IR 05000219/1981009
| ML20050C639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1982 |
| From: | Knapp P, Plumlee K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050C633 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-81-09, 50-219-81-9, NUDOCS 8204090197 | |
| Download: ML20050C639 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.
50-219/81-09 Docket No.
5_0-219 License No.
OPR-16 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsipyany, New Jersey 07054 Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted: April 27-30, 1981 Inspectors:
k~
[hdo 3/A.3/72-
' K. E. Plum ee, Radiati n Specialist d' ate signed k h.
R Mr+A
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'D Approved by:
x P. J.'l(n a pp, C hi'e f,' Fa c i l i \\Fadiological d/tes/gned Protection Section, Techn cal Inspection Branch Inspection Summary:
inspection on April 27-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-219/81-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector oT radiation protection curing refueling, including procedures, training, exposure control, respiratory protection, posting and control of radiation areas and high radiation areas, labeling and control of radioactive materials, survey instrumentation, and site soil sampling.
Areas where work was being conducted were examined to review radiation safety control procedures and practices.
This inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC
,eglonal based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8204090197 820324 DR ADOCK 05000239 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Arbach, Radiological Support Supervisar
- G. Busch, Licensing Engineer
- J. Carroll, Jr., Director, Station Operations
- K. Fickeissen, Manager, Plant Engineering
- S. Fuller, Supervisor, Site QA
- R. Garner, Programs and Controls Director R. Pelrine, Chemistry Manager B. Somers, Group Chemistry Supervisor
- D. Turner, Manager, Radiation Control
- J. Sullivan, Unit Superintendent
- denotes presence at the exit interview conducted on May 1, 1981.
2.
Radiation Protection Procedures and Practices The inspector toured the facility to observe and review the procedures and practices in effect during the outage when several hundred temporary employees, in addition to the regular work force, were working onsite.
Inspection criteria included the requirements of 10 CFR 20, " Standards for Protection Against Radiation;" Technical Specification (T.S.) Section 3.1, " Protective Instrumentation," which specifies maximum 17 mr/hr trip settings on two reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors and maximum 100 mr/hr trip settings on two refueling floor area radiation monitors; T.S. 6.8, " Procedures;" T.S. 6.11, " Radiation Protection Program;"
T.S. 6.13, "High Radiation Area;" Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972, Appendix A; and ANSI Guide N18.7-1972, Sections 5.1 and 5.3.
During tours of the facility, accompanied by licensee health physics supervision, the inspector observed the workers' job performance and adherence to the radiation work permit (RWP) instructions and to procedures for step-off pads, frisking for contamination, donning and removing
protective clothing and respirators, air sampling, stay times, dosimetry (see paragraph 5.b) and records.
The inspector reviewed the instructions on 20 RWPs to verify that appropriate controls were provided for the hazards indicated on the RWP's.
3.
Radiation Protection Training a.
Escorted Individuals
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The inspector verified that training commensurate with the potential radiological health protection problems in the rostricted area was
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provided in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12.
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The inspector observed that all new arrivals awaiting more comprehensive-training, and short term visitors who would receive no further training during the visit, were instructed to stay with their escorts and to follow instructions. The unescorted individuals were briefly informed of the potential. radiation hazards and the purpose of public address system announcements and warning signals, local alarms, barriers.and posted signs.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
General Employee Training The inspector verified that training and a written examination were
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prerequisites for unescorted access to the site.
This level of radiation protection training covered the topics'in the Oyster Creek
" Radiation Safety Manual." A copy was passed out to each trainee.
l Personnel taking this course were trained in the use of personnel dosimeters, contamination friskers and portal me tors, as examples.
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The inspector reviewed the records of 10 individuals to verify their completion of this level of training.
No discrepancies were noted.
l In order to assess the effectiveness of this training, the inspector contacted one individual whose personnel dosimetry equipment was discovered missing from the badge rack on April 28, 1981, and also a second individual who, on entering the site at about 8 A.M. on April
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28, had mistakenly picked up the.first individual's dosimetry equipment
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i instead of his own.
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l Licensee security personnel identified and contacted the second
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individual before he entered any controlled area wearing other than his assigned dosimetry, which would have been contrary to Procedure No. 915.7, " Personnel Dosimetry."
f Based on these contacts, it appeared that the training was adequate
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for the first individual but possibly not enough emphasis was given for the second individual tc remember to actually read the name on i
the dosimetry badge when he took it from the self-service rack.
Alternatives to additional emphasis in training would be prompters
or warning signs on the badge rack.
i The licensee representative stated that an investigation report was ini'.iated to recommend preventive action on this item.
Licensee procedures specify followup on these recommendations.
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c.
Training of RWP-Qualified Workers Observation of training, contacts with personnel on RWP jobs, and a records review confirmed that RWP workers received the training and written examination stated in Prcceduce No. 915.6, " Training in Radiation Protection." Verification of their practical ability to don and remove protective clothing and to properly cross step-off pads was documented in accordance with the procedure.
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d.
Training of Contract Health Physics Technicians The inspector verified by reviews of records that technician qualifica-s
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tion included the training stated in Procedure No. 915.15, " Radiological Controls Field Operations Personnel Qualification / Training Standard."
The records documented their practical ability verification on 20 tasks routinely required of technicians, including, as examples, the performance and recording of surveys and air samples.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Exposur e Control a.
External Exposure Control The inspector verified by observation during tours of the facility, i
and by record review, the compliance with exposure limits required by 10 CFR 20.101, dosimetry requirements of 10 CFR 20.202 and record and report requirements of 10 CFR 19.13(a), 10 CFR 20.102, 10 CFR
20.401, 10 CFR 20.408 and 10 CFR 20.409.
i Specifically, the inspector reviewed 10 personnel files to verify
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the adequacy of Form NRC-4 and Form NRC-5 records, the documentation
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l of fitness to wear respirators, the documentation of increased i
administrative limits on exposures, and the provision of exposure j
reports to workers on termination.
I The inspector contacted two departing individuals to verify that the
written exposure information for the current calendar quarter, required by 10 CFR 19.13(e), was provided promptly on termination.
The inspector also reviewed the recent printout of personnel exposures, and no overexposures and no record errors were identified.
b.
Internal Exposures
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The inspector verified by a review of selected air sample analyses and whole body count records that the internal exposure limits i
required by 10 CFR 20.103 were not exceeded.
Specifically, records in the perscnnel files described in 1.a above, were inspected to verify compliance with Procedure No. 915.8, " Bioassay Program,"
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Section 4.1, "Invivo Bioassay Requirements." The procedure requires a current (i.e., within 365 days) whole body count as a prerequisite to entering a RWP area and a followup on termination or at least annually.
The procedure includes action levels consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR 20.203.
During the inspection, an individua., in the presence of a licensee health physics supervisor, requested the inspector's assurance that he would receive a termination whole body count on completion of his tour of duty onsite. The individual explained that his request resulted from the licensee reneging on a whole body count at the completion of his previous tour of duty onsite, about December 1, 1978.
The licensee representative assured the individual that he would receive a termination body count on compietion of this tour onsite.
The individual stated that he was satis 11ed with the licensee's commitment and he would contact NRC if he had any further questions.
The inspector asked for additional details of the 1978 termination and the individual stated that he received a whole body count but
then the job requirements changed and he was sent back into the drywell for two or three days and terminated without a recount. He stated that he was orally promised a recount by site health physics personnel and then he was told by his foreman that no recount was due him.
He was not given a recount until he returned for another
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tour of duty starting late in April, 1981.
The inspector reviewed the individual's recoro file and there was a record of a whole body count on November 29, 1978, and his corrected termination letter indicated he worked to December 1, 1978*. The
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whole body record showed the presence of 10 nanocuries of Co-60 and 5 nanocuries of Cs-137, which total less than 10 mpc-hours of exposure to airborne radioactive materials.
There was no indication in the file of any plans for a recount.
No detectable radioactivity was indicated by the preliminary results of the 1981 recount.
Review of the procedure in effect during 1978 showed that the radiation protection manager (RPM) designated who would receive a whole body count, and when, at b's discretion.
The RPM since left the licensee's employ and he was ne. contacted during this inspection.
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i Dosimetry record indicates December 7, 1978, as end of badge period.
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The inspector noted that the above information did not identify.any
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noncompliance and there is no justification at this time to go further into this matter.
Had the current procedure been in effect
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on December 1, 1978, the licensee should have documented the reason there was no whole body count on termination.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l 5.
Respiratory Protection
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a.
Use of Process or Engineering Controls
During tours of the facility, the inspector verified that process or engineering controls were provided to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103(b)(1).
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In order to limit the number, extent and severity of airborne radio-active materials areas, the licensee provided coverings, temporary enclosures over contaminated ' sos, ventilation and air-cleaning systems, access controls, ano sur face decontamination, b.
Review of Licensee Evaluations The inspector noted that records of air sample analyses, respirator usage data cards, and whole body counts were used to evaluate personnel exposures to airborne radioactive materials.
The inspector reviewed 3 air samples and calculated mpc-hour exposure records and no errors were evident.
The inspector observed that Procedure Nos. 915.8, " Bioassay Program,"
and 915.10, " Investigation of Radiation Incidents," indicated conserva-tive action levels such that detectable uptakes of radioactive materials would be identified. No overexposures, and no recent exposures greater than 2 mpc-hrs / day or 40 mpc-hrs / week, were identified.
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Selection of Proper Respirators The inspector reviewed Procedure No. 915.5, " Respiratory Protection,"
and no improper procedural selection of respirators was identified.
The inspector observed during tours of the facility that respirator use appeared to adhere to the procedure.
i d.
Fitting of Respirators The above procedure limits the use of respirators to individuals who have been tested for proper fit within the past 365 days.
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The inspector observed that the training and retraining and fit testing, appeared to adhere to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 8.15, " Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection," and to the licensee's procedures.
Respirator users were observed examining the respirators before use and testing respirators for leakage when donned for use.
e.
Maintenance Program Observation indicated that trained personnel were performing the maintenance specified by Procedure No. 915.5 and the maintenance records were specific, complete, and up-to-date.
f.
Other Requirements The inspector verified that records of physician's approvals of respirator users were caintained (see paragraph 4.a).
The inspector verified that the filter cannisters in use bore the proper labels for the actual use.
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The inspector verified that the equipment was assigned acceptable protection factors.
No items of noncompliance were identified involving respiratory protection procedures and practices.
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6.
Posting and Control of Radiation Areas, Airborne Radioactivity Areas and Contaminated Areas The inspector toured the facility on two days of the inspection to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203, " Caution signs, labels,
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signals and controls."
The inspector conducted confirmatory surveys to verify the adequacy of posted information, container labels, and barricades; and also verified adherence to Procedure Nos. 915.1, " Restriction of Access into Radiation Control Areas," and 915.12, " Radiation Work Permit (RWP)."
Review of 10 RWPs verified authorization in accordance with the procedure, and the incorporation of instructions that complied with procedures for the specification of protective clothing, respirators, dosimetry equipment, air sampling, and health physics monitoring.
The inspector surveyed the outdoor areas where contaminated materials and
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radioactive waste were stored. The inner fence appeared to be posted i
commensurate with the radiation levels. The outer fence did not appear to extend into any area where the radiation exposure rate was as great as 0.1 mrem /hr.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Radioactive and Contaminated Material Control
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The inspector toured the facility to verify that radioactive and contaminated material was collected in properly labelled containers (paragraph 6) and the radioactive waste reduction program was implemented.
The inspector verified that used protective clothing, respirators, tools, parts and radioactive waste were systematically collected and routed to the appropriate disposition, such as shipments to an offsite laundry, a respirator cleaning and maintenance facility onsite, a decontamination operation onsite, storage, or preparation for shipment offsite.
The inspector verified that noncontaminated waste was maintained in separate receptacles from contaminated materials and was surveyed to verify its proper disposition on release-from the site.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Availability of Survey Instruments, Air Samplers, and Portal Monitors The licensee inventory on April 30, 1981, identified 286 survey instruments and friskers, of which 26, or about 9%, were out-of-service needing calibration or maintenance.
The inventory revealed that 4 out of a total
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of 7 RM-16 instruments were out-of-service.
Of 115 air samplers and pumps that were located, 27 or about 23%, were
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out-of-service.
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Observation during the inspection did not identify any significant delays from any shortages of instruments; however, one example of an unplugged portal monitor power cord was observed.
This portal monitor was not posted or blocked off to prevent its use.
It was not determined during the inspection how the power cord became unplugged. A user did not appear to notice that the lights were off for this monitor.
Licensee corrective action was to safety-wire the power cord plug into the power receptacle.
No items of noncompliance were ident.~ried.
9.
Soil Survey and Soil Sampling Results a.
Soil Contacted by a Condensate Water Spill The inspector conducted a survey and obtained soil samples on April 29, 1981, in the area that was contacted by a condensate water spill
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on April 21, 1981, from a valve packing failure in the condensate transfer system.
Figure 1 is a drawing of the general area of the
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spill and identifies the locations from which Oyster Creek personnel took soil samples. The inspector's samples A-1,
-2, and -3 were from the same vicinity as OC #9 on Figure 1.
The inspector's sample B was :aken near the top of the steps shown on Figure 1.
The licensee estimated that about 10,000 gallons of the 12,000 gallons spilled was collected in the radwaste system drain for the condensate transfer system pump and valve hut,- but about 2,000 gallons spread out over the soil surrouncing this structure. This area was within the protected area of the site. Any runoff would be to the discharge canal.
The licensee's soil sample analyses obtained on April 21, 1981, indicated as high as 7.9 E-4 uC1/ gram [ Table I, OC #8 primarily composed of Ce-141 (48?;), La-140 (~ 18?s), Y-93 (~ 13?J) and Cs-137 (~
10. 5*4)]. Most of the samples contained at most, two identified isotopes having half-lives greater than one year, typically 30 year Cs-137 and 5 year Co-60.
Radioactive decay will reduce all but the Cs-137 below the present detection limit within the lifetime of the plant.
Eventual site decommissioning will assure the safe disposition of any remaining radioactivity.
The maximum identified Cs-137 concentration was 1 E-4 pCi/ml.
Three of the OC samples, Nos. OC-8,
-9, and -10, appea n d to indicate 269; to 9894 greater Ce-141 concentrations that the inspector's decay-j corrected sample A-1 which was taken at the spot having the highest I
contact exposure rate on April 29, 1981. Considering that 8 days l
had elapsed between taking the OC samples and the A-1 sample.and there was heavy rain during this period, the agreement is excellent.
The A-1 split sample results gave excellent agreement for Ce-141.
The inspector noted that the A-1,
-2, and -3 sample analyses indicated that most of the Ce-141 remained within 2-inches of the surface.
The apparent Ce-141 specific activity ratio for A-1:A-2:A-3 was 1.0:0.53:0.14.
The contaminated soil is within the site protected area. No use was evident that would cause any unmonitored introduction of this contamination into the food chain. Any runoff or seepage of water from the area would go to the intake or discharge canal which are included in the environmental monitoring program.
b.
Soil Contacted by Seepage of Water from the New Radwaste Building The licensee had reported seepage through a wall of the New Radwaste Building and onto the soil, after a tank overflowed in a pit. The licensee representative stated that surveys and sampling had identified the following maximum surface soil contamination in this area:
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Table 1A Soil Samples f rom Area of Condensate Transfer System Spill Sample A-1 (Split)
A-1 A-2 A-3
OC #1 OC #2 OC #3 OC #4 Location Sample Depth Surf.
_Su rf.
1-J L.
6-in.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Su_r[.
Surf.
LAU DO L__*
OC "
- Ce-141 1.91 E-4 1.98 E-4 1.01 E-4 2.72 E-5 2.1 E-7
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1.15 E-4 3.34 E-5 3.43 E-5 Cc-1414
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3.90 E-6
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Cs-137 3.88 E-7
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6.15 E-7
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8.69 E-5 8.00 E-5 9.49 E-5
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C0-60 3.68 E-6 1.05 E-5 5.60 E-6 3.30 E-6 9.16 E-7 2.56 E-5 3.13 E-5 2.65 E-5
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3.11 E-6 2.51 E-6 3.22 E-6
- Ba-140 4.4 E-6
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5.9 E-6
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4.43 E-5
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- La-140 1.4 E-6
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1.1 E-6
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2.6 E-6 2.0 E-6 Fe-59 9.5 E-7
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Mn-54 9.5 E-7
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4.8 E-7
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Ru-103 3.7 E-7
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t4b-95 2.7 E-7
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Sr-89
E-7"***
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Sr-90 1.9 E-7****
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- DOE-IDAHO Operations Of fice Radiologica l Env i ronmenb ta l Sciences Labora tory.
- Oyste r Creek a na lys i s.
- Decay co rrected to 4/21/81.
- S r-89 a nd Sr-90 we re nea r the limit of detection. i f present.
Table la Sample OC #5 OC #6 OC #7 OC #8 OC #9 OC #10 OC #11 CC #13 OC #14 OC #15
[o ca_tio_g uample Dopfh Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
Surf.
LAH OC OC OC OC OC OC OC OC OC OC Cc-141 1.69 E-4 3.43 E-5
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3.80 E-4 2.44 E-4 2.41 E-4 7.00 E-5
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6.0 E-6 Co-144
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Cs-137 1.04 E-4 7.8 E-5 2.56 E-6 8.3 E-5 7.63 E-5 1.03 E-5 9.15 E-6 7.28 E-5 5.27 E-5 7.86 E-6 Co-60 2.33 E-5
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1.92 E-5
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2.52 E-5
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1.57 E-5 Co-57
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3.22 E-6 2.55 E-6
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Ba-140
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La-140
f.- 7 2.01 E-5
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1.42 E-4 8.37 E-5 8.41 E-5
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Fe-59
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5.09 E-6
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C r-51
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5.68 E-5
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Zn-65
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2.09 E-5
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--
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Y-93
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1.03 E-4
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tio detectable activity was reported for sample OC #12.
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-Cs-137 3.32 E-4 (uCi/g)
i Cs-134 3.69 E-5 Co-60 5.99 E-5
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The inspector surveyed the soil on April 29, 1981 and selected the
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spot having the apparent highest' contact exposure' rate. A soil
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sample _was taken at 1-in. and another at 5-in. depth, the 1-in, j
depth being an apparently more active layer than the surface. The analyses. performed for the NRC by the Department of Energy were:
a 1-in. depth 5-in. depth l
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Cs-137 5.1 E-4 (uCi/g)
2.2 E-6 (uCi/g)
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Cs-134 5.1 E-5 Not detectable Co-60 8.0 E-5 9.4 E-7
The inspector's 1-in. depth sample appeared to have 33% to 54%
greater specific activity than the licensee had identified.
Based on local variations in the contact exposure rate, the inspector concluded this was a reasonable agreement for samples collected independently.
- I The inspector observed that contamination frisks of shoes are required on leaving this area, which is fenced.
j No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
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The inspector met with the individuals denoted in paragraph 1 on May 1, 1981.
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The licensee representative stated that:
additional cleanup of soil near i
the new Rodwaste Building was being done; no further. work is planned on
soil cleanup by the condensate transfer' system pump and valve hut; and, there was an evaluation in progress to prevent recurrence of the new
Radwaste Building seepage.
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CONDENSATE O
O TeaNSreR
12 o
O PUMP & VALVE HUT
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9 O
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5 O
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6
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CHLORINATOR EQUIPMENT B
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FIGURE 1
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APPR0XIPATE LOCATION OF OC SOIL SAM'LES TAKEN APRIL 21, 1981 f
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