IR 05000219/1981006
| ML19350E937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Briggs L, Greenman E, John Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E929 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-81-06, 50-219-81-6, NUDOCS 8106230673 | |
| Download: ML19350E937 (15) | |
Text
'o-50219-810314
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATO.RY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I
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Report No.
50-219/81-06 Docket No.
50-219 Category C
License No.
DPR-16 Priority
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Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Morristown, New Jersey and Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted: March 1 - 31,1981 Inspectors: Mfd s 1m 4d/g/
D. A. Thomd/Residint Reactor Inspector
'date s1gned
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date signed
, L. E. Briggr4 Project Inspector
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date signed
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Approved by:
N E. G. Greenman, Chief, Reactor date signed Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 1 - 31,1981 (Report No. 50-219/81-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspector (86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br />) of:
licensee action on previous inspection findings, tours of the facility, log and record review, review of plant operations, potential core spray overpressurization, maintenance observation, and review of periodic reports; and an inspection at the Jersey Central Power and Light Company offices at Morristown, New Jersey by one region based inspector and one section chief (23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />) of review of licensee action on IE Circulars and Licensee Event Reports (Followup on Regional requests).
Results: One item of noncompliance was identified. (Failure to administer QA controls, Details 7.c.)
Region I Form 12
.810 6 S h owD
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(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1... Persons Contacted
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J. Carroll, Director, Oyster Creek Operations
- J. Chardos,' Supervisor E,I&C Projects S. De Merchant, ISRG Secretary K. Fickeissen, Manager, Plant Engineering D. Grace, Oyster Creek Engineering Projects Manager
- J. Knubel, Manager BWR Licensing
- M..Laggart, Licensing Supervisor
'J. Molnar, Core Manager A. Rone, Engineering Manager-
- J. Sullivan, Manager Operations
- T. Tipton, Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager
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The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance, and operations personnel.
- These individuals were present at the exit meeting conducted on March 10, 1981, at the Jersey Central Power and Light Company Offices in Morristown, D
- These individuals participated in the March 10, 1981 exit meeting by'
telephone.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inscection Findinas (Closed) Unresolved Item (219/79-06-02) Upgrade Control Room Log Keeping.
The inspector reviewed Procedure 106 Revision 15, dated January 30, 1981,
" Conduct of Operations" and determined that the content of Control Room log entries is dictated by written procedures. The inspector verified that current logs are kept in accordance with the procedure and adequately document plant status, conduct of major evolutions, and unusual events.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (219/80-25-02) Perform analysis of cold lap indication on SDV piping found during UT examination for IEB 80-17.
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The inspector reviewed the documentatien associated with NDE request number E-80-036 including the UTL NDE report dated December 23, 1980.
Follow-up UT examination of the two inch SDV piping was performed on December 10,1980. Review of the UT results by a Level III NDE technician determined, as stated in the NDE report, that the indications observed in the July 17, 1980 examination were nonrelevant indications and that
.both UT examinations showed no unacceptable conditions. The inspector had j
no further questions on this item.
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3.
Plant Tours a.
During the course of the inspection, frequent tours were conducted in the following areas:
Turbine Building;
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Augmented Off-Gas Building;
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.New Rad-Waste Building;
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Cooling Water Intake and Dilution Plant Structure;
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Monitoring Chang areas;
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4160 Volt Switchgear, 460 Volt Switchgear, and Cable Spreading
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Rooms;
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Maintenance Work Areas; and,
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Yard Areas.
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In addition, tours of the control room were conducted at least once per. day when the inspector was on site. Tours of.the reactor building were conducted at least three times per week.
b.
The following determinations were made:
(1) Monitoring instrumentation: All control roem panels were examined to verify that' required instrumentation was functional, that proper correlation between instrument channels existed, and that indicated parameters were within Technical Specification limits. Control room indications were examined to verify that system alignments and availability complied with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. Local' plant instrumentation was selectively examined to verify instrument operability and correlation between channels.
(2)
Control room annunciators and alarms:
Lit control room annuncia tors were reviewed with operators and shift supervisors to verify that the reasons for the alarmed conditions were understood and that corrective action, if required, was being ta ken.
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-(3) Plant housekeeping conditions: General cleanliness, material
. storage, and control of materials to prevent fire hazards were-examined for conformance to licensee adninistrative procedure 119, " Housekeeping", and procedure 120, " Fire Hazards". The inspector noted that considerable progress has been made in the efforts to remove the contaminated material in storage on the 95 foot and 119 foot elevations of the reactor building.
(4)
Fluid leaks and system integrity:
Systems and equipment in the areas toured were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration.
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(5) -Radiation Controls: The inspector made observations to verify that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed. Personnel were observed to verify that dosimetry was worn when required. Work in radiation controlled areas was observed for adherence to licensee procedures and for compliance with the reouirements of applicable radiation work permits. Workers involv'ed in cleanup and decontamination activities of the 95 and 119 foot elevations were monitored frequently as.well as contractor personnel performing decontamination of the corner rooms and the minus 19 foot elevation of the reactor building.
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(6) During tours of the faciitty, valves and components in safety related systems were checked to verify proper system alignment.
Selected valve positions were checked in the core spray and containment spray systems, standby liquid control system, and control rod drive hydraulic system. All breakers in the 4160 volt switch gear room and selected breakers in the 460 volt switch gear room were verified for proper alignment.
(7) Security: The inspector verified that security posts were manned and that personnel and vehicle searches were conducted as required. Vital areas were periodically checked to insure that they were locked or guarded and that positive control of
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access was exercised.
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'(8)
By frequent observations during -the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10CFR 50.54(k)
.and Technical Specifications were being met.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
c.
'The following acceptance criteria were used for the above ' items:
Technical Specifications;
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10CFR 50.54(k); and,
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Inspector judgement.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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4.
Shift Logs and Ooerating Records a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for review of selected logs and records:
Procedure 106, Cpnduct of Operations;
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Procedure 108, Equipment Control; 'and
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Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
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The inspector had no questions in this area.
b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room logs were filled out and signed;
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Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
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Log entries involving abnormal conditions provided sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status; Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and reviewed;
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Operating orders did not conflict with Technical Specification
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requirements; and,
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Logs and records were maintained in accordance with the procedures
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in a. above.
c.
The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussions with licensee personnel.
Reviews were conducted on an intermittent
.lective basis:
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Control. Room Log, all entries;
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Group Shift Supervisors Log;
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Control Room Alarm Sheets;
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Control Rod Status Sheets;
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' Technical Specification Log;
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Reactor Auxiliary Log;
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Reactor Log;
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Control Room Turnover Check List;-
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Reactor Building Tour Sheets;
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Turbine Building Tour Sheets;
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Equipment' Tagging Log;
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Lifted Lead and Jumper Log;
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Defeated Alarm Log;
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Standing Orders, all active; and,
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Operational Memos and Directives, all active.
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d.
On March 12, 1981,. the inspector reviewed all active entries in the defeated alarm log. The following alarms were logged as being defeated:
Panel 7F-P, " Main Flash Tank Hi/Lo Level". This alarm was
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defeated on July 22, 1980 due to' continual spurious alarms.
The alarms annunciated due to actual alarm conditions resulting
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from a malfunctioning icvel controller on the main flash tank.
Maintenance action was in progress at the time of the inspector's review and was completed on March 16, 1981. Th arm was restored to operation and cleared from the defeated alan log.
Panel 8F/9F-T, " Fire in Exciter Housing CO2 Discharge". This
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alarm was entered in the defeated alarm log and the alarm window tagged because the CO2 discharge system was removed from service and the alarm circuitry removed. The licensee will consider replacing the alarm window with a blank to eliminate the necessity of the tag and defeated alarm log entry, c
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-- Panel 8F/9F-T, " Fire in Turbine Generator Bearing CO2 Discharge". The reason for defeat of this alann and its
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present status is'the same as stated for the previous item.
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l defeated on December 2,1980 due to spurious alanns. The inspector detennined that no maintenance action was in progress. After dis-cussion with the licensee, maintenance action was initiated to restore the alann to service. Corrective action was incomplete at the conclusion of this inspection.
Panel 1F/2F-C, " Shutdown Cooling Pump B Trip". This alann was
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defeated on December 2,1980 due to spurious alanns. The inspector
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detemined that no maintenance action was in progress. After dis-cussion with the licensee, maintenance action was inititated to restore the alann to service. Corrective action was incomplete at the conclusion of this inspection.
Panel 1F/2F-C, " Shutdown Cooling HX and Fuel Pool HX High
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Temperature". This alann was defeated on December 29, 1980 to clear the alann. A continuous actual alann condition exists because leakage through the-Shutdown Cooling System section isolation valves causes the shutdown cooling heat exchanger
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outlet temperature to exceed the 180 degree F alarm setpoint.
Valve maintenance is planned for the next refueling outage.
Panel 10XF, " Rad Waste Building Fire". This alarm was defeated
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on December 24, 1980 to clear a continuous alarm resulting from
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failed sensors. Maintenance troubleshooting and repair has been initiated.
Panel 10XF, " Rad Waste System Overboard Discharge Hi Rad". This
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alarm was defeated on December 24, 1980 when the associated monitor was removed from service.
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Panel 7F-P, " Aux Flash Tank Low Level". This alarm was defeated
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to clear a continuous alarm. An actual alarm condition existed due to a malfunctioning Aux Flash Tank level controller.
Maintenance action was completed on March 16, 1981, the alarm restored to operation, and the defeated alarm log entry cleared.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
e.
On March 12. 1981, the inspector reviewed the lifted lead and jumper log to determine if any active entries affected the operability of annunciators or alarms. Numerous jumpers bypassed or otherwise defeated portions of the inputs to " common" alarms. For example, several individual control rod drive temperature thermocouples are jumpered to prevent actuation of the "CRD High Temperature" common alarm because the individual thennocouple has failed. The "A."
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Emergency Condenser inlet high temperature input from recorder IG02 has been jumpered due to a failed sensor to prevent actuation of the
" Emergency Condenser Pipe High Temperature" common alarm. The lifted lead and jumper log entries which similarly affected comon
' alarms are numbers 75-4, 75-5, 75-6,80-291, 80-294,80-297, 80-298 80-305,80-306, 80-307, and 80-334. None of these jumpered inputs to common alarms were logged in the defeated alarm log. Procedure 108, revision 25, dated December 22,1980, " Equipment Control", states that the Group Shift Suoervisor is responsible for controlling the intentional defeat of alarm circuits and that he will maintain a Defeated Alarm Log and assure that the alarm windows are clearly tagged when inoperable. The procedure further states that acceptable reasons for' defeating alarms include malfunctioning alarms, alarms due to equipment tagged out of service, and knoe alarm conditions which
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have the potential of masking additional alarm conditions. The inspector expressed concern that jumpering inputs to " common" alarms falls under the category of defeating alarms which have the potential of masking additional alarm conditions, but the system of logs and tags used to administratively control defeated alarms does not lend itself to control of comon alarms. The licensee stated that he would review procedure 108 to determine if revision is necessary to more adequately control jumpering of inputs to comon alarms. This item is unresolved pending further review by the licensee and NRC (219/81-06-01).
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5.
Review of Plant Ooerations a.
The inspector reviewed circumstances surrounding a plant startup
conducted on November 28, 1980 which had been delayed due to the inability to reduce the drywell oxygen concentration to less than 5 percent to verify that the failure to inert the drywell was not the result of valve lineup errors caused by violations of the tagging procedures in procedure 108, " Equipment Control". The Control Room Operators (CRO) log and the Group Shift Supervisor's (GSS) log for the period in question were reviewed. The inspector detennined that control rod withdrawal had begun at 6:39 p.m. on November 28, 1980, and the reactor was made critical at 7:54 p.m.
Inerting of the primary containment had begun at 3:45 p.m. on November 28 but was not completed until 7:06 p.m. on November 29, 1980. The records indicated that after achieving criticality, plant power ascension and heatup were temporarily suspended at a pressure of 550 psig. Plant heatup to the point of placing the Mode Switch in "Run" was not completed until 7:05 p.m. on November
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'29,1980. The log entries indicated that a pressure buildup in the torus was observed while attempting to purge the torus with nitrogen with the torus vent valves open.
Interviews with GSS's and CRO's on duty during the startup indicated that the cause of the pressure buildup in the torus could not be detennined. A maintenance supervisor perfonned a visual inspection of the torus vent valves (V-28-17 and V-28-18)'and observed the valve operators while the valves were cycled open and shut.several times. No malfunction of the valves was observed. The suspected cause of the pressure buildup is a restriction in the vent valves resulting from modifications during the 1980 refueling outage which limited the valve opening to less than 30 degrees. When the nitrogen purge rate was reduced, inerting proceeded without further pressure buildup. The inspector reviewed
__. records of system tagouts back to July 1980 and could find no indication of valve tagging which if improperly cleared and realigned could have contributed to the'Ticensee's inability to inert t'he_ torus,.
The inspector noted however thit the inerting of the containment was further delayed by a subseouent failure of part of the electric heaters in the nitrogen vaporizer on the storage tank. A subsequent plant startup on March 31, 1981 following a drywell entry was also complicated by a similar sequence of events resulting from a pressure buildup in the torus and. by failure of the nitrogen heaters. The licensee has initiated maintenance action to repair the vaporizer heaters and has committed to perform further investigation of the flow restrictions.in valves V-28-17 and V-28-18. Flow restrictions
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in the torus vent valves is unresolved pending further investigation by the licensee (219/81-06-02).
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b.
During a plant startup.on March 17, 1981, the plant 1xperienced a momentary loss of the 'B' 41f,0 volt bus while transf arring the bus power from the Startup Transformer to the Auxiliary Transformer.
The control room operator closed breaker 'MlB' to energize the 'B'
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4160 volt bus from the Auxiliary Transfonner. The 'SlB' breaker from the Startup Transformer is interlocked with 'M1B' and should have automatically tripped but did not. The operator then reopened
'M1B' until the problem with 'SlB' could be determined. Approximately three minutes later 'SlB' tripped causing the 'B' 4160 volt bus to be deenergized. The control room operator, who was closely monitoring the panel at the time, imediately closed breaker 'MlB'
to reenergize the bus. The 'SlB' b eaker was subsequently racked
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out and inspected under job order 2699E. The cause of the breaker failure was determined to be sticking trip rollers. The breaker was cleaned, lubricated, and tested satisfactorily. The licensee will inspect the remaining 4160 volt feeder breakers during the April 1981 maintenance outage.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
c.
On March 14, 1981, et about 10:30 P.M., the packing failed on valve V-2-88, a manual bypass valve around the condensate makeup / letdown valve. The failed packing resulted in a spill of about 50 gallons of water from the condensate transfer system. The spill was completely contained within the confines of the enclosure around the condensate transfer pumps, but some of the water soaked into the earthen floor of the building. Samples of the water and wetted soil were collected for radiochemical analysis. Activity level of the water was 7.2 E-5 microcuries per milliliter gross gamma.
Activity level of the soil was 3.9 E-5 microcuries per gram of Cobalt 60. The cause of the packing failure was a stripped packing gland stud which allowed the internal pressure to blow out the valve packing. The valve was isolated and subsecuently repaired.
No offsite release of radioactive material accurred as a result of this incident.
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No items of noncompliance were identified, d.
The inspectors observed an emergency drill conducted by the licensee on March 31, 1981. The drill was conducted by the licensee to evaluate the newly implemented emergency plan. The drill was initiated by simulating a main steam line break between the main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) which yielded an " Alert" condition, with a subsequent failure of an upstream MSIV to close completely.
Tce drill was terminated when onsite radiation surveys indicated that a " General Emergency" conditicn should be declared. The inspectors observed the licensee's activity in the Control Room and the Operations Support Center and attended the licensee's critique following the drill. The licensee's evaluation of the drill indicated further personnel training and review of emergency plan'
implementing procedures is required to bring the facility to an adequate level of emergency prepaiedness. Subsequent training drills will be monitored by the NRC.
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6.
Potential Core Spray Overpressurization On March 20,1981, the licensee was notified by the NRC Licensing Project Manager of an NRC concern that excessive leakage through the-Core Spray System containment isolation check valve's (NZO2A, NZO2B, NZO2C. and NZO30) coupled with a failure of one of the Core Spray System parallel isolation valves (V-20-15, V-20-40, V-20-21, or V-20-41) could cause an overpressurization and possiSle failure of the low pressure portions of the Core Spray System piping. The licensee was requested to conduct a_ leak rate test of the check valves and report the results to the NRC. Procedure 610.4.011. " Core Spray System Testable Check Valve Leakage. Test" dated March 21, 1981, was written and approved by the
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- Plant Operations Review' Cannittee, and subsequently performed on March
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22, 1981. No unacceptable leakage was found through the check valves.
A-procedure will be incorporated into the plant surveillance program for periodic testing af these valves.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
7.
Followup en Reofonal Recuests
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a.
Scope
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On March 9 and 10,1981, a special inspection visit was made to the Corporate Office of Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCP&L)
at Morristown, New Jersey to evaluate.the adequacy of licensee actions, concerning IE Circulars 77-09, 79-04 and the recent installation of ITT Barton Model 288A Snap Action Switches.
b.
IE Circular Followup
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(1)
IE Circular 77-09, Improper Fuse Coordination in BWR
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Standby Liquid Control System Control Circuits. This circular was reviewed in detail during inspection 50-219/81-01 l
and left open because an engineering evaluation was 'n progress to determine if existing fuse coordination was correct. Fuse size s, specified in G.E. Drawing 885D949, were verified to be installed in the control circuits; however, further evaluation was required to insure that proper fuse coordination existed. This study has been completed by General Electric under Oyster Creek Engineering
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Task Number's 79-38 and 80-96. The information from the study is baing used to compile an installation package which will be installed during the Spring 1981 maintenance outage.
This information is further documented in a memo, Jones to Knubel, dated March 10, 1981 and in a letter, NRC:RI to-JCP&L, dated March 20, 1981. This Circular will remain open pending inspection by the Resident Inspector subsequent to licensee modification of the control circuits.
(2)
IE Circular 79-04, Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators. This item was addressed during inspection 50-219/81-01. At that time no action had been taken by the licensee to physically inspect Limitorque operators for loose locking nuts as recomended by the circular; however, Engineering Task 80-242 had been issued to conduct Limitorque inspection.
During discussions on March 9 and
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10, 1981, the licensee agreed to:
Conduct an inspection of, accessible Limitorque operators
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prior to the scheduled April 1981 outage Conduct an inspection of all valve operators, not
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inspected above, prior to restart from the April 1981 outage. This commitment is further documented in a letter, NRC:RI to JCP&L, dated March 20, 1981.
This circular will remain open pending the completion of licensee action and rein.spection by the Resident Inspector.
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c.
LER Trerd Analysis and Followup ITT Barton, Model 288A Snap Action Switches.
IE Inspection 81-01 identified numerous Licensee Event Reports (LER's) dealing with setpoint repeatability problems on recently installed (Winter 1980 outage)safetyrelatedinstruments. These LER's were discussed with the licensee on March 9 and 10,1981. To detennine if a proper engineering design review was corducted the following documents were i
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Engineering Request EA-27 Oyster Creek Seismic Qualifications
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of Electrical Components, dated November 2,1979;
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General Electric Letter, G-EN-9-100, Oyster Creek
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NGS, Systematic Evaluation Program Seismic Review, dated September 21, 1979; Modification Proposal Number 464-1, Oyster Creek
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Nuclear Generating Station Reactor Protection Systems /
I.T.T. Bartons. Yarways, Mercoids and Magnetrol Switch Replacement, dated April _l,1980 and attacned Safety Evaluation Summary Sheet; ISRG Review Number 80-58 (GP-80-829), dated August 7,
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1980; ISRG Review Number 80-58.1 (GP-80-853), dated August
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28, 1980; Purchase Requisition Number 61619, dated December 26,
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1979;
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Purchase Requisition Number 37138, dated November 5,
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Procedure 2006, Modification, Nonroutine Maintenance
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and Repair, Revision 0, dated March 7,1975 and Revision 1, dated September 1,1980; Procedure 2001, Administration of Procurement, Revision
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3, dated November 1,1979;
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Procedure 2019, Request for Safety Review and Independent
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Safety Review Program, Revision 2 September 14, 1979; and, ITT Barton Product Bulletin 288A/289A-2
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As a result of the above review the inspectors determined that the replacement switches that were purchased and installed were of a better design than those previously installed. Setpoint repeatability had been investigated by the licensee with the
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aid of a ITT Barton representative. The setpoint repeatability problem was thought to be a result af the methods used during instrument calibration and the environment (non laboratory)
where the switches were being used. The licensee agreed to further resolve the repeatability problem by assigning an I&C engineer to develop and monitor a testing program to:
Review and revise, as necessary, calibration procedures
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and techniques to obtain the most accurate instrument setpoints possible; Determine the time frame for sensor drift (e.g.,
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1 day,1 week,1 month) including plots for those instruments which have a tendency to drift; Determine if a more conservative setpoint can be used to
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account for observed drift; Conduct testing and correlate results for NRC review by
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May 19,1981; and,
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Develop trend ana. lysis for existing and future LER's
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to facilitate detection of problems of a generic and/or repetitive nature.
The commitments are further documented in a letter, NRC:RI to
JCP&L, dated March 10, 1981. The inspectors noted that the original purchase requisition, number 37138, was initiated requiring Quality Assurance Department review (systems affected were listed on the QASL); however, the original requisition was canceled and requisition number 61619 was issued and the materials (ITT Barton Model 288A Snap Action Switches) were purchased without -QA review. Procedure 2001, Administration of Procurement, requires review by Operational Quality Assurance (00A) and any changes must meet the same requirements imposed on the original procurement document. Purchase of safety related material on requisition 61619 without QA review constitutes an item of noncompliance (219/81-06-03).
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In addition, the' inspectors expressed concern about the untimely ~ actions taken by the licensee to resolve and close-
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out IE Circular identified issues. The licensee stated that a system to track IEC's and other NRC items currently exists but
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has experienced only limited success.
It was further stated that tracking responsibility is currently being shifted to the newly established on-site licensing department and that a -
more effective system of control would be implemented by April
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30, 1981. This item.is unresolved pending licensee implementation and subsequent NRC inspection (219/81-06-04).
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Maintenance Observation
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During the inspection period,-the inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with the administrative and maintenance procedures; recuired QA/QC involvement;
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proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use.of jumpers; radiological centrols; fire protection; and retest requirements. The following activities were included during this review:
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IobOrder269'9E, Inspect 4160voltbreakerSlB, performed
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on March 17, 1981 Job Order 7728M, QASL 4420, Rebuild Scram Inlet Valve for
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i CR014-19. This work was performed on March 16, 1981, under Radiation Work Permit number 037481.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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9.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee
.?arsuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations: the report includes the infortnation required to be reported to the NRC; planned corrective actions are adequate for resolution of identified problems; and that the reported information is valid. Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
August 1980 Monthly Operating Data Report i
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September 1980 Monthly Operating Data Report
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October 1980 Monthly Operating Data Report
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November 1980 Monthly Operating Data Report
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December 1980 Monthly Operating Data Report
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January 1981 Monthly Operating Data Report
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February 1981 Monthly Operating Data Report
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Review of the above reports determined that the August thru January reports were in error in that they indicated that no Technical Specification changes relative to the next refueling are anticipated.
This was discussed with the licensee on March 11, 1981. The licensee acknowledged the error and stated that future. reports would be submitted correctly. The February 1981 report submitted on March 19, 1981 was correct in that it stated that a Technical Specification Change Recuest to incorporate G.E. fuel assemblies will be submitted.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4.e, 5.a and 7.c.
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11. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and
findings. A meeting to discuss the results of the inspection conducted at the Jersey Central Power and Light Company offices at Morristown, New Jersey was held on March 10, 1981.
Discussions with station management relative to the status of Resident inspection efforts were held on March 11,12,16,18, 20, 26, and 31,1981.