IA-86-244, Forwards Ofc of Investigations Rept of Investigation Re 850702 Reactor Criticality & Failure of Util Employees to Inform NRC Resident Inspector of Changed Criticality Status. Summary of Investigation,Now Closed,Given.W/O Encl

Forwards Ofc of Investigations Rept of Investigation Re 850702 Reactor Criticality & Failure of Util Employees to Inform NRC Resident Inspector of Changed Criticality Status. Summary of Investigation,Now Closed,Given.W/O Encl

ML20237B853
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	05/28/1986
From:	Hayes B NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20237B682	List: IA-86-244, Forwards Ofc of Investigations Rept of Investigation Re 850702 Reactor Criticality & Failure of Util Employees to Inform NRC Resident Inspector of Changed Criticality Status. Summary of Investigation,Now Closed,Given.W/O Encl ML20237B680 ML20237B691 ML20237B696 ML20237B722 ML20237B730 ML20237B747 ML20237B757 ML20237B776 ML20237B787 ML20237B790 ML20237B807 ML20237B815 ML20237B827 ML20237B853 ML20237B869 ML20237B894
References
FOIA-86-244 NUDOCS 8712170199
Download: ML20237B853 (2)

Text

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l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565

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May 28,1986 g

MEMORANDU ,FOR: mes G. Keppler Segional Administrator, Regictn III FROM: 4 genB. Hayes, Director g V 0ffice of Investigations

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SUBJECT:

ENRICO FERMI 2 NUCLEAR POWER STATION: MATERIAL FALSE

, STATEMENT REGARDING FULL POWER LICENSING (3-85-013)

Enclosed is a Report of Investigation concerning the captioned subject.

This investigation has developed evidence to slhow that during the early morning hours on July 2,1985, as a result of a failure on the part of the shift reactor operator to follow procedures, the nuclear reactor at the Fermi facility went critical for a period of approxianately 100-114 seconds. While at least three DECO employees in the control room at that time felt that a premature criticality had occurred, the official corporate position, as determined later that day by the Assistant Superintendent for Nuclear Operations, was that the reactor had not gore critical and that further study of the matter was necessary. On the af ternoon of July 3, li days after this i event, Deco management met with the NRC Residetnt Inspector at the site, and for the first time notified the NRC of the operator procedural error and of the corporate position that the reactor had not gone critical, which at that time was contrary to the opinion of DECO's own Nuclear Reactor Engineering Department.

On July 5,1985, Deco management again met and were purportedly convinced by reactor engineering that, in fact, the reactor had been critical for a 110-114 second period. On that date, and subsequently on July 8-12, 1985, the NRC Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector Trainee were on the Fermi site.

.They interacted with licensee personnel and attended the DECO staff meetings chaired by the same individuals who notified the NRC Resident Inspector on July 3, 1985, of the operator error. Those DECO employees were fully aware of the changed criticality findings and made no effort to notify the NRC represen-tatives of the new DECO position regarding premature criticality.

On July 10, 1985, the five member Nuclear Regulatory Comission met to discuss significant issues relating to Fermi 2 and to vote on a full power license for that facility. The DECO Vice President Nuclea- Operations, and the Assistant l Manager Nuclear Production were present and observed the discussion of signi-1 ficant operator errors. Neither DEC0 representative, both of whom were admittedly aware of the July 2 operator error and the latter aware of the premature criticality, attempted to clarify the record by notifying the Commission of the July 2 incident.

8712170199 871211 PDR FOIA PUNTENN86-244 PDR 7'

.2 ..

James G. Keppler 2 May 28, 1986 On July 12, 1985, NRC Director, Division of Licensing, signed the Fermi 2 full power license. On July 15, 1985, Deco advised the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the premature criticality of July 2. That notification was the first public admission by DECO of what was their official corporate position regarding reactor criticality resulting from an operator error, established on July 5, 1985.

This investigation has been closed by 01. This report has been forwarded to [

you for your information and whatever action ycu deem appropriate. You should also be aware that a copy of this investigation has been forwarded to the Depar+. ment of Justice for a possible criminal persecution. Neither this memorandum nor report contents may be released outside the NRC without the permission of the Director. 01. Internal NRC a: cess and dissemination should be on a need and right to know basis.

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl:

V. Stello, ED0 l

Vf. Pawlik, 01:RIII 1

l I

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