IR 05000237/2020002
| ML20223A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2020 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| Download: ML20223A258 (17) | |
Text
August 10, 2020
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2020002; 05000249/2020002; AND 07200037/2020001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000237; 05000249; and
07200037 License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000237; 05000249; and 07200037
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000237/2020002; 05000249/2020002; and 07200037/2020001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0028 and I-2020-001-0136
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Location:
Morris, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
R. Elliott, Resident Inspector
J. Havertape, Resident Inspector
J. Nance, Reactor Engineer
A. Nguyen, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Phillips, Project Engineer
M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
D. Reeser, Senior Operations Engineer
G. Roach, Senior Operations Engineer
J. Weigandt, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full rated power. On April 26, 2020, an Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) failure resulted in a trip of the 2B Recirculation Pump. This caused the unit to lower power to approximately 25 percent. The ASD system was repaired and the unit returned to full rated power on April 28, 2020. On June 6, 2020, the unit performed a quarterly load drop to 70 percent power for control rod sequence exchange, turbine testing, and control rod scram time testing. The unit returned to full rated power on June 7, 2020 and operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at full rated power. On May 30, 2020, the unit performed a quarterly load drop to 74 percent power for control rod sequence exchange, turbine testing, and control rod scram time testing. The unit returned to full rated power on May 31, 2020 and operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of extreme high temperatures and seasonal storms for the following systems:
Unit 2 and Unit 3 main power, reserve auxiliary, and unit auxiliary transformers; 345 kV switchyard; auxiliary electrical equipment room, battery room, and control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; and the service water system
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding during heavy rains and river flooding on May 18-19, 2020
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2/3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on April 21, 2020
- (2) Unit 3 low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system on April 17, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 Division 2 LPCI system on May 15, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 reactor building general area, elevation 545' on April 14, 2020
- (2) Fire Zone 6.2, Unit 2/3 computer room and auxiliary electrical equipment room, elevation 517' on April 14, 2020
- (3) Fire Zone 9.0C, Unit 2/3 swing diesel generator room, elevation 517' on April 21, 2020
- (4) Fire Zone 11.2.1, Unit 2 southwest corner room, elevation 476' on May 11, 2020
- (5) Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, Unit 2 torus basement, elevation 476' on May 11, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Unit 2 and Unit 3 containment cooling service water (CCSW) vaults
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam which was administered between April 8 and May 15, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during restart of the Unit 2 'B' reactor recirculation pump and power ascension activities on April 28, 2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator scenarios on May 6, 2020
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Main power system
- (2) Reactor and auxiliary systems
- (3) Reactor recirculation adjustable speed drive (ASD) system failure
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Unit 3 LPCI system outage on April 6, 2020
- (2) Unit 3 LPCI surveillance window concurrent with Unit 2/3 standby gas treatment system maintenance window on April 14, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 main power transformer sudden pressure relay failure (emergent troubleshooting) on April 20, 2020
- (4) Unit 3 Division 2 core spray functional testing on June 23, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system oil sample revealed chemistry values in Alert Range
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Temporarily disable Unit 2 main power transformer (MPT) sudden pressure relay trips due to degraded relay
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Calibration and testing of DPIS 3-0261-34D following replacement
- (2) Open loop testing after Unit 2 'B' reactor recirculation pump adjustable speed drive repairs
- (3) Unit 2/3 'A' standby gas treatment (SBGT) run following maintenance window
- (4) Unit 3 EDG surveillance following maintenance window
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2/3 diesel fire pump flow capacity test (18-month) on April 9, 2020
- (2) Average power range monitor (APRM) set point adjustments for single recirculation loop operation on April 28, 2020
- (3) Triennial fire system flow test on May 4, 2020
- (4) Unit 3 LPCI pump flow test on June 10, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3 'B' standby liquid control (SBLC) inservice test on June 16,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) EDG 181Y relay issues
- (2) Failure of the Unit 3 main power transformer neutral bushing
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 B reactor recirculation pump trip and licensees response on April 27, 2020
60856 - Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations
- (1) Inspectors reviewed South ISFSI Expansion Pad design documents to evaluate the licensees compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(ii). Inspection was performed in accordance with Appendix A of IP 60856 and included review of licensee evaluations to verify that the cask storage pad was designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: EDG 181Y relay issues 71152 The inspectors reviewed several failures of the 181Y Low Frequency Trip relays associated with all of the emergency diesel generators over the last several years. The inspectors had no issues in regard to the licensee's identification, evaluation, or corrective actions associated with these failures.
Observation: Failure of Unit 3 Main Power Transformer Neutral Bushing 71152 On September 23, 2019, the licensee identified an oil leak on the Unit 3 Main Power Transformer (MPT) high side neutral ground bushing. The unit was subsequently shut down to repair the bushing. Inspection of the transformer revealed that the lower terminal of the bushing failed at the shoulder between the terminal conductor body and terminal tab.
This caused the bushing housing to become unclamped as tightly as it normally would be and hence a flow path was established for oil to come out of the transformer. The licensee replaced the failed bushing and successfully completed subsequent transformer testing before restoring the transformer to service.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause analysis and supporting failure analysis reports from third parties to determine the cause of the bushing failure. The licensee determined that the root cause (prior to completion of the third-party failure analyses) was an unanticipated failure of the bushing due to a material issue attributable to manufacturing and/or design issues by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The licensee did not identify any contributing causes for this issue.
One vendor concluded, through their destructive examination of the failed bushing, that the failure was due to stress corrosion cracking. Stress corrosion cracking is an environmentally assisted embrittlement mechanism which requires a material susceptible to stress corrosion, mechanical stresses (applied and/or residual) and a corrosive environment. Contributing factors for this failure may have included oxide inclusions, geometric stress risers, and chemical residue found in the bushing material upon examination. Another vendor (the transformer company) identified hydrogen embrittlement of the copper alloy. The hydrogen embrittlement was believed to have originated during the manufacturing process of the bushing in 2007. The initial rolling of the copper alloy was done by a mill, which then sent the material to the transformer company for construction of the transformer. The Unit 3 MPT was replaced in 2010 with this vintage material. Similar vintage material from the same company was used to make the Dresden Unit 2 MPT, before it was replaced in 2014, and both the Quad Cities MPTs. The inspectors, with assistance from a regional based materials specialist inspector, determined that the causes identified were appropriate. The licensee used a variety of techniques to determine the root cause based on the information that was available at the time. The licensee planned on updating their root cause evaluation with the information received from the vendors failure analyses.
The licensees immediate corrective action was to replace the failed bushing with one that was manufactured with material from a different mill (the transformer vendor switched mill companies after the construction of the failed bushing in 2008 time frame). The inspectors questioned what additional corrective actions would be taken for the MPT prior to or during the upcoming refueling outage for the unit. The licensee is taking into consideration the inspectors questions and vendor failure analyses to identify additional actions. Items for consideration that the licensee intends to address are the chemicals found in the residue on the failed bushing and where they could have originated from, the introductions of stress risers and potentially hydrogen during the manufacturing process, any potential vendor quality control actions, and possible testing of the transformer oil and/or visual inspections of internal susceptible components. The extent of cause review as well as the review of the aforementioned items may result in additional corrective actions.
Operating experience of both the Unit 2 MPT at Dresden and one of the units at Quad Cities, which were both manufactured at the same time as this failed bushing, was also evaluated to determine if potential actions to address this failure mode were missed previously. While the transformer materials were the same and they were manufactured at the same time, the failure mechanisms for each example were different. The licensee determined that operating experience would not have led them to take actions that would have prevented this failure.
The inspectors determined that their evaluation of that information was appropriate. The inspectors determined the licensee conducted a thourough extent of condition analysis to determine if other transformers could experience a similar failure. The licensee shared the information of this failure mode with the other sites in the fleet that could potentially experience a similar event. Those sites were creating their own respective corrective actions for this issue. The Unit 2 MPT at Dresden was replaced in 2014 (with a different mill providing material to the transformer manufacturer) after it experienced its failure and the licensee determined it would not be affected by the failure mechanisms identified in their root cause evaluation.
At this time, the inspectors are unable to determine if the licensees actions taken to preclude recurrence of this significant issue are appropriate based on corrective actions still being developed. The inspectors will review new actions taken when implemented and evaluate the appropriateness of those actions.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On June 30, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 11, 2020, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Pad Expansion inspection results to Mr. P. Boyle, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
277680
Dresden 2020 AR for Site Summer Readiness Actions
09/09/2019
4318714
Unit 3 3D ERV Pilot Leakby
2/17/2020
4333633
Unit 2 Turbine Control Minor Trouble
04/08/2020
4345846
2/3 A Control Room AC Compressor Vibration Levels
Elevated
05/26/2020
4346945
2/3-4450-D Gate will not Move
05/31/2020
4348690
Cottonwood Buildup on the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ASD Heat
Exchanger Fans
06/07/2020
4348696
Cottonwood Buildup on the Reactor Building Chillers
06/07/2020
4349053
Entered DOA 0010-15, Loss of Met Tower Data
06/09/2020
Procedures
DOA 0010-02
Tornado Warning/Severe Winds
DOA 0010-04
Floods (W-4)
DOA 0010-15
Loss of Meteorological Data Source
DOA 6100-01
Main Transformer Trouble
DOP 4450-08
Dresden Cooling Lake Operation
OP-AA-108-107-
1001
Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions
OP-AA-108-111-
1001
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
OP-DR-108-111-
1001
Hot Weather Strategy
WC-DR-8003-
1003
Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Nuclear Plant Interface
Requirements Interface Procedure
Corrective Action
Documents
4305255
Nitrogen Leakage on PRV 2/3-5799-1589
2/19/2019
4317987
2/3 EDG Ventilation Nitrogen Bottles Depressurizing Quickly
2/14/2020
29441
Nitrogen Bottles on 2/3 EDG Ventilation System Losing
Pressure
03/25/2020
4335087
Conduit Rusted for Cabling into 2202-19A Rack
04/13/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4343652
NRC ID: Unit 2 CCSW Vault Issues
05/15/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
DOP 1500-E1
Unit 2 LPCI and CCSW Electrical Checklist
DOP 1500-M1
Unit 2 LPCI and CCSW Valve Checklist
DOP 6600-04
Diesel Generator 2/3 Preparation for Standby Operation
DOP 6600-E2
Unit 2/3 Standby Diesel Generator
DOP 6600-M2
Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Checklist
Work Orders
1454150
Nitrogen Leakage on PRV 2/3-5799-1589
2/20/2019
1458414
2/3 EDG Ventilation Nitrogen Bottles Depressurizing Quickly
2/17/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
2394583
Can't Perform DSSP due to Flow Indicator not Operating
10/13/2014
3968356
Appendix R and EDG Flow Indicators
01/30/2017
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4335783
NRC Combustible Loading Concern
04/15/2020
Fire Plans
24 U3RB-26
Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 1.1.1.3,
Unit 3 General Area, Elevation 545'
143 U2TB-46
Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 6.2,
Unit 2/3 Computer Room and Auxiliary Electrical Room,
Elevation 517'
184 2/3 EDG
Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 9.0C,
Unit 2/3 Swing Diesel Generator Room, Elevation 517'
Procedures
101 U2RB-1
Dresden Generating Station Pre-fire Plan
FZ 1.1.2.1; Unit 2 Torus Basement Elevation 476'
2 U2RB-2
Dresden Generating Station Pre-fire Plan
FZ 11.2.1 Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Elevation 476'
Control of Transient Combustible Material
Work Orders
477605
Can't Perform DSSP due to Flow Indicator not Operating
10/16/2014
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
OPEX-AS
Simulator Exercise Guide
OPEX-AT
Simulator Exercise Guide
Procedures
MA-AA-716-008-
F-01
Foreign Material Exclusion Program Work Package Forms
OP-AA-101-113-
1004
Event/Issue Report Format (Dresden)
Corrective Action
Documents
266281
TR 3 Oil Flow Alarms not Received
07/23/2019
266770
Spurious Loss of Flow Alarm for MPT 3
07/24/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
281463
MPT 3 Oil Leak Identified
09/23/2020
4302852
MPT 3 Oil Leak
2/10/2019
4308111
DOA 6100-01 Entry for TR2 Cooling
01/05/2020
28448
Unit 2 MPT Oil Cooling Pump 5 Oil Leak
03/21/2020
28450
Unit 3 MPT Oil Cooler 4 Pump 4 Oil Leak
03/21/2020
4336520
Unit 2 MPT Continuity Light Extinguished for Sudden
Pressure Relay
04/18/2020
4339832
TR 22 CB-1 for Stage 1 Fans Found Tripped
04/30/2020
4349766
TR3 Serveron Alarm In
06/11/2020
Miscellaneous
Reactor and Auxilary Health Report
System Health Report for Main Power
06/10/2020
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Implementation per NEI 18-10
MR [Maintenance Rule] Implementation per NEI 18-10
Maintenance Rule 18-10 Failure Definition
Maintenance Rule 18-10 Performance Monitoring and
Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)
Corrective Action
Documents
4335682
Integrated Risk Management and Crew Clock Resets
04/15/2020
4336520
MPT2 Continuity Lights Extinguished
04/18/2020
Drawings
Schematic Diagram Generator and Transformer Tripping
Relays Back-up System
Procedures
DOP 1500-01
Preparation of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection for Automatic
Start
Protected Equipment List
04/06/2020
Protected Equipment Program
OP-DR-201-012-
1001
Dresden On-Line Fire Risk Management
Work Orders
1336464
D3 10y com MOV Diag Testing & Limitorque Survey 3-1501-
38A
04/01/2020
1730106-03
D3 6y Com MOV Diagnostic Testing & Limitorque Survey 3-
1501-5B
03/03/2020
4777144-03
3A CCSW Pump Discharge Valve could not be Closed
04/06/2020
Corrective Action
04344652
05/20/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
4337362
HPCI Oil Analysis Copper in Alert Range
04/21/2020
4344656
05/20/2020
Procedures
Preventive Maintenance Program
Equipment Classification
MA-AA-716-230-
1001
Oil Analysis Interpretation Guideline
Corrective Action
Documents
4336520
MPT 2 Continuity Lights Extinguished
04/18/2020
Drawings
Schematic Diagram Generator and Transformer Tripping
Relays
Engineering
Changes
631518
Temporarily Disable MPT 2 Sudden Pressure Relay Trips
due to Degraded Relay
Work Orders
5031837
Install TMod to Temporarily Disable MPT 2 Sudden Pressure
Relays Trips due to Degraded Relay
06/09/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
4335759
Damper 2/3-7509 not Able to Travel Full Closed
04/15/2020
4336861
Diesel Generator Cooling Water Check Valve Flange is
Degraded
04/20/2020
4337420
Unit 3 EDG Pressure Switch Out of Tolerance Low
04/21/2020
4337494
Unit 3 EDG Relay 3-6641-181Y1 Failed to Time Upon
Energization
04/22/2020
4337711
FME Discovered in EDG Cooling Water Pump Pipe
04/21/2020
4338023
IEMA Unit 3 EDG Walkdown Items
04/23/2020
4341007
3B Diesel Start-up Air Compressor Leak
05/04/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4338274
NRC Concerns on Conditions in the Unit 3 EDG Room
04/24/2020
NDE Reports
Heat Exchanger Inspection Report for Unit 3 Emergency
Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heat Exchangers
04/20/2020
Procedures
DOS 6600-01
Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests
143
Work Orders
04698252-14
WO Required to Perform 2B ASD Open Loop Testing Online
04/27/2020
1099854
Year PM to Inspect/Replace Diesel Generator Lube Oil
Cooler Core
04/21/2020
1901871
4-Year PM for Diesel Generator Engine Pressure
04/21/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Instrumentation Calibration
4759914
2-Year PMT of Diesel Generator #3 Prot. Relays and Meters
04/22/2020
4765376
2-Year PM to Inspect Diesel Generator 3-6601
04/19/2020
4765443
2-Year PM of Unit 3 Standby Emergency Diesel Generator
Inspection
04/20/2020
4776075
Technical Specification 'A' SBGT HEPA Filter Leak Test
04/15/2020
4778625
Technical Specification 'A' SBGT Charcoal Sample Iodine
Removal Effluent Test
04/15/2020
4781523
2/3-7509 A and B SBGT Train Crosstie Valve has Dual
Indication
04/17/2020
5001915
Quarterly Technical Specification Surveillance of SBGT 'A'
Train Charcoal Absorber Moisture Removal
04/15/2020
5034559-04
Perform DIP 0700-25 for Restore from Single Loop Ops
04/26/2020
573864-01
Replace DPIS 3-0261-34D
04/14/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
4341508
FH-5 Leaks when Open
05/06/2020
4341513
High Pressure Drop Found during Fire Protection Yard Loop
Test
05/06/2020
4341641
FME in Unit 1 Crib House Fire Protection Test Header
05/07/2020
4341775
One 0-200 psig Gauge Failed Post-Calibration Following
DFPS 4123-08
05/07/2020
4342079
Response to Post-Calibration Issue Following DFPS 4123-
05/08/2020
Procedures
DFPS 4123-06
Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump Capacity Check
DFPS 4123-08
Fire Water System Flow Test
DIP 0700-25
APRM Setpoint Adjustments to Enter into Dual Loop
(Recirculation Pump) Operation
DOS 1100-04
Standby Liquid Control System Quarterly/Comprehensive
Pump Test for the Inservice Testing (IST) Program
Work Orders
1840293
Fire Water System Triennial Flow Test
05/04/2020
4832450
D2/3 18M TSTR/COM Diesel Fire Pump Flow Capacity Test
03/03/2020
23257
Quarterly In-service Test of 3B Standby Liquid Control
System Pump
06/15/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
DR-MSPI-01
Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Basis Document
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
01611485
U3 EDG Relay 3-6641=181Y1 Failed to Time Upon
Energization
01/23/2014
3983157
Underfrequency Auxiliary Relay Failed to Time Out
03/08/2017
233847
2/3-6641-181Y1 Relay Failed
03/28/2019
281643
MPT 3 Oil Leak Identified
09/23/2020
4337494
U3 EDG Relay 3-6641-181Y Failed to Time Upon
Energization
04/22/2020
4345882
Results of Failure Analysis for MPT 3 Bushing Failure
05/22/2020
Miscellaneous
Report on Bushing with Cracked Lower Terminal
05/20/2020
NDE Reports
DRE-98599
Failure Analysis of a Neutral Bushing from Dresden Unit 3
MPT
2/16/2019
60856
Calculations
DRE18-0011
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) - Soil Parameters
DRE18-0013
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion -
Turning Pad and Heavy Haul Path Design
DRE19-0008
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion -
Reinforced Concrete Pad Design
DRE19-0011
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - Time
History Generation
DRE19-0012
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Strain-Dependent
Soil Properties
DRE19-0013
Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - Soil
Structural Interaction (SSI)
Corrective Action
Documents
04181638-12
Revise DRE18-0011 to Document Methodology that Relates
11.6 Ksi Modulus of Elasticity Criteria to 500 pci
06/08/2020
Engineering
Changes
28118
South ISFSI Expansion Pad
0