ML20237B827

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Forwards Ofc of Investigations Rept of Investigation Re 850702 Reactor Criticality Event at Plant.Evidence of Possible Violations of Criminal Statues & Civil Regulations Found.Summary of Investigation Given.W/O Encl
ML20237B827
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/27/1986
From: Hayes B
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To: Toensing V
JUSTICE, DEPT. OF, ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF
Shared Package
ML20237B682 List:
References
FOIA-86-244 NUDOCS 8712170184
Download: ML20237B827 (4)
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UNITED STATES 8 }, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ ~t r:ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

]

  • May 27, 1986 I

Victoria.Toensing Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division Department of Justice 10th & Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Toensing:

The Office of Investigations (01) is referring the enclosed Report of Investigation for your review and whatever action the Department of Justice

- (DOJ) deems appropriate. We believe that certain information and evidence developed during the course of the OI investigation may constitute violations of specific criminal statues, as well as civil regulations.

This investigation was undertaken at the request of the NRC Regional Administrator, Region III (RIII), after receiving information that an " operator error" (error in reactor control rod withdraw resulting in premature reactor core activity) had occurred during a reactor start-up. This event occurred approximately ten days before the NRC issued a full power operating license to the Detroit Edison Company (DECO). The investigation disclosed that the event occurred on July 2, 1985, and was not reported to the NRC Resident Inspector until July 3, 1985. Interviews of operating and management staff at the facility revealed that there were three meetings involving senior management at the Fermi site in which the operator error was discussed prior to the July 3 reporting to the NRC Resident Inspector. In addition, a determination was made that the event was considered a plant safety issue as evidenced by the recording of the event on a Deviation Event Report (DER) and categorized as a "yes" in the safety related category. The investigation also developed infor-mation which confirmed that as a result of at least one of the meetings of senior managers, a consultant for Deco advised that the event had to be reported to the NRC. Interviews with the described management personnel revealed that the company had checked to determine if the event was a condition required to be reported to the NRC according to 10 CFR 50.72. The company correctly determined that it was not a reportable event as described in that i particular regulation.

Before conducting any investigation, OI had established that there was no longer any requirement under 10 CFR 50.72 (deleted from the regulations after 1983) to report this type of operator error. However, 01 was advised by NRC RIII and later, the Office of the Executive Legal Director (0 ELD) that there may have been a violation of Section 186(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Section 186 pertains to the making of a material fals'e statement to the Comission in the form of "... any report, record, inspection, or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an i

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g21 4 871211 PUNTENNB6-244 PDR

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I V. Toensing 2 May 27, 1986 original application..." 01 has received a memorandum fr.om OELD providing their interpretation of the evidence contained in the 01 investigation.

OELD's position is that no willful violation had occurred. Their memorandum and analysis is enclosed for your review. .

The investigation disclosed that two Deco managers concealed the seriousness of the operator error when reporting the infortnation to the NRC Resident Inspector. On July 3, 1985, two managers, the Fermi Unit 2 Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Operations and the Operations Superintendent, advised the NRC Resident Inspector that there had been an operator error during the reactor start-up which resulted in an out of sequence pulling of reactor control rods. The managers also claimed that despite the error, no reactor criticality had occurred, however, the matter was under review by engineering. They provided a copy of DER No.NP-85-0334 to the inspector which described the occurrence and concluded "out of sequence, reactor criticality did not occur."

The investigation developed, as mentioned above, that the Deco managers, operations personnel, and engineers had discussed the seriousness of the event on three ocassions. All of these meetings occurred prior to making the report to the NRC Inspector. The investigation confirmed that evidence was available as early as the actual start-up which could indicate that the reactor had, in fact, achieved criticality. Interviews of the reactor operator and the shift technical advisor in training (STAIT) disclosed that observations of the source range monitor (SRM) had resulted in the operator recognizing that start-up was not proceeding as expected and the advisor stating to the operator " Bill, I think you're critical." This observation was also initially recorded in the technical advisor's log book, however, after discussions with the shift super-visor, the technical advisor modified his log entry to the effect that the reactor may have gone critical. During the 01 interview of the technical advisor, he initially stated that he was going to modify the log independent of his conversation with the shift supervisor. In later questioning, the technical advisor stated that he did change the log entry as a result of the ,

discussion with the shift supervisor.

The interview of the shift supervisor resulted in his stating that he did not believe the reactor had gone critical and that he advised his superior, the operations supervisor, of the event. The shift supervisor also stated that he was the individual responsible for initiating DER No. NP-85-0334. The investigation revealed that the error was not recorded in either of the official logs: the Shif t Supervisor's Log, or the Reactor Operator's Log, both of which are quality control (QA) records and are utilized for inspection purposes by the NRC. In addition, it was disclosed that the shift supervisor never advised the Lead Reactor Operator, who was responsible for completing the Reactor Operator's Log, that any error had occurred.

The 01 investigation confirmed that in two of the meetings identified above;  !

July 2 and 3,1985, members of the reactor engineering staff expr6ssed the view that the rod pull error had resulted in criticality. At the July 3, 1985, meeting, this was supported by the most experienced individual in Nuclear )

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_____m ____..._ _.__.

Y. Toensing 3 May 27,1986 Operations-Deco's Nuclear Consultant who was hired because of the lack of operating experience by the DECO staff. Despite this infomation, senior Deco Management, including the Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production, maintained their position that the reactor had not gone critical. The investigation also disclosed Deco management then made a conscious decision, based oh an evaluation of the significance of the event, to notify the NRC inspector that criticality had not resulted from the error. The 01 investigation also disclosed that senior NRC officials, including the NRC RIII Administrator and Deputy Director, Off!ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (the official responsible for signing the full power license) would not have recomended that the Femi license be issued had all the facts of the criticality event been known prior to the licensing decision.

In addition to the facts described above, the OI investigation also confimed that DECO management continued to conceal the seriousness of the event and,

-- in fact, remained completely silent on this issue during the course of the NRC full power licensing hearing for the Fermi facility. During the course of the Comission meeting, the Assistant Manager of Nuclear Production, who had been notified on July 5,1985, that reactor engineering had been correct from the outset and the reactor had in fact achieved criticality, remained silent when specific questions were directed to the NRC staff concerning operator training and significant operator errors. He again remained silent on this issue during DECO's presentation to the Comission. A copy of the Comission transcript is furnished as an enclosure.

The Comission meeting pertaining to the full power license was conducted on July 10, 1985, eight days after the event. The investigation could not develop any evidence that during the period between July 2 and July 10 Deco managers attempted to correct or amplify the infomation initially furnished to the NRC other than the testimony of one of the managers that he believed he placed a telephone call to the NRC inspector after a meeting on July 6,1985.

According to the manager, the inspector was not in and therefore, the information was not passed to the inspector. This was the only apparent attempt made by DECO to notify the NRC that their previous report was not correct.

The fact that the company had changed its position from not critical to critical was not known by the NRC either before the issuance of the full power license or during the actual licensing proceeding. The 01 investigation also disclosed that it was not until July 15, 1985, the day the license was issued and five days af ter the Comission voted to grant the license, that DECO managnement i advised that they had a reactor criticality resulting from an operator error l while withdrawing reactor control rods. Interviews of senior NRC officials j disclosed that they had not learned that the operator error had resulted in an  !

inadvertent criticality until after the license was signed by the Deputy {

Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Indeed, upon becoming aware of the l

-criticality, an attempt was made to determine if the license had actually been  ;

given to the representative from the utility. Information was also developed  !

that revealed that the RIII Deputy Regional Administrator contacted licensing in headquarters to detemine if the Fermi license had been issued.

4 May 27,1986 V. Toensing The facts described above may constitute violations of IQ U. S. C.1001 and 371 since it appears-that there was a concealment If there are of anysignificant questionsinformation regarding material to an NRC licensing decision.

this matter, feel free to contact Mr. Eugene T. Pawlik, Director, Office 2) of Investigations, Field Office, RIII, at FTS 388-5686 or Commercial: (

790-5768.

Sinc y, JY $

Ben B. Hayes, Di c or Office of Investiga io s j

Enclosures:

As stated I cc w/o enc 1:

Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech V. Stello, EDO J. Keppler, RA:RIII

-E. Pawlik, 01:RIII i

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