ML20155K174

Requests Assistance to Confirm That Proposed Activity in Plant Rept Warrants Followup & to Provide Events Assessment Branch W/Expected Completion Date for Completion of Work. Related Documents Encl

ML20155K174
Person / Time
Site:	Perry, Brunswick, 05000000
Issue date:	02/17/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20155K026	List: IA-88-165, Discusses Topics for Senior Mgt Meeting & Submits Partial Listing of Facilities Where Vendor Support Has Been Problem,Vendor Involved & Component/Issue of Interest. W/Copyrighted Matl ML20155K021 ML20155K074 ML20155K102 ML20155K120 ML20155K139 ML20155K174 ML20155K200
References
FOIA-88-165 NUDOCS 8806210128
Download: ML20155K174 (14)

Text

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/ ' 'o, , UNITED STATES

( g g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l g s WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 j

\*****/ FEB 171988 MEMORANDUM FOR: Hubert J. Miller, Director Division of Reactor Safety Region III FROM: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j

SUBJECT:

TRANSFER OF OPERATING EVENT LONG-TERM FOLLOWUP The Events Assessment Branch (EAB) has completed its short-term evaluation ,

of an operating event et Brunswick 2 and has recomended certain long-term  :

followup actions. These actions were based to a great extent on earlier followp by EAB on MSIV failures at Perry 1 for which Region III estaolished an AIT. Copies of Event Followup Reports for Brunswick 2 and Perry 1 are en-closed. Because of the extensive work already done by your staff in evaluating ,

operability of solenoid valves at Perry, we have concluded that additional long-  !

term followp is warranted by your division. Thus, the purpose of this memo- l randun is to request your assistance to (1) confirm that the proposed activity I in the Brunswick Report warrants your followp and (2) provide EAB with an ex- '

pected completion date for completing that work. i We will monitor this activity until you inform us that your followp actions have been completed. To assist in this monitoring, the enclosed Technical Assignment Control (TAC) has been issued. We will extract data from the TAC /

RITS data base to provide a weekly status of long-term follow) activities to headquarters and regional offices. Therefore, please establisi a scheduled completion date and keep the TAC data current. This followp activity has been coordinated with R. Lanksbury of your staff.

The EAB contact for this effort is Jerry Carter; please direct any questions to him (x21194).

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/ 7 g, 1 har e fos 1 Y Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

EFR 87-172 ,

EFR 88-02 TAC 67092 cc: E. Adensam E. Sylvester J. Carter FEB 101933 H. Reardon R. Lanksbury T. -M M. Shymlock  :

8806210128 880613 F WE -165 PDR - .- ___

',- EVENT FOLLOWUP REPORT 87-172 50.72 EVENT #10515, OCTOBER 30, 1987 PLANT-PERRY 1 PROJECT MANAGER- T. COLBURN W G hl

- COGNIZANT ENGINEER- J. CARTER PROBLEM M51Vs did not close within the time allowed by Technical Specifications.

CAUSE i TnTETally unknown but subsequently determined that a higher than anticipated ambient temperature caused the main pilot control (solenoid valve) to hangup.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

- RvActor isolation or containment integrity may not be possible in the event of l an accident or transient.  !

1 DISCUSSION During full closure tests of individual MSIVs, three valves exceeded the 5 second closure time of the technical specifications. Times were 22, 12, and 77 seconds with the two slowest valves being in the "D" steam line. ,

Subsequent testing of these valves resulted in closure times of 3-5 seconds. _

l The licensee initially suspected that dirt in the air system caused the ,

solenoid valve to hangup, thereby delaying the on-set of valve closure. Since -

there had been no previous instances of slow MSIY closure, the licensee continued power operation while reviewing maintenance records and preparing for their last pre-operational test, full MSIV isolation. The licensee and l NRC regional and headquarters staff agreed with this approach.

Prior to running the full MSIY isolation test, the licensee again tested individual MSIVs for closure. Slow valve closure was observed again. The licensee shut ,

down the reactor without performing their full MSIY isolation test. '

NRC dispatched an AIT to the site to be present during disassembly of the solenoid valves and to evaluate the problem. Initial conclusions were that '

steam leaks in the vicinity of the MSIVs and the control circuit valves (includes the solenoid va h es) had caused ambient temperatures in the vicinity  ;

of 300* F at the highest temperature location which also was the location of the "D" isolation valve. The elastomer seal in the solenoid Tahe had hardened and was believed to have held the solenoid in the closed position thereby preventing air from being vented, thereby keeping the MSIY open.

' FOLLOWUP

- The AIT will document their findings and'present any followup to be done, plant specific or generic. No further action by EAB is necessary.

Je Carter BWR Section Events Assessment Branch l

cc: T. Colburn E. Rossi 1

( . _ _ . _ -_ __ _ _ . -- . _ .- -_ . . . . . _ -. _ ._ _

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l BRUNSWICK 2 ISOLATION VALVES IN DRAIN LINES FAIL TO CLOSE EVENT FOLLOWUP REPORT 88-02 50.72 11109 JANUARY 2, 1988 PLANT-BRUNSWICK 2 PROJECT MANAGER-E. SYLVESTER COGN1ZANT ENGINEER-J. CARTER PROBLEH Automatically operated isolation valves in both the equipment drain line and floor drain line from the drywell did not close upon demand.

CAUSE Currently unknown; however, the solenoid valves venting air from the isolation valve pistons are suspected of sticking.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Two flow paths from primary containment to the environment existed after automatic isolation was required.

DISCUSSION The tacility was at 51% power and in the process of shutting down to refuel when a decreasing condenser vacuun led to a manual scram. Groups 2, 6 and 8 isolation on low level 1 were received as expected following the scram. All systems functioned as required except for the two automatic isolation valves in the drywell floor drain system (F-003 and F-004) and two automatic isolation valves in the drywell equipment drain system (F-019 and F-020). (See the at-tached schematic). These 4 valves did not close. The valves in the floor drain system were subsequently shut when a switch was placed in the closed position.

The valves in the equipment drain line closed at different times after cycling the close switch. Subsequent to these closures, the valves were operated suc-cessfully when the drain sumps were pumped. An AIT was sent to the site to in-vestigate the event.

1 Early investigation revealed that these valves use a single coil solenoid to vent and supply air to the piston which closes or opens the isolation valve.

The solenoid valve design is different than the solenoid used in the control air system for MSIVs. Isolation valve failures in drain lines had been observed previously at Brunswick Unit 2; no failure of the corresponding valves at Unit 1 had been recorded. No known differences can explain why Unit 2 experienced failures. Disassembly of one solenoid valve believed to be sticking did not provide any apparent cause of failure or sticking.

1 FOLLOWUP (1) The AIT documented the facts associated with their investigation of the event, and identified steps that the licensee could take to improve the plant specific problem. (AIT Report issued January 27,1988).

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(?) Scienoid valve problens have been the cause of numerous isolation valve failures at many different facilities. As a result, many generic conrunicatiens related to solenoid valve failures have been issued (most recently Circular 81-41, IN 85-17 IN 86-57 and INPO SER 57-85); yet, isolation valve failures attributed to solenoids continue to occur (Perry, LaSalle and Brunswick). For these reasons, the following additional long term actions should be taken: -

(a) Regien III in conjunction with Region II should prepare, as they have been planning, an Information Notice which sunrnarizes the problems with solenoids, what to look for during inspections of solenoids, and suggests precautions and surveillance that should improve solenoid reliability.

(b) AE00 should determine the extent of Asco solenoid valve failures as indicated by a review of operating reactor data (LERs and NPRDS). Of particular interest are failures related to inadecuacies of Asco solenoid valve design, air system quality inadequacies, and maintenance related deficiencies which might be indicative of inadequate training of technicians or poor technical information exchange between license **

and the vender. The data should be used to develop conclusions on failure frequency, causes of failures, safety systems / functions impacted by these failures and identification of plants affected. A safety assessment of the failures should also be performed. This safety assessment should evaluate plant safety degradations which have occur-red in comparison to the design besis and should consider the risk significance of systems impacted, including the potential for common cause failure. This work should be conpleted and sent to NRR/EAB by early summer 1988. l (c) AEOD should evaluate the results of the ASCO solenoid valve test program which was initiated by Cleveland Electric as a result of the numerous MSIY problems at Perry. This information, used in conjunction with the evaluetion identified in (b) above, should help in the form-ulation of any longer term follow up activities or additional reg- ,

ulatory recommendations. At an appropriate point during their eval- i uation AEOD should consider contacting INPO, or other appropriate in- l dustry group, to obtain early industry involvement in taking action to improve solenoid valve reliability.

err arter BWR Section Events Assessment Branch cc: E. Sylvester ,

C. Rossi .

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rR; portable Event number 11109 .

Tc=ility : BRUNSWICK Date Notified : 01/02/88 Unit : 2 Time Notified 04:10 R gion : 2 Date of Event : 01/02/88 Vcndor : GE,GE Time of Event : 00:17 Op3 rations Officer : Ray Smith Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : L. JOHNSON Category 1 : SCRAM R2d Release : No Category 2 : ESF Actuation Cauco : Unknown Category 3  :

Co=ponent : Category 4  :

EVENT DESCRIPTION :

WHILE SHUTTING DOWN FOR A PLANNED OUTAGE, THE UNIT WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 51% POWER DUE TO DECREASING CONDENSER VACUUM. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE DECREASING VACUUM WAS DUE TO EXISTING STEAM LEAKS BECOMING VACUUM LEAKS AS TURBINE LOAD WAS DECREASED. GROUPS 2, 6 AND 8 ISOLATIONS WERI RECEIVED TOLI4 WING THE SCRAM AS EXPECTED ON I4W LEVEL 1. ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS RIQUIRED EXCEPT TWO DRYWILL FIDOR DRAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES -

($2G16-F003 & F004) AND TWO DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ($2G16-F019 & F020) DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CI4SE AS EXPECTED. THE UNIT IS NOW FOR THE IN COND 3 (HOT S/D) AND WILL BE PROCEEDING To COND 4 (COLD S/D)

OUTAGE. THE NRC RESIDENT WILL BE NOTIFIED. (NOTIFIED R2 POTTER),

o o e UPDATE 9 1251 BY COOPER * *

• THE F0C S & F004 VALVES CIDSED UPON RECEIPT OF A MANUAL CICSE SIGNAL (SWITCH POSITION) BUT THE F019 & F020 VALVES CLOSED ONLY AFTER CYCLING THE VALVE SWITCH TO THE CICSED POSITION SEVERAL TIMES. ThE COPRESPONDING UNIT 1 VALVES ($1G16-F003, F004, F019 & F020) WERE TESTED & MANUALLY CLOSED (SWITCH POSITION) SATISFACTORILY. LICENSEE WILL

'IROUBLESHOOT / REPAIR THE UNIT 2 VALVES. WRITTEN RIPORT TO FOLI4W. LICENSEE INFORMED RI. NOTIFIED R2DO POTTER. I l

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Jarluary 4,1900

.' PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PHO-II-88-01 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. This information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date.

FACILITY: Licensee Emergency Classification:

Carolina Power & Light company Notification of Unusual Event Brunswick Unit 2 Alert Occht No. 50-324 Site Area Emergency Southport, North Carolina General Emergency X Not Applicable

SUBJECT:

REGION II DISPATCHES AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) TO BRUNSWICK Following consultation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00), Region 11 is dispatching an Augmented Inspection Team to Carolina Power and Light Company's Brunswick nuclear power plant, located near Southport, North Carolina, to make an in-depth determination of why primary containment isolation valves for the Unit ? drywell equipment drains and drywell floor drains failed to automatically close after receipt of valid Group 21 solation signal on January 2, 1988.

A manual scran had been initiated at 12:17 a.m. (EST) on January 2, when condenser vacuum reached 22" Hg (decreasing) during an planned shutdown for a refueline outage. Subsequently, a valid low level 1 signal (vessel level (162.5 inches) caused the group 2, 6 and 8 isolation signals. A total of four valves in both divisions failed to close as designed. .

The two floor drains were subsecuently closed from the control room, but the ecuipment drain valves did not close. One eouipment drain valve was found closed approximately 5 minutes after the event, and the other at approximately 10 minutes after the event. During this time, the auto close signal for the valve was sealed in.

The licensee cycled all four valves successfully later that morning when the crains had to be pumped. A licensee team has been investigating the event, but thus far no definitive cause has been found.

The NRC senior resident inspector responded to the site on January 3 and l continues to monitor the licensee's activities, augmented by regional staff.

Unit 2 will be in a scheduled refueling and maintenance outage until April, 1988.

The State of North Carolina has been infonned.

There was no injury to personnel, no release of radioactivity and no danger to public health and safety as a result of this event. Tha NRC's AIT is beine dispatched to the site to provide an in-depth regulatory analysis of the event te assure that it! cause is fully understood prior to restart of the unit.

Tnis ir.fermation is current et of 4:00 p.m. (ESTi or. January 4,19EE.  ;

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