IR 05000155/1981019
| ML20054D067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1982 |
| From: | Boyd D, Parker M, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D054 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.14, TASK-TM 50-155-81-19, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8204220301 | |
| Download: ML20054D067 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/81-19(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI
Inspection Conducted: December 16, 1981 - January 30, 1982 i
Inspectors:
G. C. WrigWt 2 ~20 ~ N
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M. E. Parke 2.c25-62 I
Approved By:
D. C.'Boyd, Chief 2-2.5-B2 Projects Section 1A f
Inspection Summary Inspection on December 16, 1981 - January 30, 1982 (Report No. 50-155/81-19 (DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine safety, resident inspection involving: Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, IE Bulletin Followup, Plant Trips, Review of NUREG-0737 Task Action Items,
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Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items, Followup on Outstanding Items of Noncompliance, and Independent Inspection Effort. The inspection involved a total of 138 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including six inspector hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of December and January. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equip-ment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of December and January, the inspector walked down the access-ible portions of the core spray and containment spray systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in e nformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were con-ducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifi-cations.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-fled personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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Calibration of Area Radiation Monitors Out of Spec voltage on Standby Diesel Generator
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Replacement of Area Radiction Moniotr Detector #12 Following completion of maintenance on the Area Radiation Monitors and the Standby Diesel Generator, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
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The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Core Spray Heat Exchanger and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test in-strumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical speci-fications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficienc-les identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities: Spent Fuel Pool Leakage Test, Bypass Valve Test, and Standby Diesel Generator Test.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
IE Bulletin Followup
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For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility.
If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the li-consee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information dis-cussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
IEB 80-11 Masonary Wall Design IE Bulletin 80-11 "Masonary Wall Design": The inspectors reviewed the licensee's submittals of July 18 and November 3, 1980, and noted
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"that the licensee has concluded that "All..... wall segments
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> satisfy the re-evaluation criteria using the basic allowable stresses indjusted with an allowabic stress increase factor." As such, the dlicensee has not identified any safety-related equipment which is
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' jeopardized by masonary walls and therefore no Technical Specification
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operability requirements are in questions.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Plant'Trirs Following the plant trips on January 7 and January 10, 1982, the i
' inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems
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by observation of control room indicators and discussions with
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licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system
status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the
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establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
The reactor was manually scrammed on January 7,1982, after the op-erators noted abnormal behavior of the control rod drives during a monthly reactor protection system (RPS) surveillance.
The licensee has reviewed the circumstances surrounding the scram and has determined that the unexpected control rod motion was caused by a bleeding down of the scram air header. The bleed down was caused by the inability to reset RPS channel B, due to a defective reset switch, which resulted in "B" master scram solenoid remaining de-energized.
With the "B" master scram solenoid de-energized, the scram air header is isolated from its air supply. At this point, leakage in the air header will depressurize the header, thus allowing the scram valves to start lifting. Once the scram valves start to lift, control rods will start drifting into the core. This situation was identified during the last refueling outage and a modification has been proposed.
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The modification, by installing a check valve around the "B" master scram solenoid, will allow air to be supplied to the screm air header with either of the two master scram valves de-energized. The modi-fication is scheduled to be installed during the refueling outage i
planned for the month of February, 1982. All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on January 15, 1982.
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i No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Review of NUREG-0737 - Task Action Items The inspectors reviewed the following NUREG-0737 item for closcout in accordance with Three Mile Island Temporary Instructions:
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Item II.K.3.14 - Isolation Condenser Isolation Modifications.
Per letted dated December 15, 1981 from D. M. Crutchfield (NRR) to
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D. Hoffman (CPCo) the high radiation isolation modification is not required for Big Rock Point. This item is considered closed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the following inspection items were reviewed to determine that appropriate corrective actions have been accomplished:
L a.
OII 78-06-02 (closed): The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure 1.3, " Review & Audits" as it pertained to PRC review of deviations.
b.
OII 79-11-02 (closed): Design change and Technical Specifications changes have been made pertaining to small break LOCA.
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OII 79-16-01 (closed): Duplicate to Item 80-01-01.
This
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l It'em will be tracked under OII 80-01-01.
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OII 80-03-01 (closed): Duplicate of items discussed in IE Report 50-155/81-05. This item will be tracked under 81-05.
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OII 80-14-03 (closed): Review of Administrative Procedure 1.9 pertaining to specification field changes.
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OII 80-14-04 (closed): Same as above.
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OII 80-14-05 (closed):
Same as above.
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OII 80-10-0 (closed): Pcwer supplies for emergency phones have been placed on a bus supplied by the diesel generator.
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OII 81-01-01 (closed): Reviewed procedures SOP 11 and 13 per-l taining to closure of resin valve.
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OII 81-05-07 (closed): Equipment in contaminated pool storage
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area has been rc-arranged to reduce radiation levels outside
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of the building.
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OII 81-05-08 (closed): New radioactive waste storage facility is under construction.
9.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance / Deviation Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the following items of noncompliance were reviewed to determine that immediate actions and actions to prevent recurrence have been accomplished.
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OII 80-14-02 (closed): Review of Administrative Procedure 1.9 and discussions with the licensee indicate that appropriate action has been taken.
b.
OII 81-01-02 (closed):
Appropriate reviews were conducted prior to startup.
Importance of following procedures was stressed to all individuals.
c.
OII 81-03-01 (closed):
Procedure revisions reviewed and found acceptable.
10.
Indapendent Inspection Effort - Prompt Public Warning System The Charlevoix County Board of Commissioners on November 25, 1981, voted (2 to 12), to oppose the installation of the prompt public warning system (sirens) at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. Big Rock Point temporarily stopped installation of the sirens, but resumed installation, when the county stated that they would not stop the installation of sirens, but that they would not allow installation of the siren activator in the county sheriff's office.
As a result of this opposition, the county board requested a public meeting with the NRC on the feasibility and/or desirability of the installation of the warning system.
Mr. William Axelson, NRC D.E.P.O.S. and the resident inspector attended the meeting along with Mr. Gordan Wenger of FEMA Region V, on December 30, 1981. The major issues for opposing the system were: annual maintenance costs which the county believed they had to support and the technical bases for such a system. Consumers Power Company, present at the meeting, formally indicated to the county that they would pay for the installation and maintenance of the system. As a result of this meeting, the county Board of Commissioners rescinded their resolution which stopped the installa-tion of the system.
The public warning system was subsequently installed and was tested on January 28, 1982. The inspecters observed the test by monitoring four different locations in the Charlevoix area. The test results were submitted to Region III Emergency Planning personnel for review and evaluation.
11.
Other Resident Inspector Items Both inspectors attended the Resident Inspector Seminar conducted in the Region III office during the week of December 14, 1981.
During this reporting period, the Senior Resident Inspector returned from a temporary assignment at the LaSalle Nuclear Plant near Marseilles, Illinois, where he was assisting in the prelicensing inspection effort.
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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the. inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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