IR 05000237/2020002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2020002; 05000249/2020002; and 07200037/2020001

ML20223A258
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	08/10/2020
From:	Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
Download: ML20223A258 (17)

Text

August 10, 2020

SUBJECT:

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2020002; 05000249/2020002; AND 07200037/2020001

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000237; 05000249; and 07200037 License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000237; 05000249; and 07200037 License Numbers: DPR-19 and DPR-25 Report Numbers: 05000237/2020002; 05000249/2020002; and 07200037/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0028 and I-2020-001-0136 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: Morris, IL Inspection Dates: April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020 Inspectors: R. Elliott, Resident Inspector J. Havertape, Resident Inspector J. Nance, Reactor Engineer A. Nguyen, Senior Resident Inspector C. Phillips, Project Engineer M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency D. Reeser, Senior Operations Engineer G. Roach, Senior Operations Engineer J. Weigandt, Resident Inspector Approved By: Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full rated power. On April 26, 2020, an Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) failure resulted in a trip of the 2B Recirculation Pump. This caused the unit to lower power to approximately 25 percent. The ASD system was repaired and the unit returned to full rated power on April 28, 2020. On June 6, 2020, the unit performed a quarterly load drop to 70 percent power for control rod sequence exchange, turbine testing, and control rod scram time testing. The unit returned to full rated power on June 7, 2020 and operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at full rated power. On May 30, 2020, the unit performed a quarterly load drop to 74 percent power for control rod sequence exchange, turbine testing, and control rod scram time testing. The unit returned to full rated power on May 31, 2020 and operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of extreme high temperatures and seasonal storms for the following systems:

Unit 2 and Unit 3 main power, reserve auxiliary, and unit auxiliary transformers; 345 kV switchyard; auxiliary electrical equipment room, battery room, and control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; and the service water system

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding during heavy rains and river flooding on May 18-19, 2020

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2/3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on April 21, 2020

(2) Unit 3 low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system on April 17, 2020

(3) Unit 2 Division 2 LPCI system on May 15, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zone 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 reactor building general area, elevation 545' on April 14, 2020

(2) Fire Zone 6.2, Unit 2/3 computer room and auxiliary electrical equipment room, elevation 517' on April 14, 2020

(3) Fire Zone 9.0C, Unit 2/3 swing diesel generator room, elevation 517' on April 21, 2020

(4) Fire Zone 11.2.1, Unit 2 southwest corner room, elevation 476' on May 11, 2020

(5) Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, Unit 2 torus basement, elevation 476' on May 11, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 2 and Unit 3 containment cooling service water (CCSW) vaults

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam which was administered between April 8 and May 15, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during restart of the Unit 2 'B' reactor recirculation pump and power ascension activities on April 28, 2020

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator scenarios on May 6, 2020

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Main power system

(2) Reactor and auxiliary systems

(3) Reactor recirculation adjustable speed drive (ASD) system failure

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

(1) Unit 3 LPCI system outage on April 6, 2020

(2) Unit 3 LPCI surveillance window concurrent with Unit 2/3 standby gas treatment system maintenance window on April 14, 2020

(3) Unit 2 main power transformer sudden pressure relay failure (emergent troubleshooting) on April 20, 2020

(4) Unit 3 Division 2 core spray functional testing on June 23, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system oil sample revealed chemistry values in Alert Range

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Temporarily disable Unit 2 main power transformer (MPT) sudden pressure relay trips due to degraded relay

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Calibration and testing of DPIS 3-0261-34D following replacement

(2) Open loop testing after Unit 2 'B' reactor recirculation pump adjustable speed drive repairs

(3) Unit 2/3 'A' standby gas treatment (SBGT) run following maintenance window

(4) Unit 3 EDG surveillance following maintenance window

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2/3 diesel fire pump flow capacity test (18-month) on April 9, 2020

(2) Average power range monitor (APRM) set point adjustments for single recirculation loop operation on April 28, 2020

(3) Triennial fire system flow test on May 4, 2020

(4) Unit 3 LPCI pump flow test on June 10, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 3 'B' standby liquid control (SBLC) inservice test on June 16,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

(2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

(2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) EDG 181Y relay issues

(2) Failure of the Unit 3 main power transformer neutral bushing

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 B reactor recirculation pump trip and licensees response on April 27, 2020

60856 - Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations

(1) Inspectors reviewed South ISFSI Expansion Pad design documents to evaluate the licensees compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(ii). Inspection was performed in accordance with Appendix A of IP 60856 and included review of licensee evaluations to verify that the cask storage pad was designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: EDG 181Y relay issues 71152 The inspectors reviewed several failures of the 181Y Low Frequency Trip relays associated with all of the emergency diesel generators over the last several years. The inspectors had no issues in regard to the licensee's identification, evaluation, or corrective actions associated with these failures.

Observation: Failure of Unit 3 Main Power Transformer Neutral Bushing 71152 On September 23, 2019, the licensee identified an oil leak on the Unit 3 Main Power Transformer (MPT) high side neutral ground bushing. The unit was subsequently shut down to repair the bushing. Inspection of the transformer revealed that the lower terminal of the bushing failed at the shoulder between the terminal conductor body and terminal tab.

This caused the bushing housing to become unclamped as tightly as it normally would be and hence a flow path was established for oil to come out of the transformer. The licensee replaced the failed bushing and successfully completed subsequent transformer testing before restoring the transformer to service.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause analysis and supporting failure analysis reports from third parties to determine the cause of the bushing failure. The licensee determined that the root cause (prior to completion of the third-party failure analyses) was an unanticipated failure of the bushing due to a material issue attributable to manufacturing and/or design issues by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The licensee did not identify any contributing causes for this issue.

One vendor concluded, through their destructive examination of the failed bushing, that the failure was due to stress corrosion cracking. Stress corrosion cracking is an environmentally assisted embrittlement mechanism which requires a material susceptible to stress corrosion, mechanical stresses (applied and/or residual) and a corrosive environment. Contributing factors for this failure may have included oxide inclusions, geometric stress risers, and chemical residue found in the bushing material upon examination. Another vendor (the transformer company) identified hydrogen embrittlement of the copper alloy. The hydrogen embrittlement was believed to have originated during the manufacturing process of the bushing in 2007. The initial rolling of the copper alloy was done by a mill, which then sent the material to the transformer company for construction of the transformer. The Unit 3 MPT was replaced in 2010 with this vintage material. Similar vintage material from the same company was used to make the Dresden Unit 2 MPT, before it was replaced in 2014, and both the Quad Cities MPTs. The inspectors, with assistance from a regional based materials specialist inspector, determined that the causes identified were appropriate. The licensee used a variety of techniques to determine the root cause based on the information that was available at the time. The licensee planned on updating their root cause evaluation with the information received from the vendors failure analyses.

The licensees immediate corrective action was to replace the failed bushing with one that was manufactured with material from a different mill (the transformer vendor switched mill companies after the construction of the failed bushing in 2008 time frame). The inspectors questioned what additional corrective actions would be taken for the MPT prior to or during the upcoming refueling outage for the unit. The licensee is taking into consideration the inspectors questions and vendor failure analyses to identify additional actions. Items for consideration that the licensee intends to address are the chemicals found in the residue on the failed bushing and where they could have originated from, the introductions of stress risers and potentially hydrogen during the manufacturing process, any potential vendor quality control actions, and possible testing of the transformer oil and/or visual inspections of internal susceptible components. The extent of cause review as well as the review of the aforementioned items may result in additional corrective actions.

Operating experience of both the Unit 2 MPT at Dresden and one of the units at Quad Cities, which were both manufactured at the same time as this failed bushing, was also evaluated to determine if potential actions to address this failure mode were missed previously. While the transformer materials were the same and they were manufactured at the same time, the failure mechanisms for each example were different. The licensee determined that operating experience would not have led them to take actions that would have prevented this failure.

The inspectors determined that their evaluation of that information was appropriate. The inspectors determined the licensee conducted a thourough extent of condition analysis to determine if other transformers could experience a similar failure. The licensee shared the information of this failure mode with the other sites in the fleet that could potentially experience a similar event. Those sites were creating their own respective corrective actions for this issue. The Unit 2 MPT at Dresden was replaced in 2014 (with a different mill providing material to the transformer manufacturer) after it experienced its failure and the licensee determined it would not be affected by the failure mechanisms identified in their root cause evaluation.

At this time, the inspectors are unable to determine if the licensees actions taken to preclude recurrence of this significant issue are appropriate based on corrective actions still being developed. The inspectors will review new actions taken when implemented and evaluate the appropriateness of those actions.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 30, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

• On June 11, 2020, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Pad Expansion inspection results to Mr. P. Boyle, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action 4277680 Dresden 2020 AR for Site Summer Readiness Actions 09/09/2019

Documents 4318714 Unit 3 3D ERV Pilot Leakby 02/17/2020

4333633 Unit 2 Turbine Control Minor Trouble 04/08/2020

4345846 2/3 A Control Room AC Compressor Vibration Levels 05/26/2020

Elevated

4346945 2/3-4450-D Gate will not Move 05/31/2020

4348690 Cottonwood Buildup on the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ASD Heat 06/07/2020

Exchanger Fans

4348696 Cottonwood Buildup on the Reactor Building Chillers 06/07/2020

4349053 Entered DOA 0010-15, Loss of Met Tower Data 06/09/2020

Procedures DOA 0010-02 Tornado Warning/Severe Winds 24

DOA 0010-04 Floods (W-4) 56

DOA 0010-15 Loss of Meteorological Data Source 6

DOA 6100-01 Main Transformer Trouble 40

DOP 4450-08 Dresden Cooling Lake Operation 35

OP-AA-108-107- Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions 7

1001

OP-AA-108-111- Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines 20

1001

OP-DR-108-111- Hot Weather Strategy 6

1001

WC-DR-8003- Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Nuclear Plant Interface 7

1003 Requirements Interface Procedure

71111.04 Corrective Action 4305255 Nitrogen Leakage on PRV 2/3-5799-1589 12/19/2019

Documents 4317987 2/3 EDG Ventilation Nitrogen Bottles Depressurizing Quickly 02/14/2020

29441 Nitrogen Bottles on 2/3 EDG Ventilation System Losing 03/25/2020

Pressure

4335087 Conduit Rusted for Cabling into 2202-19A Rack 04/13/2020

Corrective Action 4343652 NRC ID: Unit 2 CCSW Vault Issues 05/15/2020

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Procedures DOP 1500-E1 Unit 2 LPCI and CCSW Electrical Checklist 15

DOP 1500-M1 Unit 2 LPCI and CCSW Valve Checklist 50

DOP 6600-04 Diesel Generator 2/3 Preparation for Standby Operation 32

DOP 6600-E2 Unit 2/3 Standby Diesel Generator 6

DOP 6600-M2 Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Checklist 29

Work Orders 1454150 Nitrogen Leakage on PRV 2/3-5799-1589 12/20/2019

1458414 2/3 EDG Ventilation Nitrogen Bottles Depressurizing Quickly 02/17/2020

71111.05 Corrective Action 2394583 Can't Perform DSSP due to Flow Indicator not Operating 10/13/2014

Documents 3968356 Appendix R and EDG Flow Indicators 01/30/2017

Corrective Action 4335783 NRC Combustible Loading Concern 04/15/2020

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Fire Plans 124 U3RB-26 Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 1.1.1.3, 5

Unit 3 General Area, Elevation 545'

143 U2TB-46 Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 6.2, 4

Unit 2/3 Computer Room and Auxiliary Electrical Room,

Elevation 517'

184 2/3 EDG Dresden Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan Fire Zone 9.0C, 6

Unit 2/3 Swing Diesel Generator Room, Elevation 517'

Procedures 101 U2RB-1 Dresden Generating Station Pre-fire Plan 3

FZ 1.1.2.1; Unit 2 Torus Basement Elevation 476'

2 U2RB-2 Dresden Generating Station Pre-fire Plan 4

FZ 11.2.1 Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Elevation 476'

OP-AA-201-009 Control of Transient Combustible Material 24

Work Orders 477605 Can't Perform DSSP due to Flow Indicator not Operating 10/16/2014

71111.11Q Miscellaneous OPEX-AS Simulator Exercise Guide 5

OPEX-AT Simulator Exercise Guide 5

Procedures MA-AA-716-008- Foreign Material Exclusion Program Work Package Forms 0

F-01

OP-AA-101-113- Event/Issue Report Format (Dresden) 46

1004

71111.12 Corrective Action 4266281 TR 3 Oil Flow Alarms not Received 07/23/2019

Documents 4266770 Spurious Loss of Flow Alarm for MPT 3 07/24/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

281463 MPT 3 Oil Leak Identified 09/23/2020

4302852 MPT 3 Oil Leak 12/10/2019

4308111 DOA 6100-01 Entry for TR2 Cooling 01/05/2020

28448 Unit 2 MPT Oil Cooling Pump 5 Oil Leak 03/21/2020

28450 Unit 3 MPT Oil Cooler 4 Pump 4 Oil Leak 03/21/2020

4336520 Unit 2 MPT Continuity Light Extinguished for Sudden 04/18/2020

Pressure Relay

4339832 TR 22 CB-1 for Stage 1 Fans Found Tripped 04/30/2020

4349766 TR3 Serveron Alarm In 06/11/2020

Miscellaneous Reactor and Auxilary Health Report 0

System Health Report for Main Power 06/10/2020

Procedures ER-AA-320 Maintenance Rule Implementation per NEI 18-10 0

ER-AA-320 MR [Maintenance Rule] Implementation per NEI 18-10 0

ER-AA-320-1003 Maintenance Rule 18-10 Failure Definition 0

ER-AA-320-1004 Maintenance Rule 18-10 Performance Monitoring and 01

Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)

71111.13 Corrective Action 4335682 Integrated Risk Management and Crew Clock Resets 04/15/2020

Documents 4336520 MPT2 Continuity Lights Extinguished 04/18/2020

Drawings 12E-2338A Schematic Diagram Generator and Transformer Tripping AD

Relays Back-up System

Procedures DOP 1500-01 Preparation of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection for Automatic 18

Start

OP-AA-108-117 Protected Equipment List 04/06/2020

OP-AA-108-117 Protected Equipment Program 5

OP-DR-201-012- Dresden On-Line Fire Risk Management 7

1001

Work Orders 1336464 D3 10y com MOV Diag Testing & Limitorque Survey 3-1501- 04/01/2020

38A

1730106-03 D3 6y Com MOV Diagnostic Testing & Limitorque Survey 3- 03/03/2020

1501-5B

4777144-03 3A CCSW Pump Discharge Valve could not be Closed 04/06/2020

71111.15 Corrective Action 04344652 ATWS TDR OOT(TS) 05/20/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents 4337362 HPCI Oil Analysis Copper in Alert Range 04/21/2020

4344656 ATWS TDR OOT (TS) 05/20/2020

Procedures ER-AA-200 Preventive Maintenance Program 5

ER-AA-200-1001 Equipment Classification 5

MA-AA-716-230- Oil Analysis Interpretation Guideline 20

1001

71111.18 Corrective Action 4336520 MPT 2 Continuity Lights Extinguished 04/18/2020

Documents

Drawings 12E-2338A Schematic Diagram Generator and Transformer Tripping AD

Relays

Engineering 631518 Temporarily Disable MPT 2 Sudden Pressure Relay Trips 0

Changes due to Degraded Relay

Work Orders 5031837 Install TMod to Temporarily Disable MPT 2 Sudden Pressure 06/09/2020

Relays Trips due to Degraded Relay

71111.19 Corrective Action 4335759 Damper 2/3-7509 not Able to Travel Full Closed 04/15/2020

Documents 4336861 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Check Valve Flange is 04/20/2020

Degraded

4337420 Unit 3 EDG Pressure Switch Out of Tolerance Low 04/21/2020

4337494 Unit 3 EDG Relay 3-6641-181Y1 Failed to Time Upon 04/22/2020

Energization

4337711 FME Discovered in EDG Cooling Water Pump Pipe 04/21/2020

4338023 IEMA Unit 3 EDG Walkdown Items 04/23/2020

4341007 3B Diesel Start-up Air Compressor Leak 05/04/2020

Corrective Action 4338274 NRC Concerns on Conditions in the Unit 3 EDG Room 04/24/2020

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

NDE Reports ER-AA-34-1002, Heat Exchanger Inspection Report for Unit 3 Emergency 04/20/2020

Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

Procedures DOS 6600-01 Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests 143

Work Orders 04698252-14 WO Required to Perform 2B ASD Open Loop Testing Online 04/27/2020

1099854 12 Year PM to Inspect/Replace Diesel Generator Lube Oil 04/21/2020

Cooler Core

1901871 4-Year PM for Diesel Generator Engine Pressure 04/21/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Instrumentation Calibration

4759914 2-Year PMT of Diesel Generator #3 Prot. Relays and Meters 04/22/2020

4765376 2-Year PM to Inspect Diesel Generator 3-6601 04/19/2020

4765443 2-Year PM of Unit 3 Standby Emergency Diesel Generator 04/20/2020

Inspection

4776075 Technical Specification 'A' SBGT HEPA Filter Leak Test 04/15/2020

4778625 Technical Specification 'A' SBGT Charcoal Sample Iodine 04/15/2020

Removal Effluent Test

4781523 2/3-7509 A and B SBGT Train Crosstie Valve has Dual 04/17/2020

Indication

5001915 Quarterly Technical Specification Surveillance of SBGT 'A' 04/15/2020

Train Charcoal Absorber Moisture Removal

5034559-04 Perform DIP 0700-25 for Restore from Single Loop Ops 04/26/2020

573864-01 Replace DPIS 3-0261-34D 04/14/2020

71111.22 Corrective Action 4341508 FH-5 Leaks when Open 05/06/2020

Documents 4341513 High Pressure Drop Found during Fire Protection Yard Loop 05/06/2020

Test

4341641 FME in Unit 1 Crib House Fire Protection Test Header 05/07/2020

4341775 One 0-200 psig Gauge Failed Post-Calibration Following 05/07/2020

DFPS 4123-08

4342079 Response to Post-Calibration Issue Following DFPS 4123- 05/08/2020

Procedures DFPS 4123-06 Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump Capacity Check 49

DFPS 4123-08 Fire Water System Flow Test 33

DIP 0700-25 APRM Setpoint Adjustments to Enter into Dual Loop 15

(Recirculation Pump) Operation

DOS 1100-04 Standby Liquid Control System Quarterly/Comprehensive 53

Pump Test for the Inservice Testing (IST) Program

Work Orders 1840293 Fire Water System Triennial Flow Test 05/04/2020

4832450 D2/3 18M TSTR/COM Diesel Fire Pump Flow Capacity Test 03/03/2020

23257 Quarterly In-service Test of 3B Standby Liquid Control 06/15/2020

System Pump

71151 Miscellaneous DR-MSPI-01 Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Basis Document 14

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152 Corrective Action 01611485 U3 EDG Relay 3-6641=181Y1 Failed to Time Upon 01/23/2014

Documents Energization

3983157 Underfrequency Auxiliary Relay Failed to Time Out 03/08/2017

233847 2/3-6641-181Y1 Relay Failed 03/28/2019

281643 MPT 3 Oil Leak Identified 09/23/2020

4337494 U3 EDG Relay 3-6641-181Y Failed to Time Upon 04/22/2020

Energization

4345882 Results of Failure Analysis for MPT 3 Bushing Failure 05/22/2020

Miscellaneous Report on Bushing with Cracked Lower Terminal 05/20/2020

NDE Reports DRE-98599 Failure Analysis of a Neutral Bushing from Dresden Unit 3 12/16/2019

MPT

60856 Calculations DRE18-0011 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) - Soil Parameters 1

DRE18-0013 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - 1

Turning Pad and Heavy Haul Path Design

DRE19-0008 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - 0

Reinforced Concrete Pad Design

DRE19-0011 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - Time 0

History Generation

DRE19-0012 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Strain-Dependent 0

Soil Properties

DRE19-0013 Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Expansion - Soil 0

Structural Interaction (SSI)

Corrective Action 04181638-12 Revise DRE18-0011 to Document Methodology that Relates 06/08/2020

Documents 11.6 Ksi Modulus of Elasticity Criteria to 500 pci

Engineering 628118 South ISFSI Expansion Pad 0

Changes

15