IR 05000237/1993023
| ML17179B140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1993 |
| From: | Jickling R, Reidinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179B137 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-93-23, 50-249-93-23, NUDOCS 9310200066 | |
| Download: ML17179B140 (25) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-237/93023(DRSS); 50-249/93023(DRSS)
Dockets No. 50-237; 50-249 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West II I Downers Grove, IL 60515 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Generation Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
September 21-24, 1993 Inspectors: ~~~
,' R. Ji~l ing
.
I J-'
i 1\\'/. '
L n1 ())*1,,;F H. Simons
~tu!
T. Reidinger 7 Accompanying Inspectors: J. O'Brien C. McKenney Approved By: Radiological Inspection Summary
Date '
/C/5 /q3 Date
/o(r/7}
Date Inspection on September 21-24, 1993 (Reports No. 50-237/93023CDRSS); 50-249/93023CDRSS)).
Areas Inspected:
Routine, *announced inspection of the Dresden emergency preparedness exercise involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),
observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously
identified items (IP 82301).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified; however, two exercise weaknesses were identifie One weakness was assessed in the Control Room Simulator for the failure to properly classify an Alert (Section 5.a). The second weakness was assessed for the failure to issue an updated Nuclear Accident Reporting System form within 15 minutes of the start of a radiOactive release (Section 5.d).
9310200066 931007 PDR ADOCK 05000237
. G PDR
Overall, exercise performance was goo The scenario was very challenging and included an anticipated transient without scram combined with a failure of the standby liquid injection syste Other simultaneous distractors were *
introduced in the Control Room Simulato Finally; this scenario required the use of the hardened vent modification to vent containment regardless of the offsite dose consequences.
DETAILS NRC Observers and Areas Observed R. Jickling, Control Room Simulator (CRS}, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Operations Support Center (OSC)
J. McCormick-Barger, CRS, TSC, OSC H. Simons, TSC T. Reidinger, OSC J. O'Brien, Mazon Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
C. McKenney, CRS, TSC Persons Contacted M. Lyster, Site Vice President J. Kotowski, Operations Manager L. Holden, Corporate Emergency Preparedness (EP) Supervisor
- R. Flahive, Technical Support Superintendent D. Sharper, EP Supervisor B. Mayer, EP Coordinator D. Pritchard, Wo~k Control Superintendent P. Piet, Nuclear Licensing J. Shields, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor R. Wroblewski, Regulatory Assurance R. Weidner, Training Supervisor E. Carroll, Chemistry Supervisor D. Booth, *outage Manager The personnel listed above attended the NRC exit interview on September 24, 199 The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 82301)
(Closed) Inspection Follow Up Item No. 50-237/92008-01:
During the 1992 annual exercise, the offsite monitoring teams were not ready to perform their duties until almost three and one half hours after the Alert declaratio During the 1993 exercise, the offsite monitoring teams were briefed and dispatched early in the exercise such that they were ready to perform their duties in a timely manne This item is close.
General An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's emergency plah was conducted at Dresden on September 22, 199 This exercise included full participation with Kendall and Grundy Counties and partial participation with Will County, the Illinois Emergency Management.Agency (IEMA}, and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS).
The exercise tested the licensee's, State's and counties' emergency response organizations'
cap~bilities to respond to an accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive effluent. Attachment 1 describes the scope and objectives of the exercise. Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenari The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly arid timel If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and* local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public 9 s health and safet.
Specific Observations CIP 82301)
a~
Control Room Simulator CCRS)
The overall performance of the Control Room Simulator (CRS) crew was goo Appropriate procedures, including emergency operating procedures, Technical Specifications, and off normal procedures, were effectively use Emergency situations were trended and the crew was proactive in discussing potential problems ~nd option The Shift Supervisor (SS) made the good decision to contact the corporate nuclear duty officer to inform him of the rising river
- levels and the potential impact on the licensee 9 s other nuclear stations *in the vicinit The Supervisor (SS) demonstrated good command.and control of the emergency response efforts. Teamwork and communications were very good especially during periods of high activity due to changing plant condition The SS held frequent, concise briefings during which they aggressively pursued problems, such as the debris clogging the trash racks and the crib house high water leve The identification and declaration of the Unusual Event (UE) was timely. Notifications were completed well within the regulatory time requirement Shortly after the UE declaration, the SS recognized the containment cooling service water (CCSW) pumps were inoperabl For the next 30 minutes, the CRS crew focused on conflicting reports of high river level and the report that all CCSW pumps were sucking air. At the same time, the CRS crew was considering an Alert classification due to the Illinois River level being greater than or equal to 508 fee The CRS crew was focused on this emergency action level (EAL) and did not fully reviewed the EAL procedure to properly classify the emergency as an Alert due to a natural or destructive phenomena affecting a safety system such that it did not perform its required functio In order to preserve the scenario time line, the controllers issued a contingency message prompting the SS to declare an Aler The failure of the SS to properly classify the emergency will be tracked as an Exercise Weakness (No. 50-237/93023-01).
One CRS communicator appeared confused regarding the use of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form and the* State Agency Update Checklis In addition, he was unsure which telephone he should use, which phone numbers to call, to whom he was to speak with, and at what time he was to make notification However, with the aid of the CRS crew, all notifications were made in a timely manne No violations or deviations were identified. However, one exercise weakness was identifie Technical Support Center CTSC)
Station management made the good decision to staff the Technical Support Center (TSC) after the SS declared an UE in ord~r to trend river level and support the SS and CRS cre Upon arrival at the JSC, the Station Director (SD) was quick to recognize that evacuation of the TSC may be necessary due to a broken door and ventilation problem However, during this precautionary staffing, there was some confusion in the TSC on whether the Operational Support Center (OSC) was also being staffe Although the TSC staff did a good job of monitoring EALs prior to official activation of the TSC, EAL 6.1, "As the result of natural or destructive phenomena a Safety System is affected such that it may not perform its required function", was not identified as a potenti~l EA Other EALs were identified as potential reasons for upgrading to an Aler After the Alert was declared, the TSC staff immediately began preparing to take over command and control of the emergency response from the SS in the CR The transfer of command and control was very smooth and performed in a timely manne The SD and SS conducted a thorough turnove The SD properly declared the Site Area Emergency (SAE) immediately following the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).
Notifications to the offsite authorities were made in a timely manne Command and control by the SD was excellen He properly delegated tasks to the Assistant Station Director and Generating Station Emergency Plan Adviso He provided periodic, thorough briefings to the facility using an excellent microphone and speaker system that could broadcast to the OSC as well as the TS However, more ;~formation could have been given regarding the offsite dose projections and field monitoring team dat The SD also held strategy meetings to set priorities and develop plans to deal with the emergenc Status boards were kept current and accurat The new closed circuit camera and video monitor were effective in monitoring the status of inplant teams dispatched from the OS After the ATWS, the TSC staff immediately began monitoring the fission product barrier EAL The SD properly declared a General Emergency (GE) based on the loss of two fission product barriers and probable loss of the third. Notification to the State was made in a timely manne The radiation protection staff closely monitored inplant radiological conditions~ The environs group properly d~rected and monitored the-activities of the offsite monitoring team The directors in the TSC demonstrated excellent teamwork, especially between the operations, maintenance, and technical director These directors were kept current on the status of the plant and the actions taken by the CRS cre Although teamwork was excellent, the Radiation Protection Director was not immediately informed by the Operations Director that the CRS crew was venting containmen The Operations Director was discussing venting of containment at 11:01 am, but the Radiation Protection Director was not informed until 11:10 am during a briefin Due to the lack of discussion reg~rding the offsite dose consequences of venting and the lack of urgency for evaluating this evolution, it was not evident.that the TSC staff fully realized the radiological consequences of the ventin After containment venting began, there was a lack of coordination between the Radiation Protection staffs in the TSC and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) regarding protective action recommendation At one time, the TSC felt sheltering was appropriate, while the EOF decided to recommend evacuatio Recovery discussions in the TSC were excellen Each director developed their own list of items which needed to be addresse Then each item was discussed as a group to prioritize the item No violations or deviations were identifie Operational Support Center (OSC)
The staffing of the OSC was very goo Radiation protection, operations, maintenance, and electrical personnel quickly staffed the OS In addition, security personnel quickly locked various OSC doors; and posted ready rooms and briefing/debriefing rooms to facilitate access control for the OS A step off pad was promptly setup at the entrance of the OS Activation of the OSC was accomplished in an orderly manne OSC personnel were proactive in setting up the OSC including plant procedures, priority and significant events status board The
OSC Director conducted a good initial briefing explaining the basis of the Alert declaration, plant conditions, and current prioritie Team dispatch was very goo All teams dispatched from the OSC were given thorough briefings in regard to radiological and plant
- conditions. Approximately twenty teams were dispatched during the exercis As teams returned and were debriefed by the OSC Ready Room Supervisor, some paperwork regarding doses and dose rates were not immediately processed during simultaneous returns of team In one instance, an incorrect radiation reading of 5 Sv (500 rem) per hour, instead of 5 mSv (500 mrem) per hour, was reported and not corrected by the Ready Room Supervisor during his revie Communications with the inplant teams was very goo The radiation protection technicians communicated dose rate information back to the OSC in a timely manne The prioritization of emergency teams in the OSC was very goo The OSC Director had some aggressive discussions regarding teams-and work prioritie Work priorities were consistently and correctly re-prioritized as new work was requested by the TSC and actions were complete The OSC Director communicated very well with his staff regarding recommendations in changing priorities and discussions in alternate means of repairs to affected plant equipmen The overall technical response of the inplant teams was very goo The members of the standby liquid control team had various discussions and recommendations for addressing flow problem The inplant teams made very good use of the plant diagrams and
.
procedures in preparing for their assigned tasks, especially the team assigned to vent the control rod drive (CRD) overpiston are After the step off pad and frisker were set up at the entrance of the OSC, the security guard was directed by the OSC Director not to allow anyone to leave the DSC without the OSC Director's approva Later during the OSC Director's facility briefing, all OSC personnel were directed not to leave the OSC without approva However, everi after several directives by the OSC Director and Security Supervisor, the security guards allowed people to leave the OSC without the approval of the OSC Directo This could have had an impact on team formation and emergency condition mitigation as well as access control sheet Although habitability was maintained, security guards were not frisking properly at the OSC access poin Some inplant teams and personnel entering the OSC did not stop to frisk at the step off pa A step off pad was not set up for the TSC even after the radiological release had started. It may be appropriate to
station a radiation protection technician at the onsite facility access control point *
During one team briefing, the Radiation Protection Supervisor cautioned the team that the turnback dose rate was 10 mSv (1 rem)
per hou The team transitioned a 20 mSv (2 rem) per hour field of unknown size to get to a tel~phone. It may have been more-prudent to back out of the high radiation fiel Overall, status boards were well maintained in the DS On one occasion the OSC Director's priorities status board was not curren The board listed the crib house as the first priority when in fact the CRD pump repair should have been the highest priorit DSC staff waiting for team assignment were not well utilize These personnel could be used for troubleshooting problems and applying their experience to make recommendations regarding the emergency situatio No violations or deviatfons were identifie Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The Safeguards Specialist promptly established access control at the EOF after being notified to do so by the TSC staff. The Safeguards Specialist contacted his counterpart at the TSC to obtain plant status which he displayed on a status board for personnel arriving at the facilit The EOF staff arrived at the EDF approximately thirty minutes after declaration of a SA They promptly assumed their positions and contacted their counterparts at the TS The M~nager of Emergency Operations (MEO) informed the EDF and TSC when minimum staffing had been achieve The MEO provided a good initial briefing for the EOF staff informing them of plant conditions and responsibilities of the EO The transfer of command and control from the TSC to the EOF occurred at the same time as the CRS staff began venting containmen This may have caused some delays in ensuring a NARS form was transmitted to the State informing them of the offsite radiological releas The controlled venting of containment began at approximately 11:05 a The release rate exceeded the UE limit for instantaneous release rate. At this time, a new Protective Action Recomm_endation (PAR) should have been developed and issue However, a new NARS form was not issued until 11:37 a Both the TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) failed to issue an updated NARS form within fifteen minutes after containment venting bega CFR 50.54(q) requires that the licensee follow and maintain an emergency plan and the licensee's emergency plan required that a NARS form be issued to document major changes in
l
the plant's emergency status, fncluding changes in radioactive release The failure t6 issue a NARS form within fifteen minutes of the start of a radiological release will be tracked as an Exercis Weakness (No. 50-237/93023-02).
Subsequent facility briefings could have been more info~mative concerning the ongoing release from the hardened vent. These briefings may have been more effective if they had been given by the MEO instead of his supporting managers, as was often the cas Four status boards were maintained on overhead screens. Typically the latest NARS form, a significant events log, priority items, and plant status were displayed. Although the status boards were frequently updated, the information was not clearly displayed which resulted in the status boards being of limited use to the EOF staff. Critical information such as the source of the release, *PARs, and emergency classification were not prominently displaye In addition, the status boards could not be seen from the MEO's briefing room~
Control of the environmental monitoring teams was well performed at the EO Problems were noted with maintaining contact with the field teams via the radio in the scrambled mode which necessitated maintaining radio communications in the unscrambled mod In addition, all radio contact was lost with one of the field teams for a period of time, necessitating the transmittal of information vi a phone line As government officials arrived at the EOF, the Governmental Support Director coordinated briefings of the officials and provided the officials with administrative support. Access of the government officials to the MEO was goo The MEO frequently communicated with his counterparts in the TSC and Corporate EOF (CEOF) and with the State of Illinois Radiological Emergency Assessment Center Commande During the recovery discussions, a questioning attitude on the part of the EOF staff was not displaye The EOF staff did not consider thoroughly evaluating the cause of clad and fuel damage; and the source and size of the primary system leak. Questions posed by the simulated NRG staff member, rather than questions posed by the EOF staff, appeared to be the catalyst which resulted in the decision to delay entry into the recovery phas No violations or deviations were identifie However, one exercise weakness was identifie **
6.
Exercise Objectives and Scenario Review CIP 82302)
The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to NRC within the proper time frame The scenario was very challenging and included an anticipated transient without scram combined with a failure of the standby liquid injection syste Other simultaneous evolutions were introduced in the Control Room Simulato Finally, this scenario required the use of the hardened vent modification to vent containment regardless of the offsite dose consequence The scenario was especially challenging for the CRS crew throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Control and Critiques CIP 82301)
There were adequate controllers to control the exercis One instance of controller prompting was necessary to keep the exercise on schedul This was due to the missed Alert classification in the Control Roo There was a time lag between simulator data and scenario data which caused significant confusion at some points in the exercis Examples included the General Emergency classification, indications of open and closed main steam line isolation valves, high and low drywell radiation levels, and low and high main steam line radiation monitor level The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well detaile The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview which were in strong agreement with the inspectors' preliminary finding No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on September 24, 1993, with the licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection finding The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Scenario Summary
--- "- -------
I
- PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at one of its Nuclear Power Station SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
NOTE:
An EOF designation includes all EOFs and the CEOF if activated as a Backup EO A CEOF designation is for activation of the CEOF as an initerim EOF onl ** Denotes critical objectives 1)
Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions which warrant declaring a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minute Weight*
Factor
-
4 Demonstrate the ability to determine the highest Emergency Action Level (EAL) applicable for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minute ** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
5 Demonstrate the ability to determine the most appropriate EAL(s) for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minute (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
2)
Notification and Communications Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out the NARS form for conditions presented in the scenari (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and local organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of an Emergency classification or significant changes in NARS informatio ** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
c. Demonstrate the backup means of offsite notifications if the NARS network fail ** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
5
- EPEXER/dresden/objectv/l Raw
_Weighted Score score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of the Emergency classification using the Even.t Notification Worksheet as appropriat Weight Factor
-
e. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the States at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of significant chang~s in conditions reported on the State Agency Uptjate Checklis (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
4 Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support organizations such as INPO, ANI, General Electric or Westinghouse, the Fuel Vendor, or Teledyne,. for assistance during the Exercis (TSC, EOF)
1 Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) upon reques (CR, TSC, EOF)
h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Health Physics Network (HPN) upon reques (TSC, EOF)
Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate to the NRC within thirty (30)
minutes of changes in reportable conditions when an open-line of communication (ENS) is not maintaine (CR, TSC, EOF)
Demonstrate the ability to provide informational announcements over the plant PA system in accordance with procedures and policie (CR)
3)
Radiological Assessment and Protective Actions a. Demonstrate the ability to collect", document and use radiological surveys for conditions presented in the scenari (OSC)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/2 Raw Weighted Score Score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to evaluate onsite radiological information for conditions presented in the scenari Weight Factor
-
3 Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate radiological protection (including clothing and respiratory equipment) for onsite personnel in accordance with procedures and policie ** (TSC, OSC)
4 Demonstrate the ability to prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with procedures and policie (OSC)
4 Demonstrate the ability to issue and administratively control dosimetry in the OSC in accordance with procedures and policie (OSC) Demonstrate the ability to perform habitability surveys in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policie (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF)
2 Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain radiological controls in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policie (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to control personnel exposure per 10CFR20 emergency exposure limits in accordance with procedures and policie (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
i. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation exposure to inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, OSC)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/3 Raw Weighted Score Score
- ~
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to identify appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) in accordance with procedures and policies within fifteen (15) minute ** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)
1. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of the source term of a releas (TSC, EOF, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with emergency
- procedure Weight Factor
3
-
4 Demonstrate the ability to establish the relationship between effluent monitor readings and onsite and offsite exposures/contamination for given meteorological condition (TSC, EOF, CEOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to obtain a meterological forecas (TSC, EOF, CEOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of a release based on plant system parameters and effluent monitor (TSC, EOF, CEOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to calculate release rate/projected doses with primary assessment instrumentation offscale or inoperabl (TSC, EOF, CEOF)
r. Demonstrate the ability to collect and* analyze RCS and Containment Atmosphere samples using High Radiation Sampling System equipment in accordance with HRSS procedures and health physics control (CR, TSC, OSC)
s. Dem0nstrate the ability to estimate core damage in accordance with emergency procedure (TSC, EOF)
t. Demonstrate the ability of the Environs Director to initially brief the Field Teams and keep them aware of critical informatio (TSC, EOF)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/4 Raw Weighted Score Score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to develop effective sampling strategy and effectively direct the Field Teams to assess the components of a radioactive release to the environmen Weight Factor
-
3 Demonstrate the ability to collect and count field samRles in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedure _-
(OSC/FIELD TEAMS)
3 Demon~trate the ability to document field samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedure.(OSC/FIELD TEAMS)
3 Demonstrate the ability to perform dose rate measurements in the environmen (OSC/FIELD TEAMS)
3 Demonstrate the ability to evaluate field sample results in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Field Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field sample (TSC, OSC)
aa.Demonstrate the ability to monitor and direct Field Team activities in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
bb.Demonstrate the ability to monitor Field Team activitie (CEOF)
cc.Demonstrate the ability to transfer control of Field Team activities in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF) Emergency Facilities Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in the TSC and osc within thirty (30)
minutes of an Alert or higher Classification during a daytime event in accordance-with GSEP Section ** (CR, TSC, OSC)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/5
3
4 Raw Weighted Score Score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty* (30) minutes of an Alert or higher Emergency Classification in accordance with GSEP Section Weight Factor
-
(CR)
3 Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the Control Room to the TSC in accordance with procedures and policie (CR, TSC)
. 3 Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the TSC to the EOF/CEOF in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EDF, CEOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the CEOF to the EOF in accordance with procedures and policie (EOF, CEOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to maintain current and accurate information on Status Boards by updating at least every thirty (30) minute (TSC, OSC, EOF)
i. Demonstrate the ability to maintain information on the Electronic Status Board in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
j. Demonstrate the ability to exchange data and technical information between *the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policie (CR, OSC, TSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/FIELD TEAMS)
5)
Emergency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability of the. Directors and Managers to provide leadership in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in GSEP and position-specific procedure (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC)
4 Demonstrate the ability to prioritize resources for Inplant Team activities in accordance with Station procedure (CR, TSC, OSC)
EPEXER/clresden/objectv/6 Raw Weighted Score Score
- DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 c. Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch and brief Inplant Teams in accordance with Station procedure Weight Factor
-
4 Demonstrate the ability of in-plant teams to perform their assigned function ~ (OSC)
e. Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Staff and team members to conduct a thorough debriefing following the completion of assigned task (OSC)
3 Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport *
Emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant condition (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability of the Acting Station Director, Station Director, OSC Director and MEO to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification, and activities in progress at least every sixty (60) minute (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to provide access for the NRC Site Team in accordance with Access Control procedure (TSC, EOF)
i. Demonstrate the ability to provide an initial briefing to the NRC Site Tea (TSC, EOF)
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide the NRC Site Team with adequate and timely information pertaining to critical emergency response activitie (TSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to use position specific_procedure (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/FIELD TEAMS)
l. Demonstra.te the ability to assemble and account for on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of announcing the assembl ** (CR, TSC, OSC)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/7
...
Raw Weighted Score Score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability to perform search and rescue for personnel not accounted fo Weight Factor
- (TSC)
n. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within thirty (30) minutes after completion of Site Accountabilit (TSC)
p. Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, brief personnel and arrange for traffic
.~antral prior to initiating site evacuatio (TSC, EOF)
6 ).
Recovery a. Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a Recovery classification in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
b. Demonstrate the ability to generate. a Recovery Plan which will return the plant to normal operations in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
c. Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term recovery staffing requirement (TSC, EOF)
1 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate recovery actions with the Stat (TSC, EOF)
7)
SECURITY Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond to an emergency situation in accordance with procedures and policie (TSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability of the Security Director/
Safeguards Specialist to coordinate actions per the Nuclear Station Security Plan with the GSE (TSC, EOF)
3 Demonstrate the ability to establish access control to Emergency Response Facilitie [(TSC, EOF, JPIC (remote only)]
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/8 Raw Weighted Score Score
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993 Demonstrate the ability of the Safeguards Specialist/Security Director to coordinate emergency response action with appropriate offsite agencies. (e.g., evacuation routes with County Sheriff, NRC Safeguards personnel).
-
8)
PUBLIC INFORMATION a. Demonstrate the ability to activate the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) within sixty (60)
minutes of EOF activatio Weight Factor
-
(JPIC)
b. Demonstrate the ability to respond to Media requests within sixty (60) minutes in accordance with policies and procedure (JPIC)
c. Demonstrate the ability to prepare accurate Press Releases within ninety (90) minutes of a significant event while in a Site or General Emergenc ** (JPIC)
4 Demonstrate the ability to present accurate media briefings within ninety (90) minutes of significant events while in a Site or General Emergenc (JPIC) Demonstrate the ability to use visual aides to support media briefings in accordance with procedures and policie~.
-
(JPIC) Demonstrate the ability to maintain a CECo representative in the JPIC at all times. *
2
-
(JPIC)
3 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with Non-CECo JPIC representatives for media briefings in accordance with procedures and policie (JPIC)
EPEXER/dresden/objectv/9 Raw Weighted Score Score
Offsite Conditions:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993
"THIS IS AN EXERCISE" GENERAL INFORMATION Summer 1993 has been both cooler and wetter than average, and through today the September 1993 rainfall is 5.0" above normal for the month; the last rainfall was on September 21, 199 The weather in the Morris/Seneca area (0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />) is mostly cloudy with a chance of scattered thundershowers, temperatures are in the lower 70' There is a steady light wind from the south, with a steady baromete This afternoon is expected to be cool and rain The Illinois River is higher than normal, with a current (0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />)
level of 505.7'.
Illinois Highway Department has announced that continued road work (Pot hole repairs) will be continuing in the following areas:
(1)
I-55 (2)
I-80 (3)
Route 47 between 113 and Mazon CECo Conditions:
Nuclear Unit Status Braidwood-1 Byron-1 Dresden-3 LaSalle-1 Quad Cities-1 Zion-1 Fossil Units:
0% Power 100% Power Day 30. of 60 100% Power 87% Power Day 15 of 60 84% available S::,:stem Capability:
Load Estimate:
Power Purchases:
Power Sales:
System Reserves:
_System Status:
EPEXER/dresden/geninfo/1 Braidwood-2 Byron-2 Dresden-2 LaSalle-2.
Quad Ci ties-Zion-2 16,312 MWe 0% Power Day 1 of 59 95% Power 80% Power 0% Power 90% Power 13,600 MWe (0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />)
270 MWe 1, 020 MWe 1, 962 MWe Red
- ~
Unit One Dresden Nuclear Power Station 1993 GSEP Exercise September 22, 1993
"This is an Exercise" NARRATIVE SUMMARY (Initial conditions)
0700 Gaseous Monitoring vent system is not available for duct wor Unit Two Unit two has been operating at full power for the past 110 days. -The Bulk Power Operations Load Dispatcher has asked that no "high risk" surveillance be performed during the next twenty-four (24) hours. The system grid is in condition "red" due to several units (i.e. Joliet units I 7 & 8, Braidwood units I 1 & 2) having tripped because of_ severe weather activity during the previous 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The unit two CCSW pump operability surveillance is 'critical' on the surveillance list but was deferred on shift one at the load dispatchers request. The Operating Engineer after conferring with the Load Dispatcher has decided that the CCS"iN surve-illance is not a "high risk" surveillance and the performance of this surveillance will be an 'A' priority for shift two toda Hea*vy rain is expected to continue throughout the day and flooding of local municipalities has been reported overnigh The 2A CRD pump is oos for gear-box replacemen The Unit Two Feedwater level control observes a slow system failure on the first shift and the system is presently operating in manua The IMs have been requestad to make repairs starting on the second shif Unit Three Unit three is presently in day 30 of a scheduled 60 day outage. All fuel has been off-loaded and normal outage work is in progress. Major activities for the day involves replacing the SBLC squib valves following a successful injection test, and work on transformer three (TR3) which is the critical path job for the outag Unit three CRD Pump is Out of Service for bearing replacemen The pump is expected
- t*o be returned to service today at 120 (0700 -
0830)
UNUSUAL EVENT At 0727 Accu-Weather informs the station that the Morris area is expected to receive more than three inches of rain within the next two (2) hour At 0729 the Load Dispatcher calls the Control Room and reports that the Des Plaines River is high at Joliet Statio At 0730, a security guard performing rounds discovers that the TSC south door has been blown off its hing At 0735, an operator is dispatched to determine the canal level at the cribhous Because of this the load dispatcher has contacted the Army Corps of Engineers and has been informed that the Illinois/DesPlaines River is expected to crest at about 509' (feet) elevation before 1600 hr The operator at the cribhouse reports that the intake canal level is at elevation 506'.
In addition to this he informs the Control Room that there is a large amount of plastic and wood clogging the bar rack The source of the debris is due to the destruction (due to severe winds) of the temporary
"This is an Exercise" EPEXER/dresden/nsummry/1
- ~
- Dresden Nuclear Power station 1993 GSEP Exercise September 22, 1993
"This is an Exercise" enclosure that had been built for the unit three transformer wor He also reports a large amount of debris coming in from the Illinois Rive At 0800, a Security Guard performing rounds in the TSC hears a loud whirling noise coming from the TSC HVAC roo Upon investigation he discovers that the room is abnormally cool and a flapping nois.e can be heard emanating from the duc At 0820 the Unit 2 operator reports that attempts to vent the CCSW pumps has not been successfu She also reports that the vents on A & B ccsw pumps are 'sucking air'.
At 0825, water levels can be observed to be rising rapidly inside the circ water bay Expected actions The guard will notify CAS who will notify the Shift Enginee The Shift Engineer will notify the Maintenance Departmen The station shall declare an.UNUSUAL EVENT'.due to EAL 6.f (Illinois River expected to rise above 508 feet).
Maintenance crews will be dispatched to assist operators in an attempt to clear the debris from the bar rac The Security Guard will notify the Control Room of the problem with the TSC ventillation and the Control Room will dispatch an Operator and/or Mecha~ical Maintenance to investigate and make repair Investigation reveals that the rubber ventilation boot has blown and is flapping freely against the duct wor Discussions about the Unit (2) two CCSW pump operability should also occur.
0830-1000 (ALERT)
At 0830, a severe weather warning goes into effect for po+tions of Grundy, Will, and Kendall Countie An operator at the cribhouse reports that the intake canal level is at 507.7".
At 0832, an alarm indicating 125 VDC battery ground is received on panels 902-At 0833 a loss of annunciator occurs on 923-1 with the simultaneously resetting of the 125 VDC ground on panel 902-At 0930 the 2B CRD pump trips on overcurren At 0945 the condenser vacuum decreases to the SCRAM setpoin Expected Actions An ALERT should be declared based on EAL 6.1 (as a result of a natural OR destructive phenomena a safety system is affected such that it may NOT perform its required function) *.
Additional discussions will be focused on EAL 6.p (As the result of the Illinois River level having exceeded 508' elevation) due to increasing water level The HVO will replace the fuse in the 902-34 panel in the Aux Elec room, the fuse will blow again and the Control Room will call Electrical Maintenance to troubleshoo At 1000 the Unit 2 operator reports that all four ccsw pumps are venting water properl "This is an Exercise" EPEXER/dresden/nsummry/2
- Dresden Nuclear Power Station 1993 GSEP Exercise September 22, 1993
"This is an Exercise" (1000-1100)
SITE EMERGENCY At 1000, the reactor low vacuum scram alarm will come up but the reactor will NOT SCRA All attempts to SCRAM the reactor will be unsuccessfu The Main Turbine and Generator will remain on lin The isolation condenser will initially start but will isolate due to high steam flo The Illinois River will exceed 508' elevatio At 1030, the isolation condenser will close bU:t the control room will lose valve position indication (1301-2).
At 1045, a large steam leak occurs in the Containment Drywell increasipg drywell pressure and temperatur At 1059 condenser vacuum will have decreased to the point that the bypass valves will clos At this point the reactor pressure will increase to the point where the safety valves will open (and stick) due to the failure of the
"B", "C", and "D" electro-matic relief valve When operators attempt to operate SBLC they will get indication that the squib valves have opened but will not see any flow indicatio Expected Actions A SITE EMERGENCY will be declared based upon EAL 3 k (Failure of Reactor Protection System instrumentation to initiate QR complete an automatic reactor SCRAM once a Limiting Safety System Setting has been exceeded AND manual scram was unsuccessful).
An Alert will also be in affect due to the River levels EAL ca An assembly should occur at this tim Activation of the EOF will be initiated at this tim An operator will be initially dispatched to investigate the tripped CRD pum The operator will relay back to the TSC his findings and the Technical Support Center should dispatch Electrical Maintenance to troubl~shoot the Unit 2 CRD Pump and potentially crosstie to the Unit 3 CRD Pum The crosstie of the Unit 3's CRD pump will be successful only after the pump's motor bearing has been replaced and the pump reassemble An operator will be dispatched to the breaker for the 1301-2 valve and observes that the breaker has been damaged by smoke and appears to be shorte The operator should observe that SBLC is failing to inject to the vessel and will notify the Shift Engineer and an operator may be dispatched to investigat ( 1100-1300)
GENERAL EMERGENCY At 1100 drywell radiation levels will increase and drywell pressure will continue to rise to a point (62 psig) where the containment must be vented regardless of adequate core coolin The severe weather warning has been lifted but light thunder showers continue with winds blowing toward Kendall Count Offsite dose projections will be predicted to be ~lR beyond the site boundary when the containment is vente The operator may attempt to reduce pressure by starting the Drywell spray syste The drywell spray system will start, however, the operator observes no flow on the control room recorder and the pressure continues to increase in the drywell.
"This is an Exercise" EPEXER/dresden/nsummry/3
,.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station 1993 GSEP Exercise September 22, 1993
"This is an Exercise" Expected actions A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based on condition 2 EALs. EAL 2m (challenge to two of the three Fission Product Barriers AND probable loss of the third Fission Product Barrier.)
The MEO will be forced to make the decision to recommend venting the dlywell in order to save the primary containmen RECOVERY
"This is an Exercise*
EPEXER/dresden/nsurnmry/4
- ~
[,
- DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 22, 1993
"THIS rs AN EXERCISE" The release will be approximately 5e8uCi/sec from 1100 to 120 If environmental personnel run dose projections based on a two hour release; they will project lR at 5 mile The Station Chimney monitors will reach approximately 3.SuCi/cc at its peak, with the Chimney flow being 300,000 cf The contribution of flow from the Harden Vent ~s negligible.
EPEXER/dresden/rlseinfo/l