IR 05000155/1981018
| ML20040B627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1982 |
| From: | Boyd D, Parker M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040B617 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-81-18, NUDOCS 8201260260 | |
| Download: ML20040B627 (6) | |
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l U.S. NUCLEAR liEGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1II l
Report No. 50-155/81-18
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Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee:
Co:1sumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection AL:
Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: November 15 - December 15, 1981 M. E. Pa rke r [y'W f f9 Inspector:
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Approved By:
D. C. Boyd, hief,
/ -N ~ B 2-Projects Section IA Inspection Summary Inspection on November 15 - December 15, 1981 (Report No. 50-155/81-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine saiety, resident inspect. ion involving Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observat. ion, Surveillance Observation and liceparation for Refueling.
The inspection involved a total of 91 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 11 i n s pec t o r-hou rt. onsite during off-shifts and 30 inspector-hours support-ing the Emergency Preparedness Appraisal Team.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
i 8201260260 820112 PDR ADOCK 05000155 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- C, J. Ilartman, Plant Superintendent C. R. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
- C.
E. Axtell,Ifealth Physicist
- A. C. Sevener, Operations Superintendent
- J. J. Popa, Maintenance Superintendent
- D E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
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R. L. Burdette, CSRP Supervisor
- R.
E. Schrader, Technical Superintendent E. W. Raciborski, QA Superintendent
- T.
R. Fisher, Senior QA Administrator The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel including:
shift supervisors, control room operators, maintenance personnel and
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C&RP technicians.
- Denotes those pre =ent st the exit interview.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of November and December. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equi' ment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid
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leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
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verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During a daily routine tour of the control room the inspector was reviewing control room logs and noticed that a book of matches were fitted between the insulators of two florescent lights and that a sheet of yellow pve plastic was draped under the florescent lights to reduce the light intensity in the control room. This is believed to be poor housekeeping practice and creates a definite fire hazard. This condition was pointed out to the shift supervisor who in turn required their removal.
During the months of November and December, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the core spray and containment spray systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
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During monthly walkdown of Post Incident System the inspector observed two valves that were out of position; PI-11 (Pressure indicator and level gauge root valve) and PI-12 (level gauge root valve).
PI-ll is required to be in the open position but was closed and PI-12 is re-quired to be in the closed position but was open. This condition was brought to the attention of the Shift Supervisor (SS) and was immedi-ately corrected. After reviewing the problem, the SS identified that this was caused by the fact that the monthly core spray heat exchanger leak test requires, upon completion of test, that the level gauge root valve be closed, without specifying valve numbers. Thus, resulting in the root valve PI-11 being closed by the operator instead of PI-12.
It is to be noted that the misposition of these valves did not effect operation of the post incident system, as these valves isolate local instruments used mainly for core spray heat exchanger leak testing.
A change to the Monthly Core Spray lleat Exchanger Leak Test procedure has been prepared specifying valves by valve numbers and the Master Checkoff List, Section A-8 is being changed to designate PI-ll as an instrument valve versus a root valve, to prevent recurrence of this valve misposition problem.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No itema of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Monthly Maig enance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, re:gulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomptished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by l
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; i
radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls l
were implemented.
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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Repair CRD Pump #2 leaking cylinder Replace Fuel Pool Refueling Crane Power Cable Replace Radwaste Pump #1 Removal of lower rollers on new control rod blades following completion of maintenance on the CRD Pump #2 and replace-ment of Radwaste Pump #1, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
a.
Repai r of CRD Pump Inspector observed repairmen working on CRD Pump #2 to repair leaking cylinder #1 per maintenance order and procedure MCRD-5.
Review of procedures identified that step 5.1.1 required removal of cylinder head. This step had already been passed and the plunger had been removed without removal of cylinder head.
This was identified to the repairmen and they stated that this was not required to replace stuffing box gasket as this was a procedure to replace plunger packing and not necessarily the stuffing box gasket.
Discussions with the maintenance superintendent identified that a procedure change was required prior to reassembly.
A temporary change to MCRD-5 was made and concurred to by two PRC members to delete reference to CRD pump cylinder head in step 5.1.1. and step 5.3.8 but in fact deleted " steps 5.1.1.
through 5.3.9." as the temporary change stated to delete steps
"5.1.1-5.3.8."
This condition was pointed out to the Shift Supervisor and was immediately corrected.
The stuffing box gasket w.is subsequently replaced and tagging orders cleared with no further problems occurring. The licensee has committed to briefing plant personnel in this problem to prevent future procedure compliance problems.
b.
Removal of Lower Rollers on New Control Rod Blades During control rod blade inspection, the inspector observed the removal of the lower rollers on the blade. The bottom four rollers are not required per technical specification, paragraph
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4.1.1(g), which states "the bottom four (4) rollers, which can be eliminated..." The rollers were removed by shearing the roller pin with the use of a modified "c" clamp.
Thus breaking the pin
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I into three pieces.
One piece is removed with the roller and the end pieces are still attached to the blade. One end piece is welded to the blade and the other end piece is removed only if it-4-l
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is easily accessible.
The unwelded end portion of the pin is approximately 1/8" diameter by 1/2" long. The 10 CFR 50.59 review performed did not address the remaining pieces of pin left in the control rod blades, regarding possible effects of their becoming dislodged from the blade.
The inspector is continuing to review this item with the licensee (81-18-01 open).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
?!onthly Surveiilance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing oe the Control Rod Coopling Integrity Test and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instaumentation was calibrated, that. limiting conditions fo r operation were met, that remaval and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were re-viewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identi fie-1 during the testing were pro-perly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the fo?;owing test activ-ittes:
Sicam Drum Relief Valve lionitor Checkout Drive Selector Valve Reduced Pressure Test lland Heat llalance Calculations Pipe Tunnel Inspection and Reactor Protection System 1.ogic Test No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
I ri7a rat ion f or Re fueliag The inspector observed portions of t he of f-loading and receipt of new tuel by the licensee and verilled that technically adequate, approved procedures were available covering receipt, inspection and storage of new fuel.
No deficiencies were identified by the licenste in the new fuel inspection.
The inspector also observed portions of the receipt inrpection and storage of the new pei pheral control rod blades.
'I he.ns pe c t. ion included removal of the lower four rollers of each blade, allowed by technical specifications, and neutron testing.
Ne deficiencies were identified by the licensee.
See paragraph ' b concerning re-moval of lower rollers on control rod blades.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Other Resident Inspector Items During this reporting period the inspector spent a considerable amount of time assisting the Emergency Preparedness Appraisal Team. This
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effort included senerio walk-throughs of site emergency directors,
- shif t supervisors, shif t. technical advisors and a tour of the plant.
The walk-throughs were performed to ensure that licensee personnel could properly categorize an emergency and could follow emergency
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procedures to a safe and final resolution.
Also during this reporting period, the Senior Resident Inspector has been assisting in the pre-licensing inspection effort at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant near Marseilles, Illinois and is expected to return to Ilig Rock Point January 4, 1981.
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7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The 1icensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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