IR 05000155/1981001
| ML19345G433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, Parker M, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345G427 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-81-01, 50-155-81-1, NUDOCS 8104070240 | |
| Download: ML19345G433 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ESTORC.EMEST
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/81-01 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Censumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: January 10 through February 9, 1981 v. C. - y/
Inspectors:
G. C. Wright IG 8 " '. 8/
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M. E. Parker zand Apprried By:
D. C. Boyd, Chief
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Peactor Projects Section IA Inspection Summary Inspection on January 10 through February 9,1981 (Report No. 50-155/81-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine, resident inspector inspection involving:
Review of outstanding inspection items, review of refueling surveillance procedures, review of plant operations, independent inspection efforts, and IE Bulletin followup. The inspection involved a total of 129 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors, including six hours of offshif t inspection.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one item of noncompriance, Severity Level V, Failure to Follow Temporary Change Procedure, was identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent
- C. R. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor J. A. Johnson, Inst rument and Control Supervisor E. 9. Mosley, Assistant Instrument and Control Supervisor L. F. Monshor, General Engineer
- D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- T.
R. Fisher, QA Analyst
- E. R. Drenth, Senior Plant Technician The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel, including shift supervisors, shift technical advisors and contro1 room operators.
- Denotes those preseat.t the exit interview.
2.
Review of Outstanding In7pection Items (OII)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's action pertaining to the OII listed below. The inspectors verified that the actions taken were consistent with the OII.
.a)
OII No. 364 (closed): Emergency Condenser Outlet Valve M0-7053 leaks. Vendor representative inspected valve and recommended replacement of wedge. A new wedge, hand fit to match the seat, was installed.
b)
OII.*~o. 365 and No. 80-03-02 (closed): Twenty-four hour load test of Emergency Diesel Generator at 190 + 10 KW.
Test run during 1980 refueling outage.
c)
OII No. 366 (closed): The inner 16 control rod blades were replaced during the 1980 refueling outage in response to IE Bulletin No. 79-26.
d)
OII No. 80-20-01 and No. S0-15-01 (closed): The licensee has added a surveillance procedure to the operations status board, requirir review of the Caution Tag Log.
e)
OII No. 80-10-01 (closed): Testing required by IE lalletin No. 80-06 completed during refueling outage.
f)
OII No. 80-10-02 (closed): Testing required by IE Bulletin No. 80-14 completed during refueling outage.
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g)
OII No. 80-14-01 (closed): The licensee has revised surveil-lance procedure TV-10 " Pressure Test of Nucleat Steam Surply" to include a verification that the insulation around the CRL I
F-2 has been installed.
h)
OII No. 80-19-01 (closed): kevised response to IE Bulletin No 80-24 was submitted on January 29, 1981 clarifying questions raised by the inspectors and Region III staff.
No apparent it. ems of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Review of Refueling Surveillance Procedures The inspectors reviewed the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements; licensee commitments and administrative coutrols, that minimum crew requirements were met, test pre-requisites were completed, special
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test czuipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recoroed for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the te*t results were adequate.
a)
TR-01 Control Rod Drive. Performance b)
TR-02 Refueling Interlocks c)
TR-04 Poison System Sodium Pentaborate Concentration
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TR-05 Core Spray Pumps Run and Test Lcop Operation e)
TR-06 Poison System Check Valve and CU-4020 f)
TR-11 Poison System Explosive Valve (Equalizing Line)
g)
TR-17 Poison System Explosive Valve (Non-equalizicg Line)
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TR-14 Poison System Operability Test i)
TR-17 I & C Transformer Auto Transfer j)
TR-18 Essential Service Power Transfer k)
TR-20 Fission Counter Operational Check 1)
TR-21 Control Rod Drive Friction Test m)
TR-27 Poison System Tank Level Alarm Check n)
TR-29 Sphere Vacuum Relief Operability o)
TR-30 Emergency Diesel Protective Device Testing p)
TR-33 Reactor Protection System Response Time q)
TR-34 Emergency Condenser Outlet Valve (Auto Operations)
r)
TR-35 Reactor Recirculation Pump Interlocks s)
TR-39 Isolation Valve Leak and Operability t)
TR-40 Electronic Calibration of Off-Gas Treatment u)
TR-41 Transmission Line Transfer Test v)
TR-42 Diesel Generators Full Load Test w)
-TR-47 Accumulation Pressure Switch Calibratica x)
TR-48 RDS Instrument Calibration
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TR-49 Auto Closure Initiation of Off-Gas Isolation Valve z)
TR-50 Post Incident. Flow and DP Instrument Calibration aa) TR-52 Manual Enclosure Isolation Test S-5 Switch bb) TR-57 Load Test Diesel Generator to 180-200 kw
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cc) TR-58 Calibration of VT3, LVA, & Turbine Trip dd) TR-69 Fire System Flush and Inspection ee) TR-70 Fire Suppression Water System Functional Test and Pump Capacity During a review of TP-19 " Start-up Channels Operation Check" the inspector noted that tuc procedural requirement of 50-100 cps on the channel under the channel test as a starting point was not adhered to.
The actual, recorded, starting point count rate was 15 and 1.5 for channels six and seven respectively.
The inspector further noted that no temporary procedure change had been initiated nor had the post implementation review detected the deviation.
Discussions with licensee management did ascertain that the deviation had been brought to managements attention by the individual performing the test and that a conscious decision was made to proceed with the test.
The inspector brought the above situation to the Operations Supervisor's attention as there was a question as to the operability of the two start-up neutron monitoring channels due to the deviation. A revie'
of the matter was initiated and completed prior to the unit start-up on January 31, 1981.
Facility Technical Specifications requires that: " procedures shall be est;blished, implemented and maintained." In addition, the Technical Specifi.ations allow temporary changes to procedures to be made provided.
a)
"The intent of the original procedure is not altered."
b)
"The change is approved by two members (or designated alternates)
of the PRC, at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's License."
c)
"The change is documented, reviewed by the PRC at the next regularly scheduled meeting and approved by the Plant Super-intendent."
Con rary to the above, a change to surveillance procedure TR-19
" Start-up Channels Operational Check" was made on November 26, 1980 without the required approvals, documentation or subsequent PRC review.
This item of noncompliance is considered a Severity Level V violation.
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4.
Indepdendent Inspection Effort A.
The inspector reviewed the following TMI Task Action Plan items to verify adherence with the recommendation of NUREG 0737.
1)
TAP No. I.4.2.1.(1):
No formal administrative procedure exists for this item. The requirement was adhered ta for the last two SRO applicants.
2)
TAP No. I.it2.1.(2): See comments on TAP No. I.A.2.1.(1)
above.
3)
TAP No. I.A.2.1.(3):
See comments on TAP No. I.A.2.1.(1)
above. The requirements were adhered to for the last four license applicants (two SRO's and two RO's).
4)
TAP No. I.A.3.1.(1):
Preaent training program includes training in the areas of heat transfer and fluid mernanics.
5)'
TAP No. I.A.3.1.(1):
Present procedures require an over-all score of 80% with a minimum of 70% on any individual test section.
6)
TAP No. II.B.4.(1): Training program has been developed and will be implemented on a trial basis at Consumers Power Palisades plant.
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7)
TAP No. II.U.3.(2): Technical Specification change sub-mitted on September 25, 1980.
Contain'ent vent and purge valves 8)
TAP No. II.E.4.2.(7):
m close on high radiation signal from a radiation monitor c'rar the spent fuel pool.
9)
TAP No. II.E.4.2.(8): Technical Specification change sub-mitted on September 25, 1980.
10) TAP No. II.K.3.17: A review and tabulation of ECC system outages was provided in the Licensee's response to NUREG 0737 dated December 19, 1980.
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11) TAP No. II.K.3.44: Licensee's evaluation of transients with a single failure was provided in the Licensee's response to NUREG 0737 dated December 19, 19G0.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
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B.
Review of Condensate Spill in Turbine Building On January 22,-1981,. while preparing to sluce new resins from the anion tank to the Reactor Water Cleanup desineralizer, approximately 100 gallons of contaminated condensate water-5-
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spilled onto the turbine building floor. Discustions with the licensee indicated that the spill occurred due to water filling the anion tank and backing up through the resin fill valve. The spill was contained within the turbine building and no personnel contamination occurred. Further disrvssion with the licensee indicated that the resin fill valve was not mentioned in the procedure for adding and/or transferring resins. A revision to the procedure has been initiated to include a verification that the resin fill valve is closed af ter adding resins or before transfering resins (50-155/
81-01-01).
5.
Review ut Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations in preparation for startup following the 1980 refueling outage. The review was conducted to:
1)
Ascertain whether systems disturbed during the refueling outage were returned to service prior to plant startup.
2)
Verify that plant startup, approach to criticality and heat-up were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspector verified by direct observation that the core spray and containment spray systems were properly aligned and reviewed records pertaining to the control rod drive systems.
The inspector witnessed the initial preparations and startup of the unit on January 31, 1981. During the observation time the inspector verified that the control red sequence, rod withdrawal authorization, and estimated critical rod position was available to the operators prior to startup.
In addition, direct observation of the startup activities verified that all activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures and the technical specification require-ments were met.
No apparent items of non-compliance were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included tue information required to be reported, that the written response. included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulle-tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information fiscussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by
. ritten response.
the -licensee was as descri'aed in tha w
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IEB ho. 80-24 (closed): " Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment."
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Refer to IE Report No. 50-155/30-19 for details.
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7.
Exit Iaterview
An exit interview was conducted on February 9, 1981. Licensee at-J tendiace is as shown in paragraph 1.
The inspection findings for the review. period, including the item of nonecmpliance discussed in paragraph 3, were discussed.
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