IA-88-165, Discusses Topics for Senior Mgt Meeting & Submits Partial Listing of Facilities Where Vendor Support Has Been Problem,Vendor Involved & Component/Issue of Interest. W/Copyrighted Matl

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Discusses Topics for Senior Mgt Meeting & Submits Partial Listing of Facilities Where Vendor Support Has Been Problem,Vendor Involved & Component/Issue of Interest. W/Copyrighted Matl
ML20155K200
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse, Palisades, Perry, Fermi, Kewaunee, Point Beach, Cook, LaSalle, 05000000
Issue date: 03/09/1988
From: Greenman E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Davis A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20155K026 List:
References
FOIA-88-165 NUDOCS 8806210137
Download: ML20155K200 (22)
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WAR 0 91983 MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, R!!!

FROM:

Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

SUBJECT:

TOPIC FOR SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING One of the topics suggested by ORP for the subject meeting was the NRCs role in obtaining vendor support to solve equipment problems. - In response to our suggestion you asked DRP to provide background information and examples where Region 111 plants have had vendor support problems and suggestions for addressing the issues.

The following is a partial listing of facilities where vendor support has been a problem, the vendor involved and the component / issue of interest:

Facility Vendor Issue Fermi Fairbanks Morse Accelerated Failure of Diesel Generator bearings. Vendor reluctant to acknowledge problem. Problem potentially impacts Prairie Island and Duane Arnold.

Perry ASCO LaSalle Solenoid malfunctions impacted equipment operability. The vendor was initially slow in responding with infortation.

LaSalle Static-0-Ring Pressure and differential pressure switch malfunctions / failures. The switch materials were not compatible with required service conditions.

Point Beach Westinghouse Vibration-induced S/G tube failure.

The vendor did not submit a Part 21 Report following the North Anna event and was reluctant to share infonnation with the NRC.

Kewaunee ASCO Non-interchangeability of solenoid i valves and parts. Resulted in inoperable containment isolation valves. I N+ ~

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A. Bert Davis 2 MAR o g tggg Facility yendor issue D. C. Cook Foxboro Transmitter drif t in harsh environments could mislead operators.

Davis Besse Cyberex Electrical component quality on circuit boards was deficient. The vendor didspecifications.

purchase not conform with licensee Palisades Rosemount Transmitter drift in harsh environments could mislead operators.

These issues, in many cases arise from incomplete comunications between licensees and vendors regarding the capabilities of supplied equipment. At times it has appeared that vendors have been reluctant to share infonnation perfomance problems with other licensees or the NRC. Typical of this who has responsibility for filing reports pursuant to 10 CF 1 of many vendors for equipment servi:e conditions su qualification testing does not match service conditions or equipment des for and suitable for laboratory-type use fails in an industrial environment .

Another area of concern has related to AE firms who provide engineerin service to licensees.

While such fims develop QA Programs for their activities, NRC inspectioiis which have extended back through the licensee j supporting information for engineering decisions is lac) wrong.

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parts.third general problem area which is now emerging is tMt of replacement As plants age and vendors go out of business or ching product lines qualified replacement parts will become a matter of increasingWhile ccJ,cern.

this can be viewed as an industry problem related to reliability of operatio it is also of challenges regulatory to safety concern systems. if unreliable parts cause 11 creased ,

Possible solutions to these problems include increased accountability of 1 l

vendors to the NRC and the industry, strengthening systems as NPRDS  ;

and better expectations rega,rding involve rulemaking.

equipment comunications performance. between vendors and the NRC The first alternative may emphasis The second could likely be accomodated by increased NRC

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A. Bert Davis 3 liar 0 91988 to industry groups on the value of shared information. The third alternative could involve NRC sponsored workshops for vendors on such topics as -

environmental qualification, instrument reliability, or general design criteria.

In sumary, a number of specific problems have been identified regarding vendor support of licensees. The key to minimizing this problem would appear to lie with a strenghtened industry-NRC-vendor interface.

09tcIIML SIGNED BY E. G. GREEhVAN Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects l

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PRIORITY AfiENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III OCTOBER 30 198F

. LICENSEE / FACILITY N0i!FICATION/ SUBJECT CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CD./

PERRr UNIT I SRI-PC/

EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE IMSIV) STROME TIMES EVENT I

EVENT NO.

AT 8:3T P.M. ON OCTOBER 29 1987 WHILE OPERATING Ai 76% POWER. THE LICENSEC PERIORMED A FAST CLOSURE DE THE IN80ARD MSIV ON THE "D" S TE AMLINE 1821-F0220

  1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STARIUP TEST INSTRUCTION ISTIl 1821-025A. SECTION S.4 "FULL CLOSURE OF THE FASTEST MSIV AT MARIMUM PERMISSIBLE PDWER.* THE VALVE DID NOT BEGIN TO STROKE CLOSED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 18 SECONDS AFTER IT*S CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED IN THE
  • CLOSED
  • POSITION. THE VALVE THEN STROKED.

CLOSED IN LESS THAN 3 SECONDS. THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE VALVE INOPERABLE AND IMMEDIATELY BECAN TO REDUCE REACTOR POWER 10 BELOW FSI. SUBSEQUENILY Ai APPROKIMATELY STROKE TIME S. BASED 9:03 UPP.M.hNTHE VALVE WAS RESTROMED TWICE WITH SATISFACihRY THE INITIAL FAILURE. IHE LICENSEE PERFORMED FAST CLOSURE TESTING OF THE REMAINING MSIVS. AI 9:44 STRONED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROME TIME P.M.I OF MINUTE ANDMSIV 17 SECONDS1821-F028D WAS AND AT 9:52 P.M. WAS RESTROMED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIME. Af 10:18 P.M..

MSIV 1821-F0288 SECONDS AND AT WAS STROMED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISTACTORY STROKE TIME OF 11.9 10:18 P.M. WAS RESTROMED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STRoxE TIME.

VALVES 1821-F328D EVALUATION. AND 1821-F0288 WERE ALSO DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING THE REMAINING VALVES STROKED ACCEPTA8LY. THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL CLOSURE TIMES OF VALVES 1821F022D AND 2821F0280 (80TH ON THE D STEAMLINE)

WERE DETERMINED 87 THE LICENSEE TO BE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH IO CFR 50.72 WE 58)(2)lIIII. DURING ALL MSIV CLOSURES. THE PILOT SOLENOID STATUS LICHTS RE OBSERVED DEENERGIZED. TO EXTINQUISH. INDICATING IHAT THE MSIV PILOT VALVE SOLENDIDS .

THE LICENSEE CURRENTLY BELIEVES THAT DURING INITIAL CLOSURE TESIS MSIV 1821 80288 PILOT VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH VALVES 1821-F0220 IB21-F028D AND BASED UPONDID THE NOT FREELY STROKE OPEN UPON PILOT SOLENGID 6EENERGIZATIhN INABILITY I

MSIV PERFORMANCE TO RECREATE THE F AILURES AND SUBSEQUENT SATISF AdTORY THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE MSIVS OPERA 8LE Al 10:40 P.M..

THE LICENSEE IS doNTINUIpo TO EVALUATE THE EXCESSIVE MSIV STROKE TIMES IN CONSL*LTATION WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC AND IS CONSIDERING INCREASING MSIV SURVEILLANCE OPE RABILI f f. TEST FREQUENCY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES OF MSIV REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS EVALUATE THE LICENSEE *S ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION URVEILLANCE TESTING. AND-WILL MONITOR MSIV PERFORMANCE DURING FUfURE MSIV

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DAILV REPORT REGION I!Z DATE: 10-30-87 K.A. CONN /.UGd1WI LICENSEE /FACIL11Y OCT " 1987 NOTIFICATION /SUDJECT CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO./ SRI-PC/

PERRY UNIT 1 EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVli (MSIV) STROKE llMES EVENT EVENT NO. 10515 Al 6:37 P.M. ON OCTOBER 29, 1987 WHILE OPERARTING AT 76% POWER, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A FAST CLOSURE OF THE INBOARD MSIV ON THE "D" STEAMLINE. 1921-F022D.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH STARTUP TEST INSTRUCTION (STI) 1921-025A. SECTION G.4, "FULL. CLOSURE OF THE FASTEST MSIV AT MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE POWER." THE VALVE DID NOT BEGIN TO STROME CLOSED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 18 SECONDS AFTER IT'S CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED IN THE "CLOSED" POSITION. THE VALVE THEN STROMED CLUSED IN LESS 1HAN 3 SECONDS. THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE VALVE INOPERADLE AND IMMEDIAlELY BEGAN TO REDUCE REACTOR PDWER TO BELOW 75%. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT APPROXIMATELY 9:03 P.M., THE VALVE WAS RESTROkED TWICE WITH SATISFACTORY STROEE TIMES. BASED UPON THE INITIAL FAILURE, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED FAST lCLUSURE TESTING OF THE REMAINING MSIVs. AT 9:44 P.M., MSIV 1D21-F02GD WAS lAND A1STROEED 9: 52 P.M. WAS CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROKE TIME OF 1 MINU RESTROKED WITH AN ACCEPTEBLE STROKE TIME. AT 10:16 P.M..

MSIV 1D21-F028B WAS STROVED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROME TIME OF 11.9 SECONDS AND AT 10:10 P.M. WAS RESTROKED W11H AN ACCEPTADLE STROFE TIME.

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_VES UAT IIB21-F028D ON.

AND 1921-F028B WERE ALSO DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING lHE REMAINIG VALVES STROMED ACCEPTADLY. THE EXCESSIVE INI I I Al.

, CLOSURE TIMES Or VALVES IB21F022D AND 2B21F028D (DOTH ON THE "D" STEAMLINE)

WERE DETERMINED 50.72 0)) (2) (111 ) . BYDURING THE LICENSEE TO BE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR ALL MSIV CLOSURES, THE PILOT SOLENOID STATUS LIGHTS WERE ODSERVED 10 EXT INGUISH, INDICATING THAT THE MSIV PILOT VALVE SOLENUlDS

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THE LICENSEE CURRENTLY DELIEVES THAT DURING INITIAL LLOSURE

'TESIS, MSIV PILOT VALVES ASSOCI ATED WITH VALVES 1821-F020D, ID21-F02GD. AND 1B21-F0288 DID NOT FREELY STROKE OFEN UPON PILOT SOLENOID DEENERGI7ATION,

, BARED UPON THE INABILITY TO RECREATE THE FAILURES AND SUBSEQUENT SATTSFAClORY

' MSIV PERFORMANCE, THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE MSIVs OPERABLE AT 10:40 P.M.. TiiE LICENSEE IS CON 11NUING TO EVALUATE THE EXCESSIVE MSIV STROME TIMES IN CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC AND IS CONSIDERING INCREASING MSIV SURVEILLANCE OPERABILITY. TEST FREOUENCY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES OF MSIV b l i REulUNAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS EVALUATE THE LICENSEE *S ROOT CAUSE 4

l DETERt11 NATION AND WILL MONITOR MSIV PERFORt1ANCE DURING FUTURE MSIV

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eportable Event number 10515 .

Facility : Pt:RRY Date Notified : 10/30/87 Unit : 1 Time Notified 00:10 Region : 3 Date of Event : 10/30/87 Vendor : JE,GE Time of Event : 21:44 Operations Officer : Don Marksberry Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : ROGER STIFFLER Category 1 : LCO Action Statement Rad Release : No Category 2 :

Cause : Unknown Category 3 :

Component : Category 4 :

EVENT DESCRIPTION :

WITH THE REACTOR AT 62%, FULL CLOSURE TESTS ON MSIVs FOUND THREE VALVES WITH CI4SURE TIMES EXCEEDING THE 5 SECOND LIMIT. THE FIRST MSIV, F022-D (INBOARD)

CI4 SED 22 SECONDS. AFTER FURTHER TESTS THE CI4SURE TIMES WERE WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AS THE RESULT OF THE TEST, THE OUTBOARD MSIV, FO-28-D, W S TESTED WITH A CLOSURE TIME OF 77 SECONDS. THE VALVE WAS CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES WITH STROKE TIHES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. ALL OTHER MSIVs WERE TESTED WITH ONLY ONE OTHER VALVE, FO-28-B, C14 SING AT 12 SECONDS AND FURTHER TESTS RESULTED IN CLOSURE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AFTER THE FIRST TEST ON THE THREE VALVES THE SIDW CLOSURE TIMES COULD NOT BE REPEATED. SUSPECT WATER IN AIR SUPPLY AFFECTING THE PNEUMATIC SOLENOIDS WHERE THE CYCLING FREED THE SOLENOIDS.

CONSIDERING SHORTENING THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FOR FULL CLOSURE TEST WHI IS NOW 92 DAYS. NOTIFIED RDO(SNELL) .

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DAILY REPORT REGION III

. DATE: 11-02-07 LICENSEE / FACILITY NOTIFICATION / SUBJECT CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO./ SRI-PC/

PERRY UNIT 1 EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) STROKE TIMES EVENT EVENT NO. 10515 (UPDATE)

ON OCTOBER 29, 1987, WHILE OPERATING AT APPROXIMATELY 75% POWER, THE MSIVs WERE INDIVIDUALLY FAST-CLOSURE TESTED. VALVES 1921-F022D, 1821-F028D.

AND 1821-F028B EXHIBITED EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES. SUDSEQUENT FAST-CLOSURE TESTS WERE PERFORMED AND THE VALVES PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. THE VALVES WERE DECLARED OPERADLE FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS. THE LICENSEE DELIEVES THAL THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL STROKE TIMES MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO I MPU RI T I ES IN THE VALVE ACTUATOR PILOT AIR SYSTEM AND THAT THE IMPURITIES WERE DISLODGED DURING VALVE OPERATION. BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LICENSEE.

NRC REGION III. AND NRR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL HELD ON OCTOBER 30, 1987. THE LICENSEE WILL PERFORM ADDITIONAL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS ON THE SUBJECT VALVES TO CONFIRM THEIR OPERABILITY SHORTLY DEFORE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO DE PERFORMED ON NOVEMBER 6 1987. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION IS THE LAST TEST IN THE LICENSEE'S STARTUP TEST PROGRAM. WHILE SHUT DOWN FULLUWING THE STARTUP TEST THE LICENSEE WILL EXAMINE THE MSIVs AND MS!V ACTUATORS TO FURTHER ESTABLISH 1HE ROOT CAUSE OF THE EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES EXF ERIENCED ON OCTOBER 29, 1987.

REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL WITNESS MSIV FAST-CLOSURE 1ESTING TO DE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST AND WILL INFORM NRC REGION III AND NRR MANAGEMENT OF THE TEST RESULTS.

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i Number 10560 Repor t able Event fled : 11/03/87 Date Nott 21:30 Time Notified

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PERFi 1%te of of EventEvent :: 10s20 Time a 10 CFR $0.72 it : i Cl assi f icat t o.,ESF Actuation g os on : 3 na Cateoory 1 : SCRAM  %

.ndor  : GE.GE  : Rnn You Category 2 : 'I.

.erottens Officer By :ALLEN OF0Ft1 CateQory 43 :: h '

(C Nattfled s No Catego y r SS ad Release INVCFTIGATION ause : UNDER ED UNIT S/D WAS IN PROO emponent  :

POWER FOLLOWING WHILE A CONTROLL THE CONTROL D "PULL SHE.ET"E RC POINT (i.e..

ABOUT 239

'TH REACTOR AT

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OPERATORS WERETO DETERMINE THE SEQUENC MUST BE 3EE EVENT EELOW THE LOW POWER SETN JSED FOR ROD NSERT10N WHEN WITHDRAWAL CH THE /IN3LRTION)RE ROD NT FROM THOSECR SETPOINT, ACT OR OWER SETFOINT BELOW fRATION,WERE WHIWITHDIFFEREPOWER THE REDUIRENE BELOW NTS THE LO

ONSIFTENTROD
ONTROL CONTROLLER SEOUEfG HND CONF IGLWITH REACTORTORS CO THE ROD F AT T EhN b KElJED SCRAMMED ER SETPOINT MANUALLYAND OPERA NORMAL ROD DLOD 0 WERE DFub410RS a FP2727FFOOj 6DROPF ED }iELOW THE LOW PC OF THL RODS. T HE AER Ah.

AND IS Type a New Lina to T c or,t i nu t>THE FFACTOh POWER t lal TO BLOW SPEED fis F ARTAND S/D. LICENSE 35%

9UbPECli SHIFTED FRUM FASTVaRIES EE'iWEEN IS STABLE IN 20% THE SEi.*UENCE AND HDT LICEN9ErFECIFL WMEN FilhF T HI LOW 5 LuERtPRE F OWE but >RE .

h UNII EET At POINT LOWED A CONY WAu 6DL INFORMED.

iIF3T ST Ar,2 S / b PROCE D'.1FL 1 L* tt i ht . NG THE TULL SHE.ET NRC RESIDENT FA BASED ON IN f<0D BLOCt,S. Fa INVLSI l' a 1H .14iINF LEL'L H #I ED*F Di L OWI CONF IG' lA AT O. HAhRISON)

F:I ION (NO11FIED dE.

nNv OlHER CHARACT ER T O cot 4T IN ENTER EEL /JE TO OUIT.

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$ fYENT FOLLOWUP REPORT 87-172 50.72 EVENT #10515, OCTOBER 30; 1987 e.

PLANT ~ PERRY 1 PROJECT MANAGER- T. COLBURN W 4 Mu COGNIZANT ENGINEER- J. CARTER ,

PROBLEM M51Vs did not close within the time allowed by Technical Specifications.

CAUSE TnTETally unknow but subsequently detemined that a higher than anticipated ambient temperature caused the main pilot control (solenoid valve) to hangup.

SAFETY Sir.N!FICANCE (

Reactor isolafion or containcent integrity may not be possible in the event of an acc16nt cr transient.

DISCUSSION During full closure tests v, .ndividual MSIVs, three valves exceeded the 5 '

second closure time of the tectnical specifications. Times were 22, 12, and 77 seconds with the two slowst valves being in the "D" steam line.

Subsequent testing of these valves resulted in closure times of 3-5 seconds.

The licensee initially suspected that dirt in the air system caused the ,

I solenoid valve to hangup, thereby delaying the on-set of valve closure. Since there had been no previous instances of slow MS!V closure, the licensee continued power operation while reviewing maintenance records and preparing for their last pre-operational test, fell MSIV isolation. The licensee and  !

NRC regional and headquarters staff agreed with this approach.

Prior to running the full MSIV isolation test, the Itcensee again tested individra) .

MSIVs for closure. Slow valve closure was observed again. The licensee shut '

down the reactor without performing their full MSIV isolation test.

NRC dispatched an AIT to the site to be present during disassembly of t:u solenoid valves andito evaluate the problem. Initial conclusions wre TAat steam leaks in the vicinity of the MS!Vs and the control circuit velves (includes the solenoid vahes) had caused ambient temperatures in the vicinity of 300' F at the highest temperature location which also was the location of the "D" isoletion valve. The elastomer seal in the solenoid ve he had hardened and was believed to have held the solenoid in the closed position thereby pre nnting sir from being vented, tiereby l keeping the MSIV open.

I FOLLOWUP The AIT will document their findings and present any #ellowup to be done, plant specific or generic. NofurtheractionbyEAhisnecessary.

Je Carter BVR Sectior.

Events Assessment Branch cc: T. Colburn E. Rossi /

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  • .. rtable Event number 10515 .

ility : PERRY Date Notified : 10/30/87 Unit : 1 Time Notified : 00:10 l Region : 3 Date of Event : 10/30/87 Vander : GE , riE Time of Event : 21:44 Operations Off' .- Don Marksberry Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified s' STIFFLER Category 1 : LCO Action Statement Rad Release : Category 2 :

Cause : Unkr. ova. Category 3 :

Component : Category 4 :

EVENT DESCRIPTION t WITH THE REAC'fok AT 62%, FULL CLOSURE TESTS ON MSIVs FOUND THREE VALVES WITH CLOSURE TIMES EXCEEDING THE 5 SECOND LIMIT. THE FIRST MSIV, F022-D (INBOARD), i CLOSED 22 SECONDS. AFTER FURTHER TESTS THE CLOSURE TIMES WERE l WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AS THE RESULT OF THE TEST, THE OUTBOARD MSIV, FO-28-D, WAS ,

TESTED WITH A CLOSURE TIHE OF 77 SECONDS. THE VALVE WAS CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES '

WITH STROKE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. ALL CTHER HSIVs WERE TESTED WITH ONLY ONE OTHER VALVE, FO-28-B, CLOSING AT 12 SECONDS AND FURTHER TESTS RESULTED IN CIOSURE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AFTER THE FIRST TEST ON THE THREE VALVES THE SLOW CLOSURE TIMES COULD NOT BE REPEATED. SUSPECT WATER IN AIR SUPPLY I AFFECTING THE PNEUMATIC SOLENOIDS WHERE THE CYCLING FREED THE SOLENOIDS.

'[ IDERING SHORTENING T *E SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FOR FULL CLOSURE TEST WHICH OW 92 DAYS. NOTIFIED RDO(SNELL) .

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