IR 05000219/1981010
| ML20010E950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1981 |
| From: | Greenman E, John Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010E942 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-81-10, NUDOCS 8109090172 | |
| Download: ML20010E950 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND. ENFORCEMENT j
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Report No.
50-219/81-3 Docket No.
50-219
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License No.
DPR-16 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
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Morristown, New Jersey
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Oyste' Creek Nuclear Generating Station Facility Name:
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Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey
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Inspection conducted:
April 1 - 30,1981
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Inspectors:
i J. A. Thomas, Resident Rea6 tor Inspector date signed
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date signed
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Approved by:
M JUL 1 1981
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E. G. Gre'enmhn, Chief, Reactor date signed
Frojects Section 2A i
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Inspection Summary:
I Inspection ~on April'1
'30,1981 (ReportNo. 50-219/81-10)
Are&s Inspected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspector (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />) of:
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licensee action on previous inspection findings, tours of the facility, log
and record review, followup of. events that occurred during the inspection, in-
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office LER review, on-site LER followup,' and review of periodic reports.
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Results: Two items of noncompliance were identified:
(Blockage of reactor
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building to torus vacuum breakers, Paragraph 5.a; and, failure to take effective corrective action to correct a known deficiency, Paragraph 5.c).
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3109090172 010824 PDR ADOCK 05000219
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PDR Region I' Fonn 12 (Rev.-April 77).
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DCS Numbers 50219-800516 50219-800517 50219-800603 50219-800605 50219-800520 50219-800618 50219-800716 50219-800716 50219-800729 50219-800815 50219-800819 l
50219-800904 50219-801017 50219-801029 50219-801105 50219-bO1108 50219-801130 50219-801211 50219-801215 50219-801211 50219-801218 l
50219-810102
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50219-810102 50219-810112 50219-810106 50219-810115 50219-810202 i
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contar.twf J. Carroll, Direc 'nr, Oyster Creek Operations K. Fickeissen, Manager, Plant Engineering J. Maloney, Manage.*, Plant Maintenance A. Rone, Engineering Manager W. Stewart, Plant Operations Manager
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J. Sullivan, Manager, 0;ierations L
D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the e.ourse of the inspection ir.cluding management, clerit.al, maintenance, and operations
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personnel.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (Closed)
Infraction (219/80-23-01)
Failure to establish a fire wCch in a timely manner after fire protection barriers wre found to be nonfunctional. The inspector reviewed procedure 106, revision 15, January 30,1981, " Conduct of Operations" and verified that the licensee
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and Directives as stated in a letter to the licensee from NRC:R1 dated l
October 21, 1980. The Operational Memos and Directives provide a l
means of issuing instructions of a short term duration and should
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preclude recurrence of this event.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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Infraction (219/80-28-02) Personnel performing decontamination activities wearing inadequate protective clothing, and (Closed) Infraction (219/80-28-03) Personnel wearing potentially contaminated protective clothing outside of a contamination controlled area. The inspector has performed frequent observations of work in contaminated areas and of worker.ds adherence to step off pad procedures since the occurrence of these infracticas.
In addition, the inspector has observed the health physics indoctrination training of personnel authorized entry into radiation controlled areas.
Based on these observations, the inspector determined that the corrective actions stated in the licensee's letter to NRC:R1 dated October 16, 1980 have been effective in achieving full compliance and preventirg further noncompliance.
The inspector had no further questions on these items.
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Plant Tours-
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During the course of the inspection, frequent tours were coriducted in the following areas:
Turbine Buildingt
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Augmented Off-Sas Building;
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New Rad-Waste Building;
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Cooling Water In*,ake and Dilution Plant Structure;
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Monitoring Change Areas;
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Drywell entry control point
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Containment spray corner room control point
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4160 Volt Switchgear, 460 Volt Switchgear, and Cable Spreading l
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Rooms; Maintenance Work Areas; and,
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l Yard Areas.
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In addition, tours of the control room were conducted at least once
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per day when the inspector was on site. Tours of the reactor building were conducted at least three times per week.
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The following determinations were made:
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(1) Monitoring instrumentation:
All control room panels were examined to verify that required instrumentation was functional, that proper correlation between instrument channels existed, and i
that indicated parameters were within Technical Specification
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Control room indications were examined to verify that system alignments and availability complied with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The inspector reviewed systems removed from service for maintenance to verify that Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for l
Operation were not violated. Local plant instrumentation was selectively examined to verify instrument operability and i
correlation between channels.
(2) Control room annunciators and alarms:
Lit control room annunciators were reviewed with operators and shift supervisors
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to verify that the reasons for the alarmed conditions were understood and that corrective action, if required,. was being ta ken.
(3) Plant housekeeping conditions:
General cleanliness, material storage, and control of materials to prevent fire hazards were examined for conformance to licensee administrative procedure 119," Housekeeping", and procedure 120, " Fire Hazards".
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(4)
Fluid leaks and system integrity:
Systems and equipment in the areas toured were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration. Accessible hydraulic snubbers
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vT/3 visually examined to verify operability.
t (5) Radiation Controls: The inspector made observations to verify that contro? point procedures and posting requirements were being followed. Personnel were observed to verify that dosimetry was worn when required. Work in radiation controlled.
areas was observed for adherence to licensee procedures and for compliance with the requirements of applicable radiation work l
permits.
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(6)
During tours of the facility, valves and components in safety related systems were checked to verify proper system alignment.
Selected valve positions were checked in the core spray and containment spray systems, standby liquid control system, and control rod drive hydraulic system. All breakers in the 4160
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l volt switch gear room and selected breakers in the 460 volt l
switch gear room were verified for proper alignmant.
(7) Security: The inspector verified that security. posts were manned and that personnel and vehicle searches were conducted
as required. Vital areas were periodically checked to insure I
that they were locked or guarded and that positive control of access was exercised.
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-4 (8) By frequent observations during the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10CFR 50.54(k)
and Technical Specifications were being met.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
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The following acceptance criteria were used for the above item:
Technical Specifications;
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10 CFR 50.54(k); and,
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Inspection judgement.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for review of selected logs and records:
Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations;
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Procedure 108, Equipment Control; and
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Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
The inspector had no questions in tlis area, b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
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Control 9.com logs were filled out and signed;
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Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
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Log entries involving abnormal conditions provided sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status; Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and reviewed;
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Operating orders did not conflict with Technical Specification
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requirements; and, Logs and records were maintained in ace.ordance with th<. procedures
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in a. above.
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The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussions with licensee personnel.
Reviews were conducted on an intermittent selective basis:
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Control Room log, all. entries;
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Group Shift Supervisors Log;
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Control Room Alarm Sheets; Control Rod Status Sheets;
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Technical Specification Log;
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Reactor Auxiliary Log;
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Reactor Log; Control Room Turnover Check List;
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Reactor Building Tour Sheets;
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Turbine Building Tour Sheets;
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Equipment Tagging Log; Lifted Lead and Jumper Log;
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Defeated Alarm Log;
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Standing Orders, all active; and,
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Operational Memos and Directives, all active.
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Followup of On-Site Events a.
On April 17, 1981 at about 1:30 P.M., a licensee employee discovered that the reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, V-26-15 and V-26-17, were inoperable in that they were blocked from fully opening ')y scaffolding erected by contractor personnel.
Valve V-26-17 was completely prevented from opening, and valve V-26-15 was limited to about 75 percent of full opening.
Preparation was being made for a scheduled plant shutdown at the time of the discovery. A reactor shutdown was commenced at about 11:00 P.M. on April 17 and the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition at about 1:30 P.M. on ~ April 18, 1981. A subsequent
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investigation by the licensee determined that the valves had been blocked by the scaffold since the afternoon of April 16, 1981.
The scaffolding was repositioned by about 11:00 A.M. on April.20, 1981. A similar event occurred on December 19, 1979 when valve V-26-17 was blocked to about 50 pucent of full opening by contractor erected scaffolding. 7hc corrective action at that time was to discuss the event with the contractor involved and with
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operations personnel. The corrective action appears to have been inadequate in that the event has recurred. The inoperability l
of reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, V-26-15 and V-26-17, constitutes noncompliance with Technical Specification
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3.5. A.4 ( 50-219/81 -10-01 ).
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On April 20, 1981, while performing maintenance on the turbine.
generator spare exciter, the exciter air filter was removed and taken outside the turbine building and blown with an air hose to remove accumulated dust. A health physics department supervisor who observed this operation when walking through the area ordered it stopped and directed that the area be surveyed. A survey l
revealed that an area of about 20 square feet outside the turbine l
building was contaminated to a level of 8000 disintegrations per minute from the dust on the air filter. The area was roped off, posted, and subsequently decontaminated. No personnel contaminations occurred. Since the spare exciter is located outside the radiation controlled area, it was considermi to be " clean". The job supervisor failed to recognize tl2 fact that the potential exists for very low levels of airborne activity to be concentrated to l
detectable levels of contamination on ventilation system filters.
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a critioue on this event and will evaluate the event to determine what corrective action is necessary to prevent recurrence.
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The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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At approximately 1:00 A.M. on April 21, 1981, an equipment operator discovered a failr.d packing on valve V-2-88, a manual bypass valve around the hotweil makeup / letdown valve (V-2-17) in the condensate
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transfer syste:n. The failed packing resulted in a spill of radio-actively contaminated water from the condensate transfer system into the building around the condensate transfer and demineralized water transfer pumps, and onto the ground outside of the building.
A large portion of the water that leaked from the valve was collected in the plant drainage sumps and pumped to the radwaste facility, but an undetermined amount leaked to the ground outside the building and to the earthen portions of the building floor where it was absorbed by the soil. The activity levels of the spilled water were 3.02E-5 microcuries per milliliter Lanthanum-140, 6.64E-6 microcuries per milliliter Cerium-141, and 3.68E-5 microcuries
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per milliliter gross gamma activity. Activity levels of the wetted l
soil ranged from none detectable to as high as 7.9E-4 microcuries l
per gram gross ganma activity. Upon discovering the leak, the failed valve was isolated, the leak stopped, and a mound of dirt was placed to prevent any water from leaking into the storm
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sewer system. A subsequent water balance detennined that about 8000 gallons of water was collected in the radwaste facility as a result of the leaking valve.
In addition, approximately 10,000 gallons of water from the condensate transfer system is unaccounted
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'7 for. This represents a very conservative estimate of the volume of water that was spilled on the ground since the instruments used to measure condensate tank levels are inherently inaccurate and used to detect only gross changes in tank level (the tank has a 500,000 galloncapacity).
From visual examination of the area of the spill, no more than 2000 gallons of water leaked to the soil outside the building. The exact time of the valve failure cannot be determined, since the area is routinely inspected only once per shift. by licensee personnel. The leak could have existed for as much as eight hours.
There have been several prior incidents of component failure that have resulted in the leakage of water from the condensate transfer system or from the portion of the demineralized water transfer system located in the contaminated areas of the condensate transfer pump house. Spills from either system present a potential for release of radioactivity outside of the radiation controlled area.
In January 1980, pinhole leaks were discovered in the six
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inch underground piping from the condensate storage tank.
The contaminated soil was removed and the piping subsequently replaced. There is no estimate of the volume of water that leaked.
On May 16, 1980, approximately 50 gallons of water was spilled
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from the condensate storage tank when the tank was filled above the level of the open end of a length of tygon tubing t.eing used for tank level indication.
On August 9,1980, an air release valve on the condensate
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transfer system was found to be leaking.
It had been leaking at a rate of about one gallon perminute for about four hours.
On December 4,1980, a failed guage nipple on number 1
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demineralized water transfer pump caused a spill of demineral-ized water inside the condensite transfer pump house. Some of the water leaked to the grcund outside the building. The volume of water spilled could not be determined because the demineralized water storage tank level transmitter was frozen at the time of the spill.
On December 15, 1980, a weld failure on a demineralized water
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transfer pump recirculation line resulted in a spili of about 7500 gallons of water that flowed from the contaminated condensate transfer pump house to the soil outside the building. This event was documented in IE inspection 50-219/80-35. At that time the inspector expressed concern to licensee management that since the arrangement and construction of the piping in the condensate and demineralized water transfer systems are similar, the potential exists for similar failures
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i of the condensate. transfer system piping. This could cause an
uncontrolled release of radioactive water to the environment.
As in previous incidents, this leak existed for several hours before it was discovered.
On Merch 14, 1981, a failure of the packing retainer ring on
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valve V-2-88 resulted in a spill of about 50 gallons of
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contaminated water inside the condensate transfer pump house.
l These incidents are indicative of deficiencies in the condensate transfer and demineralized water transfer systems that present a l
potential for releases of radioactive material.
Due to the proximity of the storm sewer systems to this area, the potential also exists for an unmonitored release of radioactive water to the environment. Since the area is monitored infrequently by licensee personnel, the potential exists for leaks to exist for several hours before being discovered. As indicated by the frequency of
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spills from these systems, the licensee's corrective actions so far i
have been ineffective in preventing further incidents.
Failure to
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take adequate corrective action constitutes noncompliance with l
10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI (50-219/81-10-02).
d.
During review of the above incident, the inspector roted that there was some confusion on the part of operations personnel as to where to find procedural guidance for responding to the emergency.
Formerly, this emergency would have been covered by the 905 series i
emergency procedures. However, on March 31, 1981, the new Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP's)-were issued to implement the requirements of the new emergency plan. The EPIP's incorporated the requirements of some but not all of the old 905 series procedures.
Not all of the 905 procedures were incorporated into the EPIP's because
some of the situations addressed by the 905 procedures do not fall i
under the emergency classifications of the EPIP's. Verbal guidance had been given to the operations department that since the EPIP's were issued, the 905 procedures were no longer to be used, but the
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905 procedures were never formally rescinded.
During the above incident, the Group Shift Supervisor determined that the only j
appropriate procedural guidance available was in the 905 series
procedures. Following the incident, a memo was issued to the operations
department stating that in the event an EPIP cannot be applied to l
a given set of circumstances, the appropriate sections of the 905 procedures shall be used.
The licensee has conmitted to review all EPIP's and 905 procedures, rescind the 905 procedures that have been incorporated into the EPIP's, and to issue procedures to cover events not classified into the emergency categories of the emergency pl an. This item is unresolved pending further review by the licensee and the NRC (50-219/81-10-03).
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InOfficeReviewofLicenseeEventReports(LEP.'s)'
The inspector reviewed LER's received in the NRC:RI and Resident Office to verify that _ details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of-cause and adequacy of' corrective action.
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frarr. the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether
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the event warranted on-site followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
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'LER EVENT I
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- 50-219/80-17/IT The one rod interlock bypass jumpers for rods
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10-23 and 14-15 had not been removed after i
replacement of the control blades and prior to l
insertion of the rods for subsequent fuel loadinc.
50-219/80-19/3L The set pressures for Core Spray System relief
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valves V-20-25 and V-20-24 were found to be incorrect.
- 50-219/80-20/1T Fire barriers protecting safety related areas
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50-219/80-22/3L Trip points of 3 of the 4 reactor high pressure isolation condenser initiation switches were found
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to be less conservative than specified.
i 50-219/80-24/3L Surveillance requirements for the "one rod free travel interlock" were not performed on a daily basis.
- 50-219/80-25/1T Fire suppression system was removed from service to replace post indicating valves V-9-8 and V-9-12.
- 50-219/80-30/3L Electromatic Relief Valve "D" did not open during operability testing.
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- 50-219/80-32/3L Violation of technical specifications when both containment spray pump compartment doors were j
discovered open.
50-219/80-34/3L Standby Gas Treatment System I was inoperable due to an overload trip on exhaust fan 1-8.
50-219/80-36/3L Stack releases were not continuously monitored due to ' sample pump failures.
50-219/80-37/3L Standby Gas Treatment System 2 was inoperable due to misalignment of pressure sensor PN-4.
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50-219/80-40/3L Hydraulic Snubber 51/6 failed _to lock up during
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50-219/80-46/3L Standby Gas Treatment System was operated in a l
degraded mode due to installation of improper HEPA filter elements.
50-219/80-48/3L Hydraulic Snubber 23/7 failed to lock up during functional testing.
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- 50-219/80-49/lT Degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary when the isolation condenser vent isolation valves failed to close.
l 50-219/80-51/3L Violation.of technical specifications when l
daily core surveillance for APLHGR, LHGR, and MCPR were not performed.
502219/80-53/3L Operation in a degraded mode when control rod
drive hydraulic pumps were removed from service l
one at a time for maintenance.
j 50-219/80-58/3L Hydraulic snubbers 19/6 and 19/7 failed to l
lockup during functional testing.
l 50-219/80-59/3L Monthly surveillances for main station and diesel l
starting batteries were not performed.
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50-219/80-60/3L Isolation condenser pipe break sensors-1BilAl, 1811A2, 1811B1, and 181182 tripped at values greater than specified.
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50-219/80-62/3L and Operation in a degraded mode when one control 80-62/3L REV 1 rod drive hydraulic pump failed in service.
50-219/81 -01/3L Containment spray high drywell pressure switch tripped at a value greater than specified.
50-219/81 -02/3L Stack gas activity not continuously monitored due to sample pump failure.
50-219/81-03/3L Fire hydrant number 2 declared inoperable due
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to a frozen barrel.
50-219/81-05/3L Emergency service water pump 52B failed to demonstrate operability during testing.
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50-219/81-06/3L Reactor triple low level switch tripped at a value less conservative than required.
- 50-219/81-07/3L Violation of technical specifications when the north east containment spray water tight door was found open.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
On-Site Licensee Event Follow-up
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For those LER's selected for on-site' followup, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by facility procedures, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The LER's selected for on-site follow-up are denoted by an asterisk (*) in detail 6. above. The following specific observations were made and discussed with licensee management:
80-17 This event was examined in detail in inspection 50-219/80-19.
The licensee's corrective action is discussed in the written Licensee Event Report, dated May 30, 1980, and in a letter from the licensee to NRC:R1 dated September 3,1980. The corrective actions as stated in these letters will, when completed, adequately address the circumstances that caused this event. The inspector noted that Task Assignment Number 3280051.01 to evaluate the reconmendations of the General Office Review Board and the Operating Experience Assessment Lommittee is not yet complete. The corrective actions will be examined in a subsequent inspection.
80-20 This event was reviewed in detail in inspection 50-219/80-23.
The inspector verified by direct observation that fire barriers are i eing maintained and that fire watches are implemented as required by technical specifications when fire barriers are found by surveillance to be inoperable.
In addition, the licensee has implemented the Operational Memos and Directives Book to insure timely issuance of instructions of a short term duration to preclude recurrence of similar events.
80-25 Post Indicating Valves V-9-8 and V-9-12 were removed and replaced and the fire suppression system was roturned to operation. The j
Licensee Event Report stated that the removed valves would be inspected to determine the cause of the failures and a revised report would be submitted. This has not yet been completed and is being tracked i
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by the licensee.as Task Assignment number 3280065.01. This event will be examined in a subsequent inspection.
80-30 The inspector reviewed procedure 702.1.007, Revision 10, April 8,1981, "Electromatic Relief Valve Removal, Disassembly, Repair, Reassembly, and Installation", and determined that procedural steps have been included to verify proper clearance between the pilot valve operating lever and the solenoid plunger.
80-32 Both of these events resulted from water tight doors between and the torus and the containment spray compartments being found open 81-07 in violation of technical specifications. One event occurred on August 6,1980, the other occurred on February 2,1981.
Following the first event the licensee stated that an engineering evaluation would be made to determine an effective way of controlling access through the doors.
Following the second event, the licensee stated that a positive means of ensuring the doors are closed after passage would be installed. This will be reexamined in a subsequent inspection following installation of a means of ensuring that the doors are closed.
(50-219/81-10-04).
80-49 This event was reviewed in detail in inspection 50-219/80-33. The inspector had no further questions on the licensee's corrective actions.
8.
Maintenance Observation During the inspection period, the inspector obserted various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with the administrative and maintenance procedures; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; radiological controls; fire protection; and retest requirements. The following activities were included during this review:
t ob Order 7308M, QASL 4230, Rebuild CRD Pump. This work i
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was pe formed under Radiation Work Permit number 060681.
r No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspecto. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _.
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This review included the following considerations: the report.ir.cludes the information required to be reported to the NRC; planned corrective actions are adeauate for resolution of identified problems; and that the reported information is. valid. Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
March 1981 Monthly Operating Data Report
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.d.
11.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
Discussions with station management relative to the status of Resident inspection efforts were held on April 2, 13, 20, 23, and 30, 1981.
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