vital Area 31 Day Access

Review

4807695

ECP Requires Revision

4807773

HPCI MGU CAPE Rejected at MRC

48113364

Bus 33-1 Loads Did Not Load Shed During UV (DOS 6600-

03)

4814260

QDC SDV LLRT OPEX Applicable to Dresden

4814659

3Q2024 NRC Inspection Report: NCV 05000237/2024003-01

4815394

Abbreviated Maintenance 3A Target Rock Sensing Line

Fitting

4815440

D3R28 Drywell Aging Management Program A.1.26

4816220

TRM Entry for Fire Barrier Impaired

4817063

Bus 34-1 Feed to Bus 39 Breaker Won't Charge

4817876

U3 CRD C-09(10-35) Triple Notched

4818393

Drywell Inlet/Outlet Isolation Valves

21853

2B CD/CB Motor Vibration SME Call Recommendations

23934

2A CS Closing Coil Continuity High

24753

NRC Identified Issue

24762

IR 04817965 Historic Operability Review

24921-03-00

MRULE a(1) Determinations Not Performed

28862

Evaluation of Bar Rack Removal for Frazil Ice Mitigation

4832856

3A CCSW Pump Motor Trend - Elevated Amps

4833604

PI&R SA ID: DRE Aging Management ER-AA-700 Gaps

4834985

Fire Header Leak

4837255

NRC RIS 2025-02

4842823

U2 Condenser In-Leakage at Main Condenser Pipe

Penetration

590594

3B Recirculation Seal Purge Line Piped to Wrong

Connection

Corrective Action

Documents

IA Dryer 'A' Tower

Blowing Down

Excessively

3B

4843370

NRC ID: LPRM-Paragon ICPS Failure Analysis Report

4843391

NRC ID: LPRM Ion Chamber Power Supply Testing

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

4843976

NRC ID: IR to Capture ICPS Transformer Failure

4845429

NRC ID: OPXR ATI 4780262 -63 Closure

4845454

NRC ID: Comments Related to IR 4564037

4846007

NRC ID: Enhancement Opp Regarding OPEX Review

Actions

4846606

Incorrect Maintenance Rule Function Screened for

IR 4425857

4846642

NRC/IEMA Walkdown U3 250VDC Battery Cable Bend

4846643

NRC/IEMA Walkdown U2 15VDC Battery Cable bend/crack

4846647

NRC/IEMA Walkdown U2 250VDC Battery Cable Bend

4846746

NRC ID: OPXR review improper completion

4846807

NRC ID PI&R Comments Regarding Trend IR# 4727126

4846830

MRule Risk Significance Function15-6 (NRC ID -PI&R 2025)

4846837

NRC ID - Engage Health Severity Level Miss-Categorized

4846898

NRC Identified (PI&R 2025): U3 125VDC Battery Cable

Crack

4846901

NRC Identified (PI&R 2025): Cable bend evaluation U3 125

VDC

4846972

NRC Identified (PI&R 2025): Initiate Trend of DC Grounds

Inspection

4847173

NRC ID: Low Safety Significant Issue Allowed to Linger

EC 641778

U3 125VDC System Battery Ground

Engineering

Changes

ECR 461979

U3 HPCI GLSO Bucket Wiring Degradation

Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting Minutes for Monitoring

Period 1/1/2024-4/30/2024

05/20/2024

Nuclear Safety Culture Review Committee Meeting Minutes

for Monitoring Period 9/1/2024-12/31/2024

01/27/2025

Plant Health Committee Meeting Agenda and Presentation

Materials

2/24/2025

Station Oversight Meeting Package and Minutes

03/05/2025

Management Review Committee Package and Minutes

03/06/2025

Employee Concerns and Safety Culture Monitoring Program

Monthly Report

2/13/2025

0101-0099-RPT-

001

Dresden Clean Energy Center Evaluation of Mitigations to

Intake Grassing Events

Miscellaneous

DR-PBD-AMP-

XI.M20

Open-cycle Cooling Water System GALL-SLR

Revision 0

Management

Review

Committee

Agenda

03/05/2025

PHC 2.10.2025

Plant Health Committee Meeting per ER-AA-2001

2/10/2025

Station Oversight

Committee

Agenda

03/04/2025

Operability

Evaluations

44619342C MSIV

1B Limit Switch

Found Failed

DMP 0200-15

Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance

Revision 39

DMP 0200-43

Main Steam Isolation Valve Operator Air and Oil Cylinder

Overhaul

Revision 10

DMP 0200-44

Main Steam Isolation Valve Operator Air Manifold

Replacement and Air Operator Testing

Revision 03

DOP 4400-07

Circulation Water De-Icing Operation

Revision 15

EI-AA-101

Employee Concerns Program

Revision 11

EI-AA-101-1001

Employee Concerns Program

Revision 15

ER-700-1003

Use of Operating Experience for License Renewal

Implementation/Aging Management

Revision 6

ER-AA-320

Maintenance Rule Implementation Per NEI 18-10

Revision 0

ER-AA-320-1004

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) and (a)(2) Requirements

Revision 3

ER-AA-700

License Renewal Implementation Program

Revision 10

MA-AA-716-017

Station Rework Reduction Program

Revision 14

MA-AA-716-230-

1003

Thermography Program Guide

MA-DR-EM-3-

83044

25 VDC Battery Performance Test

NO-AA-10

Quality Assurance Topical Report

Revision 99

OP-AA-108-105-

1001

MCR and RWCR Equipment Deficiency Management and

Performance Indicator Screening

PI-AA-1012

Safety Culture Monitoring

Revision 4

PI-AA-115

Operating Experience Program

Revision 7

PI-AA-115

Operating Experience Program

Revision 7

Procedures

PI-AA-115-1003

Processing of Level 3 OPEX Evaluation

Revision 7

PI-AA-120

Issue Identification and Screening Process

Revision 13

PI-AA-125

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure

Revision 9

PI-AA-125-1004

Effectiveness Review Manual

PI-AA-125-1004

Collective Effectiveness Review

PI-AA-3

Nuclear Safety Culture

Revision 0

RP-AA-700

Controls for Radiation Protetion Instrumentation

Revision 10

WC-AA-101-1002

On-Line Scheduling Process

WC-AA-120

Preventative Maintenance (PM) Database Revision

Requirements

Revision 6

Security NOS ISFSI 2024 Audit

04/23/2024

NRC 71130.09 Security Plan Changes

2/12/2024

Security NOSA 2025 Audit

2/17/2025

01307278-68

Dresden Configuration Control Program

04388146-76

Clearance and Tagging

04556064-02

Security Pre-NRC Self-Assessment for Fitness for Duty

2466136-91

Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment#15 (10CFR50.65

(a)(3) Assessment)

2/19/2024

4761938-04

Self-Assessment: Age-Degradation Self-Assessment--GAPs

Identified

4763024-04

IER L1-17-5 Revision 1 : Line of Sight to the Reactor Core

4777143

Self-Assessment 2024 Nuclear Oversight Employee

Concerns Program

NOSA-DRE-24-

Engineering Design Control Audit Report

Self-Assessments

NOSA-DRE-24-

Corrective Action Program Audit Report

01742198

Transfer Spare Main Power Transformer from Quad Cities

206323-23

EWP IM REMOVE TMOD EC 635573

26226

D3 10Y PM 250VDC Bkr HPCI Turb Gland Seal Cond

Hotwell Drain

29409

SBO Bus 61 FD to Bus 24 HCAR-IV Needs to be Replaced

238793

U2 EDG Circ and Turbo Pump Breaker Tripped at MCC 28-3

257567

2B MSIV PM Electromagnetic Relief 'D' Replace Pilot

08/02/2023

Work Orders

289342-01

OP Perform As-Found Leak Test Per DOS 1500-21

5332613

Evaluate Degraded U3 125VDC Battery Cables

5598013

Bus 34-1 Feed to Bus 39 Breaker Won't Charge