IR 05000237/1993013
| ML17179A832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1993 |
| From: | Gardner R, Neisler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179A831 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-44, REF-GTECI-EL, TASK-A-44, TASK-OR 50-237-93-13, 50-249-93-13, NUDOCS 9304130109 | |
| Download: ML17179A832 (4) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:'i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Reports No. 50-237/93013(DRS); No. 50-249/93013(DRS) Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; No. DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station - Units 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted: March 31 and April 1, 1993 /
Inspector: / __ A~'~%.* ~J.:+,,~~~~~:.....=~-=-~~ Approved By: R. N. Gardner, Chief Plant Systems Section Inspection Summary ~-{-,-f3 Date Inspection on March 31 and April l, 1993 (Reports No. 50-237/93013CDRS); No. 50-249/93013CDRS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's capability to cope with a station blackout until alternate ac diesel generators are installed in December 1995 (USI A44) (MPA A-22).
This inspection utilized procedure 3770. Results: The inspector determined that Dresden has adequate procedures in place to deal with a station blackout event pending the scheduled installation of alternate ac (AAC) diesel generator PDR ADOCK 05000237 Ci PDR
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- DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)
- B. Christel, Engineering and Construction Department
- J. Kinsella, SQV Inspector
- R. Flahive, Superintendent, Technical Services
- B. Gurley, NRC Coordinator, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Purrazzo, Engineering and Construction Department
- J. Shields, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance T. Wohls, Staff Engineer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- M. Peck, Resident Inspector
- A. M. Stone, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those persons attending the exit interview on April l, 199.
Station Blackout Response Procedure 3. The inspe_ctor reviewed Dresden abnormal operating procedure DGA-12, "Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power," Revision 10, dated August 31, 1992. This procedure provides instructions for shutting down safety equipment, verifying the position of certain containment isolation valves, monitoring the condition of the station batteries and performing selective load shedding on the DC electrical syste The procedure also has requirements for monitoring reactor vessel water inventory, the use of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pumps to maintain inventory, isolation condenser operation for reactor cooldown and opening doors to the auxiliary electric equipment room, control room and panels to provide additional coolin In addition, the procedure requires verification of the automatic start of the diesel driven fire pump to provide makeup to the isolation condense The procedure requires verification that the diesel fire pump intake bay is clear of debris to prevent loss of pump suction due to clogged strainers. The inspector determined that the procedure, along with its references, was adequate to provide interim instructions for coping with a station blackout pending completion of the AAC power source installatio Formal training had not been completed on the latest procedure revision, but had been included in the requalification training so that all operators would receive adequate training. The revision had been included on the required reading list for operations personnel and signoffs that each person had read the revision were complet Severe Weather Procedures The Dresden Station has reviewed and revised procedure DOA 0010~02, "Tornado Warning/Severe Winds," Revision 2, dated March 5, 199 The procedure requires that upon receipt of a tornado/severe wind warning issued by the National Weather Service, plant personnel take steps to preclude or limit the probability of a station blackout due to wind damag These steps include verifying the availability of the three diesel generators, ceasing any testing or maintenance that make safety systems inoperable and securing items that could become tornado driven missiles. The inspector concluded that the procedure provided adequate instructions for plant response to severe weather condition Cross Tie Between Buses Installation of a cross tie between 4160 volt buses 23-1 and 33-1 is in process and scheduled to be completed during the next Unit 3 refueling outage. This modification will provide the capability to supply power to all safety related buses in both units from the AAC power source. AC Power Distribution The licensee has developed and implemented procedures for restoration of offsite power to Dresden and other Commonwealth Edison Company nuclear stations. The procedures require that restoration of reliable offsite AC power supplies to the nuclear stations be given the highest priorit to ensure adequate power for emergency control and reactor coolin In addition, the procedure states that repair crews trying to restore power to nuclear stations should be given the highest priority for necessary manpower, equipment, and material In the event of a station blackout, onsite power restoration would be accomplished using the plant's established procedures for abnormal electrical distribution system operatio. Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Reliability Program The licensee has developed a corporate EOG reliability program that provides guidelines for individual plant EOG reliability program The program incorporates the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63 and draft Regulatory Guide 1.9 for monitoring EOG reliability. Dresden Station is required to develop an EOG reliability program that includes EOG surveillance, condition monitoring of important EOG parameters, data systems to ensure availability of information, EOG maintenance, root cause evaluation, problem closeout to ensure resolution of EOG failures or problems and the determination and monitoring of EOG reliability against target trigger value The licensee is committed to have the EOG reliability program implemented at Dresden by September 1, 199. Loss of Ventilation The inspector reviewed procedure DOA 5750-01, "Ventilation System Failure," Revision 6, dated August 31, 199 Section D.7 of the procedure delineates those activities to be accomplished during a station blackout event relative to control room and auxiliary electrical equipment room ventilation. These rooms were identified as dominant areas of concern (DAC) during the licensee's station blackout revie * The procedure identifies room and panel doors in the control room and auxiliary electrical equipment room to be opened to provide ventilation on loss of power to their ventilation systems. According to the licensee's analysis, opening these doors will assist in maintaining room temperatures below the 120°F design temperatur Isolation Condenser Level Indication The licensee has implemented minor modification WR D-00600 to change the power source to the isolation condenser level indications' power supply from the instrument bus to the essential service bu The instrument bus would lose power in the event of a station blackou The essential service bus is powered by the DC system through the uninterruptable power supply and would be available during a station blackout even This modification assures that isolation condenser level indications will be displayed in the control room during the even. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such document/processes as proprietar }}