IR 05000237/1993017
| ML17179A989 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1993 |
| From: | Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179A988 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-93-17, 50-249-93-17, NUDOCS 9307140027 | |
| Download: ML17179A989 (17) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report Nos. 50-237/93017(DRP); 50-249/93017(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Dresden N~clear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
May 6 through June 18, 1993 Inspectors:
A. M. Stone M. s. Peck J. D. Smith D. M. Liao v. P. Lougheed R. Zuffa, Illinois epartment of Nuclear Safety 1J cJ-lo 7/7/93*
Approved By:
p. L. Hiland, C ief Reactor Projects Section 18 Date Inspection Summary Inspection from May 6 through June 18, 1993 (Report Nos. 50-237 /93-017(0RP):
50-249/93017(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; operational safety verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; maintenance and surveillance observations; engineering and technical support observations;*
safety assessment and quality verification; licensee event report review; training; report review; and management meeting Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in nine area One example of a previously identified violation concerning an inadequate 1987 safety evaluation was discussed in paragraph One non-cited violation concerning the adequacy of one safe shutdown procedure was identified in paragraph...,7 930708 93071
~
05000237
~DR ADOC~
PDR G
Assessment of Plant Operations The Unit 2 startup was conducted in a controlled manne Operator attentiveness to the control panels was goo The operators identified abnormal drywell temperatures during unit startup. Communications were improved with increased use of repeat-back technique and better unit operator 1 og Operations involvement in th~ integrated reporting process was wea Operations personnel threshold for initiating a problem identification form was higher than management expectations. Also, shift engineer log format and level of detail was inconsistent between crew Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support Engineering and technical staff involvement during the outages and startup activities was generally goo However, additional radiological dose and a unit shutdown resulted from two inadequate system engineer walkdown Assessment of Self Assessment and Quality Verification The acceptance of the-integrated reporting system was not consistent in all department Management expectations of department participation was considered wea **
- DETAILS Persons Contacted M. Lyster, Site Vice President
- C. Schroeder, Manager, Dresden Station
- D. Barrett, Quality Control
- D. Booth, Master Electrical Maintenance
- E. Carroll, Chemistry Supervisor A. D'Antonio. Site Quality Verification Supervisor
- M. Dillon, Fire Marshall
- R. Flahive, Technical Services Superintendent
- T. Gallaher, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Grzemski; Site Quality Verification
- B. Gurley, NRC Coordinator
- K. Housh, Fire Protection System Engineer
- R. Johnson, Operating Experience Administrator
- L. Jordan, Lead Health Physics Technician M. Korchynsky, Senior Operating Engineer
- J. Kotowski, Operations Manager G. Kusnik, Quality Control Supervisor S. Lawson, Operating Engineer T. Mohr, Operating Engineer
- T. O'Connor, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Radtke, Executive Assistant to Site Vice President
- D. Saccomando, Performance Assistant Administrator
- L. Sebby, Work Planning
- J. Shields, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor R. Stobert, Operating Engineer M. Strait, Technical Staff Supervisor
- B. Viehl, Nuclear Engineering Design Supervisor
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on June 17, * 199 The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staf.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
Violations:
(Closed) Violation (237/91035-0l(DRPll: Violation of technical specification limits on torus water bulk temperatur The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and had no further question This item is close (Closed) Violation (237/92035-0l(DRP)): Potential inaccurate information submitted to the NR The licensee obtained and reviewed detailed reactor vessel fabrication records for all Commonwealth Edison reactor vessel Additionally, the licensee has improved communications.with contract employee This item is close **
Deviations:
(Closed) Deviation (237/92026-06(DRP)):
Failure to perform augmented operator training to address several deficient containment isolation motor operated valves (MOVs).
The training department issued a memorandum which identified the MOVs considered deficient per Gerieric Letter 89-10, Supplement 3, "Consideration of the Results of NRC Sponsored Test and Motor Operated Valves."
Proper operator actions in the event a deficient valve failed to close were also discussed. This item is close *
(Open) Deviation (237/92028-0l(DRP)): Failure to meet a Systematic Evaluation Program commitmen The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee's response with regulatory assurance and engineering personne Additional discussion with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Project Manager will be necessary to resolve this issue. This item will remains ope Unresolved Items:
(Closed) Unresolved Item (237/92005-04(DRP)): Several concerns regarding the makeup water supplies to the isolation condense This item is identical to Unresolved Item (237/93012-03(DRP)) discussed belo This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (237/93007-03(DRSS)):
Apparent unauthorjzed entry into a radiological controlled are This issue was discussed in Inspection Report 50-237/93018, dated June 3, 199 Based on the results of that inspection, this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (237/93012-03(DRP)):
Adequacy of safe shutdown procedures and condensate storage tank (CST) inventor The following concerns were addressed:
The licensee did not have a surveillance mechanism to ensure adequate CST water volume:
The station procedures were revised to include specific operator actions to provide makeup to the isolation condenser and the reactor vesse *
The licensee used an unqualified local instrument to verify IA CST leve The level indication was installed, tested, and was approved for use in May 199 *
The licensee failed to consider head differences in p1p1n A correction factor of two feet was previously included in the safe shutdown procedur *
The licensee did not ensure the most limiting case was evaluated.
The inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation and concluded the calculation methodology useq by Professional Loss Control, Inc. was acceptabl A Par~ 21 notification was not warranted.
The *adequacies of the safety evaluation and emergency procedures are discussed in paragraph 6.a. This item is close (Closed) Temporary Instruction CTI) 2515/113, "Reliable Decay heat Removal During Outages.
11 Initial TI. inspection efforts were documented in Inspection Reports 50-237/91025 and 50-237/92036 dated November 15, 1991, and February 24, 1993, respectivel During the recent Unit 2 refueling outage, the inspectors reviewed the licensee~s shutdown risk program effectiveness. Observations included:
Relative risks from daily work activities were assessed and communicated to station personnel through widely distributed risk factor chart *
Shutdown safety 11 Protective Pathway 11 caution cards were placed on risk-significant equipment to ensure continued operabilit *
Heightened level of awareness meetings were conducted prior to the performance of critical outage wor *
Operators were cognizant of the shutdown risk initiatives and were knowledgeable on equipment statu *
Site quality verification performed an independent review of the planned outage activities. Several discrepancies were identified and subsequently resolve No violations or deviation were identifie.
Summary of Operations Unit 2 The unit was shut down for refueling outage D2Rl3 at the beginning of this perio The unit was made critical on May 23 and was synchronized to the grid on May 2 Increased drywell temperatures resulted in a forced unit shut down on May 2 The unit was again made critical on May 28 and was synchronized to the grid on May 2 The unit operated at power for the remainder of the perio Unit 3 The unit operated at power levels up to 100% power during the perio No violations or deviations were identifie Plant Operations (71707. 71710 & 93702)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its
responsibilities for safe operatio During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant and equipment conditions, including control of activities in progres On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; observed operator adherence with procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room indications for abnormalities; verified electrical power availability and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by station manager The inspectors also monitored various administrative and operating record The licensee maintained additional senior licensed operators for Unit 2 outage operations managemen The specific areas observed were:
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and associated support components were inspected to verify operability through observation of instrumentation and proper valve and electrical power.alignmen The inspectors also visually inspected components for material condition The following systems were inspected by direct field observations:
Unit 2 Standby liquid control system 4.16 KV Electrical, Class lE Batteries Shutdown cooling system Unit 3 Loop A low pressure coolant injection
Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health phy~ics procedures and randomly examined*radiation protection instrumentation for operability and calibratio During the month of June, the licensee noted an increased trend of shoe contaminations per entry into the radiological controlled are An investigation was initiate The licensee was to present additional information at a July 12, 1993, meeting with Region III NRC management.
Security During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the.
licensee's security program to e~sure that observed actions were being implemented according to the approved security pla No discrepancies were identifie *
Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign materia Although housekeeping and material conditions have generally improved, the conditions in emergency core cooling system corner rooms decline Numerous oil and water leaks, unsecured ladders and carts, and miscellaneous stored equipment were observe In response to the inspectors observations, the licensee initiated efforts to improve housekeeping in these area Observations of Plant Operations Immediate Actions in Response to Bulletin 93-03 NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in Boiling Water Reactors," was issued on May 28, 199 The bulletin alerted licensees on potential reactor water level indication errors during normal depressurizatio The inspectors verified the immediate actions specified in the bulletin were complete Interviews with licensed individuals confirmed arlequate knowledge of the issu Additional simulator training was scheduled for the current training cycl The inspectors had no concerns with the immediate corrective action Observations During Unit 2 Startup The inspectors monitored activities of control room operators and other operations support personnel during the startup, approach to criticality, heatup, synchronization, and power operation of the reacto The inspectors verified required surveillances were successfully completed and startup activities were performed in accordance with approved procedure The control rod withdrawal sequence and rod withdrawal authorization were availabl Management expectations were clearly communicated to the operating crews prior to unit startup. The Operations Manager and Operating Engineer emphasized the self check process and a questioning attitud~ at a special Heightened Level of Awareness meetin The operators were attentive to the panels and all observed activities were*conducted in accordance with planf procedure The operators
ide-ntified abnormal drywell temperatures which required a unit shutdown for resolutio Concerns were resolved quickly and with cooperation from all department The decision to limit power until all feedwater pumps were available was conservativ Operations Events During the inspection period, several events occurred, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The following events were reviewed for reporting timeliness and immediate licensee corrective actions:.
A Unit 2 reactor automatic shutdown signal and containment isolations occurred on May 27 while the reactor was shut dow The signal was caused by personnel error during a routine surveillanc The instrument technician failed to bleed test pressure prior to returning a reactor pressure switch to servic *
All five automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves inadvertently opened during a surveillance on May The event was the result of simultaneous performances of ADS logic testing and low pressure coolant injection pump operability testin The ECCS pump interlock was satisfied in the ADS logic resulting in the valves openin The cause of the event was personnel erro Work planning personnel and senior licensed operators failed to recognize the testing conflic *
Four high pressure coolant injection drain valves changed positions during electrical ground troubleshooting on May 2 An inadvertent open circuit occurred when a plant technician untied a bundle of electrical lead *
The Unit 2 control rod drive system malfunctioned during shutdown testing on May 19~
The licensee was able to select two control rods at the same time with no rod block The operators promptly de-selected the rod The licensee was unable to duplicate the problem during troubleshootin The licensee suspected dirty select matrix switches were the caus Assessment of Plant Operations The Unit 2 startup was conducted in a contrrilled manne Operator attentiveness to the control panels was goo The operators identified abnormal drywell temperatures during unit startu Communications were improved with increased use of repeat-back technique and better unit operator logs.
Operations involvement in the integrated reporting process was wea Operations personnel threshold for initiating a problem identification form was higher than management expectation Also, shift engineer log format and level of detail was inconsistent between crew No violations or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance (S2703 and 61726)
Routinely, the inspectors observed and/or reviewed station maintenance and surveillance activities to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standardsj and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: approvals were obtained prior to initiating the maintenance work or surveillance testing; operability requirements were met dtiring such activities; functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to declaring the component operable; discrepancies identified during the activities were resolved prior to returning the component to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. Maintenance and Surveillance Related Activities The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Repair of the 28 traversing incore probe
Rebuild and testing of the Unit 2 condensate feedwater system
Repair of the Unit 2 standby liquid control continuity circuit
Unit 2 reactor head vent installation
Drainin~ of 2/3 diesel fire pump coolant and oil
2/38 standby gas treatment system The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 2 DIS 0202-03, Recirculation MG Set Temperature Switch DIS 0500-06, Low Condenser Vacuum Switch Calibration and Functional Test DIS 0600-01, Reactor Pressure Transmitter Calibration DIS 0700-01, Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) and Rod Block Monitor Calibration
DOS 0201-01, Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel 1100 psig Hydrostatic Test DOS 1500-02, Quarterly Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test DOS 1500-06, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump (LPCI)
Operability Test with Torus Available DOS 2300-03, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Operability Verification DTS 1600-05, Torus Vacuum Breaker Individual Test DIS 0700-07, APRM Gain Adjustment DIS 0700-07, Preventive Maintenance and Calibration of the APRMs Unit 3 DOS 1400-01, Core Spray System Pump Test with Torus Available DOS 1400-02, Core Spray System Valve OperabilitY. Check DOS 1500-02, Quarterly Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test for the Inservice Test Program DOS 1500-06, LPCI System Operability Test with the Torus Available DTS 1300-02, Isolation Condenser High Flow Isolation Test DOS 2300-03, HPCI Warm Fast Start DOS 0201-01, Unit 2 Hydrostatic Test Maintenance and Surveillance Observations Fire in the 2C Feedwater Pump Room A localized floor fire occurred during heat treatment of the 2C feedwater pump casing on May 21, 199 Electrical heaters placed on the pump casing produced temperatures up to 1000°F and resulted in small flames around the pump bas Approximately twelve square feet of the floor coating burned causing minor concrete damag The dedicated fir~ watch immediately extinguished the flame A similar incident occurred on the turbine floor on March 31, 199 Both fires resulted from heat treatment operations performed by contractor personne The inspectors review of licensee corrective actions is considered an Inspector Followup Item (237/93017-0l(DRP)) pending completi-on of the licensee's investigatio Material Condition Improvement Display The licensee contracted the Lovejoy Company to assist in resolving long standing rotating equipment problem During the outages, Lovejoy personnel were instrumental in identifying design deficiencies which were previously considered corrective maintenance wor Problems identified included:
- * * * *
incorrect oil slinger ring sizes and material; improper alignment of vertical pumps; improper design of bearing coolers;'
inadequate torque requirements; and misaligned piping.
The licensee determined factors such as limited craft and engineering knowledge of equipment design and poor vendor manuals contributed to the equipment problem A display of the lessons learned was set up in the mechanical maintenanc~ sho The display offered an excellent opportunity for maintenance and engineering personnel to understand equipment design and to assist in future root cause determinations. Also, the licensee videotaped maintenance activities to enhance training lesson plan The licensee intended to develop equipment specific
, vendor manuals and procedures to ensure proper future maintenance and technically adequate parts evaluation No violations or deviations were identifie.
Engineering and Technical Support (37700}
The ~nspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities. This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine events, outage-related activities, and assigned technical specification surveillances; observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing deviation investigations and root cause determination Engineering and Technical Support Ohservations:
Immediate Actions to NRC Bulletin 93-02 NRC Bulletin 93-02, "Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Suction Strainers," was issued on May 11, 1993, to
- notify licensees of a potenti-al loss of net positive suction head for the ECCS pumps during the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
The bulletin required the licensee to identify any fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material not designed to withstand a LOCA in the drywel Fibrous air filters were not used in the drywell cooling system at Dresde During the Unit 2 refueling outage, fibrous insulation (Tempmat)
was installed at various locations in the drywel The licensee removed the insulation after discussion with the inspector An inspection conducted by engineering verified drywell readines On May 22, the inspectors accompanied operations and site quality*
verification personnel on a "final" inspection and closeout of the drywel During the inspection, several scrap pieces of Tempmat
were found on the floor or placed between mirrored insulatio Blanketed insulation in poor condition was also identifie Operations personnel corrected the discrepancies. - Large quantities of Tempmat were also discovered installed on the lower elevations and were removed by maintenance personne An additional "final tour was conducted to verify complete removal of the Tempma Failure to remove the Tempmat insulation prior to "final" drywell inspection was attributed to personnel erro The technical staff engineer did not adequately verify the insulation was removed prior to releasing the drywell to operations for final closeou In addition, the licensee identified the Tempmat was not approved for use in the drywel The inadequate walkdown and unapproved installation are considered an Unresolved Item (237/93017-02(DRP))
pending review of the licensee's investigation and corrective action The licensee planned to shut down Unit 3 in July 1993 to inspect, repair and replace insulatio Drywell Coolers Found Wired Closed After Unit Startup During Unit 2 startup activities on May 25, the operators observed increased drywell temperature The licensee made a drywell entry and confirmed the elevated temperature The licensee's engineering evaluation indicated that the environmental qualification of equipment in the drywell was not invalidate Documentation review of a system walkdown verified proper alignment of the drywell cooling component However, the abnormal temperatures continued during the power ascensio Unit 2 was shut down on May 26 to determine the cause of the elevated temperature Three drywell cooler fan discharge dampers were found mechanically wired closed, one damper was missing, and two of four flow balancing dampers were found partially ope The mispositioned dampers were not identified during the pre-startup inspection by the system enginee The dampers were placed in the correct position The licensee initiated an investigation to determine when and how the dampers were close This is considered an Inspector Followup Item (237/93017-03(DRP)) pending review of the licensee's investigation Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation In January 1987, the licensee revised the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) to include the fire protection system as an isolation condenser makeup water sourc The licensee performed a safety evaluation and concluded the revision did not constitute an unreviewed safety question. However, the licensee did not ensure the fire protection system was capable of supplying water to the isolation condens~r and sprinkler systems simultaneousl The inspectors determined the licensee's original conclusion, i.e. no unreviewed safety question existed, was 12 *
unsupported by the documented safety evaluation. A subsequent hydraulic calculation performed in May 1992 confirmed the capability of the fire protection syste Inspection Report 50-237/90022 dated October 4, 1990, discussed a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 and subsequent.enforcement actio The corrective actions included enhancements to Dresden Administrative Procedure 10-02, "10 CFR 50.59 Review Screening and Safety Evaluations." The failure to perform an adequate safety -
evaluation in 1987 is considered another example of a previous violation (50-237/90022-01).
No further licensee action is require Inadequate Emergency and Safe Shutdown Procedures In August 1989, the licensee impleme~ted Dresden Administrative Technical Requirement (DATR) 4.2.1.lc which required a minimum inventory of 260,000 gallons of water in the lA, 2/3A and 2/38 condensate storage tanks (CSTs).
The licensee did not revise the Dresden Safe Shutdown Procedure (DSSP) 100-T14, "Minimum CST Inventory," to reflect the availability of the lA CS DSSP 100-T14 requirP.d a minimum inventory of 260,000 gallons.in the 2/3 A and 8 CS The procedure did not includ~. instructions to open the cross-tie valve to the lA CS On May 27, 1991, the combined iriventory of all three tanks satisfied the.DATR requirement; however, the combined inventory of the 2/3A and 2/38 CSTs (240,000 gallons) was less than the DSSP limi The safety significance of the discrepancy was minima Although the DSSP did not provide direction to open the lA CST crosstie valve, guidance was provided in the Dresden Operator Annunciator Procedure 902(3)-6 A-The failure to have adequate emergency procedures is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criteria The inspectors considered the corrective actions complete and adequat Therefore, a violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section VII. 8. (1). were satisfie ~ssessment of Engineering and Technical Support Engineering and technical staff involvement during the outages and startup activities was generally goo However, additional radiological dose and a unit shutdown resulted from two inadequate system engineer walkdown One previous violation and one non-cited violation were identifie Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (SAQV) (40500)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were evaluate Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status
were attended to observe the coordination between department The results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staff, review of deviation reports, and review of root cause evaluation report SAQV Events:
Event Screening Committee Meeting
. The inspectors attended an Event Screening Committee (ESC) meeting to evaluate the effectiveness of the integrated reporting program (IRP) process and communication between department The inspectors observed good interdepartment communications and discussions regarding planned event investigation However, as discussed in Inspection Report 50-237/93011 dated April 6, 1993, the operations department involvement in the IRP process was a concer Specifically, the ESC members initiated six additional problem identification forms (PIFs) concerning events described in the shift engineers log book The inspector interviewed several shift operations personnel and concluded the PIF process and the initiation threshold were not understoo Also, several PIFs were generated for corrective maintenance while other conditions adverse to quality were not documente Also, participation by maintenance personnel was inconsisten The licensee initiated a PIF to address this concer Assessment of SAQV The acceptance of the integrated reporting system was not consistent in all department Management expectations of department participation was considered wea No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective actions were accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had-been accomplished in accordance with technical specification The LERs listed below are considered closed:
UNIT 2 (Closed) LER 237/90009-02: Type B & C Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Test Requirements Exceeded Due to Leaking Isolation Valve (Closed) LER 237/91013-01: Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment Involving Reactor Building Trackway Doors Due to Personnel Erro Contrary to administrative procedures, the Unit 2 reactor building trackway inner door was found open and unattended on June 24,
199 The seating surface on the outer door was also degraded and compromised secondary containment integrity. This issue was the subject of~ violation of plant technical specifications (Violation 237/91027-01) and of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control *
(Violation 237/91027-02).
(Closed) LER 237/91034: Primary Containment Isolation Valve Closure due to Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolatio (Closed) LER 237/91039: Vent and Purge System Exhaust Ductwork Separation Due to Construction and Installation Deficiencie The event was caused by improperly fastened containment ductwor The licensee reviewed the modification and maintenance history; however, was unable to determine when the deficiency occurre (Closed) LER 237/91040: Isolation Condenser Group V Isolation due to Spurious Flow Spike (Closed) LER 237/92028: Initiated Unit Shutdown Due to Inoperable 2/3 Diesel Generator and Automatic Closure of the LPCI Minimum Flow Valv This event was discussed in detail in inspection report 237/92023(DRP).
(Closed) LER 237/92043-01: APRM 1&2 Exceeded Sr.ram Setpoint Trip Technical Specification Limi Th~ inspectors determined that instrument accuracy improvements resulted in the discovery of the out-of-tolerance APRM reading UNIT 3 (Closed) LER 249/89005 and Revisions 01 and 02: HPCI Declared Inoperable Due to Cable Terminal Blocks Not Environmentally Qualifie During an audit of environmentally qualified (EQ) equipment, the licensee identified the cable EQ discrepanc (Closed) LER 249/92008: Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Vault Door Leakage Due to Worn L~tch Packin (Closed) LER 249/92017 and LER 249/92024: HPCI Declared Inoperable Due to Turning Gear Motor Engagement Failur The corrective actions, which included a complete turning gear motor breaker overhaul, were reviewed and found adequat No violations or deviations were identifie.
Training The inspector audited a licensee sponsored seminar entitled Observation
& Human Error Reduction Techniques" on June 7 and 8, 199 Insights into programmatic techniques designed to reduce human error through proper event investigation and positive corrective action were presente The licensee program was considered a positive mechanism to communicate and r~-enforce a systematic approach to error reductio ~*
f No violations or deviations were identifie Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Reports for April and May 1993. The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3. and Regulatory Guide 1.1 No violations or deviations were identifie.
Management Meetings (30703)
The monthly Dresden Plant Information meeting was held at the Regidn III office on June Mr. J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III, attende Topics discussed included progress on improvement initiatives and outage accomplishment A conference call was conducted between Dresden engineering management and Region III on May 2 The discussion focused on observations of greater than 7000 gpm flow in the containment cooling service water system during two pump operatio It was postulated that the increased flow resulted from maintenance performed during the Unit 2 outag During the June 2 monthly management meeting, the licensee staled two-pump testing on Unit~ would be performed in the near futur The inspectors will continue to follow this issu On May 26, 1993, Mr. J. Sniezek, Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research; Mr. F. Miraglia, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR); and M ~. Partlow, Associate Director for Projects NRR toured the Dresden facilit Following the tour, the NRC senior managers met with the Site Vice President, Mr. M. Lyster, to discuss current plant statu On June 10 and 11, 1993, Mr. J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III, toured the Dresden facility and met with licensee personne Topics of discussion included site quality verification involvement, engineering support effectiveness and personnel attitudes toward resolving problem No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspector Followup Items Inspector followup items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspectors and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Two inspector followup items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.b. and 6.a.
- 1 Unresolved It~ms Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviation One unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph.
Licensee Identified Violations The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding requiremen However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violation that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B.(l). These tests are:
(1)
it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation, (2)
the violation was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and (3)
it is not a willful violatio One violation of regulatory requirements identified during this inspection for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued,is discussed in paragraph.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 17, 1993, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie~. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'
comment The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar