BSEP-97-0333, Forwards Response to 970523 RAI Re Request for Exemption from 10CFR50,App R,To Permit Use of LPCI & Safety Relief Valves to Achieve & Maintain Safe Shutdown for Fires Where Rcics May Not Be Free of Fire Damage.W/O Pages 7-81 & 7-82
| ML20196J541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1997 |
| From: | Jury K CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196J565 | List: |
| References | |
| BSEP-97-0333, BSEP-97-333, TAC-M93545, TAC-M93546, NUDOCS 9708050001 | |
| Download: ML20196J541 (35) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,- 3 i e l Carolina Power & Light Company PO Box 10429 southport. NC 28461-0429 JUL 2 91997 SERIAL: BSEP 97-0333 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 I BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNii NOS.1 AND 2 i DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 ; l RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES (TAC NOS. M93545 AND M93546) i Gentlemen: By letters dated August 31,1995 (Seria' BSEP 95-0378), January 10,1996 (Serial: BSEP 96-0659), and November 21,1M (Serial: BSEP 96-0354), Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) Company requested an exemption for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit Nos.1 and 2, from the requirements of Sections Ill.G and Ill.L of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to ' permit use of low pressure coolant injection and safety relief valves to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for fires where the reactor core isolation cooling system may not be free of fire damage. Subsequently, by letter dated May 23,1997, the NRC staff requested additional information to support the staff's review of the exemption request. Enclosure 1 provides CP&L's responses to the NRC staff request for additionalinformation. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Warren Dorman, Supervisor
- Licensing, at (910) 457-2068.
i Sincerely, j l Keith R. Jury ; Manager-Regulatory Affairs / ) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant / 040048 9708050001 970729 PDR ADOCK 05000324 F PDR f-l Illl!llllilllll!Jillil!ill!il!llllll
l l Document Control Desk BSEP 97-0333 / Page 2 l t I WRM/wrm
Enclosures:
- 1. Response To Request For Additional information
- 2. Reactor Building Sketches
- 3. Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment Report, Volume 1 i
- 4. Residual Heat Removal Equipment List For The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No.1 ,
- 5. Residual Heat Removal Equipment List For The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No.2
- 6. Residual Heat Removal System Simplified Diagrams
- 7. Plant Procedure 2ASSD-05, " Reactor Building North"
- 8. List of Regulatory Commitments i pc (with enclosures):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region il ! ATTN.: Mr. Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator i Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 l ; U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. C. A. Patterson, NRC Senior Resident inspector l l 8470 River Road l Southport, NC 264S1 l l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN.; Mr. David C. Trimble, Jr. (Mail Stop OWFN 14H22) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 l 1 The Honorable J. A. Sanford j Chairman - North Carolina Utilities Commission l P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 I 3 l l l
i 1 ENCLOSURE 1 l l l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 l DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND SC-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 l RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES j- (TAC NOS. M93545 AND M93546) i l l NRC QUESTION 1: In the proposed approach, low pressure injection systems appear to be serving as an attemative shutdown capability (as defined in Sez!ans Ill.G.3 and Ill.L of the regulation) for , certain locations of Fire Areas RB-1 and RB-2. However, the proposed LPCI approach does l ! not appear to satisfy the " hot shutdown" performance criterion of Section Ill.G.1, Ill.G.2, ! and Ill.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. Additionally, Generic Letter 86-10 provides further , clarification and staff positions with regard to defining " alternate" and " redundant" shutdown capabilities. In light of these requirements, it appears the proposed LPCI approach would be providing an alternative shutdown capability for certain locations of fire areas RB-1 and RB-2
- (i.e., the north side of the Reactor Building Units 1 and 2 and the separation zone of the 20' elevation of Unit 1 Reactor Building east and southwest), where the preferred shutdown method (i.e., RCIC) may be unavailable due to fire damage. Please confirm that the proposed LPCI l approach is an alternative shutdown capability for these locations, as defined in Sections Ill.G.3 !
and Ill.L of the regulation. CP&L RESPONSE: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) Company's Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment (ASCA) Report defined alternative shutdown as safe shutdown activities requiring use of abnormal operational practices or nuclear system modifications as discussed below:
- 1) Operations:
a) Other than normal safe shutdown activities from the Control Room; b) Operations from the designated alternative control systems locations; I l c) Manual operation at equipment location. l l 2) Modifications: ! ! Rerouting, relocation, or modification of existing safe shutdown system outside a fire area to assure the ability of achieving ann maintaining safe shutdown conditions. { t E1-1 4 1 I
~ . The ASCA Report, Section 7.2 report also stated that the safe shutdown systems in the Reactor Building consist of two types:
- 1) Normal shutdown systems operated from the Control Room (primarily Train A equipment), and
- 2) Alternative shutdown systems operated locally at the remote shutdown panel or manually in the case of selected valves (primarily Train B equipment).
The components necessary to support the Low Pressure Coolant injection (LPCI) mode of operations for a fire in the Reactor Building North are the same Train B shutdown systems as described in the original ASCA Report for which the exemption request for Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, was granted. The ASCA Report described the use of the LPCI mode to control vessellevel during shutdown cooling. CP&L's request for an exemption from Appendix R, Section Ill.G.1, was due to the specific requirement regarding maintaining hot shutdown as it relates to controlling vessel level above top of active fuel. CP&L does not consider the use of the LPCl mode in conjunction with rapid depressurization to be outside the current emergency operating procedures which define the normal shutdown capability of the plant. NRC QUESTION 2: As discussed above, and in accordance with the defense-in-depth philosophy for fire protection, one reason the use of low pressure injection systems has been accepted as an alternative shutdown capability is that the regulation (Section Ill.G.3) requires fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in the area undar consideration. However, the CP&L submittals do not describe the fire safety features, combustible loadings, or fire hazards in the areas for which the exemption is requested. Therefore, please provide information which (a) describes the combustible loadings, or fire hazards in the areas for which the exemption is requested; and (b) demonstrates that the fire protection features (detection and suppression systems) provided for Reactor Building fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 are equivalent to that required by Section lil.G.3 l of the r< gulation, or provide technical justification where this level of protection is not provided and LPCI is identified as the post-fire safe shutdown capability. CP&L RESPONSE: The ASCA Report for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos.1 and 2 was submitted on April 24,1984, and supplemented by letters dated December 24,1984, and October 28,1985. The NRC approved the exemption requests contained in the ASCA Report in a Safety Evaluation Report dated December 30,1986, and NRC clarifications were provided in a revision of the Safety Evaluation dated December 6,1989. CP&L's exemption request contained in the ASCA Report, Section 7.2 provided a detailed description of the fire protection features available to support the requested exemption from Appendix R, Section Ill.G. The fire protection features described in the ASCA Report provide a increased level of protection associated with the Reactor Buildings. As shown on the enclosed sketches (provided in Enclosure 2), the suppression and detection adjacent to the raceways of concern provide an adequate level protection for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) circuit to limit the possibility that a fire would require the use of the LPCI mode of operation to maintain hot shutdown. E1-2
NRC QUESTION 3: In Enclosure 1 of CP&L letter to NRC dated August 31,1995, several documents and calculations are referenced which were not included as part of the submittal currently being ; evaluated. Therefore, to facilitate our review, we request copies of the following: ; a) GE Calculation EAS-61-0989 b) Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment Report for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. CP&L RESPONSE: When CP&L submitted the August 31,1995, request for an exemption from the requirements of Sections Ill.G and Ill.L of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, General Electric (GE) Calculation , l EAS-61-0989 encompassed those GE fuel types that were approved for use at the BSEP. >
- Since submittal of the exemption request, CP&L has received NRC approval to load the GE13 fuel type. GE Calculation EAS-61-0989 is being updated to address the GE13 fuel type, and l CP&L plans to submit a copy of GE Calculation EAS-61-0989 to the NRC by August 15,1997.
l The Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment (ASCA) Repor+. was submitted to the NRC in 1 1984. This report is a six volume report containing original database output and plant drawings , at the time of the 1984 submittal. Volume 1 of the ASCA contained the shutdown methodology l and detailed description of the individual fire areas and the fire protection features available in ! the fire areas. A copy of Volume 1 of the ASCA Report is provided in Enclosure 3 to support I the staffs review, since it contains the information referenced in this exemption request. i ! NRC QUESTION 4: 1 If not included as part of information requested in item 4, provide a more detailed description of l fire areas RB-1 and RB-2. As a minimum, this description should: (a) describe the physical i arrangement of the fire areas, (b) identify specific locations of post-fire shutdown equipment I and cables (include components / cables associated with both the current RCIC approach and the proposed LPCI approach), (c) provide an analysis of fire hazards in these areas, (d) describe fire protection features (detection and suppression) provided for these areas, and (e) include simplified plant lay-out drawings, similar to those provided in the August 31,1995, submittal describing Fire Areas RB1-6 and RB2-6. CP&L RESPONSE: The ASCA Volume 1, Section 7, provides a detailed description and analysis of the hazards associated with the RB-1 and RB-2 fire areas which supported the approved 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, exemption for the Reactor Building configurations. Simplified plant i layout sketches (five layout sketches) have been developed which reflect the general plant l configuration for the areas acsociated with this exemption request (provided in Enclosure 2). The generallocation of the RCIC circuits are shown on the sketches in addition to major components and raceways associated with the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) LPCI mode. [ E1-3
~ . NRC QUESTION 5: Provide a listing and description o the specific components that will be relied on to accomplish the proposed LPCI shutdown methodology. Include simplified drawings depicting major components and system flaw paths, and provide a detailed description of the proposed shutdown strategy. CP&L RESPONSE: A listing of RHR equipment for BSEP Unit No.1 and BSEP Unit No. 2 has been provided in l Enclosures 4 and 5, respectively. Fire area locations have been identified for electrical l components which could be affected by a fire. Fire area locations have not been identified for l manual components which are not required to change state following the fire. Existing plant t simplified flow diagrams have been provided in Enclosure 6 which identify the normal RHR configuration for shutdown cooling. Components not required for the LPCI mode have been identified in the comment section of Enclosures 4 and 5. Tha response to NRC Question 7 contains the shutdown actions required from the local control stations. l NRC QUESTION 6: Provide information which demonstrates that components associated with the proposed LPCI approach have been evaluated and found to be adequately protected from the effects of postulated fires in reactor building fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 where their use may be relied on to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions. CP&L RESPONSE: l Sketches 1 through 5 in Enclosure 2 provide the generallayout of the Reactor Building associated with the location of RCIC circuits identified in the exemption request. The major Train B RHR components and raceways containing RHR circuits are also shown on these sketches. The Separation Zones shown on these sketches provide the approved Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2 separation between the Reactor Building North and South Fire Zones. The l original ASCA submittal ihntified that local control of the Train B RHR components are located in the Reactor Building South Fire Zone and would be available to support shutdown from the local control stations. The RHR LPCI mode uses a subset of these components from the local control stations in the Reactor Building South Fire Zone. The original analysis of these components and cabling is maintained under the CP&L configuratirn control program to ensure future plant changes are reviewed and the original separation methodology is preserved. NRC QUESTION 7: , Provide a copy of the emergency or abnormal operating procedures developed to implement
- the proposed LPCI approach in the event of fire in the identified locations of the reactor
- building. For the purpose of our review, a draft version of this procedure would be acceptable.
i if such procedures have not yet been developed, provide a detailed description of the shutdown methodology to be implemented by operators in response to fire in the identified locations. l E1-4 I e
CP&L RESPONSE: Enclosure 7 provides the approach for LPCI injection from the local control stations. t i l E1-5 l
l l L ENCLOSURE 2 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDIT!ONAL INFORMATION REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION j PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES l (TAC NOS. M93545 AND M93546) l l l l REACTOR BUILDING SKETCHES l I i i l l l
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l l l l ENCLOSURE 3 ) 1 l l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 l DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 l RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES I (TAC NOS. M93545 AND M93546) ! l l l l i ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (ASCA) REPORT i l l l I i l l l I l l l l l l
ALTERNATIVE l SHUTDOWN , ! CAPABILITY ' ASSESSMENT '
- REPORT l 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R -
l BRUNSWICK STEAM i i ELECTRIC PLANT hd l UNITS 1 AND 2 [ i i i j e i Carolina Power & Light Company h l
.- UNITED STATES $
{ NUCLEAR REGULATORY f i, COMMISSION J DOCKET NO. 50-325 ;3 l LICENSE NO. DPR-71 .n j DOCKET NO. 50-324 fyy,yjjy if- ! _ LICENSE NO. DPR-62 APRIL 1984 A p a.cm. r. < 3
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'T5 BSEP l
REVISION 0 ASCA l Table of Contents t BOOK 1 TECHNICAL
SUMMARY
i ! SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ! 1 i 1.1 Objective 1-1 l 1.2 Scope 1-1 l 1.3 Criteria 1-2 1-3 l.4 Report Overview 1 1.5 Summary 1-4 l 1.6 Acronyms and Abbreviations 1-5 1.7 References 1-7 l SECTION 2 FIRE PROTECTION FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS ; 1 l 2.1 Introduction 2-1 2.2 BTP APCSB 9.5.1 Fire Areas 2-1 l 2.3 Appendix R Fire Areas 2-3 i 2.4 Definitions 2-5 . l^ 2.5 Fire Hazards Analysis 2-8 ) l 2.6 Conclusion 2-20 ! 2.7 References 2-21 l SECTION 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3.1 Introduction 3-1 3.2 Definitions 3-2 l 3.3 Assumptions 3-9 3.4 Safe Shutdown Performance Goals 3-16 , 3.5 Analysis Methodology for Safe Shutdown Systems 3-18 l 3.6 Conclusion 3-59 3.7 References 3-60 l SECTION 4 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE
SUMMARY
4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Compliance Status 4-2 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown 4-2 4.4 Exemptions 4-4 4.5 References 4-6 d i l
l BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
-s Table of Cor, tents (continued)
SECTION 5 PROPOSED FIP.E PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 5.1 Introduction 5-1 5.2 Fire Suppression 52 5.3 Halon Suppression 5-3 5.4 Hatches 5-5 5.5 Doors 5-5 5.6 Stairwells 5-5 5.7 Penetrations S-5 5.8 Raceway Protective System 5-6 5.9 Fire Stops 5-8 5.10 References 5-10 SECTION 6 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 6.1 Introduction 6-1 6.2 Alternative Shutdown Control Stations 6-3 6.3 Alternative Shutdown Method 6-7 6.4 References 6-18 SECTION 7 EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR BASES
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7.1 Introduction 7-1 7.2 Exemptions Categorized by Fire Area 7-2 7.3 References 7-179 TABLES 1.5-1 Appendix R Compliance Summary 2.3-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Identification 2.3-2 Existing Protection For Fire Areas ii 1
I l l 1 1 1 BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA l Table of Contents (continued) I TABLES (continued) l 3.5-1 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - RCIC l 3.5-2 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RCIC l 3.5-3 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - RCIC l 3.5-4 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RCIC 3.5-5 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - HPCI 3.5-6 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - HPCI 3.5-7 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - HPCI 3.5-8 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - HPCI 3.5-9 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - ADS 3.5-10 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - ADS 3.5-11 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - ADS l 3.5-12 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - ADS Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - RHR 3.5-13 3.5-14 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RHR l 3.5-15 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - RHR l 3.5-16 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RHR 3.5-17 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - PMI 3.5-18 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - PMI 1 3.5-19 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - PMI
~T 3.5-20 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - PMI 3.5-21 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - SW 3.5-22 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SW l 3.5-23 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - SW i
< 3.5-24 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SW l l 3.5-25 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - SWDG l 3.5-26 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SWDG 3.5-27 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - SWDG 3.5-28 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SWDG 3.5-29 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB1 3.5-30 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB1 3.5-31 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB1 3.5-32 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB1 3.5-33 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB2 3.5-34 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB2 3.5-35 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB2 3.5-36 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB2 3.5-37 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB3 l 3.5-38 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB3 l 3.5-39 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB3 l 3.5-40 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB3 l 3.5-41 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB4 3.5-42 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB4 3.5-43 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB4 iii
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l BSEP ! i REVISION 0 ASCA ! ! s Table of Contents (continued) TABLES (continued) 3.5-44 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB4 3.5-45 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - DC 3.5-46 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown support Components - DC 3.5-47 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - DC 3.5-48 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - DC 3.5-49 High/ Low Pressure Interface Resolution - Unit 1 3.5-50 High/ Low Pressure Interface Resolution - Unit 2 4.1-1 Modification Summary 6.2-1 Alternative Shutdown Method Summary 7.2-1 III.G.2 Comparison RB1-1 7.2-2 Summary Evaluation RB1-1 7.2-3 Summary Evaluation RB1-6 7.2-4 III.G.2 Comparison RB2-1 7.2-5 Summary Evaluation RB2-1 7.2-6 Summary Evaluation RB2-6 7.2-7 Summary Evaluation Dg-1 s' 7.2-8 III.G.2 Comparison SW-1 7.2-9 Summary Evaluation SW-1 , 7.2-10 III.G.2 Comparison DG-8 7.2-11 Summary Evaluation DG-8 7.2-12 III.G.2 Comparison Diesel Generator Building 7.2-13 Summary Evaluation Diesel Generator Building BOOK 2, 3 AND 4 APPENDIX A RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 81-12 TABLES A-1 Safe Shutdown Components A-2 Alternative Shutdown Components BOOK 5 APPENDIX B PREVIOUSLY DOCKETED APPENDIX R MATERIAL l l I NW l l l
l l BSEP ' i REVISION 0 ASCA I
-s Table of contents (continued) l BOOK 6 l
FIGURES 2.3-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing East Yard Units 1 & 2 i 2.3-2 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i l Diesel Generator Building 2' Elev South Units 1 & 2 l 2.3-3 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Diesel Generator Building 2' Elev North Units 1 & 2 l 2.3-4 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing j Diesel Generator Building 23' Elev South Units 1 & 2 l 2.3-5 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Diesel Generator Building 23' Elev North Units 1 & 2 2.3-6 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Diesel Generator Building 50' Elev South Units 1 & 2 2.3-7 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Diesel Generator Building 50' Elev North Units 1 & 2 2.3-8 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Service Water Building 4' and 20' Elev Units 1 & 2 1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing 2.3-9 Control and Radwaste Buildings 9' Elev Unit 1 [
~} ,,. 2.3-10 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control Building 23' Elev Unit 1 2.3-11 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Control Building 23' Elev Unit 1 l
2.3-12 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control Building 49' Elev Unit 1 l 2.3-13 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ! Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev West Unit 1 l 2.3-14 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Reactor Building (-)17' Elev East Unit 1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing 2.3-15 Reactor Building 20' Elev West Unit 1 2.3-16 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 20' Elev East Unit 1 2.3-17 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Reactor Building 50' Elev West Unit 1 i 2.3-18 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 50' Elev East Unit 1 2.3-19 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building Sections and Details Unit 1 2.3-20 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 1 2.3-21 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 1 J v l
- . . - - . . . . . . - . - . - - . - - - - - - - - _ . - . - ~ - . - . - - - - . 5 BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA l
-s !
Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 4 2.3-22 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Northeast Unit 1 i 2.3-23 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Southeast Unit 1 i 2.3-24 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Southeast Unit 1 2.3-25 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Turbine Building 38' and 45' Elev Southwest Unit 1 ' 2.3-26 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 38' and 45' Elev Southeast Unit 1 2.3-27 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control and Radwaste Buildings 9' Elev Unit 1 . 2.3-28 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i' Control _ Building 23' Elev Unit 2 2.3-29 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control Building 23' Elev Unit 2 , 2.3-30 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ! control Building 49' Elev Unit 2 , 2.3-31 Fire Area / Fire' Zone Boundary Drawing
'N~ Control-Building 38' and 70' Elev Unit 2 j 2.3-32 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary' Drawing .j Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev West Unit 2 .:
2.3-33 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing , Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev East Unit 2 t 2.3-34 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ! Reactor Building 20' Elev West Unit 2-2.3-35 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 20' Elev East Unit 2 2.3-36 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 50' Elev West Unit 2 2.3-37 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 50' Elev East Unit 2 2.3-38 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ; Reactor Building Sections and Details Unit 2 ; 2.3-39 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 2 ; 2.3-40 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ' Turbine Building 20' Elev Northwest Unit 2 2.3-41 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Southeast Unit 2 2.3-42 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Turbine Building 20' Elev Northeast Unit 2 2.3-43 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control and Radwaste Building 9' Elev Unit 2
# vi
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l l BSEP i REVISION 0 ASCA I i -s l Table of Contents (continued) l I FIGURES (continued) l 3.1-1 sh. 1 of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Hot Shutdown 3.1-1 sh. 2 of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Transition 3.1-1 sh. 3 of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Cold Shutdown 3.3-1 ADS Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-2 ADS Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-3 HPCI Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-4 HPCI Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-5 RCIC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-6 RCIC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-7 RHR-SDC Safe Shutdown P&!D - Unit 1 3.3-8 RHR-SDC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-9 RHR-TC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-10 RHR-TC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-11 Service Water Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-12 Service Water Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-13 DC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 1 ; i 3.3-14 DC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 2 1 3.3-15 AC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 1 i 3.3-16 AC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 2
'g I 3.3-17 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation - Unit 1 ) ~
3.3-18 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation - Unit 2 l 3.4-1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RCIC - Unit 1 I 3.4-2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RCIC - Unit 2 l' 3.4-3 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - HPCI - Unit 1 3.4-4 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - HPCI - Unit 2 3.4-5 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - ADS - Unit 1 , 3.4-6 Piping Nid Instrumentation Diagram - ADS - Unit 2 l 3.4-7 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RHR - Unit 1 3.4-8 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RHR - Unit 2 3.4-9 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - SW - Unit 1 3.4-10 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - SW - Unit 2 3.4-11 DGCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-12 RHRCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-13 RPLC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-14 SDC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-15 TC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-16 PMI Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-17 EP Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-18 DGCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 3.4-19 RHRCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 ! 3.4-20 RPLC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 l 3.4-21 SDC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 3.4-22 TC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 i 3.4-23 PMI Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 3.4-24 EP Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2
-- vii
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA Table of Contents (continued) FIGURmS (continued) 4.1-1 Typical Circuit Modifications - Add Isolation Switch and Fuses 4.1-2 Typical Circuit Modifications - New Control Power Fuses 4.1-3 Typical Circuit Modifications - Move Limit Switches 4.1-4 Typical Circuit Modifications - New Alternate Power Source 4.1-5 sh. 1 of 2 Typical Circuit Modifications - Isolation of Valve Interlocks 4.1-5 sh. 2 of 2 Typical Circuit Modifications - Isolation of Valve Interlocks 4.1-6 Typical Circuit Modifications - Additional Fuses for 4.16kV Switchgear 4.1-7 Typical Circuit Modifications - Fuse Isolation of Device in System Logic 7.2-1 sh.1 Reactor Building Isometric View of Elevations
-17', 20' and 50'. Unit 1 *7.2-1 sh.2 Reactor Building (Typical) Combustion Gas Diffusion Path *7.2-1 sh.3 Plot Plan 7.2-2 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for -]
_f 7.2-2 sh.2 HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-2 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - West 20' elevation 7.2-2 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - East 20' elevation 7.2-2 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-2 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - East 50' elevation-7.2-2 sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - HPCI 7.2-3 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-3 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-3 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - West 20' elevation 7.2-3 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - East 20' elevation
--
- Located in Book 1 viii
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA ? Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 7.2-3 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-3 sh.6 Reector Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - East 50' elevation , 7.2-3 sh.7 Reacter Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) l Unit 1 - HPCI Room I 7.2-4 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RER (TC) Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-4 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-4 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - West 20' elevation
)
7.2-4 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - East 20' elevation 7.2-4 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-4 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - East 50' elevation 7.2-4 sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) '} Unit 1 - HPCI Room 7.2-5 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - West (-)17' elevation 7.2-5 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-5 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - West 20' elevation 7.2-5 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - East 20' elevation 7.2-5 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-5 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - East 50' elevation 7.2-5 sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - HPCI Room 7.2-6 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-6 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-6 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - West 20' elevation s
- Located i: Book 1 ix
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA -s Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued)
.7.2-6 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - East 20' elevation 7.2-6 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC {
l Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-6 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - East 50' elevation 1 7.2-6 sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - HPCI Room 7.2-7 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI 1 Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-7 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-7 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - West 20' elevation 7.2-7 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutd'yn Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - East 20' elevation i 7.2-7 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI ' Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-7 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI
~g Unit 1 - East 50' elevation !
7.2-7 sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - HPCI Room 7.2-8 sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB I Unit 1 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-8 sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB i Unit 1 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-8 sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - West 20' elevation 7.2-8 sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB l Unit 1 - East 20' elevation 7.2-8 sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - West 50' elevation 7.2-8 sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - r,ast 50' elevation 7.2-8 sh.7 Reactor Bui: ding Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - HPCI Room
*7.2-9 Fire Area RB1-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for HPCI and RCIC
*7.2-10 Fire Area RB1-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for RHR SDC
*7.2-11 Fire Area RB1-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for RHR CW
- Located in Book 1 X
l 1
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BSEP i
~
REVISION 0 ASCA 4
- Table of Contents (continued)
FIGURES (continued)
*7.2-12 Fire Area RB1-6 Cross Section Emcrgency Core Cooling Systems Room and Pipe Chase
*7.2-13 Fire Area RB1-6 Typical Pipe Penetration Seal 4
7.2-14sh.1 Reactor Building Isometric View of Elevations { (-)l7', 20' and 50' Unit 2 I
*7.2-14sh.2 Reactor Duilding (Typical) Combustion Gas Diffusion Path l 7.2-15sh.1 Keactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for '
i HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation ,7 7.2-15sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for . HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-15sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for
. HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - West 20' elevation !
7.2-15sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for !
! HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - East 20' elevation l 7.2-15sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for i HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - West 50' elevation 7.2-15sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - East 50' elevation ! 7.2-15sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for j '\ HPCI, RCIC, APS Unit 2 - HPCI Room l
, _ 7.2-16sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for l RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation
- 7.2-16sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for i
- RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-16sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - West 20' elevation j 7.2-16sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for i RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-16sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - West 50' elevation 7.2-16sh.6 Reactor Building 3afe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - East 50' elevation 7.2-16sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - HPCI Room 7.2-17sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for i RHR (TC) Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-17sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for ,
RHR (TC) Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-17sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shtttdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - Wect 20' elevation l
- Located in Book 1 Xi
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 3
, Table of Contents (continued)
FIGURES (continued) 7.2-17sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-17sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - West 50' elevation 7.2-17sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - East 50' elevation 7.2-17sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - HPCI Room 7.2-18sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-18sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-18sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - West 20' elevation 7.2-18sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-18sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - West 50' elevation 7.2-18sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW
^
- Unit 2 - East 50' elevation I 7.2-18sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW
~
Unit 2 - HPCI Room 7.2-19sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC j Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-19sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation : 7.2-19sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC ! Unit 2 - West 20' elevation 7.2-19sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-19sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - West 50' elevation j 3 7.2-19sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - East 50' elevation 7.2-19sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - HPCI Room 7.2-20sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-20sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for DMI Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation
--
- Located in Book 1 ,,
X11
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 7.2-20sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - West 20' elevation 7.2-20sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-20sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - West 50' elevation 7.2-20sh.6 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - East 50' elevation 7.2-20sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - HPCI Room 7.2-21sh.1 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - West (-)l7' elevation 7.2-21sh.2 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - East (-)l7' elevation 7.2-21sh.3 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - West 20' elevation 7.2-21sh.4 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - East 20' elevation 7.2-21sh.5 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB } s./ 7.2-21sh.6 Unit 2 - West 50' elevation Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - East 50' elevation 7.2-21sh.7 Reactor Building Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB ' Unit 2 - HPCI Room
*7.2-22 Fire Area RB2-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for HPCI and RCIC *7.2-23 Fire Area RB2-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for l RHR SDC ! *7.2-24 Fire Area RE2-6 Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for RHR CW *7.2-25 Fire Area RB2-6 Cross Section Emergency Core Cooling Systems Room and Pipe Chase i *7.2-26 Fire Area RB2-6 Typical Pipe Penetration Seal l *7.2-27 Diesel Generator Basement Plan and Section View l *7.2-28 Diesel Generator Basement Stairwell Enclosures 7.2-29sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - North 7.2-29sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - South 7.2-30sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - North #
- Located in Book 1 wiii
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA -m Table of contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 7.2-30sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 1 - South 7.2-31sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 1 - North 7.2-31sh.2 Diesel Generetor Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Uait 1 - South 7.2-32sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - North 7.2-32sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - South 7.2-33sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - North 7.2-33sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 1 - South 7.2-34sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - North 7.2-34sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - South 7.2-35sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB
' '; Unit 1 - North
._' 7.2-35sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - South 7.2-36sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for . HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - North 7.2-36sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - South 7.2-37sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdoun Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - North 7.2-37sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (SDC) Unit 2 - South 7.2-38sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - North 7.2-38sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR (TC) Unit 2 - South 7.2-39sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - North 7.2-39sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - South 7.2-40sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - North
- Located in Book 1 Xiv
l SSEP REVISION 0 ASCA y Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 7.2-40sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - South 7.2-41sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - North 7.2-41sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - South 7.2-42sh.1 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - North 7.2-42sh.2 Diesel Generator Basement Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - South 7.2-43 Service Water Building Safe Shutdown Raceways and Equipment for Service Water Unit 1 7.2-44 Service Water Building Safe Shutdown Raceways and i Equipment for Service Water Unit 2
*7.2-45 Service Water Building Plan and Section View l 7.2-46 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown l Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room 1 7.2-47 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown l "s Raceways for RHR SDC Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-48 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR TC Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-49 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room ;
7.2-50 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown , Raceways for DC Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room ) 7.2-51 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown 1 Raceways for PMI Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-52 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 1 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-53 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for HPCI, RCIC, ADS Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-54 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR SDC Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-55 Diesel Genarator Building 73' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for RHR TC Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room l l -
- Located in Book 1 xv
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA -s Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES (continued) 7.2-56 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for SW Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-57 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for DC Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-58 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for PMI Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room 7.2-59 Diesel Generator Building 23' Elevation Safe Shutdown Raceways for EB Unit 2 - Switchgear E7 Room
*7.2-60 Turbine Building General Arrangement 20' Elevation -
Partial Viev
*7.2-61 Diesel Generator Building General Arrangement Plans Units 1 and 2 *7.2-62 East Yard Units 1 and 2 PHOTOGRAPHS *7.1-1 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-2 Reactor Building Unit 1 Fire Area RBl-6 ^} *7.1-3 *7.1-4 Reactor Reactor Building Building Unit Unit 1
1 20' Elevation 5' Elevation
*7.1-5 Reactor Building Unit 1 5' Elevation *7.1-6 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-7 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-8 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-9 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-10 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-11 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-12 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-13 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-14 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-15 Reactor Building Unit 1 20' Elevation *7.1-16 Reactor Building Unit 1 50' Elevation *7.1-17 Reactor Building Unit 1 50' Elevation *7.1-18 Reactor Building Unit 1 50' Elevation *7.1-19 Reactor Building Unit 2 -17' Elevation *7.1-20 Reactor Building Unit 2 -17' Elevation *7.1-21 Reactor Building Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-6 *7.1-22 Reactor Building Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-6 *7.1-23 Reactor Building Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-6 *7.1-24 Reactor Building Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-6
- Located in Book 1 xvi l
l
. . _ . _ . - . . - _ . . .m._ _ _._._ ._ _ ,._ _.. _ .__,_, _ _ . _ _ _ . . . __ . . ._ _ .
i BSEP l s REVISION 0 ASCA ; Table of Contents (continued) l PHOTOGRAPHS (continued) I
*7.1-25 Reactor Building Unit 2 5' Elevation 1
*7.1-26 Reactor Building Unit 2.20' Elevation
*7.1-27 Reactor Building Unit 2 20' Elevation !
*7.1-28 Reactor Building Unit 2 50' Elevation i
*7.1-29 Diesel Generator ~ Building 2' Elevation l l *7.1-30 Diesel Generator Building 2' Elevation '
l *7.1-31 Diesel Generator Building 2' Elevation l *7.1-32 Diesel Generator Building 2' Elevation ! *7.1-33 Service Water Building 20' Elevation
*7.1-34 Service Water Building 20' Elevation
*7.1-35 Service Water Building 20' Elevation
*7.1-36 Service Water Building 4' Elevation
*7.1-37 Service Water Building Sump Elevation
*7.1-38 Turbine Building Units 1 and 2 20' Elevation
*7.1-39 Turbine Building Exterior West Wall 1
! ~3 - i i
+
l l l l 4 i
- Located in Book 1 Xvii I
t I
l BSEP REVfSION 1 ASCA
% TECHNICAL
SUMMARY
i In accordance with the provisions of Appendix R, "
...that licensees should reexamine those previously approved configurations of fire protection that do not meet the ;
requirements specified in Section III.G to Appendix R...," a detailed, reexamination and reanalysis of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant safe shutdown capability has been performed. The results of the reexamination and reanalysis described in this report build upon the previous fire protection activities approved by the Commission under the guidelines of Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and those performed under the guidelines . of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R. This current reanalysis also
\ consipers other . subsequent fire protection improvements incorporated into the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant and will be i updated periodically to reflect relevant changes to plant j configuration such as plant modifications. j This report reviews Carolina Power & Light Company's f Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-325 i
and 50-324) safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits
~
for compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. This ; report also includes the description of a proposed alternative shutdown method. Sufficient technical information is provided to permit NRC Staff review and approval of an alternative shutdown method and the resulting proposed plant modifications. In addition, those areas not in compliance with the provisions of # Appendix R are identified, a substantive basis for equivalent i
_.__._.__._._._.__m_.. _ _ _ . . _m______-. _.. BSEP ; _ REVISION 0 ASCA protection to the public health and safety is demonstrated , through detailed analysis, and appropriate exerapt ions are requested where necessary. This report is the result of an extensive evaluation performed by qualified fire protection and nuclear system- l l engineers and was conducted on a functional and systems basis. . 1 First, the safe shutdown performance goals and requisite safety functions were identified for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. I l Second, the safe shutdown systems necessary for achieving the i l performance goals and ensuring safe shutdown in the event of a j l l postulated exposure fire were defined. Once these necessary l 1 l systems were identified, the related components and circuits ! (including associated circuits) were then reviewed for compliance <
-~# l with the specific separation criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, !
l ! Section III.G.2. For those fire areas not in compliance, studies l were completed to determine whether: (1) Alternative shutdown capability was previously provided or could be provided. l (2) II?,G.2 modif :ations were more practicable than making additional alternative shutdown modifications. (3) Where an exemption request was both necessary and could be justified, it was requested. The results of these studies are listed in Table 1.5-1. The table identifies the fire areas at Brunswick and the technical approaches selected to achieve the appropriate levels of protection.
/ ;
ii l ! I t I i
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 3 The results of the reexamination and reanalysis of the Brunswick alternative shutdown capability can be summarized as follows: (1) Separation between required safe shutdown circuits which meets the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 presently exists in three of the fire areas reviewed. (2) Alternate shutdown capability existed or could be provided for 31 areas. (3) Ten exemptions from the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 are requested in twenty-two fire areas where existing fire protection features provide equivalent protection. (4) Associated circuits not meeting the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and sharing a common power source with the shutdown equipment, will be electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuits of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices. w- (5) Associated circuits not meeting the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and having a common enclosure will be electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of concern (by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices) and the proposed or existing fire area boundaries, fire retardant coatings on cables, and special fire protection features on vertical raceways. (6) Associated circuits not meeting the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and which could cause spurious operation adversely affecting the shutdown capability, have been adequately resolved by appropriate action pre- or post-fire. 1 (7) One exemption from the specific requirements of Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 is requested for the East Yard where alternative emergency lighting provides equivalent lighting for safe shutdown requirements. J iii l
BSEP , , REVISION 0 ASCA Conclusion Following completion of the Alternate Shutdown capability Analysis,. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant has concluded that it can meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.G through a combination of alternative shutdown capability in accordance with III.G.3 requirements, separation of redundant functions in accordance with III.G.2, and equivalent protection as described in the exemption requests for certain areas. 1 l-1 l l l iv
9 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 1 4 SECTION PAGE i P
- 1. INTRODUCTION ............................,,, 11 1.1 C9jective .................................. 1-1 !
1.2 Scope....................................... 1-1 1.3 Criteria....................................'l-2 1.4 Report Overview............................. 1-3 j 1.5 Summary..................................... 1-4 ;
- 1. 6 Acronyms and Abbreviations.................. 1-5 1.7 References.................................. 1-7 l l
l TABLES , 1.5-1 Appendix R Compliance Summary I n v ! I i 1 l l
.g Page 1 of 1
.. ___ ___ _ _ . _ - - = . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ - - _ . . _ _ _ - _ .
i
.m BSEP '
REVISION 0 ASCA I
- 1. INTRODUCTION I 1.1 ,0bjective i-l l
This report describes the fire protection features for the i safe. shutdown systems and their associated circuits at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (BSEP), and the relationship of these features to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.[1] , As a result of this evaluation, an alternative shutdown system is determined to be necessary to achieve regulatory compliance in most plant areas. Conceptual designs for an alternative shutdown i system and fire protection modifications are presented to outline : the methods selected to achieve compliance. ! In those instances where proposed modifications and/or i existing plant design features provide an adequate level of fire protection safety equivalent to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.G.1 l exemptions are requested and the necessary technical justifications are provided.- 1.2 Scope This report presents the results of the analyses that were per f ormed to address the requirements for protecting safe 1 shutdown systems and their associated circuits as specified in 10 j CFR 50 Appendix R, and the associated regulatory guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 81-12, the subsequent J i i i %s Page 1-1
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
% Clarification Letter to Generic Letter 81-12, and Generic Letter :
83-33.[1,3,4,5) These requirements are intended to limit damage i to safe shutdown systems resulting from a fire and to ensure that the ability to achieve safe shutdown is not compromised. The analysis presented in this report evaluates the conformance of BSEP to these requirements. The report describes a three-fold analysis: (1) Using Commission guidelines and criteria, redundant systems and equipment necessary for safe shutdown, including their associated circuits of- concern, are . identified, ;
.i (2) The locations of the redundant systems and equipment -
within fire area boundaries of BSEP are reviewed to determine the availability of a means to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire; and - (3) Wherever the requisite separation between safe shutdown systems does not exist, modifications are proposed to
--)
protect the safe shutdown capability, and either ; achieve verbatim compliance with Section III.G.2, or provide an alternative shutdown capability (Section III.G.3 compliance), or support compliance through exemption requests. ! 1.3 Criteria The criteria used in this analysis are based on the i following: (1) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L;[1] (2) NRC Generic Letter 81-12 and subsequent Clarification Letter of March 22, 1982;[2,3] l (3) NRC Generic Letter 83-33;[4] (4) NRC Staff guidelines, especially: (a) SECY 82-13,[5] J Page 1-2 i 1
- . _ _ _ - _ . . . . _ _ _ .~ __
l BSEP !
- REVISION 0 ASCA (b) Internal Staff memoranda addressing safe shutdown ;
capability, and I (c) Appendix R SERs issued for.other plants; and , (5) Brunswick licensing bases and operating practices as ! documented in the FSAR, Technical Specifications, and plant procedures. 1.4 Report Overview This report contains seven sections. Section 2 presents the BSEP fire areas which are part of 'the basis for the Appendix R ( analyses performed. Criteria for establishing fire areas are 1 discussed as well as the process used to determine the associated fire hazard severity. The y ant's active fire protection 1 features are summarized with the detection and suppression ! systems grouped for each fire area on an area-by-area basis. i 3 Section 3 describes the process used to identify safety functions, safe shutdown systems, components and circuits, and I i associated circuits of concern. Related assumptions and I considerations are also discussed. Section 4 identifies plant areas not in compliance with Appendix R Section III.G.2 and presents feasible options for i achieving compliance. Section 5 describes the fire boundary and suppression modifications proposed at Brunswick which are considered necessary to: (1) Bring identified fire areas into compliance with the specific criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section , III.G; or j l ~s l- Page 1-3 l i :
i BSEP RCVISION 0 ASCA. 1 s-(2) Meet the requirements for equivalent protection considered in the exemption applications contained in Section 7. ; Section 6 provides a discussion of the proposed alternative shutdown systems. The systems modifications necessary to achieve the alternate shutdown capability are detailed and the operation of the alternative shutdown system is discussed. This section presents the detailed information requested by Generic Letter 81-12 and. associated clarification letters. Section 7 presents a detailed analysis for each fire area identified in Section 4 as not beir.g in compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R, and for which an exemption is sought. Each of the areas is described in detail and ran individual fire hazards analysis is provided. Tables and drawings summarizing - significant fire area information are also provided at the end of each subsection. I 1.5 Summary Table 1.5-1 summarizes the status of each fire area with respect to conformance to the requirements of Appendix R. The table identifies the fire areas at BSEP, and the general technical approaches selected. For those fire areas not in conformance with the specific criteria of Appendix R Section III.G, the proposed modifications will provide the necessary level of protection by upgrading fire barriers, installing suppression and detection systems, modifying ! circuits, rerouting cables, encapsulating conduits and providing alternative shutdown stations. v Page 1-4
l I l SSEP REVISION 1 ASCA l
1 For twenty-two additional fire areas, similar modifications l are proposed to achieve an equivalent level of protection where verbatim compliance with Appendix R is not achieved. For these areas, applications for exemptions are presented on the basis of i detailed fire hazards analyses.
1.6 Acronyms and Abbreviations l I ! The following acronyms. abbreviations and system j designations have been used in this report: ACS - Alternative Control Station ADS - Automatic Depressurization System ANS - American Nuclear Society APCSB - Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch ASCA - Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment BOP - Balance of Plant. ! l BRK - Breaker ' BSEP - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant BTP - Branch Technical Position s CB - Control Building l i l CFR . Code of Federal Regulations { Chemical Engineering Branch l CMEB - ' CP&L - Carolina Power & Light Company CRD - Control Rod Drive CS - Core Spray System CST - Condensate Storage Tank CT - Current Transformer DG - Diesel Generator DGCW - Diesel Generator Cooling Water l EB1 - Diesel Generator No. 1 and Associated Switchgear ! EB2 - Diesel Generator No. 2 and Associated Switchgear Diesel Generator No. 3 and Associated Switchgear EB3 - EB4 ! Diesel Generator No. 4 and Associated Switchgear Engine Governor Monitoring EGM - ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EPS - Emergency Power System FPSER - Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report FR - Federal Register FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection System HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI - Low Pressure Coolant Injection ss Page 1-5 ( l
_ - - - ._ . . = . . . - . . . - _ _ _ _ - . - .. - - . . . . . - . . - i BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA MCC - Motor Control Center # MG - Motor Generator t MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NFPA - National Fire Protection Association NPSH - Net Positive Suction Head NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS - Nuclear Steam Supply System NTS - New Transfer Switch PMI - Plant Monitoring Instrumentation PSAR - Preliminary Safety Analysis Report PEID - Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RB - Reactor Building RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHR - Residual Heat Removal System RHRCW - RHR Cooling Water RPLC - Reactor Pressure and Level Control RPS - Reactor Protection System RTD - Resistance Temperature Detector RTGB - Reactor Turbine-Generator Board RWCU - Reactor Water Clean-Up RX - Reactor SDC - Shutdown Cooling : SER - Safety Evaluation Report SRP - Standard Review Plan SPC - Suppression Pool Cooling i S/RV, - Safety / Relief Valve SW - Service Water System ; SWDG - Service Water Diesel Generator Function SWGR - Switchgear TC - Torus Cooling UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report SYSTEM DESIGNATIONS A71 - Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff B21 - Nuclear Boiler System B32 - Reactor Recirculation System Cll/Cl2 - Control Rod Drive C32 - Feedwater Control System C41 - Standby Liquid Control System C51 - Neutron Monitoring System I C71/C72 - Reactor Protection System D12 - Process Radiation Monitoring D22 - Area Radiation Monitoring Ell - Residual Heat Removal System E21 - Core Spray System E41 - High Pressure Coolant Injection System E51 - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System G16 - Radwaste System G31 -
' Reactor Water Clean-up System G41 -
Fuel Pool Cooling and Clear-up Page 1-6
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l l l BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
?
i 1.7 References I 1
- 1. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix R, " Fire Protection Program for ' Nuclear Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
l
- 2. Memorandum to All Power Reactor Licensees With Plants '
Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979 from Darrell G. Eisenhut,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule-(45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) -
Generic Letter 81-12," February 20, 1981.
- 3. Memorandum to Darrell G. Eisenhut .from Roger J.
'Mattson,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) -
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12," March 22, 1982.
- 4. Memorandum to All Licensees and Applicants of Nuclear Power Reactors from Darrell G. Eisenhut,
Subject:
"NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10
- CFR 50 (Generic Letter 83-33)," October 19, 1983.
- 5. Memorandum to The Commissioners from William J. Dircks,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule Schedules and Exemptions
( (SECY.82-13)," January 11, 1982. l l l i l- ! t d Page 1-7
i N' l CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY I BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 { APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE
SUMMARY
TABLE 1.5-1 ! I I l*- Refer to Table 4.1-1 for a summary of the proposed l l modifications. 1 I I l** Refer to Section'7 for detailed exemption request. l l (?f ** under Fire Area column, exemption affects l I Doth units.) I . l l i I : l 1 I ; I I ! I I III.G Compliance Method
- I ;
- l l III.G.2 I III.G.3 l Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 l .I l Fire Area l I I I 1 I I i i I l CB-l** l l l X l X l l l CB-2 l l l X l X l i l CB-7 l l X l X** l l r l CB-8 i l X l X** l l [
l CB-9 l X l I l X** l l CB-10 l X l 1 1 X** I , i CB-23E** l l l X l X l ; I I I I I I DG-l** l l l X l X l I l l DG-2 l I l X l X l l l DG-3 I X l l l X l l DG-4 l l X l X l l l DG-5 l l l X l X l l 'DG-6 l l X l X l l I DG-7** I l l X l X** l ! l DG-8 l X l I l X** l [ l DG-9 l X l l I X** 1 ! l DG-ll** l l l X l X l. I DG-12 l l X i X** 1 1 l DG-13 1 X l l l X** I ; I DG-14** l l l X l X l l DG-16E l X l X l l l l DG-19 I l X l X l 1 i l l I l v , I Page 1 of 2
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l CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ; l K BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS-l &'2 ! APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE
SUMMARY
TABLE l.5-1 ! (continued) . I I l l ' 1 I i I l , I III.G Compliance Method
- l
.l- l III.G.2- 1 III.G.3 1 l Fire Area' l Unit 1 l Unit 2 I Unit 1 I Unit 2 l l 1 1 1 .. I l l DG-20 l I X- I X l l l DG-21 l X l l l X l l DG-22 1 X l l l X l 1 I I I I I l East Yard **l l l X l X !
l- 1 I I I I I SW-l** l l l X l X l. I I I I I I I TBl** l l l X l X l 1 . I I I I I - I Valve Pit I X l N/A l~ l I
]s l
I Unit 1 I l-I 1 I I I J I I I I Valve Pit I N/A l X l l l i 1 Unit 2 I I I l- 1 I I I I i l I l
- l. RB1-1 l l l X** l N/A l l RB1-6 l l l X** l N/A l 1 I I I I 'l I RB2-1 l l l N/A l X** l RB2-6 i
l- l l l N/A l X** l- ! I I I i l I l ! l i-i i
/
l l Page 2 of 2 4
. . . - - , . , . . . - - ,, - . . - , . , . . _ . , - < , , - . , ,m., ., - , . .--i
a TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 2 SECTION PAGE
- 2. FIRE PROTECTION FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS .............. 2-1 2.1 Introduction ..................................... 2-1 2.2 BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Fire Areas........................ 2-1 2.3 Appendix R Fire Areas............................. 2-3 2.4 Definitions....................................... 2-5 2.4.1 Fire Area......................................... 2-5 2.4.2 Fire Barrier...................................... 2-5 2.4.3 Fire Detector..................................... 2-6 2.4.4 Fire Resistance Rating............................ 2-6 2.4.5 Fire Stop......................................... 2-7 2.4.6 Fire Suppression.................................. 2-7 2.4.7 Fire Zone......................................... 2-7 2.4.8 Flame Retardant................................... 2-7 2.4.9 Noncombustible Material........................... 2-7 2.4.10 Fire Barrier Penetrations......................... 2-8 2.5 Fire Hazards Analysis............................. 2-8 2.5.1 Fixed Combustibles................................. 2-9 2.5.2 Transient Combustibles............................ 2-11 I 2.5.3 Ignition Potential...........................e .... 2-14
- ' 2.5.4 Fire Propagation Control Measures................. 2-14 2.5.5 Automatic Detection and Suppression............... 2-15 2.5.6 Modifications..................................... 2-17 2.5.7 NFPA Codes and Standards.......................... 2-18 2.6 Conclusion........................................ 2-20 2.7 References................................. ...... 2-21 TABLES 2.3-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Identification 2.3-2 Existing Protection for Fire Areas FIGURES (Located in Book 6) 2.3-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing East Yard Units 1 & 2 2.3-2 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Diesel Generator Building 2' Elev South Units 1 & 2 2.3-3 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Diesel Generator Building 2' Elev North Units 1 & 2 2.3-4 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Diesel Generator Building 23' Elev South Units 1 & 2 v'
Page 1 of 3
l Table of Contents for Section 2
- ,s' continued ;
l j FIGURES (continued) (Located in Book 6) l l l 2.3-5 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ' l Diesel Generator Building 23' Elev North Units 1 & 2
- 2.3-6 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Diesel Generator Building 50' Elev South Units 1 & 2 ]
l 2.3-7 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Diesel Generator Building 50' Elev North Units 1 & 2 l 2.3-8 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Service Water Building 4' and 20' Elev Units 1 & 2 2.3-9 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control and Radvaste Buildings 9' Elev Unit 1 2.3-10 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing , Control Building 23' Elev Unit 1 l 2.3-11 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Control Building 23' Elev Unit 1 2.3-12 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Control Building 49' Elev Unit 1 l 2.3-13 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev West Unit 1 2.3-14 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev East Unit 1 2.3-15 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l l Reactor Building 20' Elev West Unit 1 1 ! h 2.3-16 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing 4
/ Reactor Building 20' Elev East Unit 1 !
2.3-17 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l l Reactor Building 50' Elev West Unit 1 i l 2.3-18 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 50' Elev East Unit 1 , 2.3-19 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing ! Reactor Building Sections and Details Unit 1 l 2.3-20 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 1 l 2.3-21 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 1 l 2.3-22 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Northeast Unit 1 2.3-23 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing 1 l Turbine Building 20' Elev Southeast Unit 1 l l 2.3-24 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Southeast Unit 1 2.3-25 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 38' and 45' Elev Southwest Unit 1 2.3-26 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Turbine Building 38' and 45' Elev Southeast Unit 1 2.3-27 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control and Radwaste Buildings 9' Elev Unit 1 2.3-28 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control Building 23' Elev Unit 2 sd l Page 2 of 3
- - . _ _ =
l Table of Contents for Section 2 continued l FIGURES (continued) (Located in Book 6) l 2.3-29 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Control Building 23' Elev Unit 2 1 2.3-30 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Control Building 49' Elev Unit 2 l 2.3-31 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control Building 38' and 70' Elev Unit 2 'l 2.3-32 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev West Unit 2 l 2.3-33 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l l Reactor Building (-)l7' Elev East Unit 2 2.3-34 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Reactor Building 20' Elev West Unit 2 l l 2.3-35 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 20' Elev East Unit 2 l 2.3-36 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building 50' Elev West Unit 2 l 2.3-37 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Reactor Building 50' Elev East Unit 2 ! 2.3-38 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Reactor Building Sections and Details Unit 2 j 2.3-39 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing l Turbine Building Below 20' Elev Unit 2 l 2.3-40 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Turbine Building 20' Elev Northwest Unit 2 2.3-41 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing i Turbine Building 20' Eltv Southeast Unit 2 l 2.3-42 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundar y Drawing l Turbine Building 20' Elev Northeast Unit 2 2.3-43 Fire Area / Fire Zone Boundary Drawing Control and Radvaste Building 9' Elev Unit 2 a Page 3 of 3
i L
?
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
- 2. FIRE PROTECTION FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS l
L 2.1 Introduction ! I t This section describes the criteria and methodologies used 1 to define fire areas and perform fire hazards analyses for BSEP. ! i The methodology used to determine equivalent fire severities for the zones in each fire area is also discussed. < l ! l Fire protection features are described in three sections of l ! this report. This section establishes the framework for fire ; l hazards analyses. Section 5 of this report summarizes fire l protection modifications proposed for BSEP areas containing safe ,
'~~)
! -- shutdown equipraent . Section 7 describes the fire hazards i i analyses performed for those fire areas in which exemptions from - 1 Appendix R criteria are requested and details the bases l supporting these exemptions. l 1 2.2 BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Fire Areas l On December 29, 1976, CP&L described the results of its fire protection program review in response to a request from the NRC. This Appendix A report [1] and later correspondence supplementing l this report [2,3,4,5,6,7,8] contained the following information: (1) A comparison of the existing fire protection program provisions with the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1[9] and 4
- s/
1 l Pagt 2-1 l ! l
BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA (2) A fire hazards analysis of all fire areas identified in the plant. In the report, CP&L identified fire areas and fire zones based on the inherent fire resistance capability of existing plant structures. Fire areas were designated as that portion of a building that is separated from other areas by boundaries 1 (walls, floors or roofs) which could be upgraded to three hour fire boundaries with little or no additional construction. Fire zones were defined as plant areas not completely separated from adjacent zones by walls. The combustible loadings for each fire area and fire zone were determined and the existing detection and suppression capabilities were quantified. l The Appendix A report [1] identified 144 fire areas and zones
-- in the two units at BSEP. A majority of these areas consisted of
~~
individual rooms bounded by walls with sufficient thicknesses to . qualify as rated barriers. Areas not having a three-hour rating were found acceptable on the basis of a light fuel loading or lack of threat to safety-related equipment and/or redundant safe shutdown equipment. Principal areas of concern at the time included the individual Reactor Buildings, Radwaste Building, Control Building, Diesel Generator Building, Service Water Building and Augmented Off-Gas Building. Barrier penetrations considered in the original analysis included doorways, ventilation ducts, electrical raceways and i pipe chases. Penetrations of concern were upgraded to meet the Commission's requirements using the following methods: Page 2-2 l
BSEP
.ys REVISION 0 ASCA Raceways -
Delta Maid One Shot insulating cement or cellular concrete; a few penetrations were treated with mineral wool coated with Flamemastic. Doorways - Fire door assemblies were either listed or found acceptable to the Staff. Ventilation Ducts - Rated fire dampers installed in HVAC barrier penetrations. Separation of redundant electrical divisions was also subjected to a review under BTP APCSB 9.5-1.[10] This review concluded that the modified plant configurations did not provide pathways for the propagation of fires between divisions. The Commission's review of the BSEP fire protection program resulted in the issuance of the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation og Report (FPSER)[ll) on November 22, 1977 Amendments were ; subsequently issued in April 1979[12] and June 1980[13] closing out all remaining open items on the original FPSER (see Appendix ) B for copies of these SERs). 2.3 Appendix R Fire Areas ; 1 A Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report [14] reanalyzed BSEP fire protection features in response to the requirements of 10 l i CFR 50 Appendix R[15] and was presented to the Commission in June 1982. The report described in detail those zones and areas containing safe shutdown equipment and cables which required either modification or an exemption to meet the requirements of Appendix R. The 1982 analysis was based heavily upon fire protection features previously approved by the Commission in the l r/ Page 2-3
BSEP
._s REVISION 0 ASCA FPSER and requested exemption from the safe shutdown separation 1
criteria of Appendix R in many areas. ) In the draft SER dated January 31, 1983[48] for the June 1982 submittal, the NRC stated that, as a result of denied exemptions, new proposals to make modifications to meet specific requirements of Section :II.G of Appendix R need no additional submittals unless the modifications are to provide alternative shutdown capability. In a letter dated May 2, 1983, CP&L advised
.l the NRC that it intended to perform an alternative shutdown !
capability analysis.[49] The NRC responded in a letter dated July 27, 1983[50] indicating that the analysis is to be submitted within nine months of receipt of this letter. The reanalysis of Appendix R conformance using alternative I l
-,\
shutdown is described in this report. The principal focus of l l this report is on those areas in which modifications are required l to meet Appendix R safe shutdown criteria or for which exemptions are requested. An important result of this effort is the identification of safe snutdown modifications and fire protection modifications designed to further enhance the existing protection of the safe shutdown capability. These modifications are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. The safe shutdown analysis was based on fire areas consistent with guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-33[23). As in the BTP 9.5-1 analysis,[1] fire area boundaries are based on rated barriers. These areas are identified in Table 2.3-1 and illustrated in Figures 2.3-1 through 2.3-42. s Page 2-4
BSEP
~3 REVISION 0 ASCA ,
Table 2.3-2 identifies the fire areas for which exemptions are requested, summarizes their automatic detection and suppression features, and describes the existing fire hazards. Unless otherwise indicated, the fire area boundary ratings as listed in this table are the minimum fire ratings of the barriers l' vhich form the boundaries of the fire area. 2.4 Definitions The definitions of fire protection terms used in this analysis are drawn from three sources: (1) USNRC Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 in the Standard Review Plan, " Fire Protection Program", Revision 3, July 1981;[16] j l (2) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards j and guidelines; and s 1
! (3) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers l l ~
(IEEE) Standard 384-1981.[17] l l Each definition listed in this section is annotated to reflect l l its principal source document. If there is no reference, the definition is unique to this analysis. 2.4.1 Fire Area A designated area sufficiently bounded by barriers to protect safe shutdown equipment contained within the designated area from fire hazards external to that fire area. (per guidance of Generic Letter 83-33[23] and guidance of NRC workshops.) 2.4.2 Fire Barrier Those components of construction (walls, floors, and their supports, including beams, joists and columns) that are rated in
'=#
Page 2-5 1
BSEP w REVISION 0 ASCA hours of resistance to fire by approving laboratories or have been determined to be equivalent to rated assemblies and are used to prevent the spread of fire. Penetrations in these barriers will be sealed with devices or materials which have a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier or whose design has been found adequate by fire hazards analysis. All such barriers will be controlled in accordance with the requirements of the plant Technical Specifications. 2.4.3 Fire Detector A device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system and other appropriate action (see NFPA-STD-72E, " Automatic Fire Detectors").[26) Some typical -s fire detectors are classified as follows: Heat Detector A device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature or rate of temperature rise. Smoke Detector A device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustici. Flame Detector A device that detects the infrared, ultraviolet or visible radiation produced by a fire. 2.4.4 Fire Resistance Rating The duration that materials or assemblies have withstood a fire exposure as established in accordance with the test procedures of " Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials"(18] (BTP 9.5-1). J Page 2-6
. . BSEP ,
,ys REVISION 0 ASCA 2.4.5 Fire Stop.
A feature of construction that prevents fire propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire. area or fire zone (BTP 9.5-1). 2.4.6 Fire Suppression Activities associated with'the control and extinguishing of fire (fire fighting). Manual fire suppression issthe use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually actuated fixed systems by plant personnel. Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated fixed systems such as water, Halon.or carbon dioxide (BTP-9.5-1). 3 2.4.7 Fire Zone The subdivision of a fire area (BTP 9.5-1). 2.4.8 Flame Retardant Capable of limiting the propagation of a fire beyond the area of influence of the. energy source that initiated the fire (IEEE-STD-384-1981). 2.4.9 Noncombustible Material !
-(a) A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated will not ignite, born, support combustion, or release flammable vapors shen ;
subjected to fire or heat; or (b) Material having a structural base of noncombustible , material, as defined in (a) above, with a surfacing not ; over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM-STD-E-84 Test i , " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building , Materials."[19] (BTP 9.5-1) i l l
-/ ;
l Page 2-7 l
)
T t BSEP ,
-s ' REVISION 0 ASCA ;
r i 2.4.10 Fire Barrier Penetrations l floor, A i A designed breach in a rated wall or ceiling. penetration may be utilized for access, materials handling, f movement of personnel, or for allowing passage of such things as l I conduits, electrical cables, cable trays, piping and HVAC ducts.
- 2. 5' Fire Hazards Analysis The objective of this report is to review safe shutdown i t
system configurations and identify modifications necessary to i ensure the availability of safe shutdown systems during and after ! the fire. The fire hazards analysis supports this objective in f two ways: ; (1) The results identify specific deviations from one or , more of the three design basis protective features of i
-\ Section III.G.2 to Appendix R; and (2) .For deviations which cannot be modified to meet Appendix R safe . shutdown separation- criteria, ;
combinations of features are detailed to provide l protection of the safe shutdown capability. This process is applied to the safe shutdown fire areas at > BSEP. Any deviations from the III.G.2 separation criteria are l identified and reviewed to determine whether a nuclear system i j design or operational modification could assure the availability J of the safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire. If such { modifications are not practicable, additional analysis is performed for the purpose of providing sufficient fire protection to one or more safe shutdown trains including associated circuits of concern. I Page 2-8 i E
BSL' _s REVISION 0 ASCA The principal steps of the fire hazards analysis are as follows: (1) Review the fixed and transient cc.:bustibles either present or which may be introduced into the area in support of normal plant activities; (2) Characterize the ignition potential; (3) Identify those propagation control measures in use such as rated barriers, partial barriers, physical distance, ceiling height, and flame retardants which may inhibit the spread of a fire; (4) Determine the capabilities of the automatic detection and suppression systems; and (5) Identify those features which may be required to enhance protection within a given area. Each step in this process is described in greater detail below. 2.5.1 Fixed Combustibles
) For purposes of this analysis, fixed combustibles are ,
- comprised of exposed electrical cable insulation, combustible liquids and other combustible material in a fixed location in a fire area,, The electrical cable portion of the fixed combustible loading was developed utilizing plant cable and raceway drawings !
in conjunction with information contained in a computerized conduit and cable schedule (CASP). Combustibles associated with plant equipment and all other in-situ hazards were identified during field inspection. As described in this section, loadings 1 are calculated in a manner which ensures conservatism of the data presented. The calculated combustible loadings presented herein are expected to be larger than the actual loading in the area by virtue of the conservatism in the calculations.
~s Page 2-9
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA Philosophy The fundamental philosophy applied to this analysis was based on the:following considerations: (1) Accurate determinations of fixed combustible quantities can be made using plant drawings, computer data bases and field inspections. , (2) It is recognized that fixed combustibles may be l characterized by different heats of combustion. Where ; l several different types of fuels were analyzed together I as a group (as in the case of different cable types run in common trays), the value for the heat of combustion selected was based on that material present which had ' the highest value. As an example, the highest value for electrical cables was determined to be 13,000 Btu /lb and is consistent with data reported in the literature.[20, 21, 22] Conservatism i s l Conservatism in the analysis is achieved through the
~N following considerations:
(1) The previously calculated cable tray fill was determined using fill percentages based on a cross- l sectional area method. This results in a conservative l approach for the following reason: Previous control and instrument cable calculations were completed using the cross-sectional area method, , however, power cable was previously evaluated using a ' diameter method. This diameter method estimates the tray fill to be the ratio of the summation of cable - diameters to the tray width. For example, if three two ! inch diameter cables were placed in a 12 inch wide by four inch high tray, the fill calculates to fifty percent as calculated below: l l diameter of summation = 3 cables x 2 inches = 50% i tray width 12 inches Using the cross-sectional method fill is calculated as 20%. Using the previous example for a cross-sectional method the calculation is as follows: i cross-section area cables = 3.14 r 2 x 3 cables = 20% cross-section area tray 12 inches x 4 inches s Page 2-10
BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA This calculation difference results in a percent j loading figure which is two and one-half times the l actual percent fill. A corresponding overestimation of l fire loading will result. . (2) Ignition of all exposed combustibles and enclosed
. flammable' liquids in an area is assumed regardless of ;
the degree of ignitability of the materials. l l (3) The beneficial properties of fire retardant treatments 1 and coatings in inhibiting ignition, and fire i propagation and reducing the heat release rate are not ! considered in calculating fuel loadings. 1 (4) All combustible loading figures have been increased by , an additional ten percent to ensure an additional ! conservatism. 2.5.2 Transient Combustibles The transient combustible loading data utilized in this )
- submittal was developed using a technique designed to consider
-, the multiplicity of tasks which can introduce combustibles in the plant and to assure conservatism in the data presented. As such, j l
)
the loadings are considered to comply with the tenets of Generic i Letter 83-33[23] and represent an upper limit of the transients which might be expected in an area. Philosophy The philosophy applied was based on the following assumptions: (1) The quantity and type of materials used in an area may exceed the limits established by administrative controls (i.e., quantities and types of materials are estimated based on what could be utilized, not on the l
- limits set by administrative controls).
j (2) Materials are not transported through or to areas i i difficult to access unless they are to be used there or i unless the area in question provides the only access to their ultimate location.
-/ ,
i Page 2-11 i
.ew ..+r
- w m ,
l l i BSEP i
-s REVISION 0 ASCA Conservatism Conservatism in the analysis is achieved through the ;
following considerations: (1) No credit is taken for administrative controls limitint { the quantity of combustibles in a given area. (2) Total combustion of the materials is assumed. i (3) Ignition of all combustibles is assumed regardless of , the degree of ignitability of the materials. (4) The beneficial properties of fire retardant treatments and coatings are disregarded. ; (5) The combustible loading contributed by flammable and - combustible liquids is included with the loading of . each area through which they are transported to their ! point of usage. l C (6) The loading is based on the " worst case" combination of ; transients which may be simultaneously present in an ;
~ area.
Methodology "
~!
To establish the types and quantities of materials of a .; I transient nature to be.found in a given ' ire zone, a two-phase approach was taken. Phase I consisted of an analysis which identified the types of activities occurring or which could occur [ in the plant and the types and quantities of combustibles each i Under Phase activity would introduce. II,1the activities that might occur in each fire zone were identified utilizing the ! i results of Phase I, and a determination of the worst case combination and quantity of combustibles which might be present was made. l Phase I divided the activities encountered into five groups, i each of which can introduce significant quantities of ! combustibles into the plant. These groups are: Page 2-12 i
i SSEP
- - -REVISION 0 ASCA i
'?S i j Contamination Control
)
Services (e.g., janitorial, preservation) , Modification , 1 Fuel Handling 1 i Maintenance (preventive and corrective) " 4 Each of- these activity groups was then subdivided into , 5 specific jobs which were identified by a letter / number code; with , t' ; j the letter designating the activity group and the number of the I i job. The types and quantities of combustibles associated with each job were then tabulated. I j Phase II consisted of a review of each fire zone to l' determine those jobs which routinely occur there (e.g., 2 L ! lubrication'of equipment) and those jobs which, conceivably, { -'l l 4
~# might occur there (e.g., modifications to a piping system).
Following this step, a summation of the transient combustibles l j was made and the results tabulated by the type of combustible i i (e.g., cellulosics, plastics) and the quantity of each. In cases where performance of different jobs would be mutually exclusive in nature, the data for the worst case job (s) was included in the i table. This data was then transferred to the combustible loading i spreader sheets where the transient and in-situ loading were ! tabulated. Page 2-13
l l l i BSEP
, REVISION 0 ASCA 2.5.3 Ignition Potential l l
The judgement that ignition potential is considered low is based on the availability of high energy sources in the vicinity of exposed fixed combustible materials and the ignitability of those materials. In this context, combustible materials contained within wraps, behind thermal shields or inside enclosures such as closed sumps, conduit, cabinets, tanks, etc., are excluded from consideration. The ignition potential for the exposed combustibles is low if one or more of the following attributes apply: (1) Exposed electrical cable is either self-extinguishing, non-fire propagating or qualified to IEEE-STD-383[24] or treated with a flame retardant coating; .- (2) Lubricating oils in the area contained within closed , i sumps or in substantial equipment housings and have a
' high flash point
- no uninsulated hot surfaces (i.e.,
greater than 350 6F) exist within 20 feet of the sump); (3) Exposed fixed combustibles are protected from floor-based fires by plume impingement thermal shields composed of noncombustible materials; (4) Area usage is restricted due to health physics considerations; (5) No uninsulated hot surfaces (i.e., gecater than 350 F) exist within 20 feet of the exposed combustible. 2.5.4 Fire Propagation Control Measures Fire propagation is a concern because the spread of fire damage f ror its original site could threaten redundant divisions of safe shutdown equipment. Several measures are available to control the propagation of fires. These measures include: s-Page 2-14
SSEP ! REVISION 1. ASCA e s (1) High ceilings - allow thermal mixing and diffusion of , fire plumes thereby inhibiting the development of a stratified layer of hot gases. 1 i (2) Physical separation - reduces the radiant energy ! transfer from a fire to other objects and removes '
- objects from convective heat transfer from the fire
} plume. (3) physical separation. provide comparable Partial barriers - protection to (4) Noncombustible enclosures (conduits, cabinets, etc.) - ! provide- additional mass and delay the transfer of energy from the fire plume to the objects of concern , inside (e.g., electrical cable). (5) Flame retardant coatings - raise the threshold of incident energy required to inflict damage, reduce the ' heat release rate from fires, and inhibit the propagation of fire from the original site. (6) Automatic suppression - disrupts the free burn of fires and cools both fire plumes and objects in their I vicinity thereby delaying or preventing the onset of e'g damage. s- . t Combinations of these features provide additional time for i suppression activities to successfully extinguish exposure fires and supplement the other existing protection features. 2.5.5 Automatic Detection and Suppression These active systems provide prompt indication of the presence of a fire and early suppression. The systems currently in place at BSEP were previously reviewed by the Commission against the criteria of BTP APCSB 9.5-1(10] and were found to protect the anticipated hazards. The standards which form the underlying basis for the design of these systems at BSEP are: l (1) NFPA-STD-72D-1975, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems"[25] 1 I
%#l l
Page 2-15
BSEP 3 REVISION 0 ASCA (2) NFPA-STD-llA-1974, " Standard on Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems"[35] (3) NFPA-STD-72E-1974, " Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors"[26] (4) NFPA-STD-12-1973, " Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems"[36] (5) NFPA-STD-13-1975, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems"[27] The detection system is designed to provide early warning of incipient fires through the use of ceiling-mounted ionization detectors. A common alarm panel mounted in the Control Room provides audible and visual indication of the fire zone in which an alarm may originate. The supervision feature of the detection circuitry provides indication of faults (e.g., loss of power, opens, shorts, etc.) in the system. Automatic suppression is provided in safety-related plant areas where significant exposure fires may develop as a result of plant activities. Such areas generally involve locations where combustible materials may accumulate in support of work activities (e.g., a staging area). In addition, automatic suppression is provided to protect specific hazards and to protect ECCS systems from common mode failure due to a fire. Automatic suppression is also provided in certain areas where electrical cables for redundant safety-related divisions may be in close proximity to each other. The sprinkler system design criteria is sufficient to ensure control of the anticipated hazards. The delivered water density capability of the BSEP automatic suppression systems usually J Page 2-16
i BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA , exceed the requirements for " Extra Hazard Occupancy" as specified l by NFPA-STD-13-1975, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler j i ! Systems".[27) The combustibles identified in. the standard l present a greater hazard than anticipated at BSEP in the course J ( l of normal operations. The installed suppression systems are i capable of providing water in sufficient quantities to suppress l l fires and preclude propagation to electrical cables in the t
- vicinity.
2.5.6 Modifications The fire hazards analysis has identified the need for modifications to achieve and maintain safe shutdown during and after a fire. Guidelines for selecting the most appropriate modification are provided by the current state of knowledge for
\
fire protsction engineering as reflected by NFPA codes, NRC criteria and fire science literature. Additional information in the selection of modification options is provided by design configurations found acceptable by the NRC. The documents consulted in this respect include NRC Staff review criteria published in SECY 82-13, Generic Letter 83-33 and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1.(28,23,16] In addition, configurations described in exemptions from Appendix R criteria for other plants supplement this information. Particular modifications selected for BSEP are as described l in Section 5 of this report. I s Page 2-17
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 2.5.7 NFPA Codes and Standards The fire protection / prevention features at BSEP were designed and implemented utilizing the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes as guidelines. At the time of design or implementation, the most recent editions of the applicable NFPA codes were utilized to achieve the required level of protection. NFPA codes are revised on a periodic basis to keep abreast of the state-of-the-art in fire protection. Recent changes in the codes allow for improvements or alternative approaches to achieving the required level of protection and do not imply that the existing protection is inadequate. Requiring the existing fire protection / prevention features at BSEP to be reanalyzed against the latest published editions of the NFPA codes and T
--- standards, would not significantly enhance the level of protection afforded by the existing designs and configurations.
National Fire Protection Codes
- 1) Std. No. 4 - Organization for Fire Services [29]
- 2) Std. No. 4A - Organization for Fire Departments [30]
- 3) Std. No. 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention [31]
- 4) Std. No. 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies [32]
- 5) Std. No. 8 - Management of Responsibility of Effects of Fire on Operations [33]
- 6) Std. No. 10 - Installation of Portable Fire Extinguishers [3A]
- 7) Std. No. llA - Standard on Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems [35]
J Page 2-18
BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA
- 8) Std. No. 12 - Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems [36] l
- 9) Std. No. 12A - Halon 1301 Systems [37]
- 10) Std. No. 13 - Installation of Sprinkler Systems'[27]
- 11) Std. No. 15 - Water Spray Fixed Systems [38]
- 12) Std. No. 16 - Installation of Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler and Spray Systems [39]
- 13) Std. No. 20 - Centrifugal Fire Pumps [40] I l
- 14) Std. No. 24 - Outside Protection [4)) !
- 15) Std. No. 27 - Private Fire Brigades [42]
- 16) Std. No. 30 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code [43]
l
- 17) Std. No. 51B - Cutting and Welding Processes [44] 1
- 18) Std. No. 72D - Proprietary Protective Signaling l
-~ Systems [25] j ~ ,
l 19) Std. No. 72E - Automatic Fire Detectors [26] ! ! 20) Std. No-. 80 - Fire Doors and Windows [45] l l j 21) Std. No. 101 - Life Safety Codel'46] Fire protection program and design features were implemented to meet the protection requirements of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. The continued maintenance of those systems and compliance with those specific code requirements ensures that the high degree of fire protection, as originally stipulated by the Commission, is i l maintained. l Therefore, all fire protection programs and/or systems implemented at BSEP under previous editions of the codes will not be updated to reflect subsequent editions.
%M Page 2-19
l BSEP J
- - . REVISION 0 ASCA j 2.6 Conclusion- l The fire protection functional analysis described in this l
section was an integral part of the alternative shutdown I analysis. Section 7 presents the application of this analysis.to i 1 areas requiring exemption from Section III.G criteria. The - 1 systems and components which are the subject of this protection l and the method for their selection are described in Section 3. i I 4 i i L k r i i Page 2-20 l I 6
- . _ - ~.. - . - -. . _ . . . . . - - . . . _ . - .- .- - .-
BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA 2.7 References
- 1. Fire Protection Program Review APCSB 9.5-1, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2, Carolina Power and Light Company, Raleigh, North Carolina, January 1, 1977.
- 2. " Fire Protection Program Review" Letter dated December 27, 1976.
- 3. Supplement Letter dated May 10, 1977.
- 4. Supplement Letter dated June 23, 1977.
- 5. Another Supplement Letter dated June 23, 1977. ,
i
- 6. Supplement Letter dated August 23, 1977.
- 7. Supplement Letter dated August 24, 1977.
- 8. Supplement Letter dated September 20, 1977 I
! 9. Appendix A to'USNRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, l " Fire Protection Program," September 1976.
- 10. USNRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, " Fire l b Protection Program," May 1976.
v
- 11. Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "In the Matter of Carolina Power and Light Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2,"
Docket Nos. 50-325/324, November 22, 1977.
- 12. Supplement No. 1 to the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "In the Matter of Carolina l Power and Light Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2," Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, April 1979.
- 13. Supplement No. 2 to the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "In the Matter of Carolina Power and Light Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2," Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, June 11, ! 1980. f 1 l
- 14. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, " Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment and Proposed Modifications, Units 1 and 2," June 1982.
~/
l j Page 2-21 1 j
BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA m
- 15. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix R
" Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
- 16. USNRC Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 in the Standard Review Plan, " Fire Protection Frogram," Revision 3, July 1961.
- 17. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc.,
" Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits," IEEE-STD-384-1981.
- 18. National Fire Protection Association " Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," NFPA-STD-251-1975.
- 19. American Society for Testing and Materials, " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials," ASTM-STD-E-84-1984. 1
- 20. I.I. Pinkel, " Estimating Fire Hazards Within Enclosed Structures as Related to Nuclear Power Stations." ENL-NUREG-23892, Brookhaven National Laboratory, December 1977 ,
- 21. A. Tewarson, "Physico-Chemical and Combustion / Pyrolysis Properties of Polymeric Materials." NBS-GCR-80-295, Center
'} for Fire Research, National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Dept. of Commerce; or RC80-T-79, Factory Mutual Research Corporation, November 1980.
- 22. " Categorization of Cable Flammability Part 1," Laboratory Evaluation of Cable Flammability Parameters. NP-1200, Part 1, Research Project 1165-1, Interim Report, October 1979.
- 23. Memorandum to All Licensees and Applicants of Nuclear Power Reactors from Darrell G. Eisenhut,
Subject:
"NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 (Generic Letter 83-33)," October 19, 1983.
- 24. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc.,
" Standard for Type Test of Class lE Electrical Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," IEEE-STD-383-1980.
- 25. National Fire Protection Association, " Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems," NFPA-STD-72D-1979.
Page 2-22
! BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA
- 26. National Fire Protection Association, " Automatic Fire i Detectors," NFPA-STD-72E-1974.
I 27. National Fire Protection Association, " Installation Sprinkler Systems, NFPA-STD-13-1975. of l1
- 28. Memorandum to The Commissioners from William J. Dircks,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule Schedules and Exemptions (SECY 82-13)," January 11, 1982.
- 29. National Fire Protection Association, " Organization for Fire Services," NFPA-STD-4-1980.
1
- 30. National Fire Protection Association, " Organization for Fire !
Departments," NFPA-STD-4A-1969. I 1
- 31. National Fire Protection Association, " Industrial Fire Loss I Prevention," NFPA-STD-6-1974.
- 32. National Fire Protection Association, " Management of Fire Emergencies," NFPA-STD-7-1974.
- 33. National Fire Protection Association, " Management of :
Responsibility of Effects of Fire on Operations," NFPA-STD-8-1974. 4 l
.-s' )
- 34. Rational Fire Protection Association, " Portable Fire Extinguishers," NFPA-STD-10-1981. '
- 35. National Fire Protection Association, " Standard on Synthetie l Foam and Combined Agent Systems," NFPA-STD-11A-1974. l
- 36. National Fire Protection Association, " Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," NFPA-STD-12-1980.
- 37. National Fire Protection Association, "Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems," NFPA-STD-12A-1980.
- 38. National Fire Protection Association, " Water Spray Fixed Systems," NFPA-STD-15-1973.
- 39. National Fire Protection Association, " Installation of Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems and Foam-Water Spray Systems," NFPA-STD-16-1973.
- 40. National Fire Protection Association, " Centrifugal Fire Pumps," NFPA-STD-20-1973.
l
~ '
Page 2-23
i i BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA f
- 41. National Fire Protection Association, " Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and the Appurtenances," NFPA-STD-24-1973.
- 42. National Fire Protection Association, " Recommendations for Organization, Training and Equipment of Private Fire -
Brigades," NFPA-STD-27-1975. j
- 43. National Fire Protection Association, " Flammable and r Combustible Liquids Code," NFPA-STD-30-1981. ;
i
- 44. National Fire Protection Association, " Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes," NFPA-STD-518-1977.
t
- 45. National Fire Protection Association, " Fire Doors and Windows," NFPA-STD-80-1981.
- 46. National Fire Protection Association, " Code for Safety to I Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures," NFPA-STD-101- .
1981. !
- 47. National Fire Protection Association, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," NFPA-STD-803-1978.
-~ 48. Draft SER on Appendix R Exemption Request. Brunswick Steam .;
. Electric Plant Units 1 and 2, Carolina Power and Light .I Company, January 23, 1983. i
- 49. Letter from P.N. Howe (CP&L) to D.B. Vassallo (NRC),
SUBJECT:
" Additional Information Concerning Exemption Requests and Alternate Shutdown Capability," dated May 2, 1983. ,
- 50. Letter from D.G. Eisenhut (NRC) to E.E. Utley (CP&L), ';
SUBJECT:
" Exemption from Requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3," dated July 27, 1983.
i f 1 i i
~d Page 2-24 f
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 FIRE AREA / FIRE ZONE IDENTIFICATION TABLE 2.3-1 l I I r l FIRt FIRE l LOCATION l l AREA ZONE l l l l l BUILDING l ELEVATION NOW NCL A T UR E l l l- (FT) l l 1 1 I l DG-1 1 DG-1 Diesel Generator l 2 Basement l l 1 l l DG-2 DG-2 Diesel Generator 1 23 Diesel Cell s4 l 1 I I l DG-3 DG-3 Diesel Generator l 23 Diesel Cell a3 l r l 1 l 1 l DG-4 l DG-4 Diesel Generator l 23 Dieset Cell a2 l l l l l D6-5 l DG-5 Diesel Generator 23 l Diesel Cell si l 1 I I l DG-6 DG-6 Diesel Generator ! 23 l E5 Switchgear Room l l l l l DG-7 DG-7 l Diesel Generator 23 E6 Switchgear Room j , t i i I l DG-3 DG-8 l Diesel Generator i 23 E7 Switchgear Room j l 1 I 1 DG-9 DG-9 Diesel Generator l 23 E8 Switchgear Room j l I l DG-10 DG-10 1 Diesel Generator l 23 8 Loading Dock i I i l DG-11 DG-11 Diesel Generatur i 50 El Switchgear Room l l l I l i l I l y 4 Page 1 of 9 i
. _ _ _ . . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - - _ - _= - - - - - - - --- - - - --
TABLE 4. ,jcontinued)
~
FIRE FIRE LOCATION AREA ZONE i
~-
BUILDING ELEVATION NOMENCL A T URE (FT) _ _.I DG-12 DG-12 Diesel Generator 1 50 E2 Switchgear Room j l DG-13 DG-13 Diesel Generator 50 E3 5=ltchgear Room l 1 DG-14 DG-te Diesel Generator 50 E4 Switchgear Room l 1 . DG-16E DG-15 Diesel Generator 50 Supply Air Plenum l I DG-16 Diesel Generator 50 Fan Room l I DG-17 Diesel Generator 50 Air Lock l 1 DG-1B Diesel Generator 50 Air Lock l I DG-23 1 Diesel Generator 50 AFFF System Room l l DG-19 DG-19 Diesel Generator -l* 6" ' Fuel Cell et l l DG-20 DG-20 Diesel Generator -l' 6- Fuel Cell a2 l l l DG-21 DG-21 Diesel Generetor -1" 6" Fuel Cell s3 l I I l DG-22 DG-22 Diesel Generator -1" 6 '- Fuel Cell sa l l j t
$w-g SW-1A Service water 20 Pump Area j l l l Sw-1B Servloe water 4 Basement l l l l
Sw-1C Service water -13* 4* Sump l 1 CB-1 CB-la Control Building 23 Division Il cable l access way l Contsut Building l CB-10 23 Olvision I cable l access way and rettle sp te j l CB-12a Luntrol ButIdtng 49 Diviston II cable l l ! access wey j CB-12b Control Butiding i i 49 Division I cable l access way l CB-2 CB-2a l Contrul Buildins 23 Div6ston I cable l access way l CB-2b Control Building l 23 Division 11 table l access way end rettle spete l j n
" i
. _ _ _ __I Pege 2 of 9 ..
TABLE 2.3- continued) I l FIRE FIRE LOCATION l AREA 20NE I BUILDING ELEVATION NOMENCLATURE 1 (FT) j l l l CB-13a Control Building 49 Division I cable l
} } access way l 1
CB-13b Control Building 49 Division II cable l access way l l l l CB-7 CB-7 Control Bulloing 23 l 1a Battery Room l l 1 l l CB-B CB-8 l Control Building 23 lb Battery Room j g l l l ' l CB-9 CB-9 Control ' Building 23 2a Battery Room j i l l CB-10 CB-10 i Control Building 23 2b Battery Room l 8 l Control Building i ' i CB-23E CB-3 l 23 South stairwell l l l I I , [ CB-4 Control Building l 23 North stairwell [
}
l CB-5 Control Building 23 Cable spread Unit si i l l l CB-6 Control Building 23 l Cable spread unit s2 I I i CB-11 Control Building l 23 Elevator Shaft I i l CB-14 Control Building 49 Unit s1 Computer Room l , I l CB-15 Control Building 49 Unit #2 Computer Room I l l CB-16 Control Building 49 Aualliary Operator s Office I , l l ! l CB-17 Control Butiding 49 , operators Kitchen l 1 Control Building l l CB-10 49 Wash Room l l l I CB-19 i Control Building 49 Visitors Gallery l l l
. i l
l C8-20 Control Building 49 Northwest Area l l CB-21 Control Building l 49 Southwest Area l l l < j CB-22 Control Building l 49 Wash Room l r l i I l CB-23 Control Building i 49 Control Ruum l t 1 i l CB-24 Control Building l 70 l HvAC Equipment Room l l I CB-25 Control Building l 70 Air Conditioning Condensor Areal l l I j i i l i Page 3 of 9 !
?
( , TQBLE 2,3* ,/ continued) 4 1 l { FIRE FIRE LOCATION l l AREA ZONE I l l BUILDING ELEVATION l NOMENCLATURE l (FT) \ I l l CB-26 Control ButIding 70 l Elevator Machinery Room l T I I 1 l RB1-1 RB1-1-a l Reactor Building 1 -17 l South Core Spray l 1 RB1-1-b Reactor Building 1 -17 North Core Spray l l I l l l RB1-t-c Redctor Building 1 -17 l North RHR l l l l RB1-1-d l Reactor Building 1 -17 South RHR I l l RB1-t-e j Reactor Building 1 20 North RHR Ha Room I i I . I I l RB1-1-f l Reactor Building 1 l 20 l South RHR H= Room l i l l ! l I l RB1-1 g Reactor Building 1 l 20 l North Central Area l l (N/C) I l t I ! " l RB1-1 9 Reactor Building 1 20 l Northeast Corner [ j l (N/E) l l l l 1 l l l RB1-1 g Reactor Building i 20 East r 3nt r a l Area - North l (E/C)N l l l l l RB1-1 g Reactor Building 1 l 20 East Central Aree - South l l (E/C)5 I l l I I l RB1-1 g Reactor Building 1 l 20 ' Southeast Corner l l (5/E) l . 1 I I RB1-1 g Reactor Building 1 20 South Central Area l (5/C) l l
- l RBI-1 g Reactor Building 1 l 20 Southwest Corner j _)
(5/W) l -l ' l l I l
- l RB1-1-g Reactor Butiding i 20 Northwest Corner j l
l (N/W) I , l RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 50 l North Central Area j i (N/C) l r I ! RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 50 Northeast Corner l L (h/E) l r l 1 -l + l RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 i 50 l East Central Area ! [ l (E/C) l t i I - l RB1-1-h kedctor Building 1 50 Southeast Corner l l (5/E) l i i I ! I i Page 4 of 9 h
.- . , - . . . . . -, . c , ...w. - .+ , v. _,. . .w., , + , . .
~;~ - . _ . _ ~ . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - (. TOBLE 2.3 continued) l 1 l FIRE FIRE _ LOCATION I l AREA ZONE i l BUILDING ELEVA flON NOMENCLATURE i l (FT) i l l l 1 I g RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 50 Southwest Lorner l l (5/W) I l RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 50 l West Central Area l (W/C) ! l 1 l RB1-1-h Reactor Building 1 l 50 l Northwest Corner j (N/W) I l
'l l
R81-1-1 Reactor Building 1 77 RWCU Access Ruum l , I l RSt-l-j Reactor Building'1 80 West Area l l l l RB1-1-k l Reactor Building 1 80 East Ares 1 l l I l RB1-1-1 Reac*ur Building 1 117 Spent Fuel Pool l I I l RB1-1-m Reactor Building 1 117 Refueling Floor l l l RBI-1-n Reactor Butiding 1 5 Mezzanine l l t j RB1-1-0 Resctor Building 1 36 ECC5 Tunnel Roof - North l [ fn) i 1 I { RB1-1-o Reactor Building 1 36 ECC5 Tunnel Roof - South l l (5) ' I I i
} l RB1-1 p Reactor Building 1 98 General Area l l l l RBl-2 Reactor Building 1 -17 HPCI Room I
l RB1-3-a Reactor Building 1 -17 Orywell I [ RB1-3-b Reactor Building 1 -17 Torus l l 1 l l RB1-4 Reactor Building 1 20 l MSiv Pit l l RB1-5 Reactor Building 1 20 Decont Room I [ RB1-7 Reactor Building 1 l 20 Drywell Entry l l RB1-B Reactor Building 1 20 TIP Room i , I I l RB1-9 Reactor Bulloing 1 20 Elevator Shaft l l l
) RB1-10 Reactor Building 1 50 RWCU Area - South I (s) i I
I , Page 5 of 9
+
- - - - _ - - - . - _ = - _ _ _ _ .
. .. - .~ -
! TABLE 2. continued) . I^
, l , ,
FIRE l FIRE l LOCATION l AREA l ZONE . L l BUILDING ELEVATION NOMENCLAIURti (FT) l t RB1-lO Reactor ButIdtng 1 50 l RwCu Area - No r t ite.h t I (N/E) l l l RBI-10 l Reactor Butiding 1 50 RwCO Area - Norttness j l (N/W) ,
- l
- RB1-12 Reactor Building 1 80 Back wash Tank Room i l <
RB1-13 l Reactor Building 1 80 l CRD Repair Room l- j l l 1 RBI-14 Reactor Building i 80 Shimmer Surge Tank Aree l l I RBS-35 Reactor Building 1 133 Elevator Machinery kuum l ;
\ >
RB1-16 Reactor Buildina'1 133 -RwCU Filter Demin. Pts RB1-17 Reactor Building I 93 kWCU Filter Demin. Pat t i RBl-18 Reactor Building 1 98 Clothing Change Houn. ll . l ! l RB1-19 Reactue Building 1 98 Contaminated Equlp. N o v.s. l l l 4 Rel-20 Reactor Building 1 .77 RWCU Valve Ruom l { l - RBI-21 kemctor Building i 80 Nesin Stormue kuum l ' I; l 6 RBI-6 RB1-6 Reactor Building 1 20 ECCS Tunnel l , [ l i l TB1 l TBl(A) Turbine Building 3B & 45 Feed =ater Hester Level
- l I !
TB1(U) . Turbine ButIding 20 Condenser and Condensate l
?
Booster Pump Level l l TBt(L) T u rta ine Building 9 Condenser Hotwell Level l 1 t Valve Pit-Unit 1 valve Pit-Unit 1 N/A 2 Valve Pit - Nortti l } l I l Valve Plt-Unit.2 Valve Pit-Unit 2 N/A 2 i Velve Pit - South l 1 l } East Yard East Yard N/A 19 1/2 East Yard l
._________.__l -
i i t I t Page 6 of 9 > t e i _ , ., - - .-- , ,. - , - , , . . , . ... . . . . - - ~ . . - - , , + . . , - - - - ~ , - - - - , . . ~ . ,
TOBLE 2.3 continued) I l FIRE FIRE LOCATION AREA 2ONE ' i
, BUILDING l ELEVATlDN NOMENCLATURE l l (FT)
I I RB2-1 RB2-1-a Reactor Building 2 -17 l l South Core Spray i RB2-1-b Reactor Building 2 I i l -17 North Core Spray l I l RB2-1-c Reactor Building 2 -17 North RHR l l I
! RB2-1-d Reactor Building 2 -17 South RHR j RB2-1 e Reactor Building 2 l 20 North RHR Ha Ruum l l
RB2-1-f Reactor Building 2 20 South RHR Hs Room l l RB2-1 g Reactor Building 2 20 i, North Central Area l (N/C) l 1 3 l RB2-1 g Reactor Building 2 20 Northeast Corner l l (N/E) I l RB2-t g Reactor Building 2 I l 20 East Central Area - North l l l (E/C)N l l l ? RB2-1 g I Reactor Building 2 20 l ( (E/C)5 East Central Area - South l l RB2-1 g Reactor Building 2 i I i 20 Southeast Corner j l (S/E) I i l RB2-1 g 1 l Reactor Bts i l at i ng 2 20 South Central Area l l (5/C) I l I J RB2-1-g Reactor Building 2 20 Southwest Corner l (s/w) l, l l l' g RB2-1 g l Reactor ButIding 2 20 Northwest Corner l [ ! l (N/W) I i RB2-1-h l Reactor Building 2 50 North Central Area 1 (N/C) l I RB2-1-h Reactor Building 2 I l 50 Northeast Corner l l (H/E) l l RB2-1-h Reactor 9uilding 2 I l l (E/C) !! 50 I East Central Area l I I l l RB2-1-h Reactor Building 2 50 Southeast Corner (S/E) RB2-1-h Reactor Building 2 50 Southwest Corner (S/W) l l
' l l I l
Page 7 of 9 I r _m
l } V TACLE 2. s/(continued) /
-FIRE l- FIRE LOCAft0N _ , _ ,,_ _
AREA- .l ZONE I BUILDING ELEVATION NOMENCLAll)RL l (FT)
~ . . . _ . . _
l RB2-1-h Reactor Building 2 50 West Central Area (W/C) R82-1-h Reactor Sullding 2 50 Northwest Corner (N/W) l , RS2-1-1 Reactor Building 2 77 RWCU Access Room RS2-1-j Reactor Building 2 80 West Area RB2-1-k Reactor Building 2 80 East Area I RB2-1-8 Reactor Building 2 117 Spent Fuel Pool RS2-I-m Reactor" Building 2 117 Refueling Flour L 1 l R82-1-n Reactor Building 2 5 . Mezzanine l 1 l RB2-1-o Reactor Bu l ld f rig 2 36 ECCS Tune.el kuot tour s e. l (N) ' l l I l pp2-1-o Reactor Building 2 36 ECCS Tunnel kuut. Lu.. t n l l (5' I l I L l l RB2-e p Reactor Building 2 98 Generdi Area i i RS2-2 Reactor Building 2 -17 l HPCI Room I I l RS2-3-a Reactor Building 2 -17 Drywell I i RB2-3-b Reactor Building 2 -17 Torus RB2-4 Reactor Building 2 20 Mstv Pit RB2-5 Henctor Building 2 20 Decont Ruom RB2-7 Reactor Building 2 20 Drywell Entry RB2-8 Newctor Building 2 20 TIP Ruum R82-9 Reactor Building 2 20 Elevetor 5hatt RB2-10 Reactor Building 2 50 RwCu Ared - Sou t ts I (5) RB2-10 Reector Building 2 50 RwCO Area - Nurthedht (N/E) l RB2-10 Reactor Building 2 50 RwCU Ared - Nor ttawes t l (N/W) l
. .. I Page 8 of g
i TABLE 2. ,jcontsnued). f A l l GENERAL RATING OF EXISTING FIRE AREA FIRE FIRE l FIRE EXISTING AUTOMATIC' BOUNDARIES SEVERITY l i AREA ZONE DETECTION , SUPPRESSION (HOURS) (MINUTES) 20' Elev Ionization None (See Notes I and 4) 20 Seperation Smoke Detoctors l Zone i i l 50' Elev Ionization l Hone (See Note 1) 15 ; Separation Smoke Detectors Zone (-)l7* Elev Ionization Automatic (See Note 1) l 23,3 i South Smoke Detectors Sprinkler (-)17' Elev Ionization Automatic (See Note 1) l 32,1 i [ North smoke Detectors Sprinkler l [ l 20' Elev :lonization Partial (See Note 1) l 64.2 l South Smoke Detectors (See Note 6) l l ll l l l 20' Elev ilontratton Partial (See Note I) bl.5 l l l North l5moke Detectors L (See Note 7) ;j 1 \ RB2-6 RS2-6 Iontration None (See Notes 1 and 5) 15 k Smoke Detectors CB-t CB-la Iontration None (See Note I) 49.86 1 i 5moke Detectors - 3 I CB-lb Ionization None (See Note 9) 16.26 Smoke Detectors i l 1 I C8-12e Iontratton None 3 l 9J,94 j- j Smoke Detectors l 3 l CB-120 lontratton None (See Note 9) 30.64 Smoke Detectors f CS-7 CS-7 Iontration Hone (See Note ) st3.2 Smoke Detectors f r l l l i CD-8 C8-0 Ionization None (See Note 1) le?.6 ' l Smoke Detectors l , CB-9 CB-9 Ionization Nosee (See Note l) I T 2. t$ j I smoke Detectors F I l l CB-10 C8-10 lonization None (See Note 1) 198,6 l Smoke Detectors l CB-23E CB-23E Ionization None (See Note I) 1;i, p !
$moke Detectors L
] L Page 3 of 4 f
f
. . . . . , ., . - . . . . - - . ~ +
I
-}
( TOBLE 2$. . continued) I i i i l FIRE FIRE I LOCATION l l AREA ZONE I I l BUILDING ELEVATION NOMENCLATURE l (FT) l 1 l l RB2-12 i Reacter Building 2 80 Back wash Tank Room l l i RB2-13 Reactor Building 2 80 CRD Repair Room i RB2-14 l Reactor Butiding 2 80 Skimmer Surge Tank Area l l l : l l RB2-15 Reactor Building 2 133 1 Elevator Machinery Room l l l l l RB2-16 Reactor Building 2 133 RwCU Filter Demin. Pit J l RB2-17 Resctor Building 2 93 RwCU Fitter Demin. Pit 1 l RB2-18 Reactor Buiiding 2 98 CIothing Change Room l l l I i l l .RB2-19 Reactor Building 2 l 98 Contaminated Equip. Room I 1 I I I I l l RB1-20 l Reactor Building 2 77 RWCU Valwe Room l f I i l RB1-21 l Reactor Building 2 80 1 Resin Storage Room { l l l RB2-6 l RB2-6 Reactor Building 2 20 E Tunnel l
\
l 1 I l l I 6 Page 9 of 9 i I ____._--___....-.m...._.____..--_ . _ . . _ _ - __ -__am ..__- 4--' *- e-- ++"P# 'T'-+y = e ie-w a h ---e '9- -- -- t L
-e- 'm
e CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 &2 EXISTING PROTECTIDN FOR FIRE AREAS TABLE 2.3-2 5 l l I I l GENERAL l l l! l g l 1 l l RATING OF l [ l l EXISTING l FIRE AREA FIRE l l FIRE FIRE EXISTING l AUTOMATIC l BOUNDARIES 3EVERITY [ l AREA ZONE DETECTION l 5UPPRESSION (HOURS) (MINUTES) l 1 I I I i DG-1 l DG-1 1 Ionization Automatic l 3 48.00 l l l l5moke Detectors Sprinkler l(See Notes 1 and 2) l 1 i i I l DG-6 l DG-6 l Ionization None 3 ' 20.36 l l l l$moke Detectors j j I I l l DG-7 DG-7 Ionization None 3 21,7 l l Smoke Detectors ! l l l DG-8 DG-8 Ionization None i 3 25.74 l Smoke Detectors l DG-9 DG-9 l Ionization None 3 24.06 l l l5moke Detectors 1 I I l DG-11 DG-11 IIonization None 3 43 . 8 7 l Smoke Detectors i DG-12 DG-12 l Ionization None 3 i H.97 15moke Detectors l l l 1 l DG-13 DG-13 lInnizatton None i 3 PO.45 l l l5moke Detectors l l l 1 Page 1 of 4
?
b
i l
$ \ ")
o
\ TQBLE 2. 3 % centinued)
I l I I l l l GENERAL ( l l RATING OF l [ l EXISTING FIRE AREA FIRE I
! FIRE FIRE Ex! STING l AUTOMATIC BOUNDARIES SEVERITY l AREA ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION I (HOURS) (MINUTES) l DG-14 DG-14 L Ionization None 3 7.8 l l5moke Detectors l 1 I I l SW-1 SW-1A l Ionization Automatic 3 l 12.0 l l5moke Detectors Sprinkler (See Note 1) I
{ l I I l- l Sw-18 : Ionization Automatic I 33.6 l , Smoke Detectors Sprinkler l l l TB1 fB1 fonizattun Partial Automatic (See Note 8) l Moderate l l Smoke Detectors Sprinklers l l l l (Special Hazards) l l l l 1 1 I
] EAST EAST Security Foot Patrol Hydrant and Hose 1 NA l h/A l -
l VARD WARD lund Camera System Houses l l l 3 t i I I i ! ] RBI-l l (-)17* Elev ilonization None l(see Notes I and 3) l 15 l l Separation l5moke Detectors l l l Zone l l l l I I
) 20* Elev Ionization None (See Notes 1 and 4) 20 l l Separation Smoke Detectors l r j Zone {
l I ! j 50* Elev Ionization I None (See Note 1) 15 l l Separation Smoke Detectors , t j Zone l l 1 I I l (-)17' Elev , Ionization Automatic (See Note 1) l 22.7 l l South smoke Detectors t sortnkler l l , I I I I l (-)17' Elev l Ionization l Automatic (See Note 1) l 12.3 l j l North i Smoke Detectors l Sprinkler { l I i l 20- Elev Ionizatton l Parttal (See Note 1) 64.5 l l South ' Smoke Detectors I (See Note 6) l l i l i I l 20- Elev Ionization l Partial (See Note 1) l 66.9 l l North Smoke Detectors I (See Note 7) l l I I I I I I I l RBI-6 i RB1-6 Ionization l None (See Notes 1 and 5) ) 15 l l l Smoke Detectors l l l ? I ! l 1 i l i I l RB2-1 (-)17* Elev Ionization i None (See Notes 1 and 3) l 15 l l Separatton Smoke Detectors l l l l Zone I l 1 I i l l I I I I Page 2 of 4
..-..;.- _m. _ . . . . _ - ., . , . , _ . . . -. - . . . , , . . . . . . . . -, . _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ .
- - - ~ ,_.~.. . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [ I A I~ TABLE 2.3*../ continued) l l ' i j GENERAL l l RATING OF l l EXISTING FIRE AREA FIF. FIRE FIRE l Ex! STING AUTOMATIC BOUNDARIES SEVERl'/v AREA ZONE I DETECTION SUPPRESSION (HOURS) (UINUTES) , i l i i l l 20' Elev Ionization None (See Notes 1 and 4) l 20 l . l Separatton l Smoke Detectors l l [ Zone l l l l 1 I I i l 50' Elev lionizatton l None (See Note 1) l 15 l l Separation 15moke Detectors 1 l l Zone l I (-)17' Elev lonization i Automatic (See Note 1) I 23.3 l South Smoke Detectors Sprinkler l l ; I I I l (-)17' Elev l Ionization Automatic l (See Note 1) I 12.1 l North .5moke Detectors Sprinkler l l l I 1 20' Elev . Ionization Partial l (See Note 1) l 64,2 l l South : 5moke Detectors (See Note 6) i l l l I l l 20* Elev ' Ionization Partial (See Note 1) 62.5 l l North 5moke Detectors (See Note 7) l 1 I { RB2-6 l RS2-6 Ionization None (See Notes 1 and 5) 15 l l l Smoke Detectors . l l { l 3 l l CB-1 me-la : Ionization None (See Note 9) l 49.06 l Smoke Detectors [ l 1 3 l l l l l CB-Ib tonization None (See Note 9) I 16.26 l t l l Smoke Detectors l l ! I i 3 i
- l CB-12a 'lonization None (See Note 9) 93.94 l l l Smoke Detectors .
l i j ' 3 i CD-12b Ionization None l (See Note 9) 30.64 Smoke Detectors l
- t CB-1 l CB-7 fontration None (see Note 3) i 163.2 l Smoke Detectors l ?
l I! l l l CB-8 i CB-8 l Ionization None (See Note 3) 117.6 l ! Smoke Detectors i i l CB-9 CB-9 Ionization None (See Note 3) 172.8 l , l .5moke Detectors j l l I l l C8-10 CB-10 Ionization None i (See Note 3) 1 199.6 l l Smoke Detectors l l 1 l l CB-23E CB-23E llonization None (See Note 3) 73.7 l Smoke Detectors i I l 1 ! i t Page 3 of 4 j
i { TACLE 2 f r icontinued) j N NOTES: !
- 1. Fire barrier penetrations in areas of concern will be evaluated for adequacy in theer one e eut i figuration. Penetrations requiring upgrade will be sealed and/or dampered or modified to achieve 4 m l
level of protection commensurate with the hazard in the area (see Note 5 for en..ptions). ,
- 2. Installation of a total flooding Halon suppression system and a supervised cross-roeted detetttues i system. 1 F
- 3. One-hour-rated wrap of all esisting redundant trains =lthin the separation zone. One-hour-rated =,o +
or removal of combustible flem-conduit Jackets. t 4 In9tallation of a line of close-spaced sprinkler heads along the conter of the separattort zune.
- 5. Esemption for non-rated. sealed penetrations in the east well of the fire area due to lo= fuel loading, fire propagation retardancy, separation between penetrations and an automatic detection system in the area. Esemption for non-rated. sealed penetration in the drywell wall due to_the nitrogen-inerted containment which reduces the potential for combustible gas tunition post-accident. f Esemption for vibration isolation pads sealing material in Olesel Generator Basement telling base un
- suppression and protection from one side.
- f
- 6. Fire Zones R81-1-G(5/W) and RB2-t-G(S/W) have automatic sprinkler' systems. All.other fire zueses on the 20 ft elevation (south) have no automatic suppression. .
~
- 7. Fire Zones R81-1-G(N/E) and RB2-1-G(N/E) hewe automatic sprinkler systems. all othee t ie e eunes use the 20 ft elevation (north) have no automatic suppression.
, 8. The only Turbine Building enterior walls that are fire rated are those immediately adjdtent Ia the "L" shaped rattle space between the Control. Turbine and Reactor Buildings. Enterior = ales ut the Control and Reactor Buildings adjacent to the Turbine Building are fire rated.
- 9. The north well contains a non-rated penetration to enterior open rattle space between the Conteol .nd Unit i Reactor Building. The adjacent enterior Reactor and Turbine Building walls are t ie e s.ted.
I w b t i I I i i t a k Page 4 of 4 l t i I
. -- _. . . _ - . . _ _ . . -~. _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . .-- --, _ _ _ . _ _ - _._ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . - . _ _. . _ . _ _ . -
t I[~5 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 3 l l SECTION PAGE
- 3. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ................... 3-1 3.1 Introduction ................................... 3-1 3.2 3.2.1 Definitions ...................................... 3-2 Active Safe Shutdown Components .................. 3-2 3.2.2 3.2.3 Alternative Shutdown ............................. 3-2 3.2.4 Associated Circuits of Concern ................... 3-3 Category ......................................... 3-4 3.2.5 Data Base Management System (Data Base) ......... 3-4 3.2.6 3.2.7 Isolation Device ................................. 3-4 Passive Safe Shutdown Com 3-5 Post-Fire ...............ponents 3.2.8 ................... 3-5 3.2.9 3.2.10 Pre-Fire ......................................... 3-5 Raceway...........................................
3-5 3.2.11 Safe Shutdown .................................... 3-5A j 3.2.12 Safe Shutdown Equipment .......................... 3-7 3.2.13 Safe Shutdown Functions .......................... 3-8 : i I 3.2.14 Spurious Operation ............................... 3-8 l 3.3 Assumptions ...................................... 3-9 3.3.1
,-)
3.3.1.1 Fire Damage to Plant Equipment ................... Electrical Cable Fire Damage ..................... 3-10 3-10 3.3.1.2 Mechanical Component Damage ..................... 3-11 3.3.1.3 Instrument Damage ................................ 3-12 3.3.1.4 Smoke and Toxic Gases ............................ 3-12 3.3.2 Fire Duration and Brigade Activity ............... 3-13 l 3.3.3 Inerted Drywell ................................. 3-13 3.3.4 HVAC Requirements ................................ 3-14 3.3.5 Manpower Availability and Manual Operation ....... 3-14 3.3.6 Repairs .......................................... 3-15 3.4 Safe Shutdown Performance Goals .................. 3-16 3.4.1 Reactivity Control ............................... 3-17 3.4.2 3.4.3 Reactor Pressure and Level Control .............. 3-17 Reactor Overpressure Protection .................. 3-17 3.4.4 Torus cooling .................................... 3-17 3.4.5 Shutdown Cooling ................................. 3-18 3.4.6 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation ................. 3-18 3.4.7 Safe Shutdown Support ............................ 3-18 3.5 Analysis Methodology for Safe Shutdown Systems ............................... 3-18 3.5.1 Safe Shutdown / unctions and Systems .............. 3-19 3.5.1.1 Reactivity Control ............................... 3-19 3.5.1.2 Reactor Pressure and Level Control .............. 3-20 3.5.1.3 Reactor Overpressure Protection .................. 3-21 3.5.1.4 Shutdown Cooling ................................. 3-21 3.5.1.5 Torus Cooling .................................... 3-21 3.5.1.6 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation ................. 3-22 1 Page 1 of 4
Table of Contents for Section 3 continued SECTION PAGE 3.5.1.7 Emergency Power System ........................... 3-23 3.5.1.8 Diesel Generator Cooling Water ................... 3-23 3.5.1.9 RHR Cooling Water ................................ 3-24 3.5.2 Identification of Safe Shutdown Components ....... 3-24 3.5.2.1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System ............ 3-26 3.5.2.2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System ........... 3-28 3.5.2.3 Automatic Depressurization System ................ 3-31 3.5.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System ..................... 3-33 3.5.2.5 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation ................. 3-37 3.5.2.6 Service Water System ............................. 3-38 3.5.2.7 AC Emergency Power System ........................ 3-41 3.5.2.8 DC Emergency Power System ........................ 3-44 3.5.3 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables ........................... 3-46 3.5.4 Associated Circuits of Concern ................... 3-49 3.5.4.1 Associated by Common Power Supply ................ 3-50 3.5.4.2 Associated Circuits by Spurious Operations ....... 3-52 3.5.4.3 Associated by Common Enclosure ................... 3-53 3.6 Conclusion ....................................... 3-59 3.7 References ....................................... 3-60 3 TABLES 3.5-1 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - RCIC 3.5-2 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RCIC 3.5-3 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - RCIC 3.5-4 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RCIC 3.5-5 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - HPCI 3.5-6 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - HPCI 3.5-7 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - HPCI 3.5-8 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - HPCI 3.5-9 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - ADS 3.5-10 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - ADS 3.5-11 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - ADS 3.5-12 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - ADS 3.5-13 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - RHR 3.5-14 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RHR 3.5-15 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - RHR Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - RHR 3.5-16 i 3.5-17 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - PMI l 3.5-18 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - PMI 3.5-19 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - PMI 3.5-20 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - PMI 3.5 61 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - SW 3.5-22 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SW 3.5-23 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - SW 3.5-24 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SW v Page 2 of 4
- _ . ~ . - - .- . .
Table of Contents for Section 3
, continued TABLES (Continued) l 3.5-25 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - SWDG l
3.5-26 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SWDG l 3.5-27 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - SWDG 3.5-28 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - SWDG 3.5-29 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB1 3.5-30 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB1 3.5-31 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB1 3.5-32 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB1 3.5-33 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB2 3.5-34 Unit 1 Saf e Shutdoim Support Components - EB2 3.5-35 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB2 1 3.5-36 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB2 3.5-37 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB3 3.5-38 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB3 3.5-39 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB3 3.5-40 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB3 ! 3.5-41 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - EB4 3.5-42 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB4 3.5-43 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - EB4 3.5-44 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - EB4 3.5-45 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Components - DC 3.5-46 Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Support Components - DC 3.5-47 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Components - DC
)
~-'
3.5-48 3.5-49 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Support Components - DC High/ Low Pressure Interface Resolution - Unit 1 3.5-50 High/ Low Pressure Interface Resolutic*t - Unit 2 FIGURES (Located in Book 6) 3.1-1 sh.i of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Hot Shutdown 3.1-1 sh.2 of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Transition 3.1-1 sh.3 of 3 Safe Shutdown Sequences Diagram - Cold Shutdown 3.3-1 ADS Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-2 ADS Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-3 HPCI Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-4 HPCI Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-5 RCIC Safe Shutd"wn P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-6 RCIC Safe Shutt' awn P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-7 RHR-SDC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-8 RHR-SDC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-9 RHR-TC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-10 RHR-TC Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-11 Service Water Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 1 3.3-12 Service Water Safe Shutdown P&ID - Unit 2 3.3-13 DC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 1 3.3-14 DC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 2
- 3.3-15 AC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 1 l 3.3-16 AC Safe Shutdown One Line Diagram - Unit 2
{ J Page 3 of 4
l L i i Table of Contents for Section 3 l ,_s continued i i FIGURES (continued) (Located in Book 6) , p 3.3-17 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation - Unit 1 l 3.3-18 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation - Unit 2 l 3.4-1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RCIC - Unit 1 l 3.4-2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RCIC - Unit 2 3.4-3 Piping and Instrumentation. Diagram - HPCI - Unit 1 3.4-4 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - HPCI - Unit 2 3.4-5 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - ADS - Unit 1 , j 3.4-6 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - ADS - Unit 2 l 3.4-7 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RHR - Unit 1 3.4-8 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - RHR - Unit'2 3.4-9 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - SW - Unit 1 5 3.4-10 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - SW - Unit 2 3.4-11 DGCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-12' RHRCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 i 3.4-13 RPLC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 i 3.4-14 SDC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 3.4-15 TC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 , 3.4-16 PMI Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 r 3.4-17 EP_ Functional Block Diagram - Unit 1 ' 3.4-18 DGCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 1 3.4-19 RHRCW Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 i
)
x-3.4-20 3.4-21 RPLC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 SDC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 l j 3.4-22 TC Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 4 3.4-23 PMI Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 i 3.4-24 EP Functional Block Diagram - Unit 2 { ( I t t i sJ r Page 4 of 4 l
l rs i BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
- 3. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3.1 Introduction This section describes the methodology used in the' safe shutdown analysis of BSEP. Definitions used in the analysis are presented in Subsection 3.2 including the technical and/or .
regulatory bases as required. Subsection 3.3 presents the assumptions and scenarios used in the safe shutdown systems analysis. The safe shutdown performance goals a.e described in L Subsection 3.4. The Appendix R safety functions identified'for L t l BSEP are then introduced, and are represented in safe shutdown [
)
'~
sequence diagrams depicted in Figure 3.1-1. ! l The analysis methodology is described in Subsection 3.5, followed by the process used to define essential shutdown components and to develop an Appendix R separation analysis. The safe shutdown analysis was completed using the latest available plant documentation. A modification review process will be developed to review existing and future plant modifications for Appendix R compliance. The methodologies applied in resolving i t the issue of associated circuits of concern are also presented in f Subsection 3.5, as well as the process used to identify instances of nonconformance with Appendix R separation criteria. i J 5 i Page 3-1 e
,,-r - aw i, _ ,.
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA O 3.2 Definitions This'section establishes the definitions of terms used in the safe shutdown analysis of BSEP. These terms are based on industry standards and/or regulatory criteria. - 3.2.1 Active Safe Shutdown Components , These components are defined as being required to achieve , safe shutdown ~and their operating state or position must change from the normal position or operating state. . 3.2.2 Alternative Shutdown . Alternative shutdown is defined in this report as safe. shutdown activities requiring utilization of abnormal operational practices or nuclear system modifications as discussed below. l (1) Operations: l' ] (a) ' l . _ , Other than normal safe shutdown activities from the Control Room; (b) Operations from designated alternative control systems locations; and (c) Manual operation at equipment location. (2) - Modifications: ; Rerouting, relocation, or modification of existing safe l shutdown system outside a fire area to assure the , ability of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown j conditions. Basis I l This definition recognizes that alternative shutdown may require deviation from normal operational practices and shutdown equipment. In this context, procedural guidelines for post-fire 4
%d Page 3-2
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA O shutdown must address operation of shutdown equipment in an l unusual manner or from outside the Control Room. Similarly, it may be necessary to operate different combinations of equipment to achieve safe shutdown. The Commission's definition for alternative shutdown as provided in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L[1] focuses exclusively on plant modifications. This analysis encompasses the Commission's definition and extends it to include the associated procedural aspects of post-fire shutdown in an environment where plant equipment may be damaged. 3.2.3 Associated Circuits of Concern Safety-related and nonsafety-related cables that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 and have either: (1) Category-CPS: A common power source with the shutdown , equipment and the power source is not ' electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices; or (2) Category-SPUR: A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely effect the shutdown capability, (e.g., l RHR/ Nuclear Boiler isolation valves); or (3) Category-CE: A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, such as a raceway, panel or junction box, where the circuits are either not electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or will allow , propagation of fire into the common , enclosure. 4 i %W Page 3-3 l
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA m The principal basis for this definition is a letter from Mr. D. G. Eisenhut (NRR/DL) to all power licensees with plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, entitled " Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)-Generic Letter 81-12,"[2] dated February 20, 1981, and Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12[3] dated March 22, 1982. 3.2.4 Category A safe shutdown component is classified into one of three categories. These categories are Active Safe Shutdown, Passive Safe Shutdown or Spurious Operation. The category determines the circuit analysis which is to be performed for each component. 3.2.5 Data Base Management System (Data Base) A cross-referenced set of files c-tored in a computer on D ,,/ direct access storage devices which allows users to search for and establish relationships among common record types. Examples of common record types include devices located within the same fire area which may be subjected to the effects of an unmitigated fire. 3.2.6 Isolation Device A device in a circuit which prevents malfunctions in one section of an electrical circuit from causing unacceptable effects in other sections of the circuit or other circuits. Acceptable isolation devices for power circuits are single isolation devices actuated by fault currents (breakers and fuses). For low energy control and instrumentation circuits, J Page 3-4
SSEP REVISION 1 ASCA s acceptable isolation devices are those actuated by fault currents (e.g., fuses or circuit breakers), relays, control switches, 3 transducers, isolation amplifiers, current transformers, diodes, and fiber optic couplers.[3,43 3.2.7 Passive Safe Shutdown Components These components are defined by their normal operating position being identical to their required safe shutdown. position (or status), but where a change of position (or status) is detrimental to safe shutdown. Passive components may be affected by fire-induced failures in their power or ccatrol circuits which 0 could lead to the passive component adopting an undesired position (or status) due to spurious operation. : 1 3.2.8 Post-Fire
)
,, .The time period following the identification of a fire. j 3.2.9 Pre-Fire 1 ;
The time period preceding the identification of a fire (e.g. ) normal operation). 3.2.10 Raceway Any channel that is designed and used expressly for supporting or enclosing wires, cable or bus bars. Raceways ;
- consist primarily of, but are not restricted to, cable trays and
! conduit. Interlocked armor enclosing cable. should not be construed as a raceway.[4,5) i m< Page 3-5
,.-; , , - , . ,n- - ,.w
. . . . - .- . - - . . . . - . . . . _ - . _ . _ . - . . - - . . . . . . - . - . = . . . . - . . . - . - . . . . . .
BSEP REV SION 1 ASCA-n 3.2.11 Safe Shutdown s A condition which exists when the plant is being maintained in a hot shutdown, transition to cold shutdown, or cold shutdown 9 mode. . The definition for safe shutdown used in this analysis assumes the plant to be in one of three states at any moment: two stable conditions (hot and cold shutdown) and a transient i l l i l i 1 r I n. f 1 1 l i e I Page 3-5A
BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA condition when the unit is undergoing a change of mode from hot :
to cold shutdown. Hot and cold shutdown conditions are defined i primarily by Section III.L to Appendix R and BSEP Technical l Specifications.[6] Transition to cold shutdown includes the i combination of systems necessary to maintain hot shutdown while ' achieving cold shutdown.
- Hot shutdown exists when the plant meets the following !
criteria: 5 (1) The reactor is subtritical with an effective multiplication factor (keff) of less than or equal to 0.99; " (2) The reactor coolant makeup. function is capable of ' maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the active fuel; 5 (3) Reactor decay heat is being removed at a ' rate
^) /
approximately equal to its generation rate; (4) The primary system temperature is greater than 212 0F; 1 and (5) The reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. l The difference between hot shutdown and transition to cold I 1 l shutdown is.in the relative matching of decay heat generation and i removal rates. In the transition state, heat. removal exceeds heat generation allowing for a cooldown of the plant. Cold l shutdown differs from transition in that the reactor coolant system temperature is reduced below 212 0F. The origin for the definitions of hot shutdown, the transition to cold shutdown, and cold shutdown is found in several documents including: 1
%s j Page 3-6 !
l
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA (1) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.L(1] (2) The BSEP Technical Specifications [6] (3) American Nuclear Society Standards, " Safe Shutdown," STD-58.11 (draft)[7] (4) U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.139, " Guidelines for Residual Heat Removal,"[8] especially relative to guidance for taking credit for limited operator action outside the Control Room to achieve safe shutdown (5) Enclosure 1 of NRC Generic Letter 81-12, which offers the following recommendations for achieving hot shutdown: (a) Using control rods for reactivity control function (b) Using HPCI or RCIC for reactor coolant makeup function (c) Using the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the: torus cooling mode for reactor pressure control and decay heat removal functions .y (d) Using RHR in the shutdown cooling mode or suppression pool cooling (e) Using the reactor vessel level and pressure and torus temperature indicators for process monitoring function (f) Using onsite ac and de power sources for support functions 3.2.12 Safe Shutdown Equipment 1 Equipment (i.e., systems, components, cables, piping, l i valves) which may be used for achieving and maintaining safe I l shutdown in the event of a fire in a plant area. There are several bases for this definition. Redundant l methods of achieving safe shutdown are available to the operator in the event of a fire. Appendix R, Section III.G recognizes J Page 3-7
SSEP REVISION 0 ASCA this inherent redundancy and requires that at least one such method be sufficiently protected to remain free of damage (this is applicable to hot, transition to cold shutdown and cold ; shutdown), or be repairable to allow for timely achievement of - cold shutdown in the event of a fire. Verification that at least one path of safe shutdown systems is free of fire damage for each i fire area demonstrates compliance with the rule. Where a safe shutdown path cannot be shown to meet the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G with the existing plant configuration and where the technical basis to support an exemption request ; cannot be demonstrated, fire protection and/or safe shutdown system modifications are proposed to assure availability of a : i safe shutdown method. ; m ' 3.2.13 Safe Shutdown Functions j The safe shutdown functions are Reactivity Control (RC), Reactor Pressure and Level Control (RPLC), Reactor Overpressure l I Protection (ROP), Torus Cooling (TC), Shutdown Cooling (SDC), i Plant Monitoring Instrumentation (PMI), RHR Cooling Water l_ (RHRCW), Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) and Emergency Power System (EPS). These functions are defined in Subsection i 3.5.1. 3.2.14 Spurious Operation 3 l The maloperation of electrical or electromechanical I components caused by circuits energized or de-energized as a i result of fire damage. i ' 1 f \ d i Page 3-8 l
~ n - - - = .
BSEP i REVISION 0 ASCA m This definition recognizes that electrical cables may be damaged by a fire. This cable damage may prevent operation of safe shutdown components or may result in maloperation of non-safe shutdown equipment which may preclude attaining safe shutdown. The effects of spurious operation have been analyzed as follows: (1) Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; and (2) Maloperation of equipment which is not defined as active or passive safe shutdown, but which could prevent the achievement of a safe shutdown function and thus has been included as required for safe shutdown. 3.3 Assumptions This analysis considers the effects of fire on plant
~
equipment and identifies methods for achieving safe shutdown. The fundamental assumption made in this analysis is that a single fire occurs in any plant area coincident with a complete 72-hour loss of off-site power. However, off-site power is assumed to be present for those situations where availability of off-site power could adversely impact safe shutdown. All equipment normally 1 present in the plant is assumed to be functional at design 1 capability and may be lost only as a result of fire damage. No other external events, accidents, or equipment failures are assumed to occur in connection with either the postulated fire or l through achieving a stable cold shutdown condition. J Page 3-9
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i 1 BSEP ItEVISION 0 ASCA Other assumptions are made in the course of this analysis to ! 1 l ensure that the study closely reflects the impacts of a fire. These assumptions. consist of.the following major categories: t ( (1) Fire damage to plant equipment (2) Fire daration and brigade activity 1 ) (3) Inerted drywell (4) HVAC requirements (5) Manpower availability and manual operations I ( 6) Repairs l Each category is discussed in the subsection that follows. i 3.3.1 . Fire Damage to Plant Equipment I This sub: action describes the basic assumptions made with l regard to fire damage. O ,- 3.3.1.1 Electrical Cable Fire Damage The integrity of insuistion and external jacket material for l electrical cables is susceptible to fire damage. Damage may l assume several forms including deformity, loss of structure, cracking and ignition. The relationship between exposure of electrical cable insulation to fire conditions, the failure mode, and time to failure may vary with the configuration and cable type. To accommodate these unotrtainties in a consistent and
- conservative manner, this analysis, except where fire protection l
l features exist, assumes that the functionel integrity of l electrical cables is immediately lost when exp? sed to a postulated fire in an area. Electrical cable failures are l i limited by the following considerations: i s/ Page 3-10 i
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
.m (1) The fire damage occurs throughout the area under consideration.
(2) The fire damage results in an unusable cable with regard to proper safe shutdown function. (3) The fire-damaged cable conductors will either short to other conductors in the same cable or conductors in other cables located in the same enclosure; or short to ground through the enclosure; or the conductor will separate causing an open circuit. This analysis reflects the latest position concerning hot shorts as expressed by t..e Staff in a me:aorandum to CP&L dated December 21, 1983.[9] This position excludes the following combinations of cable-to-cable hot shorts based on the low likelihood of occurrence: (1) 3-phase ac power circuit cable (4.16kV and 480V voltage levels);
% (2) De-energized 2-vire double fused ungrounded dc power i
_T cable (125V or 250V voltage level); (3) De-energized 2-wire double fused ungrounded dc control circuit caole (125V voltage level); and (4) De-energized 2-wire ungrounded ac power or control circuits (120V ac). 3.3.1.2 Mechanical Component Damage Fire damage to valves, piping, and noncombustible tubing is not assumed to adversely impact their ability to function as pressure boundaries or as safe shutdown components. Therefore, a fire is not assumed to cause a valve or othec mechanical component to change position unless the fire also affects the electrical equi i runt or circuit associated with the component. In addition, it was assumed that exposure to a fire will not prevent the manual stroking of the valve following fire
'd extinguishment.
Page 3-11
BSEP l REVISION O ASCA s This assumption reflects the fact that nuclear power plant l fires are sufficiently limited in magnitude and duration to l preclude the potential of significanc damage to mechanical 1 equipment. Damage which is assumed to occur as a result of a l fire would involve discoloration and other such nuperficial l manifestations of exposure to a high temperature cxidizing environment. Since these effects would be localized e.nd of short l duration, mechanical and overall structural integrity is considered not impaired. 3.3.1.3 Instrument Damage Instruments (e.g., resistance temperature detectors (RTDs), thermocouples, pressure t ansmitters and flow transmitters) are assumed to suffer damage in a manner similar to electrical i ' '% _f cables. If these devices are exposed to a fire, only associated cables are damaged. The instrument fluid boundary remains undamaged. Sight glasses and mechanically linked tank-level indicators are assumed to be unaffected by fire. 3.3.1.4 Smoke and Toxic Gases This analysis recognizes that smoke and corrosive gases generated by burning materials such as those containing l polyviny1 chlorides may pose a threat to personnel safety. Notwithstanding this consideration, the relatively short burn duration of the postulated fire is assumed to preclude the build-l up of sufficient concentrations of such gases to fail electrical I and mechanical components. Consequently, concentrations of such J l Page 3-12 i I i
I BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA -s gases within fire areas and deposition of chlorides on plant components are not considered in this analysis. Postulated corrosive gas build-up from a fire in a small area and chloride deposition within a general plant area would not be sufficient to adversely affect plant equipment while safe shutdown is achieved and maintained. This conclusica is further supported by the Commission in their analysis of the Browns Ferry fire as documented in NUREG-0050.[10] 3.3.2 Fire Duration and Brigade Activity The total fire brigade commitment to a fire is one hour. This hour is broken down as follows: (1) 30 minutes to respond and extinguish the fire.after its discovery h (2) 30 minutes to assess the fire damage and restore suppression equipment following fire extinguishment 3.3.3 Inerted Drywell The BSEP drywell is inerted during power operation within the following guidelines and therefore has not been analyzed: (1) The containment atmosphere oxygen concentration shall be less than 4 percent by volume within 24 hours after thermal power is greater than 15 percent of rated thermal power. (2) The containment atmosphere concentration may be deinerted beginning 24 hours prior to a scheduled reduction of thermal power to less than 15 percent of rated thermal power. 3.3.4 HVAC Requirements The -17 ft elevation (east side) of the Reactor Building and the diesel generator cells are cooled with the normal HVAC equipment, or at least some portion of it. v Page 3-13
l l BSEP l' . ,m REVISION 0 ASCA l The service water structure has sufficient holes in the exterior walls which communicates directly with the ambient l environment to provide cooling for the necessary safe shutdown pump motors in that area. l l 3.3.5 Manpower Availability and Manual Operation ; 4 ! This analysis assumes the manual operation of some safe 1
- shutdown equipment as a prct of the alternative shutdown process
! for specific fire areas. Any manual operation so credited will l l be incorporated in the BSEP safe shutdown procedures for use by l l l the operating shift personnel. All operators and fire brigade l members are drawn from on-site personnel based on the minimum l l staffing level specified by technical specifications and current operating practices. Although a recall procedure can be credited i
'h i
_.- for increasing the number of operators available for manual operations after a fire, this analysis does not take credit for a < recall procedure. The activities requiring operations personnel intervention in the event of a fire include fire fighting and plant operation. To plan thc allocation of personnel, the basic fire scenario is combined with the shutdown scenario to ensure the proper coordination of activities. A time-line/ manpower concept is l utilized in this analysis to establish that sufficient time is available for achievement of the safe shutdown system function. l a l Page 3-14
BSEP REVISION O ASCA - n 3.3.6,. Repairs i This analysis further assumes that off-site power would be , restored-72 hours following fire initiation. The repair of the balance of plant (BOP) power feeds to the emergency buses, which may be affected by a' fire, would be accomplish 3d during this . extended time period without specially developed procedures, equipment, and training.
-The following hot, transition to cold, and cold shutdown.
activities.are not considered repair activities for the analysis and subsequent alternative shutdown ' activities described in this report, t The breakers which allow cross-tying the emergency 4.16kV busses to each other are racked out during normal plant ;
',,T -- operation. The fuses for the control circuits of these. breakers f are removed from their in-circuit holders and attached to the .
front of the associated switchgear cubicle doors. The alternative shutdown activities required for several fire. areas necessitate the racking in and subsequent closure of these breakers. The activities required to bring this switchgear into i service consist of: l (1) Inserting the fuses to their in-circuit holders; and (2) Mechanically cranking the mechanism- to' rack in the [ breaker to its operating position.
} %d Page 3-15 i
1 BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA Several valve breakers will be open during normal operation. Therefore, the first operation required to put this safe shutdown equipment into service is the manual closure, at the respective MCC, of the breaker. 3.4 Safe Shutdown Performance Goals The safe shutdown performance goals of Section III.L to Appendix R establish the criteria for defining systems and components requiring protection. These goals are: (1) Reactivity Control. Insert sufficient negative reactivity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions. (2) Reactor Coolant Makeup. Maintain the reactor vessel water above the top of the active fuel. (3) Decay Heat Removal. Remove the decay heat through cold ,,, shutdown conditions.
/
(4) Process Monitoring. Provide direct reading of safe shutdown process variables. (5) Support Functions. Provide support to achieve all of the above performance goals. These five goals are accomplished in this analysis through the successful performance of the following safe shutdown functions: (1) Reactivity Control (RC) (2) Reactor Pressure and Level Control (RPLC) (3) Reactor Overpressure Protectiori (ROP) (4) Torus Cooling (TC) (5) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) (6) Plant Monitoring Instrumentation (PMI) v Page 3-16
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 3 _ (7) Safe Shutdown Support (a) Emergency Power System (EPS) (b) Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) (c) RHR Cooling Water (RHRCW) . The following subsections identify each function and its relationship to the safe shutdown performance goals. 3.4.1 Reactivity Control Function: Provide sufficient negative reactivity to ' l achieve and maintain cold shutdown reactivity conditions. Appendix R Performance Goal: Reactivity Control Safe Shutdown Mode: Hot, transition to Cold and Cold 3.4.2 Reactor Pressure and Level Control Function: Provide the capability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level and control pressure. Appendix R Performance Goal: Reactor Coolant Makeup, Decay Heat Removal Safe Shutdown Mode: Hot, transition to Cold 3.4.3 Reactor Overpressure Protection Function: Provide a means to prevent reactor vessel
- overpressurization.
l l Appendix R Performance Goal: Reactor Coolant Makeup Safe Shutdown Mode: Hot, transition to Cold 3.4.4 Torus Cooling Function: Remove decay heat from the torus. l Appendix R Performance Goal: Decay Heat Removal l Safe Shutdown Mode: Hot, transition to Cold v Page 3-17
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 3.4.5 Shutdown Cooling Function: Provide a means for removing decay heat, maintain reactor coolant temperatures below 212 F, and provide reactor coolant makeup water. Appendix R Performance Goal: Reactor Coolant Makeup, Decay Heat Removal Safe Shutdown Mode: Cold 3.4.6 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation Fur.ction: Provide a means for monitoring process variables. Appendix R Performance Goal: Process Monitoring i Safe Shutdown Mode: Hot, transition to Cold and Cold 3.4.7 Eafe Shutdown Support Function: (a) Provide ac and dc power to switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers
=
feeding safe shutdown components (EPS). _; m l (b) Provide cooling water to emergency diesel l generators (DGCW). ' l l (c) Provide cooling water to RHR heat exchangers, RHR pumps and area coolers (RHRCW). Appendix R Performance Goals: Support Functions l l Safe Shutdown Mode: EPS - Hot, transition to Cold and Cold , DGCW - Hot, transition to Cold and l Cold RHRCW - Hot, transition to Cold and Cold 3.5 Analysis Methodology for Safe Shutdown Systems l The safe shutdown functions described in Subsection 3.4 establish the framework for identifying those systems and I l i s-Page 3-18
- ... . . - . . ~ . - . . . - . - - . . - - - . - . . _ . . . - . . . - - - . . - - _
i BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA components necessary for safe. shutdown. This subsection ! i j describes the process .used to identify these systems and l components. The principal steps in this process are: (1) Relate systems to the. safe shutdown functions of , Subsection 3.4. .. (2) Identify those components in each system required for i its successful achievement of the safe shutdown i function. This is shown on the functional block diagrams. (Figures 3.4-11 and 3.4-24) } (3) Completion of circuit analysis for required components to identify necessary cables for local or normal ! operating stations. , (4) Expand the safe shutdown analysis results to include associated circuits as defined by the Commission's { criteria, i Each step in this process is summarized below. 3.5.1 Safe Shutdown Functions and Systems q ' This analysis establishes six principal functions and three support functions, as required for safe shutdown, and defines the i corresponding safe shutdown systems. ! Principal Functions 1 3.5.1.1 Reactivity Control ! l Safe Shutdown Systems: None i This functicn will be accomplished by the hydraulic insertion of control rods as a result of the de-energization of the scram solenoid valves. Once inserted, control rods are latched in the inserted position. Fire does not affect the ability to scram. v Page 3-19 T
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i SSEP REVISION 1 ASCA j 3.5.1.2 Reactor Pressure and Level Control Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - High Pressure Coolant i Injection (HPCI) and safety / relief valves Train B - Reactor Core Isolation i Cooling (RCIC) and safety / relief ' valves HPCI and RCIC rely on separate trains of dc control power and are driven by non-condensing steam turbines served by the 1 main steam headers upstream of the main steam isolation valves I l (MSIVs). The steam is exhausted from both turbines to the suppression pool. Two sources of water are available to the HPCI and RCIC systems in each unit. The primary source which is normally .
-~ aligned to supply these systems are the condensate storage tanks locat'ed in the East Yard. The HPCI system is equipped with a l
logic which automatically shifts suction from the condensate l storage tank to the backup source, the suppression pool, if i < 1 l either suppression pool water level increases to a certain ' l setpoint or the condensate storage tank level is low. The RCIC system suction will be switched from the condensate storage tank h to the suppression pool if necessary. ! Reactor pressure control is provided by a combination of l manual safety / relief valve actuations and injection of cold high I pressure water. The high pressure water injection system draws steam from the rest. tor vessel and serves to control reactor l l pressure. l i
~
Page 3-20 l
BSEP ~ REVISION 0 ASCA 3.5.1.3 Reactor Overpressure Protection Safe Shutdown Systems: Safety / Relief Valves These valves are located on the main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs and are capable of automatic actuation, requiring no external source of power other than reactor vessel steam pressure. The equipment that is required to support this function is mechanical and is not cubject to the separation criteria of Section III.G to Appendix R. 3.5.1.4 Shutdown Cooling Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Residual Heat Removal System (A) Train B - Residual Heat Removal System (B) 3 The cold shutdown decay heat removal performance goal is fulfilled by the shutdown cooling function. This function is initiated after the reactor vessel pressure is reduced to approximately 125 psi. Makeup water is provided by the RHR system in the LPCI mode as required. For this safe shutdown analysis, it is necessary to have one operating RHR pump and heat exchanger loop in the shutdown cooling mode and its associated service water (RHRCW) loop to assure stable cold shutdown conditions. The ultimate heat sink is the discharge canal for the shutdown cooling function of RHR. 3.5.1.5 Torus cooling Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Residual Heat Removal System (A) Train B - Residual Heat Removal System (B) Page 3-21
BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA >
Placing the RHR system in the torus cooling mode provides the means to transfer decay heat from the torus to the discharge canal. For this safe shutdown analysis it is necessary to have one operating RHR pump and heat exchanger loop in the torus cooling mode. The service water (RHRCW) loop provides the cooling water for the RHR heat exchanger. 3.5.1.6 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Instruments for reactor pressure, reactor level, suppression , pool level and suppression pool temperature. I Train B - Instruments for reactor ' pressure, reactor level, suppression pool level and suppression pool !
, temperature, j In order to achieve and maintain tafe shutdown conditions, I the operator must be able to monitor various plant parameters.
These parameters provide the information required by the operators in order to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. This function ensures the instrumentation required to monitor reactor level, reactor pressure, and suppression pool level. Temperature is available ! following any fire. ! Support Tur.ctions The following three functions support the principal functions previously discussed. h
%el Page 3-22
. , , . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . . . . _ . . _ . _ . - _ ~ . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ i BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA 3.5.1.7 Emergency Power System Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Emergency ac and de power distribution system (A) Train B - Emergency at and dc power distribution system (B) J For a postulated fire involving a loss of off-site power, ! the Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution System (the AC Emergency Power System) is the ultimate source of ac electrical } power for the safe shutdown systems. Essential components of , this system include the diesel generators and supporting j 2 equipment (control power, air-start system, diesel fuel supply, etc.), the 4.16kV emergency switchgear, 480V emergency switchgear ! and motor control centers supplied by the emergency switchgear.
- Safe shutdown also requires the availability of the 125/250V 3
~
DC Power Supplies and Distribution System (the DC Emergency Power l System) for 125/250V de control power. For the postulated fire j scenarios, at least one train of 125/250V generation (batteries) and distribution equipment for each unit is required for safe , t shutdown. Stored battery energy supplying 125/250V de power is sufficient to support the needs of safe shutdown equipment until , ac on-site power and battery charging capability are restored. 3.5.1.8 Diesel Generator Cooling Water , Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Service Water I Train B - Service Water Cooling water for the diesel engines is provided by the diesel generator cooling water function of the SW system. This s-Page 3-23
- - ~ . _ _.- .
( l l~ l BSEP
- ,_s REVISION 0 ASCA i l function requires.one service water pump per unit lined up to the j nuclear service. vater header. This- service water removes the r t
heat rejected from the diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger. ' 3.5.1.9. RHR Cooling Water Service water removes heat from the RHR heat exchanger, the seal coolers and the RHR Room coolers and delivers it to the ultimate heat sink. This process is the RHR cooling water function and is the final step in the removal of decay heat from the reactor vessel or the suppression pool. l A review of this initial list indicates that the number of safe shutdown functions requiring identification and protection of components is reduced to the following list:
,_ s.3
/ (1) Reactor Pressure and Level Control l (2) Torus Cooling I 1
(3) Plant Monitoring Instrumentation l (4) Shutdown Cooling (5) Emergency Power System (6) Diesel Generator Cooling Water (7) RHR Cooling Water These functions and their associated systems are then subjected to the next step of the analysis. 3.5.2 Identificatiuri cf safe Shutdown Components j For each system identified in Subsection 3.5.1, plant P& ids, I l system descriptions, and one-line diagrams were used to identify [ i ! %/ Page 3-24 1
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.BSEP
, REVISION 0 ASCA the safe shutdown flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the desired safe shutdown -
functions..(Figures 3.4-1 through 3.4-10.) During the analysis 1 of the safe shutdown flow paths, those components whose spurious i operation could impair safe shutdown system operability were also i i identified. This identification included those branch flow paths [ which must be isolated and remain isolated to assure that flow ! will not be diverted from 'the primary flow path. From this information, a list was compiled which identified all components required for each system's performance of its safe shutdown 1 function. For each component, the following information was i identified: (1) System :
. h' 1 (2) Train (3) Mode of Safe Shutdown (4) Required Position I (5) Category ,
A functional block diagram was produced for each function , showing the potential success paths for achieving the required function. These diagrams are shown in Figures 3.4-11 through ; 3.4-24 and illustrate the redundant combinations of safe shutdown j equipment providing the multiple process paths which fulfill the I BSEP safe shutdown functions. These diagrams provide the ; criteria used to judge the ability of BSEP to meet the separation requirements of Appendix R. I Page 3-25
_ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ - - - . _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . - _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ = _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . l l I l . BSEP J l 'S REVISION 0 ASCA t l The. safe shutdown systems subjected to this process are . 1 described below. l ( 3.5.2.1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System I
- The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System provides !
core cooling by maintaining sufficient reactor water inventory
- once the reactor vessel is isolated from its normal heat sink, the main condenser. The principal components of the RCIC system l consist of a steam-driven turbine pump unit and associated valves and piping, which deliver high pressure makeup water to the reactor vessel from either the condensate storage tank (CST) or the suppression pool. The RCIC turbine receives reactor steam i
from the main steam line upstream from the main steam isolation ( } valve (MSIV). The steam line to the turbine contains a normally J open motor-operated inboard (480V ac) isolation valve, normally open motor-operated outboard (250V dc) isolation valve, and normally closed turbine steam supply valve (250V de). A reactor vessel low water level signal automatically 1 activates the RCIC turbine pump unit. RCIC may also be started j manually by the operator from remote-manual controls in the Control Room or from the remote shutdown panel. Figures 3.3-5 and 3.3-6 depict the components and flow paths for RCIC. Tables 3.5-1 through 3.5-4 identify the RCIC components and I instrumentation that are identified for safe shutdown system operation. 1 < i 1 b s_.i i Page 3-26 l i*
4 I BSEP j
-s REVISION 0 ASCA The monitoring instrumentation required for RCIC operation ;
is pump discharge flow, turbine speed'and CST level. The turbine ; speed control system positions the steam inlet valve to control the RCIC pump discharge flow. The turbine control logic provides ! automatic shutdown of the RCIC turbine upon receipt of the i turbine overspeed, turbine high exhaust pressure, pump low l suction pressure, reactor vessel high water level, or auto- l isolation signals. } Since the steam supply line to the RCIC' turbine is a primary + l containment boundary, certain primary containment isolation signals may automatically isolate this .line, causing shutdown of the RCIC turbine. Although the automatic trip logic circuitry is ; not essential for safe shutdown, it is included in this analysis ,
) . l of the RCIC system in order to address the issue of potential ;
I fire-induced spurious operation. ! The steam from the RCIC turbine exhausts to the suppression ! pool. .The exhaust line is equipped with vacuum breakers to prevent suppression pool water from being drawn.into the exhaust : line when the steam condenses following turbine operation. The RCIC pump can take suction from the CST or from the ,
)
suppression pool. Transfer from the CST to the suppression pool l l occurs automatically when the CST vater level is low. When CST ' level indication is not available in the Control Room, local ; mechanical indication at the C5T will be utilized. Cooling water for the RCIC turbine lube-oil cooler and for condensing the steam j in the barometric condenser is supplied from the RCIC pump l d discharge. . i Page 3-27 ! 1 i
BSEP
- m REVISION 0 ASCA The RCIC pump normally discharges to the reactor vessel; however, there ,is a full-flow test return line which allows the pump discharge to bypass the reactor vessel and flow to the CST l to facilitate system tests.
l Two de motor-operated valves are located in the pump discharge line. A minimum-flow bypass line protects the RCIC pump from overheating under no-flow or low-flow conditions. The minimum-flow bypass line maintains flow through the RCIC pump by diverting water to the suppression pool. The minimum-flow valve can be operated automatically or manually. When operated automatically, the valve is controlled by a pressure switch which senses RCIC pump discharge pressure and a flow switch which
-s senses discharge flow.
3.5.2.2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System l The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System provides makeup water to the reactor to prevent overheating of the reactor fuel in the event of a small steam / water leak in the primary [ system. The system supplies high pressure water to the reactor i vessel in sufficient quantities to keep the core covered. The l principal components of the HPCI system consist of a steam turbine, which drives a centrifugal pump, and system valve controls and instrumentation. The system is designed to operate ! Independent of ac power, service air, or external cooling water systems. HPCI can be operated automatically or manually from the Control Room, or it can be initiated manually from a local Page 3-28
I BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA i station. Figures 3.3-3 and 3.3-4 depict the components and flow i paths for HPCI, and Tables 3.5-5 through 3.5-8 identify the HPCI ' components required for safe shutdown, e A low reactor vessel water level signal or high drywell pressure signal automatically activates the HPCI system. The HPCI turbine receives reactor steam from a main steam line upstream of the MSIVs. The steam flows through normally open i inboard (480V ac) and outboard (250V dc) motor-operated isolation j i valves to the turbine. A motor-operated turbine steam inlet l : valve in the HPCI steam line is located upstream of the turbine stop valve. This 250V de valve is normally closed and opens on a HPCI initiation signal.
-- Upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal, the dc-powered j auxiliary oil pump starts, providing the oil pressure to open the turbine stop valve and the turbine control valve, thus starting i the HPCI turbine. As the turbine speed increases, the shaft-l driven oil pump takes over and maintains the oil pressure. When i
the pressure supplied by the shaft-driven oil pump is sufficient, the auxiliary oil pump is stopped automatically by a high oil ! pressure signal. A small amount of' water is diverted from the 1 HPCI pump discharge flow to cool the turbine lubricating oil. A speed governor limits the turbine speed to its maximum , operating level. A control governor receives a HPCI flow signal from the Control Room controller and adjusts the turbine control i l v i ! Page 3-29 1 1
,, m , -
4 BSEP
,_ REVISION 0 ASCA. I valve so that the designated HPCI pump discharge flow rate is l 3
obtained. The flow signal used for automatic control of the [ turbine originates f rom a fic w element in the HPCI pump discharge { line. The steam from the HPCI turbine exhausts to the suppression pool. The HPCI turbine exhaust line is equipped with vacuum breakers to prevent suppression pool water from being drawn into ; the exhaust line as the. steam condenses following turbine operation. The line to the vacuum breakers is equipped with two series automatic isolation valves. The isolation signal for the valve consists of a high drywell pressure signal and a low reactor pressure signal. The steam supply line drain isolation i
,s valves fail in their closed position on loss of control air. The .
A .
%' condensate drains for the turbine exhaust side are manually- ,
l operable, in addition to being provided with de solenoid-operated j valves. ' Failure of the gland seal condenser system will not prevent the HPCI system from operating based on current BSEP operating practices. When CST level indication is not available i in the Control Room, local mechanical indication at the CST will be utilized. l The HPCI system can take suction from either the condensate storage tank or the suppression pool. Initially, the system uses demineralized water from the condensate storage tank; this water flows to the HPC! pump through a normally open isolation valve. { When the CST water level is low or suppression pool level is L v 1 Page 3 -30
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BSEP -s REVISION 0 ASCA high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool occurs. The suppression pool suction valves open automatically, and the condensate storage tank suction valve closes. These valves can also be operated from the Control Room. Two dc motor-operated HPCI pump discharge valves are provided in the pump discharge line. The inboard valve is normally closed and will be opened either automatically or by remote operator action. To prevent overheating the HPCI pump at low flows, a pump discharge minimum flow bypass line is provided back to the suppression chamber. The bypass flow is controlled by an automatic, dc motor-operated valve. A flow switch in the HPCI pump discharge line provides the necessary signals. Also, -~ an interlock is provided to shut the minimum flow bypass whenever the turbine is tripped, preventing drainage of the condensate storage tank into the suppression pool, which is at a lower elevation. There are two ac motor-operated valves located in a full flow test return line from the pump discharge to the CST. 3.5.2.3 Automatic Depressurization System The purpose of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) is to provide protection against overpressurization of the reactor vessel and to enable manual depressurization of the nuclear system. Each unit has 11 safety / relief valves (SRVs) which prevent reactor pressure vessel overpressurization. These are located on the four steam lines between the reactor vessel and the first J Page 3-31
l l BSEP l -s REVISION 0 ASCA l main steam isolation valve. Seven of these 11 valves have the l automatic depressurization features. Each valve discharges to l the suppression pool through a separate line which enters at a point below the minimum water level of the pool. Figures 3.3-1 and 3.3-2 depict the major components in the ADS. Tables 3.5-9 through 3.5-12 identify the ADS components required for safe shutdown. The valves open by mechanical self-actuation if there is excess pressure and may also be operated remote-manually to control the pressure rise and depressurize the nuclear system. All 11 safety / relief valves are provided with individual control switches for remote-manual operation from the Control l Room. Three of the four valves which do not have automatic
- -~ features can also be controlled from the remote shutdown panel l
l located at the 20 foot elevation of the Reactor Building. Each of the eleven SRVs associated with ADS is equipped with an air accumulator. The accumulators ensure that there will be sufficient air to cycle each ADS valve five times or hold the
- valve open if it is already open, in the event that the air supply to the ADS valve is unavailable.
Seven of the ADS valve control switches on the reactor
- turbine-generator board (RTGB) in the Control Room are two-position (auto-open). When the control switches are placed in the open position, a solenoid valve is energized, opening a pilot valve which allows steam pressure to open the valve. The r
remaining four SRVs can also be actuated from the RTGB, and their
%W Page 3-32 l
(
BSEP ,, REVISION 0 ASCA control switches are two position switches (closed-open). When operated remote-manually, the solenoid valves may be actuated at any nuclear system pressure. However, sufficient steam pressure, approximately 100 psig, must be present to overcome the main valve preload spring tension, or the valve will not open. The SRVs close once pressure drops below 50 psig. In their automatic operating mode, the ADS valves open automatically when the HPCI system cannot make up inventory on a loss of coolant. However, for safe shutdown, the ADS valves are operated manually to provide depressurization of the reactor vessel. There are 11 vacuum breaker valves located in the drywell, _, and these are associated with the 11 SRV downcomer tubes. The
- ' vacuum breaker valves are nontestable swing check valves.
Following a SRV operation, the steam in the line condenses as it cools, creating a vacuum in the downcomer tube. The vacuum l breakers open to prevent water in the suppression pool from being drawn up into the downcomer tube. 3.5.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System 1 l The objective of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is ' to remove decay heat from the reactor at a greater rate than it is produced and to supply low pressure coolant makeup to the reactor vessel. Three modes of RHR operation are required for safe shutdown. The torus cooling mode and the shutdown cooling mode are required for decay heat removal, while the low pressure l v Page 3-33 I l
BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA l
coolant injection (LPCI) mode is required for reactor coolant level control during cold shutdown. The TC function is performed i by RHR in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation, and the i SDC function is performed by RHR in the shutdown cooling or low pressure coolant injection mode of operation. The RHR system consists of two essentially complete and i
- independent loops, identified as train A and train B. Each loop I is comprised of two pumps, piping, valves, a heat exchanger, and associated instrumentation and controls. The arrangement of the valves and pipes for each loop provides the flexibility required for the multiple functions performed by this system.
The RHR system is provided with manual overrides for 4
-~ operation in the LPCI and suppression pool cooling modes.
Reactor shutdown cooling and torus cooling are initiated by the l plant operator. ! In the LPCI mode of operation, the RHR system will start automatically in response to either of two initiation signals: (1) reactor vessel low low low level or (2) drywell high pressure coincident with reactor vessel low pressure. The RHR pump can take suction from the suppression pool or from the reactor vessel. The suppression pool is the water source for LPCI and sui-pression pool cooling modes operation, I while the reactor recirculation loop is utilized for shutdown cooling operation.
- s/
Page 3-34 4 J
i
~
BSEP
,_s REVISION 0 ASCA RHR pump operation will be accomplished from the Control- !
Room under remote-manual operator control or from the 4.16kV i switchgear cells. In the shutdown cooling mode, a _hrottling valve, located in the discharge line, is used to regulate RHR A minimum-flow coolant flow as cooling requirements. diminish. bypass line routes water from the pump's discharge to the suppression pool. The minimum flow bypass valves operate - automatically if one or 'both pumps in the loop are operating. This automatic function is controlled by a flow switch located in the discharge line from the two pumps. When either or both pumps of a loop are operating and the flow through the loop is less than 3080 gpm, as detected by the flow switch associated with the
,, loop, the minimum flow bypass valve will open. The bypass valve, '/ however, will not immediately open. If the low flow condition persists for a preset time- period after issuance of the command to open, the bypans valve will open and will remain open as long as the flow through both RHR pumps is less than 3080 gpm. When ,
the flow switch detects a flow greater than 3080 gpm, the minimum flow valve is closed. The bypass valves remain closed if their associated RHR pumps are both idle. Support equipment for the RHR pumps includes 4.16kV power generation and distribution equipment. Figures 3.3-7 through 3.3-10 present the safe shutdown flow paths for RHR, and Tables 3.5-13 through 3.5-16 identify the RHR : components for safe shutdown. s_/ i Page 3-35 1
BSEP 1 -s REVISION 0 ASCA I l RHR Shutdown Cooling Function The shutdown cooling (SDC) function of RHR is used to remove decay heat once reactor vessel pressure has decreased to l approximately 125 psig. Suction'is taken from one of the reactor { l recirculation loops by one of the RHR pumps and pumped through L the RHR heat exchanger, where cooling is accomplished by heat ; L l transfer to the Service Water System. The water is then returned- I l l to the reactor vessel by one of the recirculation loops. During this mode of operation, the isolation valves and the l shutdown cooling suction valve corresponding to the operating pump are opened remote-manually. Also during this mode of : l operation, only one pump per loop is permitted to operate (not an s_. , interlock but an administrative control). l
) .
For this analysis, one RHR pump per unit and its associated heat-exchanger are sufficient to complete .the cooldown to cold > shutdown conditions after the reactor vessel has been depressurized below 125 psig. System initiation and operation is performed by operator action from the Control Room or the remote
- operating stations. Process monitoring instrumentation and local i
RHR instrumentation provide adequate monitoring during the I I cooldown to cold shutdown. Logic circuitry of this mode of RHR operation is not essential for safe shutdown, since there will be ample time for operator action. For this analysis of safe shutdown, the RHR loop cross-tie valve is assumed to be closed l with its associated breaker in the open position. ss Page 3-36
BSEP
,, -REVISION O ASCA This mode of RHR operation is used to restore and maintain the reactor vessel water level during cold shutdown. This is accomplished using one RHR loop, which takes suction from the suppression pool and injects into the reactor . vessel. Valve :
alignment requirements are similar to those specified for the torus . cooling function. No additional- instrumentation or ! interlock logics are essential for safe shutdown. RHR Torus Cooling Function For the suppression pool cooling mode of operation, one RHR pump per unit is aligned to pump water from the suppression pool, through one RHR heat exchanger, and back to the suppression pool j through the full flow test line. The heat exchanger is cooled by i
,, the residual heat removal cooling water function of the Service I
Water System. No additional instrumentation is essential for safe 7 shutdown. Process ' monitoring . functions and local RHR instrumentation are sufficient for this mode of RHR operation. 3.5.2.5 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation ; The instrumentation required to ensure safe shutdown is j categorized as system diagnostic instrumentation or plant monitoring instrumentation. System diagnostic instrumentation is included in the safe shutdown equipment list for the associated safe shutdown system. ! 1 I i This ensures that the required instrumentation function is maintained whenever the associated safe shutdown system is , required. l sJ i i i Page 3-37
i i r BSEP
-w REVISION 0 ASCA i
Plant monitoring instrumentation (PMI) includes the primary system parameters, which are not part of a safe shutdown system. The instruments included in this function are reactor vessel ! level, reactor vessel pressure, torus level, and torus temperature. Redundant instrument channels were chosen for each of these process parameters. Train A reads out in the Control l Room. Train B reads out at the remote shutdown panel. l l 1 This function is fulfilled by the instrumentation shaded on l Figures 3.3-17 and 3.3-18. Tables 3.5-17 through 3.5-20 identify l i j plant monitoring instrumentation essential for safe shutdown. l l l 3.5.2.6 Service Water System The Service Water (SW) System performs two functions. The diesel generator cooling water (DGCW) function provides essential
~~~~
cooling water for operation of the diesel generators. The purpose of the residual heat removal cooling water (RHRCW) function of the SW system is to supply water for cooling of the l RHR pumps, area coolers and heat exchangers. The Service Water System for each unit consists of five service water pumps enclosed in a water intake structure (common to Units 1 and 2), and associated lube water pumps, strainers, valves and controls. The pump discharge piping consists of two headers, one for l nuclear and/or vital equipment in the Reactor Building and the ! Diesel Generator Building, and the other for conventional equipment in the Turbine Building and the Reactor Building. Each l v I Page 3-38 l
BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA header consists of a group of service water pumps, parallel loads and interconnecting headers, which are normally operated independently. Under normal operating conditions, three SW pun.ps (two operating, one standby) pr , vide water to the conventional header while the remaining two SW pumps (one operating, one standby) provide water to the nuclear header. The SW lube water pumps provide water to the nuclear and conventional SW pumps for bearing lubrication, seal injection and cooling water for the pump motor coolers. The lube water pumps normally take suction from either the nuclear or conventional header. g- Figures 3.3-11 and 3.3-12 depict the major components and flow paths for the SW system and Tables 3.5-21 thicugh 3.5-26 identify the service water components which are required for safe shutdown. For RHRCW, service water is delivered to the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers from the nuclear service water header. For each unit, any one of the five SW pumps, and one RHR heat exchanger are required to provide cooling water for the RHR system. For DGCW, the Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generator's jacket water heat exchangers are supplied with cooling water from the nuclear headers from Units 1 and 2 through normally closed motor-operated valves. The Unit I nuclear header is : e normal J Page 3-39
BSEP
,_s REVISION 0 ASCA supply for diesel generators 1 and 2, and the alternate supply
- for diesel generators 3 and 4. The Unit 2 nuclear header is the normal supply for diesel generators 3 and 4 and the alternate supply for diesel generators 1 and 2.
The nuclear SW pumps, which supply the nuclear service water headers and are powered by the 4.16kV emergency buses, also have an. automatic starting capability. Upon loss of normal power, the diesel generators start and re-energize the emergency buses, which in turn enable the nuclear SW pumps to start. Once
" tarted, the pumps will continue to operate until stopped by
;perator action or tripped by pn: active devices. The nuclear service water pumps for each unit can supply cooling water for
.- the diesel generators of- either ar both units. Each unit is provided with an opposite unit diesel starting signal to the nuclear service water pumps. When the diesel generators of i eitaer unit automatically start, .the nuclear service water pumps for both units also start. This ensures that an alternate, automatic water supply exists for the diesel generator jacket water coolers in the event that there is loss of off-site power.
One operable service water pump is sufficient to satisfy the diesel generator cooling requirements for both units simultaneously. For this analysis, the operation of one diesel l generator per unit is required to meet the plant electrical demand. i i
%d Page 3-40
BSEP
,, REVISION 0 ASCA l The nuclear and conventional service water pumps are powered l
-from the.4.16kV emergency buses. This ensures that these pumps will be available-during all operating conditions. ,
3.5.2.7 AC Emergency Power System . The plant's standby AC Power Supply and Distribution System I (AC Emergency Power System) provides a reliable source of power l for emergency loads necessary to respond to an accident on one , unit and to safely shut down the second unit. The AC Emergency i Power' System has emergency diesel generators which can sepply the necessary power requirements should a total loss of off-site power for both units occur. This- system includes an on-site, independent emergency ac power source which can be started automatically or manually, and which suppl #,es power to essential N.
shutdown equipment safe if off-site power sources are unavailable. (
The emergency ac power source for both units consists of i four diesel generators (DGs). Each diesel-driven generator unit j is equipped with its own auxiliary components. These include a I self-contained, individual starting air system, fuel oil, lube i
)
oil, cooling water, voltage regulator and controls. Cooling l water is provided by the diesel generator cooling water (DGCW) function of the Service Water System. Each diesel is provided with two full-size, air-cooled, 480V ac motor-driven starting air compressors and two interconnected air receivers. Engine starting is accomplished by direct J Page 3-41
. . - - . . - - . _ . - . - - . . .-- . - . . .. ~.- - - . - - -
BSEP
, REVISION 0 ASCA injection of the starting air into the engine cylinders.
Controls for the' compressors are arranged to maintain a constant receiver pressure'which is sufficient to crank the engine for a 1 minimum of 30 seconds. Either compressor is capable of returning the system to full pressure from minimum starting pressure within 75 minutes. Electrical power for the starting air compressors is supplied from the associated diesel bus. , The primary source of diesel fuel is the fuel oil storage l tank. This tank contains sufficient fuel to operate all four l diesel engines at full load for seven days. This tank supplies four four-day storage tanks located in the underground vault adjacent to the Diesel Generator Building. Two fuel oil transfer pumps provide transfer capability from each underground four-day
-- storage tank to its corresponding diesel generator day tank. 1 Each day tank contains sufficient fuel to operate its ;
corresponding diesel engine at full load for a minimum of two hours. Existing local transfer switches allow operation of the fuel oil transfer pumps independently of the Control Room, provided that ac power is present at the corresponding local l motor control center. In addition to the diesel generators, the AC Emergency Power System consists of four 4.16kV emergency buses (El, E2, E3 and E4) and four 480V emergency unit substations (ES, E6, E7 and E8). Power is distributed within the plant at 4.16kV and supplied
- j. to major loads at that volto3e. The electrical output from the i
, s/ f Page 3-42 i
BSEP
,, REVISION 0 ASCA DGs is supplied at 4.16kV to four class lE buses which supply the loads required for safe shutdown.' Unit substations, consisting of transformers and switchgear, are provided within the plant to step the voltage down to 480V and supply loads at that voltage.
120V ac electrical power is supplied for lighting, instruments and controls. Each 480V substation is normally fed from one of the 4.16kV emergency buses through a 4.16kV-to-480V, 1500kVA transformer and dual primary / secondary breakers. Tie breakers are provided between the 480V emergency substations; this allows feeding of one substation from another, should the normal feed not be available. The 480V emergency unit substations feed various p, motor control centers which in turn feed equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the units. The emergency buses El, E2, E5 and E6 provide power primarily to BSEP Unit 1, while Duses E3, E4, E7 and E8 primarily serve BSEP Unit 2. The emergency buses are separated into two divisions. Buses El, E3, E5 and E7 are Division I; E2, E4, E6 and E8 are Division II. Cables and equipment for each division are physically separated to meet the original plant design criteria. The diesel generators, 4.16kV emergency buses, and 480V emergency buses are located in the Diesel Generator Building. The 4.16kV emergency buses are normally fed from their corresponding unit's 4.16kV auxiliary buses. Upon loss of all off-site and unit auxiliary power, the emergency buses are powered by the emergency diesel
'~'
generators. Page 3-43
BSEP
,_s REVISION 0 ASCA The AC Emergency Power System is equipped with key-locked isolation switches located on. the local diesel generator electrical panel and on each emergency bus section. These switches allow is]lation of the diesel generators and emergency buses from the control circuit conductors routed through the Control Building. In the event that a fire forces an evacuation :
of the Control Room or in any way affects control of the diesel ! L generators and emergency buses from the Control Room, safe i i f shutdown equipment can be operated locally by placirg these l NORMAL / LOCAL switches in the LOCAL position. Figures 3.3-13 and 3.3-14 indicate the primary safe shutdown ! equipment for the AC Emergency Power System. Tables 3.5-29 i l -
<T through 3.5-44 identify the components required for safe
[ , i
~-
shutdown. l 1 l l 3.5.2.8 DC Emergency Power System j l The 125/250V DC Power Supply System (DC Fmergency Power l System) supplies power for operation of HPCI, RCIC, ADS, RHR, l l 4.16kV emergency switchgear, diesel generator logic and control circuits, and essential instrumentation. The DC Emergency Power l System consists of batteries and battery chargers, associated j buses, electrical circuitry, switches, indicators, and alarm devices required for operation and surveillance of the system. l Two 125/250V de batteries are provided for each unit. The individual batteries are located in separate battery rooms, which i also contain the battery chargers and main de distribution ! %/ i Page 3-44
BSEP
,_ REVISION O ASCA switchboard associated with the battery. This arrangement provides complete separation and isolation of redundant dc. power l distribution equipment.
Each unit has two sets of 250V batteries which supply power for dc motors and dc motor-operated valves. The 250V batteries , are center-tapped to form two separate 125V dc batteries which t provide power for circuit breaker control, relay operation, plant ! annunciation, emergency lighting, and the uninterruptible 120V ac ! power supply. Each '125V de battery has an associated battery l i charger to maintain the battery at full voltage. Two batteries and two chargers feed each of the two distribution switchboards associated with each unit. Switchboards lA and 1B are associated _ with BSEP Unit 1, and 2A and 2B are associated with Unit 2. The s/ 125V dc batteries lA-1, 1B-2, 2A-1 and 2B-2 supply power to the ECCS and analog trip cabinets.. ! These batteries are rated at 1200 amp-hours, based on eight hours of service, and can supply their load as required without battery charger assistance and without a voltage drop below i 105/210 volts. Each battery charger provides the 125V de power i supply during normal operations, keeps its associated battery fully charged at all times, and recharges the battery after a 1 discharge. On loss of power to the charger, the battery supplies all required loads. The two batteries associated with each unit ; have engineered safety feature control loads distributed between l them so that redundant dc-powered subsystems on each unit have i t
~/ t Page 3 45 i
BSEP :
, REVISION 0 ASCA !
separate normal power supplies. Critical loads are supplied by ' alternate sources of dc power. Ee_5 charger is sized using the ! largest combination of normal steady-state loads, and a charging
- capacity capable of restoring the battery from the design minimum charged state to the fully charged state in approximately eight !
hours. Figures 3.3-13 and 3.3-14 indicate the primary safe shutdown equipment for the de system. Tables 3.5-45 through 3.5-48 identify the components required for safe shutdown operation of the de system. 3.5.3 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables The safe shutdown component list developed during the safe
.s shutdown analysis sets the stage for the identification of the l T electrical circuits essential to proper equipment performance.
All electrically dependent devices listed in Tables 3.5-1 through 3.5-18 were evaluated in order to identify the corresponding safe shutdown electrical circuits and cables. The circuits identified ! included power (4.16kV ac, 480V ac and 125/250V de), control j (120V ac and 125V dc), and instrumentation from the normal operating station (Control Room) and local operating stations l such as the remote shutdown panel, switchgear, and motor control I i centers. ' The safe shutdown circuit analysis used one-line diagrams, i elementary circuit drawings, and cable block diagrams. Based on
- the results of this analysis, all of the necessary electrical i
i e cables were selected for the subsequent cable routing and l
- f. separation analysis phases.
Page 3-46 i t . - _
BSEP
,,s REVISION 0 ASCA For each electrical circuit, all circuit cables required for the component to perform as required were identified as being safe shutdown and entered into the data base management system.
The circuit analysis was performed based on the component's category. Components that were required to operate or change , position (active safe shutdown) had their power and control cables identified. For components that were required to maintain their normal operating position (passive safe shutdown or spurious operation), only the control cables which would change i their position were identified. Typical circuits which are not required for component operation are annunciator, computer, motor winding heaters and external monitoring circuits that are
- electrically isolated from the electrical circuits of concern.
The BSEP computer-based conduit and cable raceway schedules were then used to identify the physical routings of individual cables.
The electrical raceway drawings overlayed with the BSEP fire zones were marked up with the safe shutdown cable routes and safe shutdown equipment. These drawings were used to determine the physical location of all safe shutdown equipment by specifying the fire zone in which the equipment and cables are located. These-fire zones were later combined to produce fire areas for subsequent separation analysis. This information was compiled to produce the final data base to be used in the Appendix R separation analysi.'. s Page 3-47
l ! BSEP l REVISION 0 ASCA Using the functional block diagrams and the safe shutdown equipment information, the Appendix R separation analysis was performed using the data base management system. This analysis identified the safe shutdown components potentially damaged by an Appendix R fire in each fire area. The analysis was done for 1 safe shutdown from both the Control Room and existing local l control stations. The functional block diagrams were then l I evaluated for all safe shutdown functions to identify deviations I from the separation criteria of Appendix R. Since there were no l i fire areas in the ESEP analysis that are considered free of ' intervening combustibles (fixed or transient), all electrical safe shutdown equipment in a given fire area was considered
-, failed in the most damaging manner. -- The next step was to develop options to resolve the identified deviations. These options included, but were not ;
1 limited to, modifying the plant to comply with Section III.G.2 or providing alternative shutdown. This process identified those l safe shutdown components which required modifications to facilitate safe shutdown operation from the Control Room, existing remote shutdown panels, or local control stations. The existing remote shutdown locations are described in Subsection 6.2.2 where they are identified as alternative control stations. The final product of this analysis identified all the fire areas at.BSEP which require alternative shutdown from existing control stations (see Section 4 for a detailed compilation of i 1 ~s Page 3-48
_ . . _ _ __ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ . - . _ . _ _ - _ _ - - . - . _ . ~ . t BSEP g REVISION 0 ASCA I Appendix R compliance). The analysis also identified minor control circuit modifications required to ensure compliance with current Appendix R regulatory guidelines for alternative shutdown ' systems. Section 6 provides a detailed explanation of the , alternative safe shutdown system philosophy at BSEP. f 3.5.4 Associated Circuits of Concern ! The separation and protection requirements of 10 CFR 50 l . Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to *
" associated" circuits, i.e., those circuits which could prevent f operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and t equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of l concern was performed for BSEP in accordance with NRC Generic r s Letter 81-12 and the subsequent Clarification to Generic Letter. ;
(. The latter document refined the definition of these associated i circuits of concern to those circuits which have a physical l separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix l l i R, and have one of the following: l (1) A common power source with the shutdown equipment and l whose power source is not electrically protected from i the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; (2) A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious l operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; (3) A common enclosure with the shutdown cables: (a) Is not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or l (b) Will allow propagation of the fire into the common i enclosure. 2 J Page 3-49 l 1
. - - - _.-.. - - _ . . .~ . - - . - - _ - . - - - - .. . - . -
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA This criteria was applied to the network of safe shutdown i 1 r circuits identified- in Subsection 3.5.3 to determine those I additional circuits requiring protection. The analysis of such l . circuits is described in the following subsections. l 3.5.4.1 Associated by Common Power Supply i Electrical circuit fault protection was originally designed ( to provide protection for plant electric circuits through the use l of protective relaying, circuit breakers, and fuses. This protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of all electrical distribution equipment from electric l ! faults and overload conditions. in the circuits. When power ! ! cables are affected by fire-induced failures, the operation of u these protective devices will result in isolation of the affected 4' Il i i electrical circuit and thus will prevent the propagation of the ! fault to other portions of the electrical system. An integral part of the original electrical system protection was the proper coordination of all these devices. Such coordination ensures that the protective device nearest to the fault operates prior to the operation of any " upstream" devices, and limits interruption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. These design practices provide I reasonable assurance that most circuits of concern, associated with safe shutdown circuits by common power supplies, will be sufficiently protected to ensure that fire damage does not ! propagate to the safe shutdown circuit. i l I < J Page 3-50 l l
BSEP
, REVISION 0 ASCA ToLconfirm the validity of this assumption, a review was conducted of the 1982 BSEP Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment ,
i [11] which had previously evaluated the existing electrical circuit protection and coordination for safe shutdown power supplies. The original list of power supplies was amended to
. include those power supplies identified in this updated analysis.
Three assumptions were employed in this review: (1) No' single failure criteria was applied to electrical protection devices. Electrical protection devices are assumed to operate properly in accordance to their corresponding time-current characteristics, unless their failure is directly attributable to a fire. (2) Only one electrical fault at any given time was assumed to affect a common power supply feeder branch. The largest load side feeder circuit breaker or fuse was used for that purpose and coordination verified against
-s the line side protection. Electrical faults may be
; considered bolted phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground.
~/
(3) Loss of electrical power (either motive or control) to passive safe shutdown devices (as defined in Section 2) was not considered detrimental to safe shutdown since these devices were assumed to be in their normal position or status pre-fire and thus fail safe or "as is". Loss of electrical power (either motive or control power) to passive safe shutdown devices, by definition, would not have an impact on safe shutdown capability by spurious operations unless that condition had been clearly identified in the safe shutdown : analysis and analyzed separately from this study. Likewise, the analysis assumed that loss of electrical ! power to circuits associated with high-low pressure i boundary components would not result in spurious operations affecting those devices, i The results of this review confirmed that most of the { I circuit over-current protective devices reviewed had been i properly selected and were coordinated. Design changes will be l v Page 3-51
BSEP m REVISION 0 ASCA I initiated to correct the few remaining deficiencies identified during the review. Consideration will be given to incorporating direction in post-fire shutdown procedures to clear buses of non-safe shutdown loads where simultaneous sustained circuit faults have the potential of affecting a safe shutdown power supply. Upon incorporation of these changes, proper circuit coordination will exist at BSEP, thereby eliminating all circuits i of concern associated by common power supply. ! 3.5.4.2 Associated Circuits by Spurious Operations This analysis identified the potential spurious operation candidates and placed them into one of the 'following two categories: (1) Spurious operation candidates which could affect proper
,,)
a safe shutdown system operation; and (2) Spurious operation candidates which could cause an uncontrolled loss of primary coolant. I Those spurious candidates which fall into the first category were addressed by-including these devices on the safe shutdown 1 equipment list- for the affected safe shutdown system and analyzing them as a safe . shutdown component. l Those spurious canilidates which fall into the second category were analyzed on a case-by-case basis. For some cases, the spurious candidate was paired with a redundant valve. Either , of the redundant devices is capable of preventing a loss of coolant. For other cases, no redundant device was used because the prevention of a loss of coolant could be assured by the
- ss i Page 3-52 i
l l t l
~ , , _ . _
, - . - .. . . - - _ . . - - - .. . . - . - . - . - _ ~ . . - . - - . - t BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA ' ss single valve. For all spurious candidates which could cause a i loss of coolant, a resolution was provided. These resolutions fall into one or a combination of the following types: (1) Pre-fire action (e.g., maintain a breaker open during normal operation)- (2) Pre-fire plant modification (e.g., replace single-pole , circuit breaker with a new two-pole circuit breaker) , t (3) Post-fire operator action (e.g., open a breaker) ; In those cases where. post-fire operator actions were used, those actions will take place shortly following the identification of a substantial fire at BSEP. ! i The results of this analysis are summarized in Tables 3.5-49 ! and 3.5-50. l 3.5.4.3 Associated by Common Enclosure
'g sl In the context of this analysis, enclosures comprise sealed fire areas, cable trays, cabinets, conduits, and other such t
structures which may contain electrical circuits and l. electromechanical devices. The fundamental concern for ! i protecting circuits associated by common enclosure is to ensure j that fire damage does not propagate into enclosures containing l redundant safe shutdown divisions. Such protection is provided through the use of overcurrent devices, IEEE-383 cable insulation, cable tray covers, conduits, and rated fire seals at I fire barriers. Over-current devices are used on all power and control [ i circuit conductors. These devices will ensure that electrical faults are cleared before they create a fire hazard remote from ra) ' Page 3-53
._. . _. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ . ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ . . . _ _ .
I l BSEP g REVISION 0 ASCA the location of the fault. The exception to this are l instrumentation loop conductors which are discussed in detail later in this section. , I Rated fire seals at fire area barriers prevent direct propagation of the fire from' one area to the next area. This l ensures that redundant safe shutdown enclosures which are separated by fire area barriers remain independent. Propagation within the same fire area is ameliorated by the j, IEEE-383 features of the cable insulation- used on power and control circuits. This addresses the cable trays used to route l much of the power and control cables throughout the plant. Fire i propagation within the same area is also retarded by the use of l .- conduit. Since conduit is totally enclosed along its route, fire ! cannot propagate along the conduit. Conduit is typically used l for the last portion of the cable route as the cable leaves the i cable tray and runs to the final device in the field. The enclosures in a power plant which contain instrumentation loop conductors are either instrumentation racks, control panels, cable trays, conduits, or remotely located devices. Instrumentation panels are . rigid metal cabinets on which the individual instrumentation loop modules are mounted. i Cable trays and conduits form the raceways in which field run cables are routed. Remotely located devices include process measurement racks which contain transmitters, controllers and/or ! indicators. i -sa I Page 3-54 __,-,m. . , , . . . . . . ._ .- _ _ . . _ . _ .-_ .. . _ _ _ _ . , . - ,_, .
BSEP -% REVISION 0 ASCA
. Process instrumentation / control loops originate' in a panel which contains the de power supply for the instrumentation loop.
This panel is fed by 120V ac power circuits which-also present the potential for fire damage resulting in a 120V ac power ,
~
conductor coming-in contact with an instrumentation loop. The concern is that fire damage may propagate into instrument loops in the form of a flame front or fault current. The design features of an instrumentation panel provide several barriers which greatly reduce the likelihood of a 120V ac power circuit coming in contact with an instrumentation loop. First, the entire enclosure is grounded. This would cause the ; local fuse in the power circuit to blow should the fire-damaged, s 120V ac wire come in contact with either the enclosure or any , 4 metal-encased device inside the cabinet. Given the far greater surface area of grounded enclosure to cable, there is a greater i potential for the fire-damaged circuit to contact a portion of the metal enclosure than another wire located inside the cabinet. The next barrier to damage, whicn would inhibit the fire-damaged 120V ac power cable from contacting an instrumentation loop, is the metal shield enclosing all instrumentation loop l conductors which run external to the instrumentation cabinet. Similar to the enclosure, this metal shield is grounded at one end of the instrument loop and would, in all likelihood, also l blow the local 120V ac panel fuse in the case of a fire-induced fault. 1 J s/ l Page 3-55
. - - - . .. - - - . - - _ _ . _ . - - - . . . - - ~ . - - . - . - - - .
BSEP m REVISION 0 ASCA For the reasons delineated above, the potential for fire l l damage inside an instrumentation panel resulting in 120V ac being impressed directly on an instrumentation loop, is sufficiently small as to be neglected. , Raceways routed throughout the plant which contain instrumentation loop conductors are dedicated to that service. They contain nothing but. instrumentation loop circuits and are ! completely enclosed. Because of this restriction, the only i cable-to-cable faults which could induce fire damage-related fault currents in the subject loop would be other instrumentation loops. Because of the small currents used in these circuits (in the range of 4-20 ma or 10-50 ma), it would require mcny multiple
-3 faults on a single conductor to generate sufficient currents to 1
'# produce an ignition source in some other part of the plant.
Instrumentation loop power supplies typically will not allow much more than the design maximum for the loop for the following reasons: (1) First, the step-down transformer which feeds this power supply has inherently a large impedance because of the small conductors used on the secondary winding. (2) The secondary side of the transformer usually incorporates a current-limiting resistance to reduce "in rush" currents when the power supply is initially turned on. (3) Usually the regulator portion of the power supply incorporates a " current sense" resistor which controls electronics which prevent an excessive current from j being produced by the output stage of the power supply.
- ~-
Page 3-56 mw -
l l l l l BSEP ; g REVISION 0 ASCA (4) Either the primary or the secondary circuits of the step-down transformer will usually have a fuse which interrupts fault currents produced in the power supply. I i These multiple faults would have to take place through the ( grounded shield which encloses each instrumentation loop pair of l l wires. The potential for multiple faults resulting in a credible 1 ignition source is best illustrated with an example. Suppose ten l instrumentation loops operating at full scale (50 ma each) were l l to fault to a single loop in such a manner as to force their l l entire current to flow through a single loop. The resulting current would be: 10 x 50 ma = 500 ma = 1/2 A. The resulting , heat generation rate per foot of wire would be: (1/2 A)2 x l g (.0068) = 1.7 milliwatts (based on #18 copper wire). This energy level can best be put into perspective by comparing it to a cable insulation damage study performed by Factory Mutual Research.[12] i Table X of the Factory Mutual Research report shows that piloted i i ignition, in natural air flow, requires integrated energies ranging from 420 KJ/M 2 to 1360 KJ/M2 In order to reach these integrated energy levels, the previously calculated 1.7 millivatts would have to be applied for a time ranging from approximately 67 hours to 217 hours. Clearly, since these times are so long, the deposited energy will dissipate before sufficient integrated energy levels are reached to cause ignition. v Page 3-57
I BSEP
,_ REVISION 0 ASCA Based on the large number of independent faults required and the fact that these faults would also have to occur through metal l shields, it is likely that this situation does not present a credible common-enclosure ignition source remote from the point l
of the presumed fire damage. Remotely located devices are, primarily, process measurement transmitters which control the instrumentation loop currents to some value proportional to the measured variable. The instrumentation cables routed to these devices are enclosed over l their entire path in the raceways discussed previously. Once the cable enters the electrical enclosure which forms part of the transmitter, it is again protected by a grounded metal enclosure.
-s This enclosure protects the loop conductors from coming in direct '/ contact with high-energy electrical conductors. Since most transducers are powered by the current (4-20 ma) which flows through the instrumentation loop, there is no mechanism by which a high-energy hot short could take place inside the transducer enclosure.
In summary, the only locations in the plant where instrumentation circuits are exposed to fire damage which could induce currents in excess of the normal 4-20 ma are the fixed routed raceways, control panels and instrumentation racks. The currents which could be induced by a fire affecting a raceway, have been shown to be too small to be of concern. Also, the l barriers inherent in the instrumentation rack and control panel i s/ i Page 3-58
BSEP -s REVISION 0 ASCA portion of an instrumentation installation, reduce the probability of a high-energy source (120V ac maximum) coming in contact with an instrumentation loop to a value that is sufficiently low to be neglected, considering the very low probability of occurrence of an Appendix R fire. 3.6 Conclusion This section described the process used to identify deviations from the safe and alternative shutdown requirements of Appendix R. Th. sections which follow present the results of this analysi , summarize the modifications proposed, and contain exemption applications where Section III.G requirements cannot be met. The nature of these modifications are, for the most part, g refinements to the existing alternative shutdown capability and
)
'~' generally involve provision of additional electrical circuit isolation devices. The principal conclusion to be derived from this assessment is that existing plant alternative shutdown features provide a substantial amount of protection to the safe shutdown capability as specified by Appendix R. v Page 3-59
__ __- _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _.-_ _ ._, __ m . _ ._ -. - - _ . _ _ _ _ l BSEP ! j s REVISION 0 ASCA l 3.7 References
- 1. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix R, " Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
l . Revised as of 1983. , i
- 2. Memorandum to All Power Licensees With Plants Licensed !
l Prior to January 1, 1979 from Darrell G. Eisenhut, l l
SUBJECT:
" Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) - Generic Letter 81-12," February 20, 1981.
- 3. Memorandum to Darrell G. Eisenhut, SU3 JECT: " Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) -
l Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12," March 22, 1982. l
- 4. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Inc., " Standard Criteria for Independence of Class lE !
Equipment and Circuits," IEEE-STD-384-1981.
- 5. U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems."
- 6. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical
-% Specifications updated through 1978.
~) l l 7. American Nuclear Society Standards, " Safe Shutdown,"
.STD-58.11 (draft).
- 8. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.139, " Guidelines for Residual Heat Removal."
- 9. Memorandum to E. E. Utley (CP&L) from D. B. Vassallo (NRC),
SUBJECT:
" Associated Circuits Evaluation for the Brunswick Units," December 21, 1983.
- 10. NRC Special Review Group, " Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," NUREG-0050, February 1976.
- 11. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2, " Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment and Proposed Modifications," June 1982.
- 12. " Progress Report Small Scale Testing of Flame-Retardant Coated Cables," by M.M. Khan and A. Tewarson, Factory j Mutual Research Corporation, Norwood, MA, March 1982.
l J I l Page 3-60 I l
PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPEN0!X R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 30 r SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RS CB XU-28 TERM CAB /JU2 TERM CAB EB XU-13 TERM CAB /JU4 Uml FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 UPS PDP 1A UPS DISTR PNL 1A i b e l
. = _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ , - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
s.; , CDROLINQ POWER & LIGHT COMPDMV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL 5AFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 30 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION P004-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P005-1-821-LT-N021B RX P+NSSS H21-POOS-003 POO5-1-821-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B PDP 31A SST XFRM PwR DISTR PNL 31A PT COMPT /F22 POT XFMR DG NO 1 75 KVA PWR CONV MODULE UNINTER PwR SUP RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN +M XFRM REL PNL RTGB DIV 1 IXU-2/JA6 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB DIV 1 2XU-2/JA6 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB DIV1/JA6 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB/JC4 RTG ZONE M VA CTL SLDG SKID JUNC BOX /YV2 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 1 SPLICE BOX /Y2O SPLICE BOX FOR DISC RE8 SPLICE BOX /vH9 SPLICE POINT SPLICE BOX /YXI MLC IXA SPLC IN MH XK7 SPLICE /w50 lxC MCC SPLICE IN MH XK7 SPLICE /XE1 SPLICE POINT SPLICE /XE2 SPLICE POINT SPLICE /XE3 SPLICE POINT SP ICE /Y21 SPLICE PT IPA MCC FDR . SPLICE /v55 IXC SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE /v12 2XC MCC SPLICE IN MH XB9
- SPLICE /YJ4 2CA MCC SPLICE IN MH XB9
- SwBD IA/GJ5 DC DIST SwBD 1A CKT GJ5 SwGR 10/AD1 1D 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ADI SwGR 1D/ ADS 10 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ADS ,
SwGR ID/A07 10 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AD7 SWITCHING MODULE UPS STATIC IR TANSFER Sw TEAM box /GA2 DG1 TERM BOX i TERM BOX /RN2 TERM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 1
- TERM BOX /YV2 TERM 00X 1 DIE GEN 1 8 TERM CAB IXU-14/JI9 TERM CAB FOR TBO JNO TERM CAB 1XU-39/JH6 TERM CAB FOR El DIV 1 TERM CAB 2XU-39/JH6 TERM CAB FOR El DIV 1
! TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JB0 JNO TERM CAB XU-39 TERM CAB El DIV 1 TERM CAB XU-41 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 [ TERM CAB XU-41/JKO TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAD /JH6 TERM CAB FOR Et DIV 1 TERM CAB /JKO TERM CAB FOR E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLOG VA l i
( COROLINO POWER & LIGHT COM GNV () ) BRUNSWICK STEQM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 30 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 1E7 PwR DISTR PNL 1E7 2-FO-LS-2012 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2012 F0 TK 1 2-FO-LS-2285 LIMIT Sw1TCH LS-2285 FO TK 1 2A-DG DGC DISTR PNL CKT 009 CNTL CAB /H54 DG CONTROL CAB I . CT COMPT /F26 CONT XFR DG NO 1 DISCONNECT SW/RE8 DISCH SW FOR TRANSFORMER GF4 E1/AE6 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AE6 E1/AE7 El 4kV SwGR CIRCUIT AE7 E1/AE8 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AE8 E1/AE9 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AE9 E1/AFO El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AFO E1/AF8 El 4KV SwGR CIRCu!T AFB E5/AUO E5 480V BUS CIRCUIT AUO E5/AU4 ES 480V BUS CIRCUIT AU4 E5/FM9 4BOV SUBSTA ES TRANS CPT ENG PNL/HA9 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/HG1 LOGIC CAB DG4 ESS CAB DIV1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 EXCITATION CUBE /H46 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG1 INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =l+2 AT V-80 INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 MCC ICA/C07 MCC ICA UNINT PWR SVP 1A MCC ICA/C74 MCC ICA FOR BRKR PDP 31A MCC DGA/D37 DGA 480 MCC CKT D37 MCC DGA/D38 DGA 480 MCC CKT D38 , MCC DGA/D45 DGA 480 MCC CKT D45 MCC DGA/DQ7 DGA 480 MCC CKT 007 MCC DGA/DR1 DGA 480 MCC CKT DR1 MCC DGA/DR4 DGA 480 MCC CAT DR4 MCC DGA/DR5 DGA 480 MCC CKT ORS MCC DGA/DR6 MCC DGA VENT FAN F-EF-DG ' MCC DGA/EC8 DGA 480 MCC CMT EC8 I MCC DGC/DO9 DGC 480V MCC CMT D09 NEUT GND XFMR/F13 NEUT GRND XFR DG-1 P004-1-B21-LT-NO21A RX P+NSSS H21-POO4-003 I [ 1 _____.____._.__.s _ . . _ _ _m_m.__ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ < * - _ _ . - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ , - m.__. - , , _
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(c, ) PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 l APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 29 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
MCC ICA ICA 4B0 MCC CMT C01 ES MCC ICA CB-23E MCC 1PA IPA 480 uCC CKT But E5 MCC IFA SW-1 MCC InA MCC 1xA INC LINE E5 MCC 1xA RB1-N MCC inA-2 MCC IXA2 INC LINE E7 MCC IXA-2 RB1-N MCC inC IXC 480 MCC CKT DSO ES MCC IXC RB1-N , RB1-E l WCC DGA DGA 480V MCC CKT D36 E5 MCC DGA DG-5 POP 1a E5 DISTR PNL 1A 1E7 N/A CB-23E POP 31A PwR DISTR PNL 31A PDP 3tA SST N/A CB-23E 6DP 3%A SST XFRM PwR DISTR PNL 31A MCC ICA N/A CB-23E i st)p 31AB PWR DISTR PNL 31AB DIV 2 1E7 N/A CB-23E PDP V7A VITAL DISTR PNL V7A MCC ICA N/A CB-23E SwBD 1A F()P V9A VITAL DISTR PNL 21A MCC ICA N/A CB-23E SWBO 1A l [
/ .
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 29 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
1A-DG 125V DC DISTR PNL 4A 1A-DG SST N/A DG-11 In-DG SST DISTR PNL XFMR DGA MCC DGA N/A DG-11 In-5W 1A-5W- DISTR PNL 1A-5W SST N/A SW-1 p 1A-5W 55T DISTR PNL MFMR MCC IPA N/A SW-1 1E7 PWR DISTR PNL.1E7 1E7 SST N/A CB-23E 1E7 SST XFRM PwR DISTR PNL 1E7 ES N/A CB-23E
.-FO-SV-2012 FO TK1 SOL VLV N/A 2A-DG DG-19 ,
161 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 1 N/A PNL 1A DG-5 , PNL 4A PNL 2A DG1 CRNKC5 VAC BLWR DG1 CRNKC5 VAC BLWR MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-5 DG1 EXH FAN E-EF-DG DG1 EXHAUST FAN MCC OGA MCC DGA DG-5 teG 1 FO TRNSFR PP 1A DG1 FO TRNSFR PMP 1A MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-19 , Db1 FO TRNSFR PP 18 DG1 FO TRNSFR PMP 18 MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-19 DG1 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG1 STRTG AIR COMP 1 MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-1 l DG1 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG1 STRTG AIR COMP 2 MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-1 El El 4KV SWGR CKT AE6 DG1 PNL 1A DG-11 PNL 2A ES E5 480V BUS CKT AT9 ES 55T. PNL 1A DG-6 PNL 2A LS 55T ES 480V SWGR TRANSFORMER El N/A DG-6
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PAGE 2
- CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 l APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SWDG >>
l TABLE 3.5 - 28 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION l INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 INTERFACE /XN5 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV WTR
- LOCAL CTL STA/L52 SRV SUPPLY VALVE CONT STA l MCC IPA /BU9 IPA 480V MCC Cur 809 MCC IPA /BVO TPA 480V MCC CKT Bv0 l
MCC IPA /BV1 IPA 480V MCC CKT BV1 i MCC 2PA/E04 2PA 480 MCC CKT E04 I l MCC 2PA/E05 2PA 480 MCC CMT EOS , MCC 2PA/E06 2PA 480 MCC CMT E06 l MCC 2PA/EO7 2PA 400 MCC CKT E07 i MCC 2PA/E08 2PA 480 MCC CKT E08 MCC 2PA/E12 2PA 480 MCC CKT E12 ;
- MCC 2PB/E29 2PB 480 MCC CMT E29 i MCC 2PB/E36 2PB 480 MCC CKT E36 MCC 2PB/E37 2PB 400 MCC CKT E37 l
MCC 2PB/E38 2PB 400 MCC CKT E38 MCC 2PB/E39 2PB 480 MCC CMT E39 MCC 2PB/E40 2PB 480 MCC CKT E40 MCC DGA/EB9 DGA 480 MCC CMT EB9 MCC DGA/EIS MCC DGA MCC DGB/EC3 PGB 480 MCC CKT EC3 MCC DGB/EI6 MCC DGB MCC DGC/EF2 DGC 480V MCC CKT EF2 MCC DGD/EF4 DGD 480V MCC CKT Er4 MCC DGD/EF6 DGD 480V MCC CkT EF6 l RTGB XU-2/JA5 RTG ZONE H RCC SW RTGB XU-2/JBB RTG ZONE H RCC SW SPLICE /YF1 NUC SWP 2B SPL IN TR 63E SPLICE /VF2 CONV SWP 28 SPL IN TR 63E SPLICE /VF9 NUC SWP 2A SPL IN TR 61E ' SPLICE /YGO CONV SWP 2A SPL IN TR 61E , SWGR 1C/AD5 1D 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AD5 j SWGR TD/AD6 1D 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AD6 SWGR 2C/AC5 2C 4KV SWGR CMT AC5 , i TERM box /PBS TERM BOX CAC PROCESS l ( TERM box /VH4 TERM BOX VV CAC PV1219C , ( TERM CAB XU-13 TERM CAB EB l TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JBO JNO TENM CAB MU-25 TERM CAB EB l l TERM CAB /504 TERM BOX l t ! t i
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( CCROLING POWER & LIGHT COMPQN7 BRUN5w!CC STECM ELECTRIC PLRNT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SwDG >>
TABLE 3.5 - 28 5t PPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-5W-V212 DG3 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV 1-Sw-v213 DG4 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV 2-5W-LSH-3120 LEVEL SWITCH 3120 , 2-5w-L5H-3123 LEVEL Sw!TCH 3123 2-Sw-L5H-3126 LEVEL SwlTCH 3126 2-5W-L5H-3129 LEVEL SWITCH 3129 2-5W-L5HH-3121 2-X L5HH 3121 2-5W-L5HH-3122 2-X L5HH 3122 2-Sw-L5HH-3124 2-X L5HH 3124 2-5W-L5HH-3125 2-X LSHH 3125 2-5W-L5HH-3127 2-X LSHH 3127 2-5W-L5HH-3128 2-X LSHH 3128 l 2-5W-LSHH-3130 2-x LSHH 3130 2-Sw-L5HH-3131 2-X LSHH 3131 2-Sw-POIC-118 STRNR 28 FOR CONV SWP 2B 2-5W-PS-1316 PRESSURE Sw!TCH SERV WTR PS-6 2-Sw-PS-136 SOLENOID VLV SERV WTR PS-136 2-5W-V13 CONV HOR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV 2-Sw-v14 CONV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 28 DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V16 CONV HDR PUMP 2B DISCH VLV 2-5w-V17 CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLv 2-5W-vi8 CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV 2-5W-V19 NUC HOR PMP 2A DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V2O NUC HDR PMP 28 DISCH VLV 2A-5W 2PA DISTR PNL CMT E14 BOP CAB XU-14 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS DG1 ENGINE PNL ENG CONTROL PANEL DG1 i DG2 ENGINE PNL/HBO ENG CONTROL PANEL DG2 l DG4 ENGINE PNL/HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 DG4 ENGINE PNL/HB2 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG4 DG4 LOGIC CAB XU-30 LOGIC CAB DG3 E1/AF6 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AF6 E3/AJ3 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ3 E3/AJ4 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ4 E4/ALI E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT All E4/AL2 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AL2 ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 HEATER CAB /VW7 MCC 2PB PT WD HTR CAB HEATER CAB /VW8 MCC 2PA PT WD HiR CAB INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D l t l
'(s ( / f PAGE 2 CAROLINA PCwER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5 WICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDCWN COMPONENTS
<< SwDG >> .
TABLE 3.5 - 27 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA >
==================== s============================= ==================== ==================== ===============
+
L5wp 2B C5WP 28 MTR E4 E4 Sw i C5wP 28 STRNR C5wp 2B STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1
- 4. 5 w P 2C C5wP 2C MTR El El Sw-1 I
i LSWP 2C STRNR C5WP 2C STRNA MCC IPA MCC IPA Sw-1 l 4 UBF WTR PUMP 2A NUC/ CON LUBE WTR PUMP 2A MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 ! l LUBC WTR PUMP 28 NUC/ CON LUBE WTR PUMP 20 MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 ( H5 up 2A N5wp 2A MTR E3 E3 Sw-1 l NSmP 2A STRNR N5wP 2A STRNR MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 NswP /B NSWP 28 MTR E4 E4 Sw-l NSwP 2B STRNR NSWP 2B STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 i r l l l L t.
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PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5wlCK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHu1DOWN COMPONENTS u SwDG >> TABLE 3.5 - 27 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOUNCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== :-=================== ===============
2-5w-PV116 C5WP 2A STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 2-Sw-PV118 C5WP 20 STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 2-5w-PV120 C5wP 2C STRNR DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC IPA SW-1 2-5W-PV136 LUBE WTR PUMP INTAKE VLV 2A-5W 2A-5W Sw-1 2-5W-PV138 BACKWASH VLV FOR N5wP STRNH 2A MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 2-Sw-PV140 BACKWASH VLV FOR NSWP STRNR 20 MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 2-sw-v13 CONV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 4-5w-V14 CONV HOR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 2 Sw-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 28 DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 2-sw-V16 CONV HDR PUMP 2B DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 2-Sw-V17 CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC 1PA SW-1 2-Sw-VIB CONV HOR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC 1PA Sw-1 2-5W-V19 NUC HDR PMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 ; 2-Sw-V2O NUC HOR PMP 28 DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 2-5w-V210 DG1 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-5 2-Sw-v211 DG2 JKT wTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 2-5W-V212 DG3 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 2-Sw-V213 DG4 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 2-sw-V255 DG 3&4 SW SUPPLV VLV MCC DGD MCC DGD VP i C5wP 2A C5WP 2A MTR E3 E3 SW-1 L5wP 2A STRNR C5wP 2A STRNR MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1
e ( ( c) . ). PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENOIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SwDG n TABLE 3.5 - 26
$UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION TERM CAB /JU3 TERM CAB EB XU-25 i TERM CAB /SQ4 TERM BOX p
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' BRUNSWICK STEAC ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1.
[ APPEN0!X R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SWDG >> >
TABLE 3.5 - 26 j SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION I
-INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D ,
INTERFACE /XN4 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV wfR 1 LOCAL CTL STA/L51 SRV SUPPLY VALVE CONT STA i MCC IPA /BU4 IPA 483V MCC CMT BU4 MCC 1PA/ BUS 1PA-480V MCC CKT BU5' MCC IPA /BU6 IPA 480V MCC CKT BU6
- MCC 1PA/BU7 1PA 480V dCC CKT BU7 .[ '
MCC IPA / BUB IPA 480V MCC CKT BU8 MCC 1PA/BV2 IPA 480V MCC CKT BV2 MCC 1PA/BX8 IPS 480V MCC CKT BX8 , MCC 1PB/BX1 1PB 480V MCC CKT BX1 MCC 1PB/BM9 1PB 480V MCC CMT BX9 I 1 MCC 1PB/BYO IPB 480V MCC CKT BYO ! i MCC 1PB/BV1 1PB 480V MCC CRT BY1 [ ] MCC 1PS/BY2 IPS 480V MCC CKT BY2 , MCC 2PB/E44 2PB 480 MCC CMT E44 ~J MCC 2pB/E45 2PB 480 MCC CKT E45- ( MCC 2PB/E46 2PB 480 MCC CKT E46 MCC DGA/044 DGA 480 MCC CKT D44 MCC DGA/ECO DGA 480 MCC CKT ECO ! MCC DGA/EC8 DGA 480 MCC CKT EC8
- MCC DGB/EC4 PGB 480 MCC CKT EC4 [
MCC DGC/EE3 DGC 480V MCC CKT EE3 ! MCC DGC/EF3 DGC 480V MCC CKT EF3 i MCC'DGD/EE6 4BOV MCC CKT EE6 l MCC DGD/EF7 DGD 480V MCC CKT EFF A RTGB XU-2/JA5 RTG ZONE H RCC SW i RTGB XV-2/JB0 RTG ZONE H RCC SW ' '~ SPLICE /YFO CONV SWP 1A SPL IN 64E ! SPLICE /YF3 CONV SWP IC SPL IN 64E i SPLICE /VF4 NUC SWP IB SPL IN TR 64E i SPLICE /VF7 CONV SWP IB SPL IN 60M ! . SPLICE /YF8 NUC SWP 1A SPL IN TR 60M ! SwGR IC/AC5 1C 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ACS ! SwGR IC/AC6 1C 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AC6 f SwGR 10 1D 4KV SWGR CKT AD6 ! TERM BOK/YH4 TERM BOX VV CAC PV1219C TERM CAB XU-13 TERM CAB EB . TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JB0 JNO j TERM CAB XU+25 TERM CAB EB . TERM CAB /JU2 TERM CAB EB XU-13 . e t 1 I i-
(' (.) CAROLINA power & LIGHT d62PANY
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BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTCOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SwDG >>
TABLE 3.5 - 26 5UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-5W-PS-1316 LUBE PUMP SWITCH 1-5W-PS-136 LUBC WTR PUMP VLV 1-5w-V13 CONV HDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-Sw-Vl4 CDNV DDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-5W-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 1B DISCH VLV 1-5W-V16 CONV HDR PUMP 18 DISCH VLV 1-5W-V17 CONV HDR PUMP 1C DISCH VLV 1-5W-VIB CONV HDR PUMP IC DISCH VLV 1-5w-V19 NUC HOR PMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-5W-V20 NUC HDR PMP IB DISCH VLV 1A-5W IA-5W- DISTR PNL 2-Sw-V210 DG1 JkT WTR CLR INLET VLV 2-5w-V211 DG2 JKT wTR CLR INLET VLV 2X-LSH-3120 LEVEL SWITCH L5H-3120 2X-L5H-3123 LEVEL SWITCH L5H-3123 2X-LSH-3126 LEVEL Sw!TCH L5H-3126 2x-L5H-3129 LEVEL SWITCH L5H-3129 2X-LSHH-3121 2x-L5HH-3121 2X-LSHH-3122 2X-L5HH-3122 2x-L5HH-3124 2x-LSHH-3124 2X-LSHH-3125 2x-L5HH-3125 2X-L5HH-3127 2X-L5HH-3127 2x-L5HH-3128 2X-L5HH-3128 2X-L5HH-3130 2X-LSHH-3130 2X-LSHH-3131 2X-L5HH-3131 DG1 ENGINE PNL ENG CONTROL PANEL DG1 DG2 ENGINE PNL/HBO ENG CONTROL PANEL DG2 DG3 ENGINE PNL/HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 DG4 ENGINE PNL/HB2 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG4 E1/AF7 E1 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AF7 E1/AF9 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AF9 E2/AH1 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH1 E2/AH6 E2 4kV SWGR CIRCUIT AH6 E4/AM6 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AN6 E55 CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 HTR CAB /M01 MCC DGA PT WD HTR CAB HTR C%B/VW7 MCC 2PB PT WD HTR CAB HTR CAB /VwB MCC 2PA PT WD HTR CAB HTR CAD /VXD MCC IPS PT WD HTR CAB INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX
., -. - - . . - .s
PAGE 2 CAPOLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC f8LANT - UNIT 1 1 i APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE 5t4U100wN COMPONENTS
<< Sw Dt2 ?*
TABLE 3.5 - 25 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
($wP 18 CSwP 18 MTR E1 El Sw-1 i t'SWP IB STRNR CSWP 18 STRNR MCC IPA MCC IPA SW-1 ; CSwP 1C CSWP 1C MTR E2 E2 Sw-1 ; tSwp 1C STRNR CSWP IC STRNR MCC ;PB MCC IPB SW-1 3 LUBE WTR PUMP 1A NUC/ CON LUBE wTR PUMP 1A MCC 1PA MCC 1PA Sw-1 , e Het WTR PUMP IB NUC/ CON LUBE WTR PUMP 18 MCC IPB MCC IPB Sw-1 NSup 1A NSWP 1A MTR El El Sw-1 Nsup 1A STRNR NSWP 1A STRNp urC IPA MCC 1PA 5W-1 NSwp 1B NSwp 1B MTR E2 E2 SW-1 Nswp 18 STRNR NSWP IB STRNR MCC IPB MCC IPS SW-1 r I i
V PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER 8. LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< SWDG >>
TABLE 3.5 - 25 COMPDNENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
-=================== ======e======================= ==================== ==================== ===============
1-Sw-PV116 C5WP 1A STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 1-5w-Pv110 C5WP 18 STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 1PA MCC 1PA Sw-1 1-Su-PV120 C5wP 1C STANR DISCH VLV MCC IPS MCC 1PB SW-l 1-5w-PV136 LUBE WTR PUMP INTAKE VLV 1A-5W 1A-Sw SW-1 1 SW-PV138 NSWP 1A STRNR DISCH VLV MCC ?PA MCC 1PA Sw-1 1-Sw-PV140 NSWP IB STRNR DISCH VLV OCC 1PB MCC 1PB Sw-1 1 Sw-V13 CONV HOR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV LtCC 2PD MCC 2PB SW-1 1-5w-V14 LONV DDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 1-Sw-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 18 DISCH VLV MCC 1p* . MCC 1PA SW-1 1-Sw-V16 CONV HDR PUMP IB DISCH VLV WCC 1PA MCC IPA SW-1 1-sw-vi7 CONV HDR PUMP 1C DISCH VLV MCC IPB MCC IPB SW-1 1-Sw-V18 CONV HOR PUMP IC O!5CH VLV MCC IPB MCC IPB Sw-1 1-Sw-V19 NUC HDR PMP 1A DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC IPA Sw-1 1-5W-V20 NUC HDR PMP 18 DISCH VLV MCC 1PB MCC 1PB Sw-1 1-5w-V210 DG1 Jnf wfR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-5 1-Sw-V211 DG2 JKT wTR CLR IHLET VLV MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 1-Sw-V212 DG3 JkT wTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 1<5w-V213 DG4 JKT WTR CLR INLET VLV MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 1-Sw-V255 DG 1 & 2 Sw SUPPLY VLV MCC DGA MCC DGA VP _swp 1A C5wp 1A MTR E4 E4 Sw-1 C5WP 1A STRNR C5wP 1A STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1
.e i
PAGE 4 CAROLINA P0wER & LIGHT LUMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 24 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION-P018 E 11 -P S- N0 20 C RX REC CH A 1R H21-P018 P018-2-E11-PT-N002A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P021-2-E11-PS-N016B P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N0160 P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-NO208 P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N0200 P CHAN O INST RACK P021-2-Ell-PT-N0028 P CHAN B INST RACK P022-2-832-PS-N01BB IR-RX BLDG , P601-2-E11-DPC-R600A ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL ' P601-2-E11-OPC-R6008 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANCL PDP 2A E7 DISTR PANEL 2A > PDP 2B EB DISTR PANEL 28 PEN 2X-102C PENETRATION X 102C PEN 2X-102E PENETRATION X 102E , PNL 4A 125V DC DISTR PNL 4A PNL 4B 125V DC DISTR PNL 48 , RTGB XU-2/JA4 STG ZONE F RCC SW RTGB XU-2/JAS RTG ZONE H RCC SW . RTGB XU-2/JB8 RTG ZONE H RCC SW I SPLICE /VF1 NUC SWP 2B SPL IN TR 63E SPLICE /VF2 CONV SWP 28 SPL IN TR 63E SPLICE /VF9 NUC SWP 2A SPL IN TR 61E SPLICE /YGO CONV SWP 2A SPL IN TR 61E SwGR ID/ ADS 1D 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ADS , SWGR ID/AD6 ID 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AD6 1 SwGR 2C/ACS 2C 4KV SWGR CKT ACS i TERM BOM/W3x TERM BOX TERM BOX /w3Y TERM BOX TE%M BOX /w3Z TERM BOX TERM box /VH4 TERM BOX VV CAC PV1219C TERM CAB XU-13 TERM CAB EB TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JB0 JNO TERM CAB XU-25 TERM CAB EB TERM CAB /JU4 U=1 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64
PAGE 3 CAROLINA power'& LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SW $>
TABLE 3.5 - 24 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC 2XA/0B0 2xA 480 MCC CKT DB0 MCC 2xA/DE1 2xA 480 MCC CKT DE1 MCC 2xA/DE3 2xA 400 MCC CMT DE3 MCC 2xA/ DES 2xA 480 MCC CKT DES MCC 2xA/DG5 2xA 480 MCC CKT DG5 MCC 2xA/DH5 2XA 480 MCC CKT DHS MCC 2xA/DH9 2xA 480 MCC CKT DH9 MCC 2XA/DIO 2xa 480 MCC CKT DIO , MCC 2xB/DA9 2XE 400 MCC CMT DA9 L MCC 2Xa/DM1 2XB 480 MCC CKT DM1 MCC 2XB/DM6 2xB .8d0 MCC CKT DM6 MCC 2mB/DN1 2MB 480 MCC CMT DN1 MCC 2xB/DN2 2x8 480 MCC CMT DN2 MCC 2xB/DN9 2XB 480 MCC CKT DN9 MCC 2XB/DP2 2xB 480 MCC CKT DP2 MCC 2XB/DP5 2XB 480 MCC CKT DP5 POO4-2-821-LT-NO31A Rx V5L-LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-LT-NO31C RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-PT-N021A RX P*N555 H21-P004-004 POO4-2-B21-PT-NO21C JET PUMP INST RACK r004-2-E11-PT-N011A RK V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P00d-2-E11-PT-N011C Rx V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PT-N019A RX P+N555 H21-P004-003 P004-2-E11-PT-N019C RX P+N555 H21-P004-003 P005-2-821-LT-NO318 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-829-LT-NO31D RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-PS-N0218 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-PT-N0210 RX P+N555 H21-P005-004 ' P005-2-B2?-PT-N0210 IR JET PUMP INSTR P005-2-E11-PT-N0118 RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P005-2-E11-PT-N011D RX P+N555 H21-POO5-003 P005-2-E11-PT-NO198 RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P005-2-E11-PT-N0190 RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P006-2-832-PS-N018A IR-RX BLDG P009-2-B21-LT-NO36 JET PUMP INST RACK H21-P009 P010-2-821-LT-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR P010-2-021-LTS-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR P010-2-821-PS-N0210 IR JET PUMP INSTR P018-2-F11-PS-N016A RK REC CH A IR H21-P018 6 P018-2-E11-PS-NO16C RX PEC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-PS-N020A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT E6%PANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENT 5-
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TABLE 3.5 - 24 SUPPORTING COMPONENT D?SCRIPTION 2A-5W 2PA DISTR PNL CKT E14 BOP CAB XU-14 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS OG4 LOGIC CAB XU-30 LOGIC CAB DG3 E1/AE7 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AE7 E1/AF5 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AF5-E1/AF6 E1 4KV SWGP CIRCUIT AF6 E2/AG5 E2 4KV 5* C9 CIRCUIT AGS E2/AG9 E2 4KV SwGP CIRCUIT AG9 E3/A13 E3 4kV SwGT CIRCUIT A!3 E3/AJ1 E3 4KV SwGl CIRCUIT AJ1 E3/AJ3 E3 4KV SWG., CIRCUIT AJ3 E3/AJ4 E3 4KV SwGR RCUIT AJ4 E4/AKO E4 4KV SwGR Ca 'CUI T AKO E4/AK3 4KV BUS E4 RHR 'MP 28 E4/AL1 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCD.* AL1 E4/AL2 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT **2 E55 CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 E55 CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 E55 CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAD DG2 ESS CAB OIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 HEATER CAB /VW7 MCC 2PB PT WD How CAB HEATER CAD /VW8 MCC 2PA PT WD HTR CAB INTERFACE /xN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D INTERFACE /xN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 INTERFACE /MN5 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV WTR UCC IPA /BU9 1PA 480V MCC CMT BU9 MCC IPA /BVO IPA 480V MCC CMT Bv0 MCC IPA /BV1 1PA 480V MCC CKT BV1 MCC 2PA/E04 2PA BRO MCC CKT E04 MCC 2PA/EOS 2PA =d0 MCC CKT E05 MCC 2PA/E06 2PA 480 MCC CKT EO6 ' MCC 2PA/E07 2PA 480 MCC CKT E07 MCC 2PA/E08 2PA 480 MCC CKT EO8 , MCC 2PA/E12 2PA 480 MCC CKT E12 MCC 2PB/E29 2PB 480 MCC CMT E29 MCC 2PB/E36 2PB 480 MCC CMT E36 MCC 2PB/E37 2PB 480 MCC CKT E37 MCC 2PB/E38 2PB 480 MCC CKT E38 MCC 2PB/E39 2PB 480 MCC CKT E39 MCC 2PS/E40 aDB 480 MCC CNT E40 MCC 2xA/ DAB 2 (A 480 MCC CKT DA8 k
. _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ .._.___.___.~.__.____________.___..____________________________._.___--_.--m.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - m _ - . . -,.
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CDROLING POWER & LIGHT CD'M9CNV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 24 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-E11-C001A E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AI7 2-E11-C001B E4 4r? SWGR CIRCUIT AK4 2-E11-C001C E1 4W 4 SWGR CIRCUIT AF4 2-E11-C001D E2 4L' 5WGR CIRCUIT AGB 2-E11-FOO4A RHR PUdp 2A SUCT VLV 2-E11-F0049 RHR PUMP 28 SUCT VLV 2-E11-F004C RHR PUMP 2C SUCT VLV 2-E11-F004D RHR PUMP 2D SUCT VLV 2-E11-FOO6A SHUTON CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-FOO69 SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006C SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006D SHUTON CLG SUCT VLV l 2-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV i 2-E11-FOO9 RHR INBOARD ISOLATION VLV l 2-E11-F073 Sw-RHR CROSSTIE VLv ( 2-E11-FS-NG21A FLOW SWITCH RHR 2-Ell-FS-N021B FLOW SWITCH RHR 2-E11-LS-F075 RHR Sw CROSSTIE VLV 2-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL , 2-H12-P612 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 2-H12-P613 PROCESS IN1R CABINET 2-H12-9617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P622 INBD PRIM VLV REL VERT BD . 2-H12-P623 OUTBD PRIM VLV REL VERT BD ! 2-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H21-POO5 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B 2-H21-P009 JET PUMP INST RACK 2-SW-PDIC-118 STRNR 2B FOR CONV SwP 28 2-Sw-PS-1316 PRESSURE SwlTCH SERV WTR PS-6 2-Sw-PS-136 SOLENOID VLV SERV WTR PS-136 ! 2-Sw-V13 CONV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V14 CONV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV 2-5W-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 2B DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V16 CONV HDR PUMP 28 DISCH VLV ! CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV 2-Sw-V17 2-SW-V18 CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV [ 2-SW-V19 NUC HDR PMP 2A DISCH VLV ' 2-Sw-V20 NUC HOR PMP 28 DISCH VLV i. i e_ - --- v y-- .. - r -e- . - - - r - , . -- , ,
k .. ._ /, 1 PAGE 3 CAROLINA POwFR & LIGHT COMPANY BRUT:SwlCK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UN!T 2 APPENDIM R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
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TABLE 3.5 - 23 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIFE AREA
-=================== ==================== =a======= ==================== ==================== ===============
LUBE WTR PUMP 2A NUC/ CON LUBE WTR PUMP 2A MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 LUBE wiR PUMP 28 NUC/ CON LUBE WTR PUMP 28 MCC 2PB MCC 2P8 Sw-t , o N5wP 2A NSWP 2A MTR E3 E3 Sw-1 NSwp 2A STRNR NSWP 2A STRNR MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1 L NSWP 28 N5wP 28 MTR E4 E4 SW-1 N5mp 2B STRNR N5wP 28 STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 h L k 4
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .m_. .__.____.__m_._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . ______m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _________.______ m_. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . .
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R E55EN11AL SAFE 5HUTDOWN COMPONENTS
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TABLE 3.5 - 23 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== =======================-======= ==================== ==================== ===n===========
2-Sw-v118 Sw CRO550VCR VLV MCC 2xA MCC 2xA RB2-5 2-5W-V124 RNR B COOLER OUTLET VLV N/A N/A RB2-5 2-Sw-V125 RHR PMP 20 SEAL CL EX DIS VLV PDP 2B PDP 2B RB2-5 1-5w-V126 RHR PMP 28 SEAL CL Ex DIS VLV PDP 2B PDP 2B RB2-5
/-5w-V129 RHR A LOOLER DUTLET VLV N/A N/A RB2-N 2-Su-V13 CDNV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA Sw-1
/-Sw-V130 RHR PMP 2A SEAL CL Ex DIS VLV PDP 2A PDP 2A RB2-N 2-sm-V131 RHR PMP 2C SEAL CL EX DIS VLV PDP 2A PDP 2A RB2-N
/-5w-v14 CONV HDR PUMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 !
I 2-5W-vi5 CONV HDR PUMP 20 DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 l-5w-vi6 CONV HDR PUMP 2B DI5CH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 2-Sw-V17 CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV MCC 1PA MCC 1PA SW-1
/-Sw-v1B CONV HDR PUMP 2C DISCH VLV MCC 1PA MCC IPA SW-1 2-5w-V19 NOC HDR PMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 2-5W-V2O NUC HOR PMP 28 DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 C5wp 2A C5wp 2A MTR E3 E3 Sw-1 I i
C5wP 2A STRNR C5wP 2A STRNR MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 C5wp 2B C5WP 28 MTR E4 E4 Sw-1 l C5WP 28 STRNR C5WP 2B STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 C5wP 2C C5wP 2C MTR El El SW-1 C5wP 2C STRNR C W 2C STRNR MCC IPA MCC 1PA SW-1
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CAROLINA .'OWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTimL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 23 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== =======================n====== ==================== ==================== === =====
7-E11-FOO2A RHR HX 2A OUTLET VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-Ell-FOO2B RHR HM 28 OUTLET VLV MCC 2MB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-F068A CNTM CLG HX 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N PDP 2A PNL 4A 2-E11-F0688 CNTM CLG HX 28 DISCH VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 PDP 2B PNL 4B t-E11-F073 SW-RHR CROSSTIE VLV WCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2 SW-PV116 C5WP 2A STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 /-5w-Pv118 C5WP 28 STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 2-Sw-PV120 C5WP 2C STRNR DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC IPA SW-1 /-5w-Pv136 LUBE WTR PUMP INTAKE VLV 2A-5W 2A-5W SW-1 2-Sw-PV138 BACKWASH VLV FOR NSWP STRNR 2A MCC 2PA MCC 2PA SW-1 2 Sw-PV140 BACKWASH VLV FOR NSWP STRNR 2B MCC 2PB MCC 2PB SW-1 2-Sw-V101 SW HDR FEED VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-E 2-Sw-v102 SW CROSSOVER VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-E 2-5w-V105 SW FEED VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-Sw-v106 SW PRI ISOL VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-5 2-Sw-v111 CONV HDR INTAKE VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-5w-V117 NUC HDR INTAKE VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5
( t - )y . PAGE 4 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
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TABLE 3.5 - 22 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SWGR IC/AC6 1C 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ACC SWGR ID 1D 4KV SWGR CNT AD6 TERM BOX /YH4 TERM BOX VV CAC PV1219C TERM CAB XU-13 TERM CAB EB TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JBO JNO TERM CAB XU-25 TERM CAB EB TERM CAB /JU2 TERM CAB EB XU-13 TERM CAS/JU3 TFRM CAB EB XU-25 TR1P CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECC5 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 _ _ _ _ - . _ __ - ,%-+-., 4 >.p,g
PRGE 3 CAROLING POWER & LIGHT CdMPONtf BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLQNT - UNIT 1 APPEN0!X R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
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TABLE 3.5 - 22 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC 1xA/DIO MCC IXA IN MOV 1-5W-V111 MCC 1xB/DA9 MCC 1xB RELAY COMPT MCC 1xB/CMI MCC 1x0 MOV SW-V103 MCC 1xB/DM6 MCC 1x8 MOV SW-V106 MCC IXB/DN1 MCC 1xB MOV 1-E11-F0688 MCC IXB/DN2 MCC 1xB MOV 1-E11-F073 MCC 1xB/DN9 MCC 1xB MOV 1-E11-F002B MCC 1xB/DP2 MCC 1x0 MOV 1-5W-V117 MCC 1xB/DP5 MCC 1xB RELAY COMPT MCC 2PS/E44 2PB 480 MCC CKT E44 MCC 2PB/E45 2PB 480 MCC CKT E45 MCC 2PB/E46 2PB 480 MCC CKT E46 P006-1-832-PS-N01BA IR-RX BLDG PO18-1-E11-P5-N016A IR-RX BLDG P018-1-E11-PS-N016C IR-RX BLDG P018-1-E11-PS-H020A IR-RX BLOG P018-1-E11-PS-NO20C IR-Rx BLDG P018-1-E11-PT-N002A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P021-1-E11-PS-NOl68 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-ND16D CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0208 CHAN B INST RACK PO21-1-E11-PT-N0200 P CHAN B INST RACK PO21-1-E11-PT-N020D P CHAN B INST RACK PO22-1-832-PS-N0188 IR-RX BLDG P601-1-E11-DPC-R600A ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL P601-1-E11-DPC-R6008 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL PDP 1A E5 DISTR PNL 1A PDP IB E6 DISTR PNL 1B PEN 1X-102C PENETRATION x 102C PEN 1X-102E PENETRATION x 102E PNL 3A 125V DC DISTR PNL 3A PNL 38 125V DC DISTR PNL 3B RTGB XU-2/JA4 RTG ZONE F RCC SW RTGB XU-2/JA5 RTG ZONE H RCC SW RTGB AU-2/JB8 RTG ZONE H RCC SW SPLICE /YFO CONV SWP 1A SPL IN 64E , SPLICE /VF3 CONV SWP IC SPL IN 64E SPLICE /VF4 NUC SWP IB SPL IN TR 34E SPLICE /YF7 CONV SWP 18 SPL IN 60M SPLICE /YF8 NUC SWP 1A SPL IN TR GOM SWGR IC/AC5 IC 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AC5
COROLINA POWER & LIGHT CQdPANY (. AGE 2' . BRUNSWICK STEAM' ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 AFPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDGWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SW >> j TABLE 3.5 - 22 'I i
SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION E2/AH1 E2 4kV SWGR CIRCUIT AH1 E2/AH4 E2 4kV SWGR CIRCUIT AH4' i E2/AHS E2 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AHS E2/AH6 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH6 E3/A13 E3 4kV SWGR CIRCUIT AI3 E3/AI8 E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AI8 i E3/A19 E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT A19
'E4/AKO E4'4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AKO f E4/AK6 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AK6 E4/AK9 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AK9 E4/ALO E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ALO ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ;
ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CtB DG3 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 y HTR CAB /VW7 MCC 2PB PT WD HTR CAB HTR CAB /VW8 MCC 2PA PT WD HTR CAB HTR CAB /VXO MCC IPS PT WD HTR CAB .j INTERFACE'+ D8 TERM BOX
~
INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D l INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 INTERFACE /XN4 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV WTR MCC 1PA/BU4 1PA 480V MCC CKT BU4 MCC 1PA/ BUS IPA 480V MCC CKT BU5 MCC 1PA/ BUS 1PA 480V MCC CKT BU6 [ MCC IPA /BU7 1PA 480V MCC CMT BU7 MCC 1PA/ BUB IPA 480V MCC CKT Bua , MCC 1PA/BV2 IPA 480V MCC CMT BV2 ' ! MCC 1PA/BX8 IPB-480V MCC CKT BX8 MCC IPB/BX1 IPB 480V MCC CMT BK1 [ MCC 1PS/BX9 IPS 480V MCC CKT BX9 MCC IPB/BYO IPS 480V MCC CMT BYO i MCC IPB/By1 . IPB 480V MCC CKT BV1 MCC IPB/BY2 IPB 480V MCC CMT BV2 ; MCC IXA/ DAB MCC 1XA RELAY COMPT I MCC 1XA/DB0 MCC IXA RELAY COMPT MCC 1XA/DE1 MCC IXA CRSVR V 1-SW-V118- [ MCC 1XA/DE3 MCC 1XA ISO MOV 1-SW-V106 e MCC 1XA/ DES MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11'-F002A ! MCC 1XA/DG5 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F068A i MCC 1XA/DMS MCC IXA FD MOV 1-SW-VIO1 j i i I t l [ I e
. _ _ _ _ . . - . . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . . . . . . , _ . ~ , . - - , - . _ . . . . . , . .-- . _ . , - n . - - . . - - - - , - . _ -- . - - . . . .. _., .. .. -
g- ) PQGE 1 k' / } CAROLIMQ POWER & LIGHT COMPONV BRUNSWICK STERM tLECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 22 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-E11-F004A RHR PUMP 1A SUCT VLV 1-E11-F0048 RHR PUMP IB SUCT VLV 1-E11-FOO4C RHR PUMP 1C SUCT VLV 1-E11-F004D RHR PUMP 10 SUCT VLV 1-E11-F006A SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F006B SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F006C SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F0060 SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 1-E11-F009 RHR INBOARD ISOLATICN VLV 1-E11-FS-NO21A FLOW SWITCH RHR 1-E11-FS-N0218 FLOW SWITCH RHR 1-E11-LS-F073 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-LS-F075 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P612/JNS FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 1-H12-P613 PROCESS INSTR CABINET 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P622 INBD PRIM VLV REL VERT BD 1-H12-P623 NSS SHUT OFF OUTBD CAB 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 1-H21-P009 JET PUMP INST RACK 1-SW-PS-1316 LUBE PUMP SWITCH 1-SW-PS-136 LUBE WTR PUMP VLV 1-SW-V13 CONV HDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-SW-V14 CONV DDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-SW-V15 CONV HDR PUMP 18 DISCH VLV 1-SW-V16 CONV HDR PUMP 1B DISCH VLV 1-SW-V17 CONV HDR PUMP IC DISCH VLV 1-SW-V18 CONV HDR PUMP IC DISCH VLV 1-SW-V19 NUC HDR PMP 1A DISCH VLV 1-Sw-v20 NUC HOR PMP 1B DISCH VLV 1A-SW 1A-SW- DISTR PNL E1/AFO El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AFO E1/AFI El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AFI E1/AF7 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AF7 E1/AF9 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AF9 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AGS
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PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5 WICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIA R ESSEN!?-; .. A F E SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 21 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
IUSE wTR PUMP 1A NUC/ CON LUBE wTR PUMP 1A MCC IPA MCC IPA SW-1 LUBE WTR PUMP 18 h;'C/ CON LUBF WTR PUMP 18 MCC IPB MCC 1PB SW-1 N$wp 1A N$wP 1A MTR El El SW-1 t45WP 1A STRNR NSWP 1A STRNR MCC 1PA MCC 1PA SW-1 N5mp 18 N5wp 18 MTR E2 E2 Sw-1 N5wP IB STRNR NSWP IB STRNR MCC IPB MCC IPS Sw-1
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER 3 LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< SW >>
TABLE 3.5 - 21 COMPONENT DE5CRIPTION POWER SOUPCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
= ======u==========c ============================== ==================== ==================== =============== I 1-Sw-V118 SW CROSSOVER VLV MCC 1XA MCC IMA RB1-N 1-SW-V124 RHR B COOLER OUTLET VALVE N/A N/A RB1-5 1-Sw-Vl25 RHR PMP ID SEAL CLN EX DIS VLV PDP 10 PDP 1B RB1-5 1-Sw-V126 RHR PMP IB SEAL CLN EX DIS VLV PDP 18 PDP IB RB1-5 1-5w-V129 RHR A COOLER OUTLET VALVE N/A N/A RB1-N 1-SW-V13 CONV HDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 1-Sw-v130 RHR PMP 1A SEAL CLN EX DIS VLV PDP 1A PDP 1A RB1-N l 5w-V131 RHit PMP IC SEAL CLN EX DIS VLV PDP 1A POP 1A RB1-N 1-Sw-V14 'ONw DDR PUMP 1A DISCH VLV MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 i-Sw-v15 CONV HDR PUMP IB OISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC 1PA Sw-1 1-5w-V16 CONV HOR PUMP 18 DISCH VLV MCC 1PA MCC IPA SW-1 1-Sw-V17 CONV HDR PUMP 1C DISCH VLV MCC 1PB MCC 1PB Sw-1 1-Sw-V18 CONV HDR PUMP 1C DISCH VLV MCC IPB MCC 1PB Sw-1 1-5w-V19 NUC HDR PMP 1A DISCH VLv MCC IPA MCC IPA Sw-1 1-SW-V2O NUC HDR PMP 1B DISCH VLV MCC 1PB MCC IPB Sw-1 CSwP 1A CSwp 1A MTR E4 E4 Sw41 CSwP 14 STRNA CSwP 1A STRNR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 CSwp to CSwP 18 MTP E1 El Sw-1 L5wp 18 STRNR C5wP 18 STRNR MCC 1PA MCC IPA Sw-1 CSWP IC CSWP 1C MTR E2 E2 Sw-1 i swp IC STRNR CSwp IC STRNR MCC IPB MCC IPB Sw-l
, , s PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM LLECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTI AL -SAFE SHUTDOsw COMPONENTS
<< Sw >>
TABLE 3.5 - 21 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================ = =============== ==== ==================== ===============
b I-E11-FOO2A RHR HX 1A OUTLET VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-N 1-E11-F0028 RHR HX 18 OUTLET VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-5 1-E11-FO68A CNTM DLG HX 1A DISCH VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-N PDP 1A PNL 3A 1-E11-F068B CNTM CLG HX 1B DISCH VLV MCC IMB MCC 1XS RB1-w PDP IB PNL 38 1-E11-F073 SW-RHR CROSSTIE VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XS RB1-5 t-Sw-Pv116 CSWP 1A STRNR DISCH VLv MCC 2PB MCC 2PB Sw-1 1-Sw-Pv118 CSWP 1B STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 1PA MCC IPA Sw-1 1-Sw-Pv120 CSwP 1C STRNR DISCH VLV MCC 1PB MCC IPB Sw-1 1 Sw-PV136 LUBE WTR PUMP INTAKE VLV 1A-SW 1A-SW Sw-1 1-Sw-PV138 N5wP 1A STRNR DISCH VLV MCC IPA MCC IPA Sw-1 1-Sw-PV140 NSwP 1B STRNR DISCH VLV MCC IPB MCC IPB Ow-1 1-Sw-V101 Sw HDR FEED VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-E 1-Sw-V102 SW CROSSOVER VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-E 1-Sw-V105 Sw FEED VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XS RB1-S i 1-SW-V106 SW PRI ISOL VLV MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB1-5 1-Sw-V111 CONV HDR INTAFE VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-N 1-Sw-V117 NUC HDR INTAKE VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-5 [ V _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . - - _ .w,. .. _ __- m-
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COROLIceo POWER & LIGHT COMPONV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS >
<< PMI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 20 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-C91-P607 ANALOG INPUT CAB NO1 2-CAC-LT-2602 LEVEL INDICATOR 2-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-CAC-PT-334I PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-CAC-TE-1258-21 2-CAC-TE-1258-21 2-CAC-TE-778-7 SUPP POOL THERMOCOUPLE
- 2-E11-FT-3339 FLOW TRANSMITTER RHR 2-H12-P603/JF9 RX CTL BENCH BD CONSOLE ;
2-H12-P612/JG2 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 2B-0G DGD DISTR PNL CKT D49 ISOLATOR CAB /J1C TSC COMP ISO CAB Di XU77 = P004-2-B21-LT-3331 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-C32-LT-NOO4A RM V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-C32-PT-3332 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-C32-PT-N005A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P005-2-D21-LT-N0170 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P021-2-E11-FT-3338 P CHAN B INST RACH P021-2-Ell-PDT-NOO2B P CHAN 8 INST RACK P603-2-C32-LC-R600 CTL BBD VERT SECT IND P603-2-C32-UR-R608 CTL BBD VERT SECT IND P603-2-FW-LIC-3269 CTL BSD VERT SECT IND P612-2-C32-ES-M613 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK P612-2-C32-EV-MbOOA FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK P612-2-C32-EV-K616 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK P612-2-C32-LA-H624 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK i PDP 324 120V AC DISTR PNL 32A , PDP 32AB 120V AC DISTR PNL 2E7 PDP 328 120V AC DISTR PNL 328 PDP V10A VITAL DISTR PNL V-10A r PDP V8A VITAL DISTR PNL V-8A PEN 2X-1038 PENETRATION X 103B PEN 2X-104A PENETRATION X 104A RTGB XU-3/JN8 RTG ZONE K TSI UA VA RTGB XU-51/JW9 RTG ZONE O/P VERT SEC XU-51 TERM BOK/N18 TERM BOX CAC PROCESS TERM BOX /WOS TERM BOX p TERM BOM/WOT TERM BOM 5
. - _ - - - - _ . - -- _ - - - _ . - _ - - - - _ _ ~ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
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PAGE 1 i CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ! BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< PMI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 19 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
-=================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
P603-2-C32-LI-R606A REACTOR LEVEL INDICATOR -PDP V8A NA C8-23E PDP v10A P603-2-C32-PI-R605 REACTOR PRESSURE INDICATOR PDP VBA NA CB-23E PDP V10A RSP-2-821-LI-3331 REACTOR LEVEL INDICATOR 2B-DG NA RS2-5 kSP-2-032-PI-3332 REACTOR PRESSURE INDICATOR 28-DG NA RB2-5 kSP-2-CAC-LI-3342 SUPP CH LEVEL INDICATOR 28-DG NA RB2-5 RSP-2-CAC-TR-778 SUPP CH TEMP RECORDEA 28-DG NA RB2-5 HIGB-2-CAC-LR-2602 SUPP CH LEVEL RECORDER PDP 32AB NA CB-23E PDP 328 HTGB-2-CAC-TR-1258 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLDG PDP 32A NA CB-23E i h g d _ m -. -~. e ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .- .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - POGE 1 { . l' (' COROLING POWER & LIGHT CO'PdNY
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C BRUNSWICM STEDM ELECTRIC PLQNT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS !
<< PMI->>
TABLE 3.5 - 18 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
------------------------------ -----~~---------------- ------
1-C91-P607 ANALOG INPUT CAB NO1 ' 1-CAC-LT-2602 LEVEL INDICATOR 1-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-CAC-PT-3341 PRES 5URE TRANSMITTER 1-CAC-TE-1258-21 1-CAC-TE-1258-21 1-CAC-TE-778-7 SUPP POOL. THERMOCOUPLE 1-E11-FT-3339 FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-H12-P603/JF9 RX CTL BENCH BD CONSOLE 1-H12-P612/JG2 FW & RX RECIRC SYS PNL 18-DG PWR DISTR PNL 18-DG INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX ISOLATOR CAB /J1C TSC COMP ISO CAD D1 XU77 POO4~1-821-LT-3331 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-1-C32-LT-N004A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-1-C32-PT-3332 RX v5L LEVEL & PNE55 A P004-1-C32-PT-NOO5A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P005-1-821-LT-N017D RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B , PO21-1-E11-FT-3338 CHAN 8 INST RACK P021-1-E11-PDT-NOO2B CHAN B INST RACK P603-1-C32-LC-R600 RX CTL BENCH BD ; P603-1-C32-UR-R608 RX CTL BENCH BD , 1 P603-1-FW-LIC-3269 RX CTL BENCH BD P612-1-C32-ES-M613 FW & RX RECIRC SV5 PNL P612-1-C32-EV-K60rA FW & RX RECIRC SYS PNL P612-1-C32-EV-M616 FW & RX RECIRC SYS PNL [ P612-1-C32-LA-KG24 FW & RX RECIRC SYS PNL PDP 31A PWR DISTR PNL 31A PDP 31AB PWR DISTR PNL 31AB DIV 2 POP 318 PWR DISTR PNL 318 DIV 2 PDP V7A VITAL DISTR PNL V7A PDP V9A VITAL DISTR PNL 21A PEN 1X-1038 PENETRATION X 1038 PEN 1X-104A PENETRATION X 104A RTGB XU-3/JN8 RTG ZONE M T5I UA VA RTGB XU-51/JW9 RTG ZONE O/P VERT SEC XU-51 TERM BOX /WO5 TERM BOX TERM BOX /W1V TERM BOX TERM BOX /V1B TERM BOX L L
. - - _ _ .. . . . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ ~ _ ._. -
s (s_ / / PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ' ORUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 , APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS 5
<< PMI >> t i
TABLE 3.5 - 17 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== =================. . ... ..=,,,=,,,,
PbO3-1-C32-LI-R606A REACTOR LEVEL INDICATOR PDP V7A N/A CB-23E PDP V9A , i P603-1-C32-PI-R605 REACTOR PRESSURE INDICATOR PDP V7A N/A CB-23E-PDP V9A WSP-1-D21-LI-3331 REACTOR LEVEL INDICATOR 10-DG N/A RB1-5 [ M P-1-C32-PI-3332 REACTOR PRESSURE INDICATUH IB-DG N/A RB1-5 [ kSP-1-CAC-LI-3342 SUPP CH LEVEL INDICATOR 10-DG N/A RB1-S t RSP-1-CAC-TR-778 SUPP CH TEMP RECORDER 1B-DG N/A RB1-S . I RTGB-1-CAC-LR-2602 SUPP CH LEVEL RECORDER PDP 31AB N/A CB-23E PDP 31B HTGB-1-CAC-TR-1258 $UPP CH TEMP RECORDER PDP 31A N/A CB-23E t i h 5
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PAGE 6 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 16 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION t SPLICE /vEB RMR PP 2C 5PL IN MH XB4 6 SWGR IC/AC6 1C 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AC6 SWGR 1D/AD7 ID 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AD7 SWGR 2C/ACS 2C 4KV SWGR CMT ACS SWGR 2D/AD5 2D 4MV SWGR CMT ADS SWGR 20/AD6 2D 4KV SWGR CRT AD6 TERM BOX / COB TERM BOX TERM 00X/CW9 TERMINAL BOX TERM box /DQ2 TERM box TERM B0x/EB5 TERMINAL box L TERM 60X/WOS TERM BOX TERM CAB /JI9 TERM CAB FOR JBO JNO TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB Rx CNTL BLOG VA TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-28 TRIP CAB xU-63 TRIP CAO ECCS 1 xU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 i a- _._1__________________m ._
PAGE 5 ( ) CDROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPAMV BRUN5w!CK STEQD ELECTRIC PLONT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 16 5UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION P005-2-021-PT-N021D IR JET PUMP INSTR P005-2-E11-PT-N0118 RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P005-2-E11-PT-N011D RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P005-2-E11-PT-N0198 RX P+N555 H21-POOS-003 P005-2-E11-PT-N019D RX P+N555 H21-P005-003 P006-2-832-PS-N018A IR-RX BLDG P009-2-821-LT-NO36 JET PUMP INST RACK H21-P009 P009-2-021-PT-N021C JET PUMP INST RACK H21-P009 P010-2-821-LIS-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR PO10-2-821-LT-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR PO'0-2-821-LTS-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR P010-2-B21-PS-NO21D IR JET PUMP INSTR PO18-2-E11-PS-N016A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 PO18-2-E11-PS-N016C RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-PS-N020A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-P5-NO20C RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P019-2-E21-PS-N008B CORE SPRAV IR CHANNEL 8 P019-2-E21-P5-N0098 CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL 6 , PO21-2-Et1-PS-N0168 P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N016D P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-NO208 P CHAN O INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N0200 P CHAN B INST RACK j P022-2-832-PS-N018B IR-RX BLOG PDP 2AB COM DISTR PANEL 2AB POP C72-P001 RELAY PANEL AIR COMP IB PEN 2X-102C PENETRATION X 102C PEN 2X*102E PENETRATION X 102E PEN 2X-105D PENETRATION X 105D PEN 2X-105J PENETRATION X 105J , PNL 4A 125V DC DISTR PNL 4A PNL 48 125V DC DISTR PNL 48 REMOTE SD PNL REMOTE INST PNL RTGB/JA2 RTGB DIV II RTGB/JC3 RTGB Div I SPLICE BOX /vE3 RHR PP 2A SPL IN TR 60A SPLICE BOX /VE7 RHR PP 2A SPL IN MH XB4 SPLICE /vDO RHR PP 28 SPL'IN TR 64A SPLICE /vDS RHR PP 2D SPL IN TR 63A SPLICF/VD7 RHR PP 2B SPL IN WH XB5 SPLICE /vD9 RHR PP 20 SPL IN MH XB5 SPLICE /vEO RHR PP 2C SPL IN TR 61A
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COROLING POWER & LIGHT OdPONY BRUNSw!CM STECM ELECTRIC PLOMT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 16 1 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
-------------- -.~------------ --------------.---------------
MCC 2xB/D11 MCC 2MB RELAY COMPT ' MCC 2xB/DA9 2XB 400 MCC CMT DA9 MCC 2xB/DK1 2x8 400 MCC CMT DK1 ; 2x8 4HO MCC Ckt DK6 ; MCC 2xB/DK6 MCC 2xB/DK8 2XB 480 MCC CKT DKB > MCC 2xB/DK9 2x8 480 MCC Chi DK9 l MCC 2xB/DLO 2xB 480 MCC CMT DLO ! MCC 2xB/DL1 2x8 400 MCC CKT DL1 MCC 2xB/DL2 2xa 480 MCC CRT DL2 MCC 2xB/DL3 2xB 480 MCC CKT DL3 MCC 2xB/DL6 2x0 480 MCC CMT DL6 MCC 2xB/DLB MCC 2xB MOV 2-E11-F016B MCC 2xB/ DMO 2x0 480 MCC CKT DMO WCC 2xB/DM2 2KB 480 MCC CMT DM2 MCC 2xB/DM3 2xB 480 M' C CKT DM3 MCC 2XB/DM4 2xB 480 MCC CRT DM4 MCC 2xB/DM7 2xB 480 MCC CKT DM7 MCC 2MB/DM8 2tB 480 MCC CKT DM8 MCC 2xB/9NO 2MB 480 MCC Cki DNO MCC 2xB/DN6 2xB 400 MCC CKT DN6 MCC 2xB/DP0 2xB 480 MCC CMT DPO MCC 2xB/DP3 MCC 2x0 ALT FDR E11-F009 MCC 2MB/DPS 2MB 480 MCC CMT DPS MCC 2xB/DP7 2MB 480 MCC CKT DP7 MCC 2xDB/E20 MCC ExDB RELAY COMPT MCC 2XLB/049 2xDB 250 MCC CKT 849 MCC 2xDB/B50 2xDB 250 MCC CKT B50 MCC 2xDB/B51 2xDB 250 MCC CKT eS1 P001-2-E21-PS-N008A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A P001-2-E27-PS-N009A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A P004-2-821-LT-NO31A RX %SL LEVEL & PRESS A . P004-2-021-LT-NO31C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-PT-NO21A RX P+NSSS H21-P004-004 P004-2-E11-PT-NO11A Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PT-N011C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PT-N019A RX P+NSSS H21-POO4-003 P004-2-E11-PT-N019C Rx P+NSSS H21-P004-003 P005-2-021-LT-NO318 Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-NO310 Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B , P005-2-821-PS-N0218 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-PT-NO218 Rx P+NSSS H21-P005-004 L [ f _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - - ~. - - - , _ _ _ . , _ - _ _ - - . - - _ , , - -
. ~
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w1CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
. TABLE 3.5 - 16 5UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC 2xA-2/D07 MCC 2XA-2 B32-F031A MCC 2XA-2/DD8 MCC 2xA SPARE STR MCC 2XA-2/DD9 MCC 2XA-2 B32-F043A MCC 2XA-2/DEO MCC 2xA-2 832-F044A MCC 2XA-2/DF3 MCC 2xA-2 E11-F015A MCC 2xA-2/DF5 MCC 2xA-2 E11-F017A MCC 2XA-2/DGO MCC 2XA-2 E11-F028A MCC 2xA/000 MCC 2XA REM SH DN R CMPT MCC 2xA/DA6 2XA 480 MCC CMT DA6 MCC 2xA/DA8 2XA 480 MCC CMT DA8 MCC 2XA/D80 2XA 480 MCC CMT DB0 MCC 2XA/DD6 2XA 480 MCC CKT 006 MCC 2xA/DE6 2XA 480 MCC CMT DE6 MCC 2XA/DE/ 2XA 480 MCC CMT DE7 MCC 2XA/DE8 2xA 480 MCC CMT DE8 MCC 2xA/DE9 2XA 48C MCC CMT DE9 MCC 2XA/DF0 2XA 480 MCC CKT DF0 MCC 2XA/DFt 2xA 480 MCC CRT OF1 MCC 2XA/DF2 2XA 480 MCC CKT DF2 MCC 2XA/DF4 2XA 480 MCC CMT OF4 MCC 2XA/DF6 2XA 480 MCC CMT OF6 MCC 2XA/DF7 2xA 480 MCC CMT DF7 MCC 2XA/DF8 2xA 480 MCC CKT DF8
. MCC 2XA/DF9 2XA 480 MCC CKT DF9 l MCC 2XA/DG1 2xA 480 MCC CKT DG1 ! MCC 2XA/DG2 2XA 480 MCC CKT DG2 l MCC 2XA/DG4 2XA 480 MCC CKT DG4 MCC 2xA/DG8 2xA 480 MCC CMT DG8 i MCC 2xA/DH3 2XA 480 MCC CKT DH3 MCC 24A/DH4 2XA 480 MCC CKT DH4 MCC 2XA/DH6 2XA 480 MCC CMT DH6 MCC 2xA/DI2 2XA 480 MCC CMT D12 MCC 2XA/F00 MCC 2xA ALT FOR E11-F009 MCC 2XA/Ft* MCC 2XA NORM FDR E11-F009 l MCC 2xB-2/GX2 MCC 2XB-2 832-F0310 MCC 2xB-2/DK3 MCC 2XB SPARE STR MCC 2xB-2/DK4 MCC 2xB-2 B32-F0438 MCC 2MB-2/DK5 MCC 2XB-2 B32-F0448 MCC 2x8-2/DL7 MCC 2xB-2 E11-F015B MCC 2XB-2/DL9 MCC 2XB-2 E11-F017B MCC 2xB-2/DM5 MCC 2XB-2 E11-F0288 l l l l l
r POGE 2 ( CCROLING POWER a LIGHT CvuPANY BRUMSWICK STEQM ELECTRIC PLCNT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 16 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-H12-P609/JH3 TRIP SYS A RPS VERT BD 2-H12-P609/JM6 TRIP SYS A RPS VERT BD 2-H12-P610/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P611/JM5 TRIP SYS B RPS VERT BD 2-H12-P611/JM9 TRIP SYS B RPS VERT BD I-H12-PCl2 Fw & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 2-H12-p613 PROCESS INTR CABINET 2-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERf! CAL BD 2-H12-PGIS RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-t M 2 -P62 2 INSO PRIM VLV REL VERT BD 2-H12-P623 OUTBD PRIM VLV REL VERT BD 2-H12-P624/JF0 BENCH RB AUX RELAY CAB 2-H12-P624/JR6 BENCH BD AUX RELAY CAB 2-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H21-POO5 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B 2-H21-P009 JET PUMP INST RACK 2-VA-TS-936A RHR ROOM A TEMP SW 2-VA-TS-9368 RHR ROCM A TEMP SW 2-VA-TS-936C RHR R 0091 8 TEMP Sw i 2-VA-TS-936D RHR ROOM D TEMP SW 2-VA-TS-936E HPCI ROOM TCNP SW 2-VA-TS-936F HPCI ROOM TEMk Sw BOP CAB XU-14 TERM CAB ED GEN CVS DAMPER /029 DMPR 2J-TPD-AB SV DAMPER /030 DMPR 2J-TPD-RS ZS DAMPER /031 DMPR 2K-TPD-RB E1/AE/ El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AE7 E1/AFS E1 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AF5 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AG5 i E2/AG9 E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AG9 E3/AI3 E3 4KV SwGR CIRLeti AI3 E3/AJ1 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ1 > E3/AJ2 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT *J2 E4/AMO E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AKO E 4 / A.K 3 4KV BUS E4 RHR PUMP 2 'l ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 ;
PoGE 1 L COROLINQ POWER & LIGHT CuatPQG4V BRUNSWICQ STECM ELECTRIC PLQNT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTD0wN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 16 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-E11-C001A E3 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT AI7 2-E11-C001B E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AM4 2-E11-COO 1C El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AF4 2-E11-COO 1D E2 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AG8 2-E11-FOO4A RHR PUMP 2A SUCT VLV 2-E11-F004B RHR PUMP 2B SUCT VLV 2-E11-F004C RHR PUMP 2C SUCT VLV 2-E11-F004D RHR PUMP 20 SUCT VLV 2-E11-FOO6A 5HUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-FOO68 5HUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006C SHUTON CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006D SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 2-E11-F009 RHR INBOARD ISOLATION VLV 2-E11-FOl6A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F016B CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLv 2-E11-F017A RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 2-E11-F0178 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 2-E11-F020A SUPP POOL SUCT VLV 2-E11-F0200 SUPP POOL SUCT VLV 2-E11-F021A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F0218 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-FO27A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F027B CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F028A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F028B CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 2-E11-F073 SW-RHR CROSSTIE VLV 2-E11-F075 RHR SW CRO55 TIE VLV 2-E11-F5-NO21A FLOW SWITCH RHR 2-E11-FS-N0218 FLOW SWITCH RHR 2-E11-LS-F075 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 2-G16-F003 ORYW EQUIPMENT & FLR DRN VLV 2-G16-FOO4 DRVW EQUIPMiNT & FLR DRN VLV 2-G16-F019 DRYW EQUIPMENT & FLR DRN VLV 2-G16-F020 DRYW EQUIPMENT & FLR ORN VLV l 2-H12-P005 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B 2-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P603/JN3 PX CTL BENCH BD CONSOLE 2-H12-P603/JN4 RX CTL BENCH BD VERT SEC IND t w y4v--o-g- - - - w _ . - '--av v-.
PAGE 4 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3,5 - 15 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA *
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
2-E11-F021A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-FO218 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-S 2-E11-F040 RADW DISCH VLV MCC 2XDB MCC 2XDB RB2-E 9613-2-FY-K600A RHR SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E
!601-2-FI-R603A RHR FLOW INDICATOR PDP 2A N/A CB-23E
<-832-F044A RECIRC PUMP 1A BVPASS VLV MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-3 2-B32-F0448 RECIRC PUMP IB BVPASS VLV MCC 2XB-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-3 1-E11-F023 HEAD SPRAY ISOLATION VLV MCC 2XDB MCC 2XDB RB2-W 2- 8 3 2-FO3 2 A RECIRC PUMP 2A BVPASS VLV MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-3 t-832-F0328 RECIRC PUMP 28 BYPASS VLV MCC 2MB-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-3 2-Eli-F027A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N !
2-E11-FO270 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XS MCC 2XS RB2-5 - RHR QREA CLG FAN 2A RHR A COOLING FAN 2A MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N RHR OREA CLG FAN 2B RHR A COOLING FAN 28 MCC 2XB MCC 2XS RB2-S . h END OF REPORT
(. (;x- -) PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 15 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ======a============= ==================== =========
t-E11-FOO3B HEAT EX SHELL OUTLET VLV MCC 2XS MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-FO'P' CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 1-Eti-F017F RHR CUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC 2XB-2 MCC 2MB-2 RB2-5 2-E11-F049 RADW DISCH VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-E t-E11-F0288 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2xR-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-5 2- E 11 -F 0158 RHR OUTBOARD VLV MCC 2XB-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-6 PNL 4B J-E11-F047B HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VLv MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-S /-032-F0318 RECIRC PUMP 2B DISCH VLV MCC 2XB-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-3 1-E11-F053A COND DISCH VLV PDP 2A PDP 2A RB2-N 2-E11-F026B RHR DRAIN TO RCIC MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-F026A RHR DRAIN TO RCIC MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-832-F0230 RECIRC PUMP 28 SUCT VLV MCC 2XB t #CC 2XB RB2-3 2-B32-F043A RECIRC PUMP 1A EQ VLV MCC 2XA-2 /CC 2XA-2 RB2-3 2-IR-RB-4-FI-3338 RHR FLOW INDICATOR 28-DG N/A RB2-5 2-IR-RB-4-FY-3338 RHR SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A RB2-5 PO21-2-FT-3338 RHR FLOW TRAN5MITTER N/A N/A RB2-5 PO21-2-FT-NO158 RHR FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB2-5 Pt>01 F I -R 60 38 RHR FLOW INDICATOR POP 2B N/A CB-23E P612-2-FV-K6008 RHR SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E PO18-2-F1 *G15A RHR FLOW TRAN5MITTER N/A N/A RB2-E __________.___m._ _ _ _ . _ , - . - . _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ . . . . . - . . . . . . . - . ,, . _ . . _. _ , . . . _ .- . _ _. . . , . . - . , _ ,
t fAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY , BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 + APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 15 u COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE A'EA
====4====s========== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===========. ==
1 2-E11-F04BA HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-F047A HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RS2-N 2-Ett-F051A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 2A PDP 24 RB2-E t 2 E11-FOO3A HEAT EX SHELL OUTLET VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N
/-Ell-FOl6A CONTAINMENT SPRAV VLv MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-E i 2 E11-F017A RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION Vt v MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-N
/-E11-F028A CONTAINMENT SPHAv VLv MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-N 2-E11-F024A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 1-Ell-F011A RHR ORAIN TO SUPP POOL MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-F0154 RHR INBOARD VLV MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-6 PNL 4A 2-E11-FOiOB SUPP POOL SUCT VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-FOO4D RHR PUMP 2D SUCT VLV MCC 2XS MCC 2XS RB2-5 2-E11-F006D SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XS F82-S 2-E11-COO 2D RHR PUMP 2D E2 E2 RB2-S 2-E11-F0048 RHR PUMP 28 SUCT VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 1-E11-FOO68 SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLv MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-C002B RHR PUMP i2 E4 E4 RB2-5 2-E11-F0488 HEAT EXCHANGER BVPA55 VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB- RB2-5 2-E11-F0510 RHR STM PRESS RED VLv POP 2B PDP 2B RB2-E 2-Ft1-F0538 COND DISCH VLV PDP 2B PDP 2B RB2-5
i
/
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 15 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==s================= ============================== ==================== ==================== =============== /-E11-F0078 RHR PUMP 2A BVP VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 PNL 4B
, 2-E11-F0248 CONTAINh8ENT SPRAV VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-5 j 2-E11-F0118 RHR DRAIN TO SUPP POOL MCC 2XS MCC 2XB RB2-5 2-E11-FOS 2B RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-E 2-E11-F052A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC 2xA MCC 2XA RB2-E
/ E11-F006C SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-FOOB RHR 09TBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC 2XDB MCC 2XDB RB2-6 l-Ell-F009 RHR INBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-3 2-832-F023A RECIRC PUMP 2A SUCT VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-3 2-E11-F010 RHR CRCSS HDR SO VLv MCC 2XB MCC 2XB RB2-E 2-832-F0438 RECIRC PUMP IB DISCH VLV MCC 2XB-2 MCC 2XB-2 RB2-3 J-832-F031A RECIRC PUMP 2A DISCH VLV MCC 2XA-2 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-3 l
2-E11-F020A SUPP POOL SUCT VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-F004A RHR PUMP 2A SUC7 VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-FOU6A SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-COO 2A RHR PUMP 2A E3 E3 RB2-N 2-E11-F007A RHR POMP 2A BVP VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N PNL 4A 2-E11-FOO4C RHR PUMP 2C SUCT VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N 2-E11-COO 2C RHR PUMP 2C El El RB2-N
t' ) . /) ( NJ PAGE 6 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL 5AFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RNR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 14 duPoORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SwGR E2/AHS E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AHS SwGR E3/AI8 E3 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT AI8 SwGR E4/ALO E4 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT ALO TERM Box /CQ8 TERM BOX TERM BOM/Cw9 TERMINAL DOX TERM BGx/DO2 TEP" BOX TERM BOK/E85 TERMINAs Sox TERM box /Q31 DMPR IK-TPD-RB TERM box /wOS TERM box TERM CAB AU-14 TERM CAB EB JBO JNO TERM CAD /JI9 TERM CAB FOR JB0 JNO TERM CAB /JM2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLDG VA TERM CAB /JM3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-28 TRIP CAS XU-63 TRIP CAB ECC5 1 xo-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 t N
- - - . . __._.-._._.___.__--_2.- _ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - - _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ . . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - _ _ - - _ ~ < - _._-_. -_._____-x__- . _ - a ._ -- __-_- __ --_ w. _-- - . _ _ _ _
( COROLIMQ power & LIGHT CUMPQNY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 { y_jh PQGE 5 i
)
APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 14 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
----------------------------~~ ------------------------------
P006-1-332-PS-N018A IR-RX BLDG P009-1-821-PT-NO21C JET PUMP INST RACK H21-POO9 P010-1-B21-LT-NO37 IR JET PUMP INSTR P010-1-B21-PT-NO21D IR JET PUMP INSTR PO18-1-E11-PS-N016A IR-RX BLDG P018-1-E11-PS-NOl6C IR-RX BLOG P018-1-E11-PS-N020A IR-RX BLDG P018-1-E11-PS-NO20C IR-RX BLDG P019-1-E21-PS-N0008 CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL B l P019-1-E21-PS-N0098 CORE SPRev IR CHANNEL B P021-1-E11-FT-N0158 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0168 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N016D CHAN B INST RACK PO21-1-E11-PS-NO20B CHAN B INST RACM P021-1-Ell-PS-NO20D CHAN B INST RACK P022-1-832-PS-N0188 IR-RX BLOG PDP 1AB COM DISTR PNL 1AB PDP C71-P001 RPS PwR DIST PNL C71-P001 PEN 1X-102C PENETRATION X 102C PEN 1X-102E PENETRATION X 102E PEN 1X-105D PENETRATION X 105D PEN 1X-105J PENETRATION X 105J PNL 3A 125V DC DISTR PNL 3A t PNL 38 125V DC DISTR PNL 38 ! REMOTE SD PNL REMOTE INST PNL l RTGB/JA2 RTGB DIV II RTGB/JC3 RTGB DIV I SPLICE BOX /YE7 RHR PP 2A SPL IN MH XB4 SPLICE BOX /YG5 RHR PP 1A SPL IN TR 60E SPLICE /vD7 RHR PP 2B SPL IN MH XB5 SPLICE /YD3 RHR PP 20 SPL IN MIi XBS SPLICE /YE8 RHR PP 2C SPL IN MH XB4 SPLICE /YG1 RHR PP 1C SPL IN TR 61K SPLICE /YHO RHR PP 1D SPL IN TR 63H SPLICE /YH2 RHR PP 18 SPL IN TR 64H SwGR 1C/ACS IC 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT ACS SWGR IC/AC6 1C 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AC6 SWGR 1D/AD6 ID 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AD6 SwGR 1D/AD7 ID 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT AD7 SwGR 2D/ ADS 2D 4KV SwGR CKT AD5 SwGR E1/AFO El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT Ar0 l 1 _ . _ _ _ _ , _ - _ __m_._.,_.___-~.m__ _ . . _ m.m___. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ - ___ ____ - - -.
PAGE ti , CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT L MPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 , APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 14 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC 1XB/DM6 MCC 1XB MOV 1-E11-F010 MCC IXB/DKB MCC IXB MOV 1-E11-F003B ' MCC 1xB/DM9 MCC 1XB MOV 1-E11-FOO4B MCC IXB/DLO MCC IXB MOV 1-E11-FOO4D , MCC IXB/DL1 MCC IXB MOV 1-E11-F006B ' MCC 1XB/DL2 MCC 1XS MOV 1-E11-F0060 MCC IXB/DL3 MCC IXB MOV 1-E11-F0078 , MCC IXB/DL6 MCC IXB MOV 1-ESI-F0118 MCC 1XB/DL8 MCC 1XB MOV 1-E11-F0168 MCC 1XB/ DMO MCC 1XB MOV 1-E11-F0218 MCC IXB/CM2 MCC IXB MOV E11-F0248 . MCC IXB/DM3 MCC 17B MOV E11-F0268 MCC 1XB/DM4 MCC 1XB MOV E11-F0278 MCC IXB/DM7 MCC 1XB MOV E11-F0478 MCC 1XB/DMB MCC IXB MOV E11-F04BB MCC IXB/DN6 MCC PXB MOV 1-E11-F075 MCC IXB/DPO MCC IXB RELAY COMPT MCC 1XB/DP3 MCC IXB ALT FOR E11-F009 ' MCC IXB/DP5 MCC 1XS RELAY COMPT MCC IXB/DP7 MCC 1XB COMPT DP7 MCC 1XDB/B2B MCC IXDA RELAY COMPT MCC 1XDB/B49 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E11-F023 MCC 1XDB/050 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E11-F008 ! MCC 1XCB/B51 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E11-F040 MCC 1XDB/BN7 MCC IMDB P001-1-E21-PS-N008A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A P001-1-E21-PS-N009A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A P004-1-821-LT-NO31A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-1-821-LT-NO31C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-PT-NO21A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 ; POO4-1-E11-PS-N011A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-1-E11-PS-N011C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A , P004-1-E11-PT-N011A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A t P004-1-E11-PT-N011C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A POOS-1-H21-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & FRESS S POOS-1-821-LT-H031D RX v5L LEVEL & PRESS B POOS-1-B21-PT-NO21B RX P+NSSS H21-P005-004 POC5-1-E11-PT-N0116 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B POO5-1-E11-PT-N011D RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-E11-PT-N0198 RX P+NSSS H21-P005-003 P005-1-E11-PT-N0190 RX P+NSSS H21-P005-003 __ m _ - _ . . _ . ___ _ _ _ _ . _____.________m_______m _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __m- -.---
~
l f { PAGE O 4 . / r CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT'CLMPANY + BRUNSWICX STEAM 6LECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 I i
- APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >> ',
TABLE 3.5 - 14 r SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC IXA-2/DDB MCC IXA2 MOV B32-F032A ! MCC 1XA-2/DD9 MCC 1XA2 MOV B32-F043A ! MCC IXA-2/DEO MCC 1XA2 MOV B32-F044A f MCC IXA-2/DF5 MCC 1XA2 MOV E11-F017A MCC 1XA-2/DGO MCC IXA2 MOV E11-F028A MCC 1XA/D00 MCC 1XA REM SH DN R COMPT l* MCC.1XA/DAG MCC 1XA RELAY COMPT # MCC IXA/DA8 'MCC 1XA RELAY COMPT MCC IXA/DB0 MCC 1XA HELAY-COMPT t
; MCC-1XA/DD6 MCC 1XA MOV 1-832-F023A [
MCC IXA/DE6 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F003A [ MCC 1XA/DE7 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F0044 , MCC 1XA/ DES MCC 1FA MOV 1-E11-FOO4C. ' MCC 1XA/DE9 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F006A . MCC 1XA/DF0 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F006C f l' MCC IXA/DF1 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F007A i MCC 1XA/DF2 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F011A MCC IXA/DF4 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F016A i MCC )XA/DF6 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F021A ' MCC 1XA/DF7 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F024A i MCC 1XA/DF8 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F026A ! MCC IXA/DF9 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F027A L MCC 1XA/DG1 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F047A MCC 1XA/DG2 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F04BA MCC 1XA/DG8 MCC IXA MOV 1-E11-F020A l MCC IXA/DH3 MCC 1XA SPARE STR ! MCC 1XA/DH4 MCC 1XA MOV 1-E11-F049 i MCC 1XA/DH6 MCC 1XA COMPT DH6 ! MCC IXA/D12 .MCC 1XA SPARE STR MCC IXA/FOO MCC 1XA ALT FOR E11-F009 1 MCC 1XA/FN6 MCC 1XA NORM FOR E11-FOO9 MCC IXB-2/Dd2 MCC IXB MOV 1-832-F031B MCC 1XB-2/DK3 MCC 1XB MOV 1-832-F0328 f MCC IXB-2/DK4 MCC IXB MOV 1-832-F043B [ MCC IXB-2/DK5 MCC 1XS MOV 1-832-F044B ! MCC 1XB-2/DL7 MCC 1XB MOV 1-E11-F015B ! MCC 1XB-2/DL9 MCC tXB MOV 1-E11-F0178 l MCC IXB-2/DM5 MCC IXB MOV 1-E11-F028B e MCC IXB/D11 MCC 1XS RELAY COMPT ! MCC 1XB/DA9 MCC IXB RELAV COMPT , MCC 1XB/DK1 MCC 1XB WOV 1-B32 F023B : r h I v I i
. _ _ _ . _ _ . - . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . ~ . . . _ _ _ . - _ . . . _ . ._. . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . __. _ . _ _ _.- - _ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ __ _t
PQGE 2 (' COROLINQ POWER & LIGHT COMPQNY
) )
BRUNSWICu STEQM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT
- APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPOPdNTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 14 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION i 1-H12-P612 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 1-H12-P612/JNS FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 1-H12-P613 PROCESS INSTR CABINET 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P618 RHR 8 RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P622 INBD PRIM VLV REL VERT BD 1-H12-P623 NSS SHUT OFF OUTBD CAB 1-H12-P624/JFO BENCH BD AUX RELAY CAB 1-H12-P624/JR6 BENCH BD AUX RELAY CAB 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD l-H21-POOS RX V5L LEVEL PRESS B 1-VA-TS-936A RHR ROOM A TEMP SW 1-VA-TS-9368 RHR ROOM A TEMP SW 1-VA-TS-936C RHR ROOM B TEMP SW 1-VA-TS-936D RHR ROOM B TEMP SW 1-VA-TS-936E HPCI ROOM TEMP SW
- 1-VA-T5-936F HPCI ROOM TEMP SW DAMPER /Q29 DMPR 2J-TPD-RB 5V DAMPER /Q30 DMPR 2J-TPD-RB 25 E1/AE7 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AET E1/AFO El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AFO E1/AH4 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH4 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AGS E2/Ak9 E4 4kv SWGR CIRCUIT AE9 E2/ALU E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT E3/AI3 E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT A13 E3/AIB E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AIB E3/AI9 E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AI9 E4/AHS E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AHS E4/AKO E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AMO E55 CAB DIV 1/H50 LOGIC CAB DG1 I ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 l ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 i.
ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 Ar WC-13 MCC 1XA-1/ DAB MCC 1XA RELAY ( 7,PT MCC IXA-1/DF3 MCC 1XA2 MOV El't-F015A MCC 1xA-2/DD7 MCC IXA2 MOV B31-FO31A l _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . __-_______m._ _ __ - - , , - -
f I 'T PAGE '\ l
\
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT' C18MPANY f ) CRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
l TABLE 3.5 - 14 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-E11-F004A RHR PUMP 1A SUCT VLv 1-E11-F0048 RHR PUMP 18 SUCT VLV 1-E11-FOO4C RHR PUMP IC SUCT VLV 1-E11-FOO4D RHR PUMP ID SUCT VLV 1-E11-F006A SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F0068 SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-FOO6C ShuTON CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-FOO60 SHUTON CLG SUCT VLV 1-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 1-E11-F009 RHR INBOARD ISOLATION VLV 1-E11-F016A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-FOl68 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-F017A RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 1-E11-F0178 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV 1-E11-F020A SUPP POOL SUCT VLV 1-E11-F0208 SUPP POOL SUCT VLv 1-E11-F021A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-F021B CONTAINUENT SPRAV VLV 1-E11-F027A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-F0278 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-F028A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV 1-E11-F0288 CONTAINMENT SPRAV VLV 1-E11-F073 SW-RHR CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-F075 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-FS-NO21A FLOW SWITCH RHR 1-E11-FS-N021B FLOW SWITCH RHR 1-E11-LS-F073 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-LS-F075 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV , 1-G16-F003 DRYW EOUIPMENT & FLR DRN VLV , 1-G16-FOO4 DRYW EQUIPMENT & FLR DRN VLV ! 1-Gl6-F019 DRVW EQUIPMENT & FLR ORN VLV 1-G16-F020 DRVW EQUIPMENT & FLR ORN VLV 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRO SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P603/JN3 RX CTL BENCH BD 1-H12-P603/JN4 RX CTL BENCH BD V 5 H12-P603 1-H12-P609/JH3 TRIP SYS A RPS H12-P609 1-H12-P609/JM6 TRIP SYS A RPS H12-P609 1-H12-P611/JH5 TRIP SYS B RPS N12-P611 ' 1-H12-P611/JM9 TRIP SVS B RPS H12-P611
+ . . _ . , , - , - . - - _ _ ,. ., # -- -- - +- +2 ---- - - - "- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
s a t- J PAGE 4 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSw!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE 5HUTDOwW COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 13 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
= .================== ============================== ==================== ======== =========== ===============
- E11-FOS 2B RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB1-E 1-E11-F053A COND DISCH VLV PDP 1A PDP 1A RB1-N 1-E11-F053B COND DISCH VLV PDP 1B PDP IB RB1-$
1-IR-RB-4-FI-3338 RHR FLOW INDICATOR 18-DG N/A RB1-5 1-!R-RB-4-Fv-3338 RHR SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A RBI-5 PU18-1-FT-NO15A RHR FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB1-N PO21-1-FT-3338 RHR FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB1-5 PU21-1-FT-N0158 RHR FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB1-5 P601-1-FI-R603A RHR A FLOW PDP 1A N/A CB-23E P601-1-FI-R603B RHR B FLOW PDP 1B N/A CB-23E P612-1-Fv-K6000 RHR B FLOW SQ RT EXT N/A N/A CS-23E Pb13-1-Fv-KbOOA PROCESS INST CAB N/A N/A CB-23E PHR AREA CLG FAN 1A RHR AREA COOLING FAN 1A MCC IFA MCC IXA RB1-N PHR OREA CLG FAN 1B RHR AREA COOLING FAN 18 MCC 1XB MCC IXB RB1-5 i i 1
. _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. r m ,,
( t ) )
.DAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ~
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RHR >>
TABLE 3.5 - 13 COMPONENT DE5CRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ===================. =,,r,,,,,,,,,,,
1-E11-F020s SUPP POOL SUCT VLv MCC IXB MCC 1xs RB1-5 1-E11-F021A CONTAINMENT SPRAW VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RB1-N 1-E11-F0218 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-E RB1-S 1-E11-F023 HEAD SPRAY ISOLATION VLV MCC 1XDB MCC IXDB RBi-N 1-Ell-F024A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RB1-N 1 E11-F0248 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-5 1-E11-F026A RHR DRAIN TO RCIC MCC IXA MCC 1XA *tB1-N 1-E11-F0268 RHR DRAIN TO RCIC MCC 1XB MCC 1XB RBI-5 1-Eit-F027A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-N 1-E11-F0278 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 1XB MCC 1XS RB1-S 1-E11-F020A CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 1XA-2 MCC IXA-2 RB1-N 1-Ell-F028B CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 1XB-2 MCC IXB-2 RB1-5 1-E11-F040 RADW DISCH VLV MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-E 1-E11-F047A HEAT EXCNANGER INLET VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-N 1-E11-F0478 NEAT EXCHANGER INLET VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB1-5 1-E11-F048A HEAT EXCHANGER BVPASS VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-N 1-E11-F0480 MEAT EXCHANGER OvPASS VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB1-5 1-E11-F049 RADW DISCH VLV MCC 1XA MCC 1XA RB1-E l-Ell-FOSIA RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 1A PDP 1A RB1-E i 1-E11-F051B RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 18 PDP 18 RB1-E i 1-E11-F052A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-E
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t PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL !AFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS s< RHR >> TsBLE 3.5 - 13 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA 32================== ============================== ==================== ===========- =====.= =====r:========= 1-E11-F006B SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB1-? l-E11-F006C SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1- 4 1-E11-F006D SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1 S 1-E11-F007A RHR PUMP 1A BVP VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RB -N PNL 3A 1-E11-F0078 RHR PUMP IB BVP VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB *-S PNL 38 1-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC IXDB MCC 1XDB RB *6 1-E11-F009 RHR INBOARD ISULATION VLV HCC IXA MCC IXA RBI-3 1-E11-F010 RHR CROSS HDR SO VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RBt-E 1-E11-F011A RHR DRAIN TO SUPP POOL MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB"-N 1-E11-F011B RHR DRAIN TO SUPP POOL MCC 1XB MCC IXB RB -S 1-E11-F015A RHR INBOARD VLV MCC IXA-2 MCC IXA-2 RBi-6 PNL 3A 1-E11-F015B RHR INBOARD VLV MCC 1XB-2 MCC 1XB-2 RB1-6 PNL 38 1-E11-F016A CONTAINMENT SPRAV VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-E 1-E11-F0168 CONTAINMENT SPRAY VLV MCC 1XS MCC IXB RB1-E 1-E11-F017A RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC 1XA-2 MCC IXA-2 RB1-N 1-E11-F0178 RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION VLV MCC IXB-2 MCC IXB-2 RBI-E 1-E11-F020A SUPP POOL SUCT VLv MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB1-N
i .1 PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & l'4GHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTFIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SA' E SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< .Ha >>
TABL. 3.5 - 13 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
1-832-F023A RFCIRC PUMP 1A SUCY VLV MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB1-3 1-832-F023B RECIRC PUMP 18 SUCT VLV MCC 1xB MCC 1XB RB1-3 1-832-F031A REClRC PUMP 1A DISCH VLV MCC 1XA-2 MCC IXA-2 RBl-3
- t-832-F0318 RECIRC PUMP IB DISCH VLV MCC IXB-2 MCC IXB-2 RB1-3 1-832-F032A RECIRC PUMP 1A BVPASS VLV MCC IXA-2 MCC IMA-2 RB1-3 1-832-F0328 RECIRC PUMP 1B BYPASS VLV MCC IXB-2 MCC IXB-2 RB1-3 i
1-832-F043A RECIRC PUMP 1A EQ VLV MCC IXA-2 MCC IXA-2 RB1-3 1-832-F0438 RECIRC PUMP 18 DISCH VLV MCC IXB-2 MCC IXB-2 RB1-3 l-812-F044A RECIRC PUMP 1A BVPASS VLV MCC IXA-2 MCC IMA-2 RB1-3 1-832-F044B RECIRC PUMP 18 BYPASS VLV MCC IXB-2 MCC 1XB-2 RB1-3 t-Ell-C002A RHR PUMP 1A E3 E3 RB1-N 1-E11-C0028 RHR PUMP IB E4 E4 RB1-5 t-E11-C002C RHR PUMP 1C El El RB1-N 1-E11-C0020 RHR PUMP 1D E2 E2 Ret-S l-E11-F003A HEAT Et SHELL OUTLET VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RB1-N 1-E11-F003B HEAT EX SHELL OUTLET VLV MCC IXB MCC IXB RB1-5 1-E11-FOO4A RHR P .,M P 1A SUCT VLV MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB1-N l 1-E11-F0048 RHR PUMP 18 SUCT VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-5 1 E11-F004C RHR PUMP IC SUCT VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RB1-N t-E11-F004D RHR PUMP 10 SUCT VLV MCC 1XB MCC 1XB RB1-5 $ 1-E11-F006A SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-N l 1
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PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< AD5 n TABLE 3.5 - 12 t
SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION t PEN 2X-102E PENETRATION X 102E PEN 2X-102F PENETRATION X 102F PEN 2X-102H PENETRATION X 102H PEN 2X-105G PENETRATION X 105G t PEN 2M-10$N PENETRATION X 105H PEN 2X-10SJ PENETRATION X 105J PEN 2X-105K PENETRATION X 105K PNL 28 DC DISTR PNL 28 a PNL 4A 125V OC DISTR PNL 4A PNL 48 125V DC DISTR PNL 48 NEMOTE 50 PNL REMOTE INST PNL TERM box /W13 TERM BOX TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 xu-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 MU-64 i t t-t
( ) PAGE 1 CAROLINA P0wER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< ADS >>
TABLE 3.5 - 12 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P628 AUTO BLOWDWN VERT BD CAD XU-73 FLUID FLOW DET CAB XU-73 ( P001-?-E21-P5-N008A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A P001-2-E21-PS-N009A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A > POO4-2-B21-LIS-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-LIS-NO31C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-LIS-N042A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS'A 9004-2-821-LT-NO31A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A , P004-2-821-LT-NO31C RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A ' P004-2-B21-LT-N042A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PS-N010A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-2-E11-PS-NO10C RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PT-N010A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-E11-PT-N010C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A , P005-2-B21-LIS-NO31B RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LIS-NO31D RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B 9005-2-821-LIS-N042B RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-NO31B RA V5L LEVEL & PRESS B , P005-2-821-LT-NO31D RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-N042B RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-E11-PS-N0100 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B POO5-2-E11-PS-N0100 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-E11-PT*N010B RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B < RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B I P005-2-E11-PT-N010D P018-2-E11-95-N016A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-PS-N016C RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-95-NO20A RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P018-2-E11-PS-NO20C RX REC CH A IR H21-P018 P019-2-E21-PS-N0088 CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL B P019-2-E21-PS-N009B CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL B 9021-2-Ell-N020B P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-N0200 P CHAN B INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N0160 P CHAN B INST RACK PO21-2-E11-PS-N0160 P CHAN B INST RACK P0 21 E 1 1 -P S-;40 208 P CHAN B INST RACK PO21-2-E11-PS-NO200 P CHAN B INST RACK l
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a PAGE 2 ;. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICM STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< ADS >>
TABLE 3.5 - 11 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
2-821-FOI3M PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 4B J-B21-F013L ' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 48 - I b t k I ,
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ .___._-_m ___________.___-.__.__m_ _ - _ - _ - ___ ____._______----______--_ _ ____ _ ___ _ ___ ______ _
m enn m gHi. PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
- UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< AD5 > >
TABLE 3.5 - 11 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA ======== ,====e====== ============================== ==================== ===================, =,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2-821-F013A PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 4B PNL 48 2-821-F0138 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 48 PNL 2B PNL 28 2-821-F013C PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 44 RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 48 2-021-F0130 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2- 2 PNL 48 PNL 48 2-021-F013E PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 4B PNL 4B PNL 2B PHL 28 2-821-F013F PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A Rd2-3 PNL 4B PNL 4B 2-821-F013G PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 I I PNL 48 PML 4B PNL 28 PNL 28 2-B21-F013H PRES 5URE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 48 2-821-F013J PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-3 PNL 48 PNL 4B j
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(. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
\ / /
DRUNSWICK STEAU ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< ADS n TABLE 3.5 - 10 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-M12-P601/JFB ENGRO SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P61B RHR S RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAv VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P62B AUTO BLOwDwN VERT BD CAB XU-73 FLUID FLOW OET CAB XU-73 INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX P001-1-E21-PS-N00BA CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A POO1-1-E21-PS-N009A CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL A POO4-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-B21-LT-NO31C RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-LT-N042A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-E11-PS-N010A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-E11-PS-N010C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-E11-PT-N010A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-E11-P1-N010C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P005-1-821-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRES 5 B P005-1-B21-LT-NO310 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-021-LT-N0428 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS S P005-1-E11-PT-N010B RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-E11-PT-N010D RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B PO18-1-E11-PS-N016A IR-RX BLDG PO18-1-E11-PS-N016C IR-RX DLDG PO18-t-E11-PS-N020A IR-RX BLOG P018-1-E11-PS-NO20C IR-RX BLOG P019-1-E21-PS-N00BB CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL B PO19-1-E21-PS-N0098 CORE SPRAY IR CHANNEL B PO21-1-E11-NO208 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0168 CHAN 8 INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N016D CHAN R INST RACK PO21-1-E11-PS-NO208 CHAN B INST RACK PO21-t-E11-PS-NO200 CHAN B INST RACK PEN 1X-102E PENETRATION X 102E PEN 1X-102F PENETRATION X 102F PEN 1X-102H PENETRATION X 102H PEN 1X-105G PENETRATION X 105G PEN 1X-105H PENETRATION X 105H PEN 1X-105J PENETRATION X 105J PEN 1X-105K PENETRATION X 105K PNL 18 DC DISTR PNL 1B PNL 3A 125V DC DISTR PNL 3A PNL 38 125V DC DISTR PNL 3B ,
REMOTE SD PNL REMOTE INST PNL TERM BOX /w!3 TERM BOX TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64
f (- i ) )
~ . , -
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIP 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< ADS >>
TABLE 3.5 - 9 l l COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
l i 1-321-F013K PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 3B PNL 3B 1-821-FOl3L PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 l PNL 3B PNL 3B l l I I
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< ADS >>
TABLE 3.5 - 9 CowpONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
1-B21-F013A PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 3B PNL 38 1-821-F0138 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 1B PNL 1B RB1-3 PNL 3A PNL 3A-PNL 38 PNL 38 1-821-F013C PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 3B PNL 3B l-821-F0130 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 3B PNL 38 1-821-F013E PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 18 PNL IB RB1-3 PNL 3A PNL 3A PNL 3B PNL 3B 1-821-F013F PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE ONL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 38 PNL 3B . t 1-B21-F013G PRES 5URE RELIEF VALVE PNL 1B PNL 18 RB1-3 PNL 3A PNL 3A , PNL 38 PNL 3B , 1-821-F013H PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 PNL 3B PNL 38 1-B21-F013J PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PNL 3A PNL 3A RB1-3 i PNL 3B PNL 38 ! l e i F
PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 8 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PO36-2-E41-DPIS-N005 LEAK DETECTOR H21-PD86 PO36-2-E41-PDT-N005 LEAK DETECTOR H21=POBS P036-2-E41-PS-N001B LEAK DETECTOR H2i-PO86 PO36-2-E41-PS-N001D LEAK DETECTC;t H21-P086 P601-2-E41-C002-4 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL P601-2-E41-FIC-R600 HPCI FLOW CONTROL P601-2-E41-Fv-K601 HPCI SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR P614-2-E41-N602A H55 TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E41-N6028 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N603C NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N6030 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N604C NSS TEMP RECORD LFAK DET P614-2-E51-N6040 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET PEN 2X-103A PENETRATION X 103A PEN 2X-!O3B PENETRATION X 103B PEN 2X-105J PENETRATION X 105J PML 4A 125V DC DISTR DNL 4A PNL 48 125V DC DISTR PNL 4B TERM BOX /098 TERM BOX HPCI Dtv 1 TERM BOX /Q99 TERM BOX HPCI DIV 2 TERM DOX/X49 TERM BOX TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 3 _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ . . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - _ . - - = . _ . _ - _ _
Ff .2 ( q. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSw!CK. STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIA R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTD0wM SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< HPCI n TABLE 3.5 - B SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION ECC 2xD/Dwl 2x0 480 MCC CKT Dwt ECC 2xDA/BO9 MCC 2xDA KCC 2xDA/B11 2xDA 480 MCC CMT B11 #CC 2xDA/B12 2xDA 400 MCC CKT B12 ECC 2x9A/B14 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B14 DCC 2xDA/B15 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B15 MCC 2xDA/B16 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B16 KCC 2XDA/B17 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B17 ECC 2xDA/B20 2XDA 400 MCC CKT B20 MCC 2x0A/821 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B21 MCC 2xDA/B22 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B22 MCC 2xDA/B23 2MDA 480 MCC CKT B23 MCC 2xDA/824 2xDA 480 MCC CKT B24 P004-2-821-LT-N017B LIGHTING PANEL 2R1 P004-2-821-LT-NO31A Rx V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-821-LT-NO31C RX V5L LEVEL & DRESS A P005-2-B21-LS-NO318 Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LS-NO31D RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-N017D Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-NO31B Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B i P005-2-821-LT-NO310 Rx v5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LTS-N017D RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B '
P005-2-C41-LS-NO310 Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-E41-LS-NO31D RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P014-2-E41-FS-N006 HPCI INSTR RACK , P014-2-E41-FSL-N006 HPCI INSTR RACK PO14-2-E41-FT-N008 HPCI FLOW TRANSMITTER P014-2-E41-PS-N010 HPCI INSTR RACK P014-2-E41-PS-N012A HPCI INSTR RACK P014-2-E41-OS-N012B HPCI INSTR RACK PO14-2-E41-PS-N012C HPCI INSTR RACK " P014-2-E41-PS-N017A HPCI INSTR RACK P014-2-E41-PS-NO178 HPCI INSTR RACK P014-2-E41-PSH-NO27 HPCI INSTR RACK P016-2-E41-DPIS-N004 LEAK DETECTOR IR P016-2-E41-PDT-N004 LEAK DETECTOR IR P016-2-E41-PS-N001A LEAK DETECTOR IR P016-2-E41-PS-N0018 LEAK DETECTOR IR P016-2-E41-PS-N001C LEAK DETECTOR IR P034-2-E41-P5-NO128 HPCI INSTR RACK H12-P034 P034-2-E41-PS-N012D HPCI INSTR RACK H12-P034 i I r [ t I
If ( ( )1
)
CoROLING POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSw!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 8 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-E41 OIL PRES SW OIL PRESS SWITCH 2-E41-C002 MPCI PUMP 2-E41-F001 HPCI TURB STM SUP VLV 2-E41-F041 HPCI PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUPP CH 2-E41-F042 MPCI PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUPP CH 2-E41-LS-N002 LEVEL SWITCH E41-N002 2-E41-LS-N003 LEVEL SWITCH E41-N003 2-eat-LS-N015A LEVEL SWITCH E41-N015A 2-E'l-LS-N0158 LEVEL SWITCH E41-NO158 2-E41 ."-N018 LS TURB STM EMH DRN POT 2-E41-NJ30A AMB TEMP EMERG CLR T/C 2-E41-N 308 AMB TEMP EMERG CLR T/C 2-E41-7 9-3314 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3314 2-E41-ri-3315 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3315 2-E 41-4 5-3316 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3316 2-E41-15-3317 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3317 2-E41-TS-1318 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3318 2-E41-TS-3354 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3354 2-E41-TS-3488 SL DET SYS E41-TS-3488 2-E41-TS-3489 SL DET SYS E41-TS-3489 2-E51-NO25C AMB TEMP T/C 2-E51-NO25D AMS TEMP T/C 2-E51-N026C DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C
'2-E51-N026D DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 2-E51-NO27C DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 2-E51-NO27D DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 2-H12-P034 HPCI INSTR RACK H12-P034 2-H12-P601/JF1 ENG4D SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P614/JF3 NS$ TEMP RECORD LEAK DET 2-H12-P614/JPS PwR RANGE NM CAB BAY l 2-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD l 2-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P620 HPCI VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD CST TERM BOX COND XFR PUMPS CNTRL STA CCC 2xA/DE2 MCC 2xA SP FVR STR MCC 2xA/DG4 2xA 480 MCC CKT DG4 OCC 2xB/DNQ 2MB 480 MCC CKT DNO MCC 2xB/OQO MCC 2x0 SP FVR STR l
l l
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL 5AFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 7 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== =======r====================== ===========*======== ==================== ===============
2-E41-F012 MIN FL f;PV TO SUPP CH MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 2-EG1-F041 HPCI PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUPP CH MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 2-E41-F042 HPCI' PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUPP CH MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A PNL 48 2-E41-F053 HPCI COND DRAIN VLV PNL 4A PNL 4A RB2-N 2-E49-F059 HPCI LUBE OIL CLG WTR VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 2-E41-F075 TURB EXH VAC BKR VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-N ! t 2-E41-F079 TURS EXH VAC BKR VLV MCC 2MB MCC 2XS RB2-N P014-2-E41-FT-N000 HPCI FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB2-N P601-2-E41-FIC-R600 HPCI FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A CB-23E P601-2-E41-FY-K601 HPCI SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E t
PAGE 1 CAROLINA P0wER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 7 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
.=================== ============================== ============s======= ==================== ===============
2-E11-F051A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 2A PCP 2A RB2-E 6 t-E11-F0518 RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 28 PC* 2B RB2-E J-E11-F052A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC 2XA WCC 2XA RB2-E 2-E11-F0528 RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC 2MB MCC 2XS RB2-E 2-E41 CONDENSATE PP HPCI TURB COND PMP MCC 2XDA MCC 2XOA RB2-N PNL 4A t-E41 HYD OIL PUMP HPCI TUR8 HYD OIL PMP MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 4 E41-C002 -HPCI PUMP N/A PNL 4A CB-23E' PNL 48
/-E41-FOO1 HPCI TURB STM SUP VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A /-E41-FOO2 HPCI STM SUP INBOARD ISOL VLV MCC 2XD MCC 2XD RB2-3 2-E41-FOO3 HPCI STM SUP OUTBOARD ISOL VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-6 2-E41-F004 HPCI PUMP SUCT FR COND TK MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N 2-E41-FOO6 HPCI PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 1-E41-F007 HPCI PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2NDA RB2-N 2-E41-F000 HPCI TEST BPV TO COND TK MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A 2-E41-F011 COND RETURN SHUTOFF VLV MCC 2XDA MCC 2XDA RB2-N PNL 4A m _ _ _ _. . _ . . . . ~ . ~ . .. ~ . .
(. - w./ ) r PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSw!CM STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHOTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< HPCI n TABLE 3.5 - 6 DESCRIPTION i SUPPORTING COMPONENT TERM box /x49 TERM BOX TERM CAB XU-64 TERM CAB E4 EB ED TRIP CAB .4U-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAD XU'64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 L
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SkUNSw!LA STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHisTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< HPCZ >>
TABLE 3.t. - 6 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC 1XDA/B17 MCC 1XDA MOV 1-E41-FOO6 MCC IXDA/B20 MCC 1XDA MOV 1-E41-F003 ECC 1XDA/B21 MCC IXDA MOV 1-E41-F001 i MCC 1XDA/B22 M( C 1XDA MOV 1-E41-F042 RECC 1XDA/B23 WC 1XDA MOV 1-E41-F041 MCC IXDA/024 ML: 1xDA MOV 1-E41-F012 P004-1-821-LT-N0178 INST RACK M12-P004-002 P004-1-B21-LT-MO31A RX V3L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-LT-NO31C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P005-1-B21-LT-N017D RX V3L LEVEL & PRESS B POOS-I-821-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B POO5-1-821-LT-NO31D RX V S, LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-E41-LS-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-E41-LS-NO31D RX VSL t,* VEL & PRESS B P014-1-E41-FS-N006 . OCI IN3Y? RACK P014-1-E41-PS-N010 H&C1 T NSTr. RACK PO14-1-E41-PS-N012A HPCI .NSTR RACK PO14-1-E41-PS-NO128 JPCI INSTk MACK P014-1-E41-PS-N012C H'CI INSTR RACK P014-1-E41-PS-N017A HPCI INSTR RACM P014-1-E41-PS-N017B HPC? INSTR AACK P014-1-E41-PSH-N027 HPCI INSTR RACK pol 6-1-E41-PDT-M004 LEAK 9ETECTOR IR P016-1-E41-PS-N001A LEAK DETECTOR IR P016-1-E41-PS-N001C LEAR DETECTOR IR PO34-1-E41-PS-N0128 HPCI INSTR RACK Hi2-PO34 P034-1-E41-PS-N0120 HPCI INSTR RACK H12-P034 P036-1-E41-DPIS-N005 LEAK DETECTOR H21-P036 : i
*036-1-E41-PDT-N005 LEAK DETECTOR H21-P036 9036-1-E41-PS-N001B LEAK DETECTOR H21-PO36 I
P036-1-E41-PS-N001D LEAK DETECTOR H21-P036 P601-1-E41-C002-4 ENGRD SAFEGUAND PANEL P614-1-E41-N602A NSS TEMP RECO10 LEAK DET P614-1-E41-N602B NSS TEMP RECOhO LEAK DET f P614-1-E51-N603C N55 TEMP RECORD LEAK DET i P614-1-E51-N603D NSS TEMP RECORD LEAw DET I P614-1-E51-N604C NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK bCT P614-1-E51-N6040 MSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET ! PEN 1X-105J PENETRATION X 105J TERM BOX /098 TERM BOA HPCI DIV 1 TERM BOX /Q99 TERM BOX HPCI DIV 2 f i 1
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COZPANY BRUNSWICX STEAU ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
" HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 6 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-E41 Oil PRES SW HPCI TURB CTL INSTR 1-E41-LS-N002 LEVEL SWITCH E41-N002 1-E41-LS-N003 LEVEL SWITCH E41-N003 1-E41-LS-N0154 LEVEL SWITCH E41-NO15A 1-E41-LS-N0158 LEVEL SWITCH E41-N015B 1-E41-NO30A AMS TEMP EMERG CLR T/C 1-E41-NO300 AMB TEMP EMERG CLR T/C 1-E41-TS-3314 TEMP Sw!TCH 2-E41-TS-3314 1-E41-TS-3315 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3315 1-E48-TS-3316 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3386 1-E41-TS-3317 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3317 1-E41-TS-3318 TEMP SWITCH 2*E41-TS-3318 1-E41-TS-3354 TEMP SWITCH 2-E41-TS-3354 1-E48-TS-3488 SL DET SYS E41-TS-3488 1-E4I-TS-3489 SL DET SYS E41-TS-3489 1-E51-N025C AMB TEMP T/C 1-E51-NO25D AMB TEMP T/C 1-E51-NO26C DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 1-E51-N0760 DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 1-E51-NO27C DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C ' 1-E51-NC27D DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 1-H12-P034 HPCI INSTR RACK H12-PO34 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL , l-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P614/JF3 TEMP RECORD LEAK DET 1-H12-P654/JP5 PwR RANGE NM CAB BAv 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL DD 1-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P620 HPCI VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 1-H21-PO14 HPCI INSTR RACK CST TERM BOX COND XFR PUMPS CNTRL STA h MCC 1XA/DE2 MCC IXA FD MOV 1-Sw-V105 MCC 1XB/DOO MCC IXB MOV 1-E41-F079 uCC 1XD/DW1 MCC 1XD MOV 1-E41-F002 MCC 1XDA/811 MCC IXDA TURB HYD OIL PUMP MCC IXDA/B12 MCC 1XDA TGS VAC T CND P MCC 1XDA/814 MCC IXDA MOV 1-E41-F004 i MCC IXDA/815 MCC 1XDA MOV 1-E41-F059 MCC IXDA/B16 MCC IXDA MOV 1-E41-F007 i _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ = _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - .- _ _ _ _ _ - .
i g ') L UJ J 1-GE CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< HPCI >>
TABLE 3.5 - 5 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CD. TROL SOURCE " IRE AREA
============== =================>r=========== ==================== ========4=========== =========
1-E41-F012 MIN FL BPV TO SUPP CH MCC 1XDA MCC 1MDA RB1-N PNL 3A 1-E41-F041 HPCI PUMP SUCT VLe FR SUPP CH MCC 1XDA MCC 1xDA RB1-N L PNL 3A 1 -- E 41 - F04 2 HPCI PUMP SUCT VLV rR SUPP CH MCC 1xDA MCC IXDA RB1-N DNL 3A PNL 30 1 E41-F053 HPCI COND DRAIN VLv PNL 3A PNL 3A RBI-N l-E41-F059 HPCI COND ORAIN VLV MCC 1RDA MCC 1RDA AB1-N PNL 3A 1-E41-F075 TURS EXH VAC BKR VLV MCC 1XA MCC IXA RB1-N t-E41-F079 TURB ExH VAC BMR VLv MCC IXB MCC 1x0 RB1-N ! PO14-1-E41-FT-N009 HPCI FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB1-N PbO1-1-E41-FIC-R600 HPCI FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A CB-23E ; PbO1-1-E41-FY-M601 HPCI SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E L
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g m_ g , , - - , - - -- - - - - - - - , PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< HPCI n TABLE 3.5 - 5 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SDURCE FIRE AREA
======,============= ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
1-E11-F051A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV PDP 1A PDP 1A RSI-E 1-E11-F051B RHR STM PRESS RED VLv PDP IB PDP 1B RBI-E l-E11-F052A RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC IXA MCC 1XA RB1-E t-E11-F052B RHR STM PRESS RED VLV MCC 1XB MCC 1XB RB1-E t-E41 CONDENSATE PP HPCI TURB COND PUMP MCC IMDA MCC-IMDA RB1-N PNL 3A t-E41 HYD OIL PUMP HPCI TURB HYD OIL PUMP MCC IXDA MCC 1XDA RB1-N 1-E41-C002 HPCI PUMP N/A PNL 3A RB1-N PNL 3B 1-E41-FOO1 HPCI TURB STM SUP VLV MCC 1XDA MCC IXDA RBI-N PNL 34 1 -F 41 -F002 HPCI STM SUP INBOARD 150L VLV MCC IXD MCC 1XD RB1-3 1-E41-F003 HPCI STM SUP OUTBOARD ISOL VLV MCC IMDA MCC 1XDA RB1-6 1-E41-F00m HPCI PUMP SUCT FR COND TM MCC 1XDA MCC 1XDA RB1-N 1-E41-F006 HkCI PUMP DISCH VLV MCC IXDA MCC 1XDA RB1-M PNL 3A 1-E41-F007 HPCI PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 1XDA MCC 1XDA RB1-N 1-E41-F000 HPCI TEST BPV TO COND TK MCC 1XDA MCC 1XDA RB1-N PNL 3A l-E41-F011 COND RETURN SHUTOFF VLV MCC 1XDA MCC IXDA RB1-5 PNL 3A
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PAGE 4 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIN R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
" RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 4 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION RSP-2-821-L5H-N0170 REMOTE INST PNL RSP-2-E51-FI-3340 REMOTE INST PNL R5P-2-E51-FIC-3325 REMOTE INST PNL RSP-2-E51-FY-3408 REMOTE INST PNL TEMM 80x/Q97 TERM B0x RCIC DIV 2 TERM 00x/w05 TERM BOX TERM CAD /Qv6 TERM BOX RCIC DIV 1 TRIP CAB MU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB xU-64 TRIP 08.0 ECCS 2 XU-64
( ; )' COROLING POWER & LIGHT C00POG4Y BR UN SWI CCI STEdC ELECTRIC PLONT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 4 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION P005-2-821-LTS-N017C RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P011-2-E51-FS-N002 RCIC INSTR RACK PO17-2-E51-FT-N003 RCIC FLOW TRANSMITTER P017-2-E51-PS-h006 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-2-E51-PS-N009A RCIC INSTR RACK P017-2-E51-PS-N0098 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-2-E51-PS-N0128 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-2-E51-PS-N012D RCIC INSTR RACK P017-2-E51-PS-N020 RCIC INSTR RACK P021-2-E11-PS-H016B P CHAN D INST RACK P021-2-E11-PS-N016D P CHAN B INST RACK
- 028-2-E11-PS-N020B P CHAN B INST RALK P021-2-E11-PS-NO200 P CHAN B INST RACK P035-2-E51-DPIS-N017 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P035 P035-2-E51-PDT-N017 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-PO35 P035-2-E51-PS-N019A LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-PO35 P035-2-E51-PS-N019C LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-PO35 P037-2-E51-PS-N012A RCIC INSTR RACK P037-2-E51-PS-N012C RCIC INSTR RACK P038-2-E51-OPIS-N018 LEAK DETECTOR 1R H21-PO38 P038-2-E51-vDT-N018 LEAK DETECTOR IN H21-PU38 P038-2-E51-PS-N0198 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P038 P038-2-E51-PS-N0190 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P038 P601-2-E51-FI-K601 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL P601-2-E51-FIC-R600 kCIC FLOW CONTROL P614-2-E51-N601A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N6018 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N602A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N602B NS$ TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N6034 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N603B NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N604A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-2-E51-N604B NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET PEN 2X-103A PENETRATION X 103A PEN 2X-1038 PENETRATION X 1038 PEN 2X-105D PENETRATION X 105D PNL 2B DC DISTR PNL 2B PNL 4A 125V DC DISTR PNL 4A PNL 4B 125V DC DISTR PNL 48 REMOTE SD PNL REMOTE INST PNL RSP-2-B21-ES-4051 REMOTE INST PNL
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS u PCIC >> TABLE 3.5 - 4 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 2-M12-P621 RCIC VERTICAL BD 2-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 2-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CMT D49 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AG5 E2/AG9 E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AG9 E4/AKO E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AKO E4/AK3 4KV BUS E4 RHR PUMP 28 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 j ESS CAB DIV2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 MCC 2XA/DE4 MCC 2xA SP FVR STR WCC 2xB/DL5 MCC 2xB FVR >TR MCC 2xC/DS4 2xC 480 MCC CMT DS4 MCC 2xC/DU8 MCC 2xC RELAY COMPT MCC 2xDB/828 MCC 2Abu RELAY COMPT MCC 2xDB/835 2xDB 250 MCC CMT B35 MCC 2xDB/B36 2xDB 250 MCC CMT B36 MCC 2xDB/B37 2xDB 250 MCC CKT B37 MCC 2xDB/838 2XDB 250 MCC CMT B38 MCC 2xDB/B39 2xDB 250 WCC CMT B39 MCC 2xDB/840 2xDB 250 MCC CKT 840 MCC 2xDB/B41 2xDB 250 MCC CNT 841 MCC 2xDB/842 2xDB 250 MCC CRT 842 MCC 2XDB/843 2xDB 250 MCC CKT B43 MCC 2xDB/B44 MCC 2xDB MOV 2-E51-F045 MCC 2xDB/B45 2xDB 250 MCC CMT 845 MCC 2XDB/846 2XDB 250 MCC CKT B46 MCC 2XDB/047 2xDB 250 MCC CKT B47 MCC 2XDB/869 PRESSURE SwfTCH 2-TD-PSL-3893 MCC 2xDB/BN7 MCC 2xDB POO4-2-821-LT-N017A RX P+NSSS H21-P004-004 P004-2-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-2-021-LT-NO31C Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P005-2-821-LT-N017C INST RACK H12-P005-002 P005-2-B21-LT-N017D Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-821-LT-NO318 RM v5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-2-021-LT-NO31D Rx VSL LEVEL & PRESS B __ =_ _ _ -
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ERUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RCIC n TABLE 3.5 - 4 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESLRIPTION
-------------~~----------~~~~-
2-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TR AN 5M I T'i ER 2-E11-C0018 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT And 2-E11-C001D E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AGB 2-E11-F0048 RHR PUMP 28 SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006B 5HUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F006D SHUTDN CLG SUCT VLV 2-E11-F008 RHR OUTBOARD I SOL A T I ON VLV 2-E11-F009 RHR INBOARD ISOLATION VLV 2-E11-LS-F073 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 2-E11-LS-F075 RHR SW CRO55 TIE VLV 2-E11-P0040 RHR PUMP 20 SUCT VLV 2-E51-COO 2 RCIC TURS CTL INSTR 2-E51-F029 PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUP CH 2-E51-F031 PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUP CH 2-E51-F045 STM SUP VLV TO TURS 2-E51-L5L-4463 LEVEL SWITCH E51-LSL-4463 2-E51-LSL-4464 LEVEL SWITCH E51-L5L-4464 2 -E51-N021 A DIFF TEMP VNT AIR IN T/C 2-E51-N02iB DIFF TEMP VNT AIR IN T/C 2-E51-N022A DIFF TEMP VNT AIR OUT T/C 2-E51-NO22B DIFF TEMP VNT AIR OUT T/C 2- E 51 - N023 A AMB TEMP T/C 2-E51-H0230 AMB TEMP T/C 2-E51-NO25A AMB TEMP T/C 2-E51-NO25B AMB TEMP T/C 2-E51-NO2bA DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 2-E51-N0268 DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 2-E51-N027A DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 2-E51-NO27B DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 2-E51-TS-3319 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3319 2-E51-TS-3320 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3320 2-E51-TS-3321 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3321 2-E51-TS-3322 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3322 2-E51-TS-3323 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3323 2-E51-T5-3355 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3355 2-E51-TS-3487 TEMP Sw!TCH $11-TS-3299 7-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 2-H12-P612 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACM 2-H12-P614/JF3 NS5 TEMP RECORD LEAM DET. 2-H12-P614/JP5 PWR RANGE NM CAB BAY
~.
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTOOWN COMPONENTS
<< RCIC n TABLE 3.5 - 3 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA ==================== ============================== ==================== n=================== ===============
J-E51-F031 PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUP CH MCC 2XDB MCC 2XOB RB2-5 PNL 4B 2-E51-F045 STM SUP VLV TO TURB MCC 2XDB MCC 2XDB RB2-5 PNL AB PNL 4A 29-DG
/-E51-F046 CLG WTR SUP VLV MCC 2xDB MCC 2AOB RB2-5 PNL 4B / E51-F062 RCIC TURB EXH VAC BKR VLV MCC 2XA MCC 2XA RB2-E /-E51-F066 RCIC TURB EXH VAC BMR VLV MCC 2AB MCC 2MB kB2-5 2-E51-V8 RCIC TURB THROTTLE VLV MCC 2XOB MCC 2XDB RB2-5 /-Ik-RB-4-FI-3340 RCIC FLOW INDICATOR N/A N/A RB2-5
, 2-IR-RB-4-FIC-3325 RCIC FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A RB2-5 l l 2-IR-RB-4-FY-3408 RCIC SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A RB2-5 PO17-2-E51-FT-NOO3 RCIC FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RB2-5 P601-2-E51-FIC-R600 RCIC FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A CB-230 i P601-2-E51-FY-M601 RCIC SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E 1 i i t i I
,_ - , -- - - - - . n . - - , . n - ---n, - , - . -, ,-,. - + . - - ,,, . - - .
t ( :) w ) PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER 8. LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 3 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE ' FIRE AREA
============== ======,======================= ==================== ==================== =========
2-E51 CONDENSATE PP BARO COND V4C TK COND PUMP MCC 2xDB MCC 2MDB RB2-5 PNL 4B z-E51 VACUUM PUMP BARO COND VAC FUMP MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-5 PNL 4B 2 F51-COO 2 RCIC TURB CTL INSTR NA PNL 2B RB2-S 28-DG PNL 4B PNL 4A . t51-FOO7 RCIC SYS INBOARD ISOL VLV uCC 2xC MCC 2xC RB2-3 PNL 2A PNL 4A /-E51-F008 RCIC SYS OUTBOARD ISOL VLV MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-6 /-E51-F010 PUMP SUCT VLV FR COND TK MCC 2XDB MCC 2NDB RB2-5 2-E51-F012 RCIC PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 2XDB MCC 2xDB RB2-5 4-E51-F013 RCIC PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-5 PNL 4B 2-E51-F019' MIN FL BPV TO SUPP CH MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-5 PNL 4B 2-E51-F022 TEST BPV TO COND TK MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-S 2-E51-F029 PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUP CH MCC 2xDB MCC 2xDB RB2-5 PNL 4B _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __.____...__.____m _______.____._______________________m=___ . _ _ _ _ . _ ._____..__.__.__________.__m_-____ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
( CAROLINO POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ()
.)
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLQNT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 2 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION P017-1-E51-FS-N002 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N0012S RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N0012D RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N006 RCIC INSTR RACM PC17-1-E51-PS-N009A RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N0098 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N0128 RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N012D RCIC INSTR RACK P017-1-E51-PS-N020 RCIC INSTR RACK P021-1-E11-N0168 CHAN B INST RACK PO21-1-E11-N0160 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-NO200 CHAN B 1hST RACK P021-1-E11-NO200 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0160 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0166 CHAN B INST RACK P021-1-E11-PS-N0200 CHAN B INST RACA ' P021-1-E11-PS-N020D CHAN 8 INST RACK PD22-1-832-PS-N0188 IR-RM BLOG P015-1-E51-DP15-N017 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P035 P035-1-E51-PDT-N017 LEAK DETECTOR 1R H21-P035 i P035-1-E51-PS-N019A LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P035 P035-1-E51-P5-N019C LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P035 P037-1-E51-P$-N012A RCIC INSTR RACK P037-1-E51-PS-N012C RCIC INSTR RACK P038-1-E51-PDT-N018 LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-P038 PO38-1-E51-PS-H019B LEAK DETECTOR IR H21-PO38 P038-1-E51-PS-N019D LEAK DETECTOR IP H21-P038 P601-1-E51-FI-K601 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL P614-1-E51-N6014 HSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-1-E51-N6018 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-1-E51-N602A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAM DET PG14-1-E51-N6028 NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET DG14-1-E51-N603A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-1-E51-N603B NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-1-E51-N604A NSS TEMP RECORD LEAK DET P614-1-E51-N6048 NS5 TEMP RECORD LEAK DET PEN 1x-102E PENETRATION X 102E PEN 1X-1050 PENETRATION X 105D REMOTE SD PNL REMOTC INST PNL RSP-1-821-ES-4051 REM 01E INST PNL RS?-1-821-LSH-N0170 REMOTE INST PNL TERM box /097 TERM BOX RCIC DIV 2 TERM B0x/w05 TERM 00x TERM CAB /QV6 TERM BCX RCIC DIV 1 TRIP CAB xU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 1 RIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64
- - . . - - - , , - . ,r,. ~ ,
( CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY O2 -) BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENT 5 u RCIC >> TABLE 3.5 - 2 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 1-H21-P017 RCIC INSTR RACM E2/AG5 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AG5 E2/AH4 E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AH4 E2/AHS E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH5 E2/AK9 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AE9 E4/AMO E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT Ak0 E4/AK9 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AK9 E4/ALO E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT ALO E55 CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 INTERFACE /xNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX INTERFACr/XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 UCC 1XA/DE4 MCC IXA X0VR MV 1-5W-v102 MCC 1XB/DL5 MCC IXB MOV 1-E51-F066
#CC 1xC/DS4 MCC 1XC MOV 1-E51-FOO7 MCC 1XDB/B20 MCC 1XDA RELAY COMPT MCC 1XDB/835 MCC 1XDB TURB BAR CND P MCC 1MDB/836 MCC 1XDB TURB VAC 1 CND P CCC IMDB/B37 MCC IXDB THR MOV 1-E51-V8 MCC 1XDB/838 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F010 UCC 1XDB/039 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F046 MCC 1XDB/840 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F012 MCC IXDB/B41 MCC tXDB MOV 1-E51-F013 MCC 1XDB/842 MCC IXDB MOV 1-E51-F022 WCC 1XDB/B43 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F008 MCC IXDB/044 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F045 MCC 1xDB/045 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F031 MCC 1XDB/B46 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F029
#CC IXDB/B47 MCC IXDB MOV 1-E51-F019 MCC 1XDB/BN7 MCC 1XDB P004-1-821-LT-N017A RX PT N555 H21-POO4-004 POO5-1-B21-LT-N017C INST RACK N12-P005-002 0005-1-821-LT-NO318 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-; 921-LT-NO31D RX VF* ~ VEL & PRESS B P005-1-821-PT-NO2tB RX P+ 921-P005-OO4 POO5-1-824-PT-N021D IR JE. . .J P INSTR P005-1-E11-PT-N011B RX v5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-E11-PT-N011D RX VSL LE.7.L & PRESS B P010-1-821-PS-NO37 IR JET PUMP INS R v
-_ . -- .- . . . _ . - - . - - _ - - . - _ . . . ~ . - - _ . . - _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - - - - _ . - - - _ _ _ - - - - . _ . _ _ - . . - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ - - . - - _ _ .
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\. _1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY L BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 2 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
..........--.s---------------- -------....--- .... ---- ---.-
1-CAC-LT-3342 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-E11-C0018 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT 4K4 1-E11-C001D E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH4 1-E11-F075 RHR Sw CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-FS-NO218 FLOW SwlTCH RHR 1-E11-FS-NO21D FLOW SWITCH RHR 1-E11-LS-F073 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-E11-LS-F075 RHR SW CROSSTIE VLV 1-E51-F031 MCC 1XDB MOV 1-E51-F031 1-E51-LSL-4463 LEVEL SWITCH E51-LSL-4463 1-E51-LSL-4464 LEVEL SWITCH E51-LSL-4464 1-E51-NO21A DIFF TEMP VNT AIR IN T/C DIFF TEMP VNT AIR IN T8C 1-E51-NO218 1-E51-NO22A DIFF TEMP VNT AIR OUT T/C ! 1-E51-NO22B DIF* TEMP VNT AIR OUT T/C l 1-E51-NO23A AMB TEMP T/C I 1-E51-NO23B AMS TEMP T/C i 1-E51-NO25A AMB TEMP T/C 1-E51-NO25B AMB TEMP T/C 1-E51-NO26A DIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C 1-E51-NO268 OIFF TEMP AIR IN T/C l-E58-NO27A DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 1-E51-N0278 DIFF TEMP AIR OUT T/C 1-E51-TS-3319 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3319 1-E51-TS-3320 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3320 1-E51-TS-3321 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3321 1-E51-TS-3322 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3322 f 1-E51-TS-3323 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3323 1 1-E51-TS-3355 TEMP SWITCH E51-TS-3355 I 1-E51-TS-3487 TEMP 5 WITCH E11-TS-3299 J 1-H12-P601 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL l ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL t 1-H12-P6C1/JF8 l 1-H12-P612 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK l 1-H12-P612/JN5 FW & RX RECIRC SYS RACK 1-H12-P614/J73 TEMP RECORD LTAK DET 1 -M 12-P614 / JPt- PWR RANGE NM L98 BAV 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VFRTaCAL BD 1-H12-P618 RHR B REL*Y VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P621 RC I C iv'. I C A L BD l 1-H12-PS23 NSS SHL( OFF CUTBD CAB l b
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PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEP" ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT. 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 1 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===e===========
l-E51-F046 CLG WTR SUP VLV MCC IXDO MCC 1XDB RB1-5 1-E51-F062 RCIC TURS EXH VAC BKR VLV MCC IXA MCC IXA RBI-5 1-E51-F066 RCIC TURB EXH VAC BMR VLV MCC IXB MCC 1XB RB1-5 s-F51-VB RCIC TURB ThiROTTLE VLV MCC IXDB MCC 1XDB Rei-L 1-IR-RB-4-FI-3340 RCIC FLOW INDICATOR N/A N/A RS1-5 I R -RB-4-FI C-3 325 RCIC FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A RB1-5 1-IR-RB-4-FY-3408 RCIC SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A RB1-$ pol 7-1-E51-FT-NOO3 RCIC FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A N/A RBI-5 Ph01-1-F51-FIC-R600 RCIC FLOW CONTROL N/A N/A CB-23E l ti01 E51 - F v - M 601 RCIC SQUARE ROOT EXTRACTOR N/A N/A CB-23E
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PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTOUwN COMPONENTS
<< RCIC >s TABLE 3.5 - 1 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PUwER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
1-E51 CONDENSATE PP BARO COND VAC TK COND PUMP MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 PNL 3B 1-E51 VACUUM PUMP BARC COND VAC PUMP MCC 1XDB MCC IXDB RB1-5 PNL 38 1-E51-C002 RCIC TURB CTL INSTR N/A PNL 3B RB1 IB-DG PNL 1B PNL 3A i 1-tbi-FOUT HCIC Svs INBOARD 150L VLV MCC IXC MCC 1XC RB1-3
- 1-E51-F008 RCIC SYS OUTBOARD 150L VLV MCC 1XD0 MCC 1XDB RB1-6 1-E51-F010 PUMP SUCT VLV FR COND in MCC 1XDB MCC IXDB RB1-5 1-E51-F012 RCIC PUMP DISCH VLV MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 1-E51-F913 RCIC PUMP DISCH VLV MCC IXDB MCC 1XDB RB1-w PNL 3B 1-E51-F019 MIN FL BPV TO SUPP CH MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 PNL 38 1 - E 51 -F 0 22 TEST BPv TO COND TK MCC 1MDB MCC 1XDB RB1-$
i 1-E51-F029 PUMP SUCT VLV FR SUP CH MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 1-E51-F031 *MCC 1XDB MOV l-E51-F031 MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 1-E51-F045 STM SUP VLV TO TURB MCC 1XDB MCC 1XDB RB1-5 PNL 3A PNL 3B 18-DG _ _ _ _ _ _t _ _ _ - - - * - . e er +- . , - - - -- , , - . , - . - - - _ - __. . <. . -,..
(.. ( .-/ ) PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB1 u TABLE 3.5 - 31 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SCURCE FIRE AREA =========msss======= =========*==================== ==================== =================s== ======== mss ====
10-DG 125v DC DISTR PNL 4A 1A-DG SST N/A DG-13 1A-DG SST DISTR PNL XFMR DGA MCC DCA N/A. DG-11
/*FO-5V-2012 FO TK1 SOL VLV N/A 2A-DG DG-19 OG1 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 1 N/A PNL 1A DG-5 PNL 2A PNL 4A DG1 CRNKC5 VAC DLwR DG1 CRNKCS VAC BLWR MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-5 OG1 ERH FAN E-EF-DG DG1 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGA MCC DGA DG.5 061 FO TRNSFR PP 1A DG1 FO TRNSFR PMP 1A MCC DCA MCC DGA DG-19 DG1 FO TRNSFR PP 18 DG1 FO TRNSFR PMP IB MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-19 leu t sTRTG AIR CMP 1 0G1 STRTG AIR COMP 1 MCC DGA MCC DGA DG.5 DG1 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG1 STRTG AIR COMP 2 MCC DGA MCC DGA DG-5 re El 4KV SwGR CMT AE6 DG1 PNL 1A DG-11 PNL 2A E5 ES 480v BUS CKT AT9 ES SST PNL 1A DG-6 PNL 2A ES SST ES 480V SwGR TRANSFORMER El N/A DG-6 MCC IPA IPA 480 MCC CKT But ES MCC 1PA Sw-1 MCC DGA DGA 4BOV MCC CKT D36 ES MCC DGA DG-5
_ - - _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ - - - - _ . _- _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - , - - - - - - _ - - - _ - .
(s (n. ) - PAGE 1 ) COROLINO POWER & LIGHT COMPQNV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENOIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS u EB1 >> TABLE 3.5 - 32 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAV VERT BD 2-FO-LS-2012 LEVEL SWITCH L5-2012 FO Tk 1 2-FO-L5-2285 LIMIT Sw1TCH L5-2285 FO TK 1 2A-DG DGC DISTR PNL CKT D09 BOP TERM CAB /XU-14 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS CNTL CAB /H54 DG CONTROL CAB 1 CT COMPT /F26 CONT XFR DG NO 1 E1/AE6 El 4KV 5WGR CIRCUIT AEb E1/AE7 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AE7 E1/AE8 El 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AE8 E1/AE9 El 4kV SwGR CIRCUIT AE9 E1/AFD E1 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AFO E1/AF8 El 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AF8 E5 SST/AUG E5 480V BUS CIRCUIT AU6 ES/FM9 480V SUBSTA E5 TRANS CPT ENG CMTL PNL/HA9 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG1 ENG PNL/HA9 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LC'GI C C AB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 ESS CAB DIV2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 EXCITATION CUBE /H46 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG1 INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-BD INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 MCC DGA/D37 DGA 480 MCC CKT D37 MCC DGA/D38 DGA 480 MCC CMT D38 MCC DGA/D07 DGA 400 MCC CKT DQ7 MCC DGA/DR1 DGA 480 MCC CMT DR1 MCC DGA/OR4 DGA 480 MCC CKT OR4 MCC DGA/DRS DGA 480 MCC CMT DR5 MCC DGA/DR6 MCC DGA VENT FAN E-EF-DG MCC DGA/EC8 DGA 480 MCC CMT EC8 NEUT GND XFMR/F13 NEUT GRND XFR DG-1 P004-1-821-LT-N021A RK P+NSSS H21-P004-003 P004-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A POOS-1-B21-LT-NO21B RX P+N555 H21-POUS-OO3 POO5-3-821-LT-NO318 RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B
. - . . . ~ . . _ - - - - _ - - _ - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB1 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 32 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PT COMPT /F22 POT XFMR DG NO 1 75 KVA RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN +M xFRM REL PNL
- RTGB DIV 1 1XU-2/JA6 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB DIV 1 2xU-2/JA6 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB DIV1/JA6 RTG ZONE D&C DG EB UA RTGB/JC4 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLDG SKID JUNC BOX /YV2 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 1 SWGR 10/AD1 ID 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT ADI SwGR 10/A05 1D 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT ADS SwGR ID/AD7 1D 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AD7
- TERM box /GA2 DG1 TERM BOX TERM BOA /RN2 TERM box FUEL STORAGE TM 1 TERM BOM/YV2 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 1
- TERM CAB IXU-39/JH6 TERM CAB FOR El DIV 1 TERM CAB 2XU-39/JH6 TERM CAB FOR E1 DIV 1 TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JSO JNO TERM CAB XU-39 TERM CAB El DIV '
TERM CAD XU-41 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAD /JKO TERM CAB FOR E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLDG VA TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RS CB XU-28 TERM CAB /JU2 TERM CA8 EB XU-13 TERM CAB /JU4 U=1 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 I L E t t . . - . . ._ - . . - _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . - - - - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ .-_.____.s w__--_. ::--.__--.____-__-~______________-_--_____-___.- - _ -__ _ , ._.-
s _ PQGE 1 CAROLINA POWER a LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB2 >> .
L TABLE 3.5 - 33 COMDONENT DESCRIPTION POwcR SOURCE CONTRDL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ======a============= ==================== ===============
18-DG PWR DISTR PNL 18-DG 10-DG SST N/A DG-12 18-DG SST XFMR PwR DISTR PNL 18-DG MCC DGB N/A DG-12 18-Sw DISTR PNL IB-Sw 18-SW SST N/A Sw-1 IB-Sw SST xFMR DISTR PNL 18-Sw MCC IPB N/A Sw-1 1EB PWR DISTR PNL 1EB 1EB SST N/A CB-23E 1E8 SST XFMR PWR DISTR PNL 1E8 E6 N/A CB-23E 2-FO-SV-2000 FO TK2 SOL VLv N/A 28-DG DG-20 DG2 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 2 N/A PNL 2B DG-4 PNL 48 PNL 1B DG2 CRNKCS VAC BLwR DG2 CRNKCS VAC'BLwR MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 DG2 EnH FAN F-EF-DG DG2 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 DG2 FO TRNSFR PP 2A DG2 FO TRNSFR PMP 2A MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 ttG2 FO TRNSFR PP 2B DG2 FO TRNSFR PMP 28 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-20 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 E2 E2 4KV SWGR CKT AG4 DG2 PNL 18 DG-12 PNL 28 E6 E6 480V BUS CAT Aw6 E6 SST PNL 18 DG-7 " PNL 2B E6 SST E6 480V SwGR TRANSFORMER E2 N/A DG-7 m.. _ . . _ ,.
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PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB2 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 33 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
MCC 1CB 1CB 480 MCC CKT C61 EG MCC 1CB CB-23E MCC 1PB IPB 480 MCC CMT BV8 E6 MCC IPB Sw-1 MCC inB MCC IXB INC LINE E6 MCC 1XB RB1-S MCC InB-2 MCC 1xB-2 INC LINE E8 MCC IXB-2 RB1-5 MCC IED 1xD 480 MCC CKT DWO E6 MCC 1XD RB1-5 MCC DGB DGB 480 MCC CMT D96 E6 MCC OGB DG-4 , PDP 1B E6 DISTR PNL 1B IE8 N/A CB-23E PDP 31B PwR DISTR PNL 31B DIV 2 PDP 31B SST N/A CB-23E Pop 318 SST 120V AC DISTR PNL 318 XFMR MCC ICB N/A CD-23E L
-_._-_.___._.-.__-m _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . -
PAGE 1 (- CAROLINA PO'xER & LIGHT COXPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
- UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB2 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 34 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGAD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 18-DG PWR DISTR PNL 18 -DG 2-FO-L5-2000 LEVtt SWITCH LS-2000 FO TK 2 2-FO-L5-2286 LIMIT SWITCH LS-2286 FO TK 2 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CKT D49 CNTL CAB /H55 DG CONTROL CAB 2 DISCONNECT SW/RE7 DISCH SW FOR TRANSFORMER GF6 E2/AG4 E2 4KV 5WGR CIRCUIT AG4 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AG5 E2/AG7 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AG7 E2/AHO E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AHO E2/AH1 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH1 E2/AHS E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AH5 E6/AWO 480V SUBSTA E6 FD MCC IXB E6/AW7 E6 480V BUS CIRCUIT AW7 E6/AK3 E6 4BOV BUS CIRCUIT Ax3 E6/FNO 480V SUBSTA E6 TRANS CPT ENG PNL/HBO ENG CONTROL PANEL DG2 E55 CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 E55 CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 EXCITATION CUBE /H47 EXCITATICM CUBICLE DG2 INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DS TERM BOX INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 INTERFACE /XN3 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV WTR JUNC BOX /YV4 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 2 MCC ICS/C82 MCC ICS 480V MCC DGB/089 DGB 480 MCC CKT D89 MCC DGB/D94 DGB 480 MCC CKT D94 MCC DGB/D95 DGB 480 MCC CMT 095 MCC DGB/D99 MCC DGB VENT FAN F-EF-DG MCC DGB/DY6 DGB 480 MCC CKT DV6 MCC DGB/DZ5 DGB 480 MCC CKT DZS MCC DGB/DZ8 DGB 480 MCC CKT DZ8 MCC DGB/EB2 MCC DGC DG2 SP FVNR STRT MCC DGB/EC9 PGB 480 MCC CKT EC9 MCC DGD/D49 DGD 480v MCC CKT D49 t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ r - sv.v. % . .
N PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UMIT I APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE 5HUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
" EB2 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 34 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POO4-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-B21-PT-N021A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 POO5-1-821-LT-NO31B RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B POOS-1-B21-PT-NO218 RX P+NSSS H21-P005-OO4 PDP 31B SST 120V AC DISTR PNL 31B XFMR $ PNL 18 DC DISTR PNL IB PNL 48 125V DC DISTR PNL 4B RELAY CAD /JG9 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL [ RTGB DIV 2 1xU-2/JA7 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB DIV 2 2xU-2/JA7 RTG 20NE B&C DG EB UA RTGB/JA1 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLDG SPLICE box /SB1 SPLICE FOR MCC 1XB LINE SPLICE box /Y22 SPLICE BOX FOR DISC RE7 SPLICE box /vtl MCC 2xB-2 SPLC IN WH KJ3 SPLICE box /Y14 2xD MCC SPLICE IN Mt1 XJ3 SPLICE /v53 1xB SPLICE IN DIESEL SwGR IC/ACS 1C 4MV SWGR CIRCUIT ACS j SwGR 1C/AC7 1C 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT AC7 SWGR 1C/ACB IC 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT ACB TERM box /RN3 TERM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 2 TERM B0x/YV4 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 2 TERM CAB 1MU-14/JI9 TERM CAB FOR TBO JNO TERM Ce8 1xU-40/JH7 TERM CAB FOR E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB 2xu-40/JH7 TERM CAB FOR E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB 2XU-42/ JIB TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JBO JNO TERM CAB MU-40 TERM CAB E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB xU-42 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB /JI6 TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TERM CAB /JI9 TERM CAB FOR JBO JNO TERM CAD /JK2 TERM CAB Rx CNTL BLDG VA TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-2e TERM CAB /JU3 TERM CAB EB XU-25 TERM CAB /JU5 U=2 FIRE DROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 xu-63 TRIP CAB AU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64
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PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRkC PLANT - UNIT 2 e APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB2 > >
TABLE 3.5 - 35 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== 2=================== ==================== ===============
18-DG PWR DISTR PNL 18-DG IB-DG SST N/A DG-12 18-DG SST xFMR PwR DISTR PNL to-DG MCC DGB N/A DG-12 2-FO-SV-2000 FO TK2 SOL VLV N/A 28-DG DG-20 DG2 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 2 N/A PNL 18 DG-4 PNL 2B PNL 40 DG2 CRNKCS VAC BLWR DG2 CRNMCS VAC BLWR MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 tm2 ERH FAN F-EF-DG DG2 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 OG2 FO TRNSFR pp 2A DG2 FO TRNSFR PHP 2A MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-20 lb/ FO TRNSFR PP 28 DG2 FO TRNSFR PMP 28 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-20 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG2 STRTG AIR C',1P 1 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG2 STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGB MCC DGB DG-4 E2 E2 4KV SWGR CMT AG4 DG2 PNL 18 DG-12 PNL 2B L6 E6 480V BUS CKT AW6 E6 SST PNL 18 DG-7 PNL 2B EG SST E6 480V SWGR TRANSFORMER E2 N/A DG-/ MCC DGB DGB 480 MCC CMT D96 E6 MLC DGB DG-4 5 i m - _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - -m _ .- ,_
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CDROLINQ POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB2 >>
. TABLE 3,5 - 36 5UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P618 CHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 18-DG PwR DISTR PNL 18-DG 2-FO-LS-2000 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2000 FO TK 2 2-FO-LS-2286 LIMIT Sw!TCH L5-2286 FO TK 2 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CKT D49 BOP TERM CAB /JI9 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS CNTL CAB /H55 DG CONTROL CAB 2 CNTL PNL/H55 DG CONTkOL CAB 2 CNTL PNL/HBO ENG cot 4 TROL PANEL DG2 E2/AG4 E2 4KV SwGR CIFCUIT AG4 E2/AG5 E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AGS.
E2/AG7 E2 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AG7 E2/AHO E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT ANO , E2/AH1 E2 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT AH1 E2/AHS E2 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AHS E6 SST/Av9 E6 480V BUS CIrtCUIT AV9 E6/FNO 480V 59BSTA E6 TRANS CPT ENG PNL/HBO ENG CONTROL PANEL DG2 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 ESS CAB DIV1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 EXCITATION COBE/H47 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG2 INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 JUNC BOX /vv4 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 2 MCC DGB/094 DGB 480 MCC CKT D94 MCC DGB/D95 DGB 490 MCC CKT D95 MCC DGB/099 MCC DGB VENT FAN F-EF-DG MCC DGB/DV6 DGB 480 MCC CKT Dv6
- MCC DGB/DZ5 DGB 480 MCC CKT DZ5 MCC DGB/DZ8 DGB 480 MCC CKT DZ8 MCC DGB/EB2 MCC DGC DG2 SP FVNR STRT MCC DGB/EC9 PGB 480 MCC CKT EC9 ;
P004-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-PT-N021A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 P005-1-821-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B I
i (, (s_S) ) l PAGE 2 i CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB2 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 36 SJPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POOS-1-821-PT-NO218 RX P+NSSS H21-P005-004 PNL 18 DC DISTR PNL 11 PNL 4B 125V DC DISTR ANL 4B-RELAY CAB /JG9
~
CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL
- RTGB DIV 2 IXU-2/JA7 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA ,
RTGB DIV 2 2XU-2/JA7 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB UA RTGB/JA1 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLDG i SwGR 1C/ACS 1C 4MV SwGR CIRCUIT ACS SwGR 1C/AC7 1C 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AC7 I SwGR 1C/ACB IC 4kV SwGR CIRCUIT ACB TERM box /RN3 TERM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 2 TERM BOX /YV4 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 2 TERM CAB IXU-14/JI9 TERM CAB FOR TBO JNO TERM CAB 1XU-40/JH7 TERM CAB "OR E2 DIV 2 - TERM CAB 2XU-40/JH7 TERM CAB FOR E2 DIV 2 I TERM CAB 2XU-42/J18 TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TERM CAB XU-40 TERM CAB E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB XU-42 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB / JIB TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TERM CAB /JI9 TERM CAB FOR JBO JNO i TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLDG VA TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-20 TERM CAB /JU3 TERM CAB EB XU-25 TERM CAS/JU5 U=2 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 P t o
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PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS u EB3 n TABLE 3.5 - 37 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
1-FO-SV-2036 FO TK3 SOL VLV N/A 2A-DG DG-21 zn-DG DGC DISTR PNL CRT D09 2A-DG SST N/A DG-13 20-DG SST DISTR PNL XFMR MCC DGC MCC DGC N/A DG-3 OG3 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 3 N/A PNL 2A DG-3 PNL 1A PNL 3A UG.1 CRNMCS VAC BLwR DG3 CRNMCS VAC BLWR MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-1 in,J ENH FAN G-EF-DG DG3 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 Ins 3 FO TRNSFR PP 3A DG3 FO TRNSFR PMP 3A MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-21 , 003 FO TRNSFR PP 3B DG3 FO TRNSFR PMP 3B MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-21 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 DG3 STRTG r.IR CMP 2 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 E3 E3 4KV SWGR CKT AI7 DG3 PNL 1A DG-13 PNL 2A E7 480V SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT E7 SST PNL 1A DG-8 , PNL 2A ET SST E7 480 SwGR TRANSFORMER E3 N/A DG-8 MCC DGC DGC 480V MCC CKT D01 E7 MCC DGC DG-3
- _ - ~ .- -- . . - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - . _ . . - - _ _ _ . _ __. . . . . - - -
PQGE 1 - CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPONY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1. APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB3 n TABLE 3.5 - 38 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION i 1-H12-?601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P618 RHR B RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 2-FO-LS-2036 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2036 FO TK 3 2-FO-LS-2287 LIMIT SWITCH LS-2287 DIES FO .
2A-DG DGC DISTR PNL CKT 009 CNTL CAB /H56 DG CONTROL CAB 3 CT COMPT /F2B CONT XFR DG NO 3 E3/AI2 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT Al2 + E3/AI3 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AI3 E3/AIS E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AIS E3/A16 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AI6 E3/AJO E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJO E3/AJ1 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJI E5/AIS E3 4MV BU5 CIRCUIT AIS E7 SST/AV8 E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT AV8 E7/FN1 480V SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT ENG PNL/HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 i ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC Cm8 DG3 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LDGIC CAB DG4 EXCITATION CUBE /H48 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG3 INTERFACE /XN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-8D INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 ! MCC DGC/D02 DGC 480V MCC CKT 002 MCC DGC/DO3 DGC 480V WCC CMT D03 MCC DGC/DI6 DGC 480V MCC CAT DI6 ! MCC DGC/017 DGC 480V MCC CKT DI7 MCC DGC/DJ1 DGC 480V MCC CMT DJ1 i MCC DGC/DJ4 DGC 480V MCC CMT DJ4 MCC DGC/DJ5 DGC 480V MCC CMT DJ5 s MCC DGCIDJ6 DGC 480V MCC CKT DJ6 MCC DGC/EE3 DGC 480V WCC CKT EE3 ' NEUT GND XFUR/FIS NEUT GRND XFR DG-3 P004-1-021-LT-NO31A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-PT-NO21A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 POOS-1-021-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B PC05-1-021-PT-NO21B RX P+N555 H21-POO5-004 PNL 2A DC DISTR PNL 2A s
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s , - , PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUNSWICM STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB3 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 38 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PNL 3A 125V DC DISTR PNL 3A PT COMPT /F24 POT XFMR DG NO 3 75 MVA RELAY PNL/HJS 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL i RTGB DIV 1 1XU-2/JA8 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB DIV 1 2XU-2/JA8 NTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB/JC4 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLOG SMID JUNC BOX /VV6 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 3 SPLICE B0x/ZU6 JCT BOX (CTL) SPLICE PNL/NLB RX BLDG SPLICE box SwGR 2D/AD1 2D 4KV $wGR CMT AD1 SwGR 2D/AD4 20 4KV SwGR CMT AD4 SwGR 2D/AD6 2D 4KV $wGR CMT AD6 TERM BOX /GA4 DG2 TERM BOX TERM BOX /RN4 TERM UOX FUCL STORAGE TK 3 TERM BOX /YV6 TERM B0x 1 DIE GEN 3 TERM CAB 1XU-39/JH6 TERM CAB FOR El DIV 1 TERM CAB 2XU-14/JI9 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS TERM CAB 2XU-41/Jk0 TERM CAB FOR E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB AU-14 TERM CAB EB JB0 JNO 5 TERM CAB XU-39 TERM CAB El DIV 1 TERM CAB XU-41 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLOG VA 4 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-28 r TERM CAB /JM3 TERM CAB /JU2 TERM CAB EB XU-13 TERM CAB /JU4 U=1 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB i TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 xO-63 TRIP CAS XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 i i
. - . +~ . . - - - . . . - - . ... . .. ,
k ~., PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB3 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 39 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
J-FO-5v-2036 FO TK3 SOL VLV N/A 2A-DG .DG-22 2A-DG DGC DISTR PNL CMT DO9 2A-DG SST N/A DG-3 /m-DG SST DISTR PNL MFMR MCC DGC MCC DGC N/A DG-13 1A-Sn 2PA DISTR PNL CMT E14 2A-5W SST N/A Sw-1 /A-Sw SST DISTR PNL MFMR MCC 2PA MCC 2PA N/A SW-1 /E7 120/208V DISTR PNL 2E7 2E7 SST N/A CB-23E 57 SST DISTR PNL MFMR ET E7 N/A CB-23E Db3 DIESEL GENERATOR HO 3 N/A PNL 2A DG-3 PNL 1A PNL 3A DG3 CRNKC5 VAC BLwR DG3 CRNKC5 VAC BLwR MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 DG3 ExH FAN G-EF-DG DG3 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 OG3 FO TRNSFR PP 3A DG3 FO TRNSFR PMP 3A MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-21 DG3 FO TRNSFR PP 3B DG3 FO TRH5FR PMP 30 MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-21 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC OGC MCC DGC DG-3 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG3 STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGC MCC DGC DG-3 F3 E3 4KV SwGR CRT A17 DG3 PNL 2A DG-13 PNL 1A E7 400v SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT E7 SST PNL 1A DG-8 PNL 2A L7 SST E7 480 SWGR TRANSFORMER E3 N/A DG-8
. . . ... . - - . - h
w* ( .. PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< ES3 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 39 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION P0wER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ===================, =========
MCC 2CA 2CA 480 MCC CMT C01 ET N/A CB-23E MCC 2PA IPA 480 MCC CMT But ET MCC 2PA SW-1 M( C 2nA MCC 2xA INC LINE E7 MCC 2XA RB2-N MCC 2nA-2 MCC 2XA-2 INC LINE E5 MCC 2XA-2 RB2-N MCC 7nc 2xC 400 MCC CMT 050 E7 MCC 2XC RB2-E RB2-N MCC DGC DGC 480v MCC CKT dot E7 MCC DGC DG-3 POP 2A E7 DISTR PANEL 2A 2E7 N/A CS-23E PDP 32A 120V AC DISTR PNL 32A PDP 32A SST NA Ce-23E PDP 32A SST 120V AC DISTR PNL 32A XFMR MCC 2CA NA CB-23E PDP 32A8 120V AC DISTR PNL 2E7 2E7 NA CB-23E PDP v10A VITAL DISTR PNL V-10A MCC 2CA NA CB-23E SwBD 2A PDP V8A VITAL DISTR PNL V-8A MCC 2CA NA CB-23E SwBD 2A i
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POGE 1 ) { (~ COROLING POWER lL LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB3 >>-
TABLE 3.5 - 40 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF1 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P618 RHR 8 RELAY VERTICAL BD 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-PB27 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 2-FO-LS-2036 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2036 FO TK 3 2-FO-LS-2287 LIMIT Sw!TCH LS-2287 DIES FO 2A-DG DGC DISTR PNL CMT 009 2E7 120/200V DISTR PNL 2E7 l 2E7 SST/GF4 DISTR PNL xFMR E7 CNTL CAS/H56 DG CONTROL CAB 3 ( CNTL CAB /HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 l CT COMPT /F20 CONT xFR DG NO 3 l DISCONNECT SW/REO DISCH SW FOR TRANSFORMER GF4 E3/AI2 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCulT AI2 l E3/A!3 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT A13 E3/AIS E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AI5 E3/AI6 E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AI6 E3/AJO E3 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AJO E3/AJ1 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ1 E5 SST/AT8 E5 480V BUS CIRCUIT AT8 l E5/A15 E3 4KV BUS CIRCUIT AIS ! E7 SST/AVO E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT AVO E7 SST/AV1 E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT AY1 l 480V SUBSTA E7 FD MCC 2xA i E7 SST/Av2 E7 SST/AV5 E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT AV5 E7 SST/AY8 E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT AVO l E7 SST/AY9 E7 480V BUS CIRCUIT Av9 E7/FN1 480V SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT ENG PNL HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 ENG PNL/HB1 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG3 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG; ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 E55 CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 E55 CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 ' EXCITATION CUBE /H48 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG3 l INTERFACE /xN1 INTERFACE =1+2 AT V-80 l INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =t+2 AT MC-13 INTERFACE /xN5 INTERFACE =1+2 SERV WTR MCC 2CA/C07 2CA 480 MCC CMT C07 MCC 2CA/C77 MCC 2CA C/B'PNL 32A MFMR MCC DGA/045 DGA 480 MCC CKT 045
. , . . , . , . , , , . , - . . . . _ , -- .- - - ~ . _ . . . - -. . . . . - , -
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COROLIMA POWER & LIGHT COMPQNV BRUNSOICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLQNT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTOOwN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB3 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 40 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
'aCC DGC/DO2 DGC 480V MCC CKT D02 MCC DGC/DO3 DGC 400V MCC CRT D03 MCC DGC/D09 DGC 480V MCC CKT 009 McC DGC/DI6 DGC 400V MCC CKT DI6 MCC DGC/DI7 DGC 480V MCC CKT DI7 MCC DGC/DJ1 DGC 480V MCC CKT DJ1 MCC DGC/DJ4 DGC 480V MCC CRT DJ4 MCC DGC/DJ5 DGC 480V MCC CkT DJ5 MCC DGC/DJ6 DGC 480V MCC CKT DJ6 MCC DGC/EE3 DGC 480V MCC CKT EE3 NEUT GND XFMR/F15 NEUT GRND XFR DG-3 POO4-1-021-LT-NO3tA RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-B21-PT-NO21A TRIP CAB ECC5 D1 XU-63 P005-1-821-LT-NO31B RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-021-PT-N021B RX P+N555 H21-POOS-004 PDP 32A SST 120V AC DISTR PNL 32A XFMR PNL 2A DC DISTR PNL 2A PNL 3A 175V DC DISTR PNL 3A PT COMPT /F24 POT XFMR DG NO 3 75 KVA PWR CONV MODULE UNINTER PWR SUP RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL RTGB DIV 1 IXU-2/JA8 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB DIV 1 2XU-2/JA8 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB/JC4 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLPG SKID JUNC BOX /YV6 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 3 SPLICE BOX /RG9 SPLICE IN TRAY SPLICE BOX /VS1 2XC SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE BOX /Y74 SPLICE BOX FOR DISC RE8 SPLICE BOX /v12 SPLICE IN MH XK9 SPLICE BOX /YX2 MCC 2XA SPLC IN MH XB9 l SPLICE BOX /ZU6 JCT BOX (CTL)
SPLICC PNL/NL8 RX BLDG SPLICE BOX SPLICE /RG9 SPLICE IN TRAY SPLICE /Y19 SPLICE PT 2PA MCC FDR SPLICE /V51 2XC SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE /VIO MCC 2XA-2 SPLC IN MH XB9 SPLICE /YI2 2XC MCC SPLICE IN MH XB9 SPLICE /YJ4 2CA MCC SPLICE IN MH XB9 I SPLICE /VX2 MCC 2XA SPLC IN MH X89 SWBO 2A/GJ5 DC DIST SWBD 2A CKT GJ5 SWGR 2D/AD1 2D 4KV SWGR CKT AD1 l L._
PAGE 3 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB3 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 40 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SwGR 2D/AD4 2D 4KV SWGR CKT AD4 SwGR 2D/AD6 20 4KV SwGR CKT AD6 SWITCHING MODULE UPS STATIC IR TANSFER SW TERM BOX /GA4 DG2 TERM BOX TERM BOX /RN4 TERM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 3 TERM BOX /vv6 TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 3 TERM CAB 1XU-39/JH6 TFRM CAB FOR El DIV 1 TERM CAB 2XU-14/JI9 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS TERM CAB 2XU-41/JKO TERM CAB FOR E3 DIV i TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JBO JNO TERM CAS XU-39 TERM CAB El DIV 1 TERM CAB XU-41 TERM CAB E3 DIV t . TERM CAB /JK2 TERM CAB RX CNTL BLDG VA TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RS CB XU-2B TFRM CAB /JU2 TENM CAB EB XU-13 TERM CAB /JU4 U=1 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECC5 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 UPS PDP 2A UPS DI51R PNL 2A - - _ - _ - _ _. --_ ____ .__i_u__ _ _ _ _ , _y e e -e en N = V e' N e
PAGE 1 s CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS u EB4 >> TABLE 3.5 - 41 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA i
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== =============== t 2-FO-5V-2024 FO TM4 SOL VLV N/A 28-DG DG-22 18-06 DGD DISTR PNL CKT D49 2B-DG $5T N/A DG-14 i ;B-DG SST DISTR PNL XFMR MCC DGD MCC DGD N/A DG-14 [
Db4 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 4 N/A PNL 28 DG-2 PNL 10 PNL 38
- Ini4 (RNMCS VAC BLWR DG4 CRNKC5 VAC BLWR MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2
DG4 EnH FAN H-EF-DG DG4 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 ot2 4 FO TRN5FR PP 4A DG4 FO TRN5FR PMP 4A MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-22 3 DG4 FO TRNSFR PP 4B DG4 FO TRN5FR PMP 40 MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-22 i, DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC DGD DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC DGD DG-2 DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DG5 STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 E4 E4 4KV SWGR CKT AJ9 DG4 PNL 18 DG-14 l PNL 2B EB .480V SUBSTA E8 TRANS CPT EU SST PNL 18 DG-9 PNL 20 t 4 EB SST E8 4SOV SWGR TRANSFORMER E4 N/A OG-9 MCC 2PB 2PB 480V MCC CKT E43 E8 MCC 2PB SW-1 , MCC DGD DGD 480 MCC CKT D56 E8 MCC DGD DG-2
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO~4PANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB4 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 42 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL I-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD . 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAV A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAV B RELAV VERT BD 2-FO-LS-2024 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2024 FO TK 4 2-FO-LS-2288 LIMIT SWITCH LS-2288 DIES FO 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CKT D49 CNTL CAB /H57 DG CONTROL CAB 4 CONT XFR DG NO 4 i CT COMPT /F29 ' E4/AJ6 E3 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ6 E4/AJ9 E4 4KV SWGR CIRCUIT AJ9
- E4/AKO E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AKO E4/AK2 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AK2 E4/AK3 4KV BUS E4 RHR PUMP 2B E4/AKS E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AKS E4/AK7 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AK7 E8 SST E8 480V SwGR TRANSFORMER E8 SST/A01 E8 480V BUS CIRCUIT A01 E8/FN2 480V SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT ENG PNL/HB2 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG4 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC cab DG3 ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 EXCITATION CUBE /H49 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG4 INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 JUNC BOM/VVB TERM BOY 1 DIE GEN 4 MCC DGD/D54 DGD 480V MCC CKT D54 MCC DGD/D55 DGD 480V MCC CMT 055 MCC DGD/059 DGD 480V MCC CKT D59 MCC DGD/D60 DGD 480V MCC CMT D60 MCC DGD/D64 DGD 480V MCC CKT D64 MCC DGD/D67 DGD 480V MCC CKT D67 MCC DGD/EC6 MCC DGC SP FVNR START S21 MCC DGD/EE6 400V MCC CKT EE6 NEUT GND XFMR/F16 NEUT GRND XFR DG-4 POO4-1-821-LT-NO31A RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS A P004-1-821-PT-NO21A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 P005-1-021-LT-NO3tB RX V5L LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-B21-PT-NO218 RX P+N555 H21-P005-004 i
I
.. .. _ _ . , _ .. . . ~ . . . . - _
PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLINT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
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TABLE 3.5 - 42 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PNL 28 DC DISTR PNL 20 PT COMPT /F25 POT XFMR DG NO 4 75 KVA RELAY PNL/HJS 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL RTGB DIV 2 1XU-2/JA9 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB DIV 2 2XU-2/JA9 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTG8 DIV 2/JA9 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB/JA1 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLOG SPLICE BOX /ZUS JCT BOX (CTL) SWGR 2C/AC6 2C 4KV SWGR CKT AC6 SwGR 2C/ACB 2C 4KV SWGR CKT ACB TERM BOX / GAS DG4 TERM BOX TERM BOX /RN5 TEPM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 4 TERM CAB 1XU-40/JH7 TERM CAB FOR E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB 2XU-14/JI9 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS TERM CAB 2XU-42/JID TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TLPW CAB XU-14 TERM cab EB JBO JNO TERM CAB XU-40 TERM CAB E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB XU-42 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-28 TERM CAB /JU3 TERM CAB EB XU-25 TERM CAB / JUS U=2 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 l
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER 2 LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK ~ STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTI4- "AFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS o :24 >> TAP I 3.5 - 43 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ===:.========================== ==================== ==================== ===============
2-FO-SV-2024 FO TK4 SOL VLV N/A 28-DG DG-21 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CMT D49 28-DG SST N/A DG-14 JB-DG SST DISTR PNL XFMR MCC DGD MCC DGD N/A DG-14 28-SW 2PB DISTR PNL CKT E47 2B-Sw SST N/A Sw-1
/B-SW SST DISTR PNL XFMR MCC 2PB MCC 2PB N/A SW-1 l 2E8 120/208V DISTR PNL 2E8 2E8 SST N/A CB-23E TE8 SST DISTR PNL XFMR EB E8 N/A CB-23E DG4 DIESEL GENERATOR NO 4 N/A PNL 28 DG-2 PNL 18 PNL 3B
, DG4 CRWKCS VAC BLwR DG4 CRNKCS VAC BLwR MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 DG4 EMH FAN H-EF-DG DG4 EXHAUST FAN MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 DG4 PO TRNSFR PP 4A DG4 FO TRNSFR PMP 4A MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-22 DG4 FO TRNSFR PP 48 DG4 FO TRNSFR PMP 4B MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-22 DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 1 DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 1 MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 I DG4 STRTG AIR CMP 2 DGS STRTG AIR CMP 2 MCC DGD MCC DGD DG-2 i i E4 E4 4KV SwGR CKT AJ9 DG4 PNL 28 DG-14 PNL 18 E3 480V SUBSTA E8 TRANS CPT EB SST PNL 18 DG-9 , PNL 28 l E8 SST E8 480V SwGR TRANSFORMER E4 N/A DG-9 1 i
PAGE 2 CAROLINA pow *. R & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNI.T 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< EB4.u TABLE 3.5 - 43 I COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOUNCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
.u================== ============================== =============s====== ==================== =============== MCC 2CB 2CB 480 MCC CMT C61 E8 MCC 2CB CB-23E MCC 2PB 2PB 480V MCC CMT E43 E8 MCC 2P6 Sw-t ccCC 2nB MCC 2xB 1riC LINE E8 MCC 2XB RB2-S MCC 2xB-2 MCC 2xB-2 INC LINE EG MCC 2MB-2 RB2-5 MLL 2xD 2xD 480 MCC CKT OWO E8 MCC 2xD RB2-5 MCC DGD DGD 480 MCC CKT 056 EB MCC DGD OG-2 PDP 2B EB DISTR PANEL 28 2E8 N/A CB-23E FOP 32B 120V AC DISTR PNL 32B PDP 320 SST N/A CB-23E PDP .<8 SST '20V AC DISTR PNL 328 XFMH MCC 2CB N/A CB-23E I f
=
_ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ ________.______m___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
-l - PQGE' l COROLIMG POWER & LIGHT COMPQNY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB4 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 44 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1-H12-P601/JF8 ENGRD SAFEGUARD PANEL 1-H12-P626 CORE SPRAY A RELAY VERT BD 1-H12-P627 CORE SPRAY B RELAY VERT BD 2-FO-LS-2024 LEVEL SWITCH LS-2024 FO TK 4 2-FO-LS-2288 LIMIT Sw!TCH LS-2288 DIES FO 2-H12-P617 RHR A RELAY VERTICAL BD 28-DG DGD DISTR PNL CMT D49 2E8 SST/GF6 DISTR PNL XFMR E8 CNTL CAa/H57 DG CONTROL CAB 4 CT COMPT /F29 CONT XFR DG NO 4 DISCONNECT SW/RE7 DISCH Sw FOR TRANSFORMER GF6 E4/AJ9 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AJ9 E4/AKO E4 4KV SWGR CIRCu!T AKO E4/AK2 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AK2 E4/AK3 4KV BUS Ed RHR PUMP 2B E4/AK5 E4 4kV SwGR CIRCUIT AK5 E4/Ak7 E4 4KV SwGR CIRCUIT AK7 . E6 SST/AV6 E6 480V BUS CIRCUIT AV8 E8 SST/A01 E8 480V BUS CIRCUIT A01 E8 SST/A02 480V SUBSTA A02 E8 SST/AOS E8 480V BUS CIRCUIT A05 E8 55T/A08 E8 480V BUS CIRCUIT A08 E8 SST/A09 E8 480V BUS CIRCUIT A09 E8 SST/A12 EB 480V BUS CIRCUIT A12 E8/FN2 480V SUBSTA E7 TRANS CPT ENG CNTL PNL/HB2 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG4 ENG PNL/HB2 ENG CONTROL PANEL DG4 ESS CAB DIV 1/H58 LOGIC CAB DG1 ESS CAB DIV 1/H60 LOGIC CAB DG3 , ESS CAB DIV 2/H59 LOGIC CAB DG2 i ESS CAB DIV 2/H61 LOGIC CAB DG4 EXCITATION CUBE /H49 EXCITATION CUBICLE DG4 , IH1ERFACE/XNO INTERFACE + DB TERM BOX INTERFACE /XN2 INTERFACE =1+2 AT MC-13 JUNC BOX /YVB TERM BOX 1 DIE GEN 4 ' MCC 2CB/C78 MCC 2CB C/B PNL 328 XFMR MCC DGB/D89 DGB 480 MCC CMT 009 ! MCC DGD/D49 DGD 480V MCC CMT D49 l MCC DGD/D54 DGD 480V MCC CKT D54 MCC DGD/D55 DGD 480V MCC CKT D55 MCC DGD/D59 DGO 490V MCC CMT 059 ; e 1 - _ - _ . -_ . . -.
. - = _ . _ - - . _ - -_. _ _ - _ . - _ _ _- _ - - - _ - - _ _ - - _ - _ - _ - - -- -----____ _ _-__ PAGE 2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICM STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< EB4 >>
TABLE 3.5 - 44 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION MCC DGD/D60 DGD 480V MCC CMT D60 MCC DGD/D64 DGD 480V MCC CMT D64 , MCC DGD/D67 DGD 480V MCC CMT D67 MCC DGD/EC6 MCC DGC SP FVNR START S21 MCC DGD/EEG 480V MCC CMT EE6 NEUT GND XFMR/F16 NEUT GRND XFR DG-4 POO4-1-821-LT-NO31A RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS A POO4-1-021-PT*NO21A TRIP CAB ECCS D1 XU-63 P005-1-821-LT-NO318 RX VSL LEVEL & PRESS B P005-1-B21-PT-N0218 RX P+NSSS H21-P005-004 PDP 32B SST 120V AC DISTR PNL 328 XFMR PNL 28 DC DISTR PNL 2B PT COMPT /F25 POT XFMR DG NO 4 75 KVA RELAY PNL/HJ5 230V GEN + M XFRM REL PNL RTGB DIV 2 1XU-2/JA9 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB DIV 2 2XU-2/JA9 RTG ZONE BAC DG EB ED UA i RTGB DIV 2/JA9 RTG ZONE B&C DG EB ED UA RTGB/JA1 RTG ZONE M VA CTL BLDG SPLICE BOX /VS2 2XB SPLICE IN DIESEL ; SPLICE BOX /V57 2XD SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE BOX /Y73 SPLICE BOX FOR DISC RE7 [ SPLICE BOX /VII MCC 2XB-2 SPLC IN MH XJ3 SPLICE BOX /YI4 2XD MCC SPLICE IN MH XJ3 SPLICE BOX /YX3 MCC 2XS SPLC IN MH XJ2 SPLICE BOX /ZUS JCT BOX (CTL) SPLICE /V52 2XB SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE /Y57 2XD SPLICE IN DIESEL SPLICE /VII MCC 2XB-2 SPLC IN MH XJ3 L SPLICE /YI4 2XD MCC SPLICE IN MH XJ3 i SPLICE /VJ5 2CB MCC SPLICE IN MH XJ3 SPLICE /YX3 MCC 2XB SPLC IN MH XJ2 I SwGR 2C/AC6 2C 4KV SWGR CKT AC6 t SwGR 2C/ACB 2C 4KV SWGR CKT AC8 TERM BOX / GAS DG4 TERM BOX . TERM BOX /RN5 TERM BOX FUEL STORAGE TK 4 l TERM CAB 1XU-40/JH7 TERM CAB FOR E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB 2XU-14/JI9 TERM CAB ED GEN SYS TERM CAB 2XU-42/ JIB TERM CAB FOR E4 EB ED XU-42 TERM CAB XU-14 TERM CAB EB JB0 JNO [ TERM CAB XU-40 TERM CAB E2 DIV 2 TERM CAB XU-42 TERM CAB E3 DIV 1 { i
PAGE 3 CAROIINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS ,
<< EB4 e>
TABLE 3.5 - 44 SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION TERM CAB /JK3 TERM CAB VA RB CB XU-28 TERM CAB /JU3 TERM CAB EB XU-25 TERM CAD /JU5 U=2 FIRE PROT LOGIC CAB TRIP CAB XU-63 TRIP CAB ECCS 1 XU-63 TRIP CAB XU-64 TRIP CAB ECCS 2 XU-64 } l 5 [ t i t t e m % + - y ~
f (m./
.1- )
PAGE-1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< DC o TABLE 3.5 - 45 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
============== ============================== ==================== ==================== =========
BQTT2R7 1A-1 250V UPPER BAT RACK 1A-1 BATTERY CHARGER 1A-1 N/A CB-7 SQTTERY 1A-2 250V LOWER BAT RACK 1A-2 BATTERY CHARGER 1A-2 N/A CB-7 BATTERY IB-1 250V UPPER BAT RACK IB-1 BATTERY CHARGER 18-1 N/A CB-B SQTTERY 18-2 250V LOWER BAT RACK 18-2 BATTERY CHARGER 18-2 N/A CB-B BATTERY CHARGER 1A-1 BATTERY CHARGER 1A-1 MCC ICA N/A CB-7 OQTTERY CHARGER 1A-2 BATTERY CHARGER 1A-2 MCC ICA N/A CB-7 uaTTERV CHARGER 10-1 125V BAT CHARGER IB-1 MCC ICB N/A CB-8 r HATTERY CHARGER 18-2 125V BAT CHARGER 1B-2 MCC 100 N/A CB-8 MCC InDA 1XDA 400 MCC CMT BIO SWBD 1A N/A RB1-N MCC inDB IXOB 480 MCC CKT B30 SWOD 18 N/A RB1-5 PNL 10 DC DISTR PNL 1A SWBD 1A N/A DG-11 PNL 18 DC DISTR PNL 18 SWBD 18 N/A OG-12 PNL 30 125V DC. DISTR PNL 3A SWBC 1A N/A CB-23E PNL 38 125V DC DISTR PNL 3B SWBD 18 N/A CB-23E SWBD to DC DISTR SWBD 1A CMT GK1 BATTERY 1A-1 N/A CB-7 BATTERY 1A-2 N/A SwSD *B DC DISTR SWBD 18 CKT GM2 BATTERY IB-1 N/A CB-B ' BATTERY 18-2 I L i A
k .. PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUN5w!CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENTS
<< DC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 46 5UPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION - INTERFACE /XNO INTERFACE + OB TERM BOX MCC ICA/COS ICA 480V MCC CKT C05 MCC ICA/C06 1CA 480V MCC CKT C06 MCC ICB/C56 1CD 480V MCC CKT C56 MCC ICB/C57 1CB 480V MCC CKT C57 SPLICE BOX /A48 SPLICE box . SPLICE BOM/W44 SPLICE box SPLICE Box /w46 SPLICE BOX SwBD 1A/GKO DC DIST SWBD 1A CKT GKO SwBD 1A/GK3 DC DIST SWBD 1A CKT GKO swBD 10-1/GM1 DC OIST SWBD 18 CRT GM1 SwBD IB-1/GM4 DC DIST SwBD IB CKT Gb4 i I i e 1
.e .. - , , .-w- -
. _ .7
PAGE 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANV BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
<< DC n TABLE 3.5 - 47 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SOURCE CONTROL SOURCE FIRE AREA
==================== ============================== ==================== ==================== ===============
BQTTERY 2A-1 250V UPPER BAT 9ACK 2A-1 BATTERY CHARGER 2A-1 N/A CB-9' BOTTERY 2A-2 250V LOWER BAT RACK 2A-2 BATTERY CHARGER 2A-2 N/A CB-9 BQTTERY 28-1 250V UPPER BAT AACK 28-1 BATTERY CHARGER 28-1 N/A CB-10 , BATTERY 2B-2 250V LOWER BAT RACK 28-2 BATTERY CHARGER 28-2 N/A CB-10 BQTTERY CHARGER 2A-1 125V BAT CHARGER 2A-1 MCC 2CA N/A CB-9 SQTTERY CHARGER 2A-2 125V BAT CHARGER 2A-2 MCC 2CA N/A CB-9 BQTTERY CHARGER 29-1 125V BAT CHARGER 28-1 MCC 2CB N/A CB-10 UATTERY CHARGER 28-2 125V BAT CHARGER 28-2 MCC 2CB N/A CB-10 mR C 2nDA 2XDA 480 MCC CKT 890 SWBD 2A N/A RB2-N MCC 2nDB 2XDB 480 MCC CKT B30 SWBD 28 N/A RB2-5 PNL 2Q DC DISTR PNL 2A SWBD 2a N/A DG-13 PNL 28 DC DISTR PNL 28 SWBD 2B N/A DG-14 PNL 4Q 125V DC DISTR PNL 4A SWBD 2A N/A CB-23E PNL 48 125V DC DISTR PNL 48 SWBD 28 N/A CB-23E Sw3D 2A DC DISTR SwSD 2A CKT GK1 BATTERY 2A-1 N/A CB-g BAT 1ERY 2A-2 . SwSD 2B DC DISTR SWBD 2B CKT GM2 BATTERY 28-1 N/A CB-10 BATTERY 28-2 k f
h (. t l' 1 COROLING POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SUPPORT COMPONENT 5
<< DC >>
TABLE 3.5 - 48 . r i SUPPORTING COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SPLICE BOX /A48 SPLICE BOX i ! i I r I r y t t 1
, - + - * - - . .~.
. _ ~ . . _ . ._ ._ ._ _- ._ _ _ . - _ _ . - _-_ . . . . . _ .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY.
- .es BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-49 l l l l l COMPONENT NUMBER I REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD l l (1) l l l l
l l l l-1 I I I I l 1-B21-F013A l NONE l Post-fire opening of l l l 1-B21-F013B l NONE I associated breaker for I l 1-B21-F013C l NONE I valves.A through L. l l 1-B21-F013D l NONE l l l l l-B21-F013E i NONE l l ) i 1-B21-F013F l NONE l l j l 1-B21-F013G l NONE l l l l-B21-F013H l NONE l l l l 1-B21-F013J l NONE l l ! l- 1-B21-F013K l NONE l l l 1-B21-F013L l NONE l l j l i l l l l 1-B21-F022A l 1-821-F028A l Post-fire operator l l 1-B21-F022B l 1-B21-F028B l action at distribution I
'g' I 1-B21-F022C I 1-B21-F028C l panels 3A circuit 12 1
i 1-B21-F022D 1 1-B21-F028D I 125V dc, and 3B circuit I l
l l l 12 125V de, by opening i l l l circuit breakers l l l l associated with the l l l l MSIVs, and power- l l l l distribution panel l ; I I l P622 120V ac 60 HZ, I l l l and power distribt' lon l l 'l l panel P623 120V ac l l l l 60 HZ by opening nev l l- l l l circuit breakers ! l l l associated with the i l l l MSIVs. Isolate the l l- l l 120V ac, 60 HZ feeds l l l I to both valves by .I l l 1 opening new installed i i l i breakers. I I I I I l 1-B21-F016 1 1-B21-F019 l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 1-B21-F019 and l l l l repower MVD-F020 and I , l l l MVD-F021 from train "B" l
- l l l MCCs. I j
j L_ l l l - f Page 1 of 3
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1 n HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-49 (continued) l I I I l COMPONENT NUMBER l REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD l l (1) l l l
.I l' I I i l I I i
-l- 1-B21-F003 l l-B21-F004 I Pre-fire opening of l 1 I I associated breaker. I 1 I I I l l-Ell-F009 l l-Ell-F008 l Pre-fire power isolation l l I l on one of the RHR l <
l shutdown cooling I : l l l l l isolation valves by I l l I keeping respective MCC l l l l' breaker in the locked l I l l open position. (Lock l l l l open breaker 850 at ! l l l MCC 1XDB 125/250V dc. l l l l or breaker DH3 at l l l l MCC 1XA 480V ac during I ,
- l normal plant operation.) l i l l l l l l l-G31-F033 I l-G31-F034 l Modify the control cir- l 7 I l I cuits for 1-G31-F004 1 !
i l l l to allow operation from I l l- l the respective-MCCs. ! , I i l l i 1-G31-F033 I l-G31-F035 l Add local control l I l I capability to 1-G31-F004.1 ; I I I I ; I l-Ell-F052A l l-Ell-F051A l Pre-fire isolation of l l l l 480V ac to F052A. I l I i (Lock open the breaker l l l l DG4 at MCC 1XA 480V ac i l l l during normal plant I
- l. I l operation.) I l' l l I I
l l-Ell-V32 i NONE I Pre-fire rack out l I l l action at MCC 1XA by l l l I opening circuit breaker l l l l DG3. I I I I I 1 I I i L 1 i l w-Page 2 of 3 i i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ -
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY , BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 1
-s HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-49 (continued) i I I I l COMPONENT NUMBER l REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD l l (1) l l l l_ l l I I I i l l 1-Ell-V33 l NONE I Pre-fire rack out l l l l action at MCC 1XB by l i
1 l I opening circuit. breaker I l l l DMg. I I I I I I l-Ell-V35 l 1-El'. '6 l Pre-fire isolation of I ; I l l 480V ac to either V35 l ! l l l or V36. (Lock open i i i l I the breaker DG9 at 1 I l l MCC 1XA 480V ac or l l l l breaker DH0 at MCC l l l l lXA 480V ac during l l l 1 normal plant operation.) l I I I I 9 l I l-Ell-F0528. I I l-Ell-F051B ll 480V Pre-fire isolatifg)of ac to F052B l l l l l l l (Lock open the breaker I i l l l DN0 at MCC 1XB 480V ac l l l l l during normal plant i l l l operation.) l I I I I l l-Ell-V37 l l-Ell-V38 l Pre-fire isolation of I d l l l 480V ac to either V37 l 1 i l or V38. (Lock open l I l l l the breaker DN7 at l ' l l l MCC 1XB 480V ac or I I i l breaker DN8 at MCC l 4 l l l 1XB 480V ac during l l l l normal plant operation.) l l l l l l l l l l-i k j ~s Page 3 of 3 I .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2
.,~
HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-50 I I I I l COMPONENT NUMBER l REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD l l (1). I l I I I I I I I I l l 2-B21-F013A l NONE I Post-fire opening of I
?-B21-F013B l
i-B21-F013C l NONE I associated breakers for l l l NONE l valves A through L. l l 2-B21-F013D l NONE l l l 2-B21-F013E l NONE l l l 2-B21-F013F l NONE l. l l 2-821-F013G l NONE l l l 2-B21-F013H l NONE I l l 2-B21-F013J l NONE l l l 2-B21-F013K l NONE i l 1 2-B21-F013L l NONE l 'l i I I I
, l 2-B21-F022A l 2-B21-F028A l Post-fire operator l ;
. cg 1 2-B21-F022B l 2-B21-F028B l action at distribution I *
) l 2-B21-F022C l 2-B21-F028C l panels 4A circuit 12 1 1 l 2-B21-F022D l 2-B21-F028D I 125V de, and 4B circuit j I l l 12 125V de, by opening i i i l I circuit breakers I i i l I associated with the i l l l MSIVs, and power I i l l l distribution panel I i l l P622 120V ac 60 HZ, I i 1 1 and power distribution I ,
l l l panel P623 120V ac l ! I l l 60 HZ by opening new I ! l l l circuit breakers I ; I l l associated with the l l l l l MSIVs. Isolate the l I l l l 120V ac, 60 HZ feeds l l 1 l l to both valves by l l l l opening new installed l l l l breakers. I I I I i l 2-B21-F016 l 2-B21-F019 l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-B21-F019. l l l l - 1 l 2-B21-F003 l 2-B21-F004 I Pre-fire opening of l 1 l-1 I associated breakers. l l l l l 2-Ell-F009 l 2-Ell-F008 l Pre-fire opening of I ; ss l l l associated breakers. I l I I i Page 1 of 4 1
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK' STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 ; i- HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION . TABLE 3.5-50 (continued) ' I I I l l COMPONENT NUMBER l REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD l l l (1) l l l l l l l I I . I I I 2-G31-F033 l 2-G31-F034 l Add local control capa- l l 1 l bility to 2-G31-F004. I l ! l l l 2-G31-F033 1 2-G31-F035 l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. l. l l l I
,1 2-Ell-F052A I 2-Ell-F051A l Pre-fire isolation of i 1 l l I 480V ac to F052A. l I I I I l 2-Ell-V32 l NONE l Pre-fire opening of I ;
-l l l breaker at MCC by I !
l l- l l opening circuit breaker. I L I I I I l l 2-Ell-V33 l NONE l Pre-fire opening of I l i l I breaker at MCC by I ! l , f. 1 opening circuit breaker.- ; , i 2-Ell-V35 l 2-E11-V36 I Pre-fire isolation of l i l i l l 480V ac to either V35 l i i l i or V36. (Lock open I 1 l l l the breaker DG9 at l l l l l MCC 1XA 480V ac or I I l 'l l l breaker DH0 at MCC l l l l l l 1XA 480V ac during I 1 l l l l normal plant operation.) l l l- 1 I I l l-l l 2-Ell-F052B l l 2-Ell-F051B ll 480V Pre-fire isolati9g)of ac to F052B . l I i l l l (Lock open the breaker l l l l DN0 at MCC IXB 480V ac l l l l l during normal plant I l I l operation.) I l' I I i , i 2-Ell-V37 1 2-Ell-V38 l Pre-fire isolation of I i i l l 480V ac to either v37 l l l l or V38. (Lock open l l l l the' breaker DN7 at l l l l MCC 1XB 480V ac or i I ' l l l breaker DN8 at MCC l l l l 1XB 480V ac during l
, l l l normal plant operation.) I s_). I ! ! l l l l l l
Page 2 of 4 l L - - - -
CAROLINA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANT BRUNSW1CK STEAM ELECT).!C PLANT - UNIT 2 HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-50 (continued) l l l l l COMPONENT NUMBER l REDUNDANT COMPONENT l RESOLUTION METHOD I I l (1) l l l l l l l l l I I l l 2-G31-33A 1 2-G31-8A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I l l l l l 2-G31-33A l 2-G31-53A l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I
- 1 I I I l 2-G31-43A I 2-G31-42A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I I I I i 2-G31-45A I 2-G31-44A l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. l I I I I I 2-G31-34A l 2-G31-10A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I
- -s l I I I .
l } l 2-G31-38A 1 2-G31-37A l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. 1 i i l l l 2-G31-38A l 2-G31-11A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I I I I l l 2-G31-29A l 2-G31-12A I Add local control capa- l l l l bility co 2-G31-F004. I I I I I l 2-G31-30A I 2-G31-13A l Add local control capa- l ' l l I bility to 2-G31-F004. I I I I I l 2-G31-30A I 2-G31-7A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. l I I I I l 2-G31-30A l 2-G31-7A l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I I I I , 1 2-G31-33B l 2-G31-8B l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. 1 I I I l l 2-G31-33B l 2-G31-53B l Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I l l l l 2-G31-43B l 2-G31-42B I Add local control capa- I
, I l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I s-- 1 I I I Page 3 of 4
CAROLINA POWER & LZGHT COMPANY l BRUNSW1CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 ' I n. HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE RESOLUTION TABLE 3.5-50 t (continued)
.x l I I I .
l COMPONENT NUMBER I REDUNDANT COMPONENT l ' RESOLUTION METHOD l l' (1) l i i l l I l l .
.I I l l 2-G31-45B l 2-G31-44B l Add local control capa- l
- l. l l bility to 2-G31-F004. 1 I I I I 1 l' 2-G31-34B l 2-G31-10B l Add local control capa- l l' l- l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I l I ( l l 2-G31-38B l 2-G31-37B i Add local control capa- l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. l l 1 i I l
! l 2-G31-38B l 2-G31-11B l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I I l .-2-G31-29B l 2-G31-128 l Add local control capa- l l l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I , J l' I I I e 1 2-G31-30B l 2-G31-13B l Add local control capa- l
!. l l l bility to 2-G31-F004. I 1 I I I ! .; '
l i 2-G31-30B l 2-G31-7B l Add local control capa- l-E l l I bility to 2-G31-F004. I j l i I I l l > l-i b I-l l v Page 4 of 4
. ~ - . . . - - - . - - . .
. . - ~ . - - - . - - - - - . - . - - . - ..... .- - -
1 a i TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 4 L l l SECTION PAGE
- 4. APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE
SUMMARY
...................... 4-1 i
4.1 Introduction ...................................... 4-1 , 4.2 Compliance' Status ................................. 4-2 l 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown .............. 4-2 l 4.4 Exemptions ........................................ 4-4 4.5 References ........................................ 4-6 TABLES 4.1-1 Modification Summary - Unit 1 SW ................... 1 l Unit 2 SW ................... 2 L Unit 1 ADS .................. 3 l Unit 2 ADS .................. 4 Unit.1 PMI .................. 5 : Unit 2 PMI .................. 6 Unit 1 HPCI ................. 7 l x Unit 2 HPCI ................. 8 ( ,,- Unit 1 EPS .................. 9 Unit 2 EPS .................. 10 Unit 1 RCIC ................. 11 i Unit 2 RCIC ................. 12 Unit 1 RHR ................... 13 i Unit 2 RHR .................. 14 l l l FIGURES l l 4.1-1 Typical Circuit Modifications - Add Isolation Switch and Fuses ! 4.1-2 Typical Circuit Modifications - New Control Power Fuses 4.1-3 Typical circuit Modifications - Move Limit Switches 4.1-4 Typical Circuit Modifications - New Alternate Power Source 4.1-5 sh.-1 of 2 Typical Circuit Modifications - Isolation of Valve Interlocks y 4.1-5 sh. 2 of 2 Typical Circuit Modifications - Isolation of Valve L Interlocks 4.1-6 Typical Circuit Modifications - Additional Fuses for 4.16kV Switchgear 4.1-7 Typical Circuit Modifications - Fuse Isolation of Device in System Logic i. i Page 1 of 1
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA i
- 4. APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE
SUMMARY
4.1 Introduction i This section discusses plant fire. areas and safe shutdown ; systems not in compliance with Appendix R Section III.G f separation criteria [1] and identifies feasible methods for achieving conformance. For tne ~ areas identified as not in conformance, the following compliance methods have been ! considered in meeting the objectives of Section III.G.1: # (1) Design basis protective features as specified in
.Section III.G.2 (a), (b), (c); or
- 05) (2) Alternative shutdown capability per Section III.G.3; or j x_/ -
(3) Exemption under 10 CFR 50.12.[2]
- _ Implementation of modifications to meet Section III.G.2 criteria, where adequate separation does not. presently exist, is not considered feasible in'certain plant areas for the following reasons:
(1) Construction of three-hour-rated barriers is difficult or unfeasible with potentially serious ramifications on other plant systems, structures and overall plant safety (e.g., seismic loading, HVAC, etc.); and (2) Rerouting of cables outside the fire area of concern.or :' to achieve in. excess of 20 feet of open space-from a redundant circuit is either not feasible or cost-prohibitive. Page 4-1
BSEP
- m REVISION 0 ASCA As a result of these considerations, three basic options were identified for achieving compliance in fire areas where Appendix R separation is not achieved:
l (1) An alternative shutdown approach relying on remote operation of equipment from dedicated alternative safe shutdown control stations and local operator actions as a redundant method for Control Room control on a selective component basis; (2) Exemptions based on either existing protection or proposed modifications; or (3) Combinations of the above options. For each safe shutdown system, the proposed modifications for achieving safe shutdown are described in Table 4.1-1. l l Section 6 presents the alternative shutdown methods for achieving l each prescribed safe shutdown performance goal. Sections 5 and 7 l contain the proposed fire protection modifications and exemption ! requests, respectively. - 4.2 Compliance Status Table 1.5-1 lists BSEP safe shutdown fire areas and the method of compliance with Appendix R Section III.G criteria. 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown A fire in selected fire areas may preclude achievement of many safe shutdown functions when analyzed according to the l criteria of Appendix R. The fire areas below, with the affected l unit identified, reflect the need for alternative shutdown. , These areas include: M kW Page 4-2
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA m (1) Service Water Building SW-1 (Units 1 & 2) (2) Diesel Generator Building DG-1 (Units 1 & 2) DG-2 (Units 1 & 2) DG-3 (Unit 2) DG-4 (Unit 1) DG-5 (Units 1 & 2) DG-6 (Unit 1) DG-7 (Units 1 & 2) DG-8 (Unit 2) DG-9 (Unit 2) DG-ll (Units 1 & 2) DG-12 (Unit 1) DG-13 (Unit 2) DG-14 (Units 1 & 2) DG-19 (Unit 1) DG-20 (Unit 1) DG-21 (Unit 2) DG-22 (Unit 2)
, (3) Turbine-Building TB1 (Units 1 & 2)
(4) Reactor Building Unit 1 RB1-1 RB1-6 (5) Reactor Building Unit 2 RB2-1 RB2-6 (6) Control Building CB-1 (Unit 1) CB-2 (Unit 2) CB-7 (Unit 1) CB-8 (Unit 1) CB-9 (Unit 2) CB-10 (Unit 2) CB-23E (Units 1 & 2) (7) East Yard (Units 1 & 2) J Page 4-3
i l BSEP l ~_. REVISION 0 ASCA i For th*=e plant fire areas, an alternative shutdown approach is proposed for compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.3. A description of the required modifications is providec in Table 4.1-1. I 4.4 Exemptions Based on this study, 11 exemption requests have been identified as being required to achieve compliance with Appendix R Section III requirements: three exemptions are being requested from Section III.G.3 full area suppression requirements, seven are being requested from III.G.2 requirements, and one exemption is being requested from III.J requiremen*5 The exemption requests, described in detail in Section 7, w include a description of the request, a description of the area
~
of concern, a description of the safe shutdown equipment affected, and a summary of the bases justifying the request. The following is a summary of the exemption requests: (1) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area RB1-1; (2) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area RB1-6; (3) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area RB2-1; (4) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area RB2-6; (5) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area DG-1; 1 i l s_/ l Page 4-4
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA r% (6) Exemption from the III.G.2 separation requirements for Fire Area SW-1; (7) Exemption from the III.G.2 suppression requirements for Fire Area DG-8; (8) Exemption from the III.G.3 suppression requirements for Fire Area TBl; (9) Exemption from the III.G.3 requirement for providing fixed suppression for Fire Areas CB-1, CB-7, CB-8, CB-9, CB-10, CB-23E, DG-6, DG-7, DG-8, DG-9, DG-ll, DG-12, DG-13 and DG-14; (10) Exemption from the III.G.3 requirements for providing detection and suppression for Fire Area East Yard; (11) Exemption from the III.J requirement for providing emergency lighting in the East Yard. 4.5 Modifications In order to provide the alternative shutdown capability for the BSEP plant, a number of plant modifications have been I
..- identified. These modifications are listed by safe shutdown system in Table 4.1-1. This table also identifies the circuit modification (mod) type (if applicable) and Figures 4.1-1 to 4.1-7 show the details of the modifications by type and provide a description of the purpose of the modification.
s-Page 4-5
l f l l BSEP l REVISION 0 ASCA ! 4.6 References i ) 1. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix l R, " Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities i Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." Revised as of I 1983. t i 2. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50.12, ! " Specific Exemptions." Revised as of 1983. l l 4
,e l
l l l l t l l e 1 -" Page 4-6
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: SW l Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Modify existing local capability in B,G order to provide complete isolation from the fire area of concern and provide backup control power for the following components: 1-Ell-F002B, 1-E11-F068B, 1-SW-V105, 1-SW-Vll7, 1-SW-V255, NSWP 1B. ,1
- 2. Add new local control switches for A,C rg 1-Ell-F068A, 1-Ell-F073 and 1-SW-V102. '
~
.Also, modify control circuit for 1-SW-V102 to preclude spurious operation.
- 3. Provide manual operation capability for N/A !
NSWP 1A and CSWP 1C discharge strainers. l l
- 4. Arid manual lube water supply valve. N/A
- 5. Modify NSWP 1A and CSWP 1C control E,F circuits to allow pump start independent of fire area of concern.
I
- 6. Add coordinated fuses for AE7-XN1/3, H l AFO-XN1/5 and A71-XN1/B. I l
1 l
~. Page 1 of 14 1
CAROLINA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: SW c Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Modify existing local capability in B,G l order to provide complete isolation l from the fire area of concern and provide backup control power for the following components: 2-Ell-F002B, 2-Ell-F068B, 2-SW-V105, 2-SW-V117, 2-SW-V255, NSWP 28. 1 J l 2. Add new local control switches for A,C l 2-Ell-F068A,.2-Ell-F073 and 2-SW-V102.
t Also, modify control circuit for l l 2-SW-V102 to preclude _ spurious operation. 1
'~5 3.
Provide manual operation capability for N/A
.NSWP 2B and CSWP 2A discharge strainers.
- 4. Add manual lube water supply valve. N/A l 5. Modify NSWP 2B and CSWP 2A control E,F circuits to allow pump start independent l of fire area of concern.
L l 1 i ! I l l ! l i l l l i i ' -- Page 2 of 14 l
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
-m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: ADS j Typical Description Mod Type ; i
- 1. Reroute cables for 1-B21-F013F in N/A order to provide operation with train A.
l w.s Page 3 of 14
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY __ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1'& 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
j TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 2 ! SYSTEM: ADS r i Typical . Description Mod Type
- 1. Provide air accumulators for N/A 2-B21-F013B, 2-B21-F013E, 2-B21-F013G as required.
- 2. Reroute cables for 2-B21-F013F in N/A >
order to provide operation with train A. S s n .. ! l i-1 L i i l J Page 4 of 14 l
CAROLINA POWER S LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: PMI Typical Description Mod Type l
- 1. Add new reactor water level indicator N/A l and reactor pressure transmitter and l indicator for Remote Shutdown Panel.
- 2. Change RTGB-1-CAC-LR-2602 to a train A N/A power. supply. !
m, Page 5 of 14
CAROLINA POWER S LIGHT COMPANY
._, BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: PMI Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Add new reactor water level indicator N/A and reactor pressure transmitter and indicator for Remote Shutdown Panel.
- 2. Change RTGB-2-CAC-LR-2602 to a train A N/A power supply.
*up l
l I 1 i l l l l I l
'~'
Page 6 of 14 )
. . _ _ . . ~ . _ . - _ _ . - _ _ - _ . . _ . _ . . . . . - . _ _ _ . _ .. -._. . . _ . _ ._ _ t
.CAROLfNA POWER & LfGHT COMPANY
, , , - BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: HPCI Typical , Description Mod Type '
- 1. Modify high water' level relays N/A '
1-E41-K45 and 1-B21-14B to prevent loss of trip function.. *
- 2. Provide fuses to isolate 1-E41-LS-N015B H from the fire area of concern.
-3. Provide alternate power source and D local control switches for 1-E41-F002 and 1-E41-F079. !
- 4. Modify 1-E41-F079 and 1-E41-F002 C i
,,rs control circuit to preclude. spurious operation.
- 5. Modify HPCI B logic to prevent spurious N/A trips of system and permit 1-E41-F042- l operation. j i
l l Page 7 of 14 1 _ __ l
- . . . _ _ . . _ _ _ . . . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ . . . . . _ . . - _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ..~ ___ _ _ _ _
CAROLZNA POWER S LfGHT COMPANY
,., BRUNSWICK ~ STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 i MODIFICATION-
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 i UNIT: 2 , SYSTEM: HPCI l l Typical Description Mod Type l~ l 1. Modify high water level. relays N/A l 2-E41-K45 and 2-B21-14B to prevent loss of trip function. I 2. Provide fuses to isolate 2-E41-LS-N015B H from the fire area of concern. l 3. Provide alternate power source and. D local control capability for 2-E41-F002 > L and 2-E41-F079. l 4. Modify 2-E41-F079 and 2-E41-F002 C l ,_ control circuit to preclude spurious i
. operation. r
~/
l 5. Modify HPCI B logic to prevent spurious N/A : trips of system and permit 2-E41-F042 operation. l l l ' l i i l L l i I s_/ I Page 8 of 14 l
CAROLfNA POWER & L1GHT COMPANY
, . -.. BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 i SYSTEM: EPS I Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Modify existing local control B,G capability in order to provide complete isolation from the fire area of concern and backup control power for El-AE6, El-AFB, E2-AH1, E2-AG4, ES-AU9, E6-AV4, DGl exhaust fan and DG2 exhaust fan.
- 2. Provide alternate source of power and D manual transfer switch for battery chargers 1B-1 and 1B-2.
m J Page 9 of 14
CAROLfNA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
,, BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: EPS Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Modify existing local control B,G capability in order to provide complete isolation from the fire area of concern and backup control power for E3- AJ0, E3-AI2, E4-AJ9, E4-AK7, E7-AZl, E8-AZ5, DG3 exhaust fan and DG4 exhaust fan.
- 2. Provide alternate source of. power and D manual transfer switch for battery chargers 2B-1 and 2B-2.
[ s-l i Page 10 of 14 l i
CAROLINA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY
~, BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: RCIC Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. Modi. existing local control N/A capobility in order to provide complete isolation from the fire area of concern and backup control power for 1-E51-V8, 1-E51 Vacuum Pump, 1-E51 Condensate Pump, 1-E51-F008, 1-E51-F010, 1-E51-F012, 1-E51-F013, 1-E51-F019, 1-E51-F029, 1-E51-F031, 1-E51-F045 and 1-E51-F046.
- 2. Add local control switches for A 1-E51-F066 and 1-E51-F022.
A. 1 3. Provide alternate power source and D
~' local control capability for 1-E51-F007 and 1-E51-F062.
- 4. Modify control circuit for 1-E51-F007 C and 1-E51-F062 to preclude spurious operation.
- 5. Modify control circuit for RCIC turbine N/A by wiring limit switches from steam inlet valve directly to turbine controls.
- 6. Provide separate power supply for remote N/A shutdown panel instruments, i 7. Provide new dc control source and add N/A an inverter for RCIC flow control instruments on the remote shutdown panel.
- 8. Add fuses to isolate CST level switches H
( in the RCIC control logic. Page 11 of 14
.- . . - - - - - . . . - - _ ~ . - - - ~ - - - - . _ - . - - . . . _ ,
CAROLINA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY f BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: RCIC l t Typical Description Mod Type
- 1. - Modify existing local control N/A .
capability in order to provide complete isolation from the fire , area of concern and backup control power for 2-E51-V8, 2-E51 Vacuum Pump, ! 2-E51 Condensate Pump, 2-E51-F008, ! 2-E51-F010, 2-E51-F012, 2-E51-F013, 2-E51-F019, 2-E51-F029, 2-E51-F031, 2-E51-F045 and 2-E51-F046. t
- 2. Add local control switches for 2-E51-F066 A and 2-E51-F022.
l /'d 3. Provide alternate power source and local control capability for 2-E51-F007 and D 2-E51-F062. l
- 4. Modify control circuit for 2-E51-F007 C and 2-E51-F062 to preclude spurious operation.
- 5. Modify control circuit for RCIC turbine N/A by wiring limit switches from steam inlet valve directly to turbine controls.
- 6. Provide separate power supply for remote N/A shutdown panel instruments.
l 7. Provide new dc control source and add an N/A ! inverter for RCIC flow control instruments j on the' remote shutdown panel, l
- 8. Add fuses to isolate CST level switches in H 1
I the RCIC control logic.
- l i
*' Page 12 of 14 i
CAROLINA POWER 6 LZGHT COMPANY I
, ~ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
TABLE 4.1-1 UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: RHR i Typical Description Mod Type I i
- 1. Modify existing local control B (
capability in order to provide i complete isolation from the fire ! area of concern and backup control power for 1-B32-F023B, 1-Ell-F003B, 1-Ell-F0048, 1-Ell-F004D, 1-Ell-F006B, 1-Ell-F006D, 1-Ell-F015B, 1-Ell-F020B, 1 1-Ell-F0168, 1-Ell-F024B, 1-Ell-F027B, 1-Ell-F028B, 1-Ell-F047B, 1-Ell-F048B,
- RHR Area Cooling Fan 1B.
- 2. Provide alternate power supply and D local control switches for 1-Ell-F008
#I'\ and modify existing alternate power / supply'and local control switches for 1-Ell-F009.
- 3. Add local control capability for 1-Ell-F007B. A
- 4. Modify control circuit to preclude C !
spurious operation for 1-Ell-F016B, 1-Ell-F017B and 1-Ell-F023.
- 5. Add fuses to 1-Ell-C002B and 1-Ell-C002D H control circuit to isolate MCC 1XA.
- 6. Add fuses to RHR A control logic to H isolate 1-Ell-F008.
- 7. Add coordinated fuses for AE7-XN1/3, H AF0-XN1/5, AF1-XN1/B and AE7-XN1/2. l l
Page 13 of 14
.. .. . . . - .-_ .- . . . .- . - - . . . - . . - - - _ _~ -,
li CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 l MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
l TABLE 4.1-1 l UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: RHR l Typical i Description Mod Type
- 1. Modify existing local control B l capability.in order to provide
( complete isolation from the fire area of concern and backup control power for 2-B32-F023B, 2-Ell-F003B, l 2-Ell-F0048, 2-Ell-F004D, 2-Ell-F006B, 2-Ell-F006D, 2-E11-F015B, 2-Ell-F020B, 2-Ell-F016B, 2-Ell-F024B, 2-Ell-F027B, , 2-Ell-F028B, 2-E13-F0478, 2-Ell-F0488, l RHR Area Cooling Fan 2B. ! i l 2. Provida alternate power supply and D I _, local control switches for 2-Ell-F008 and modify existing alternate power supply and local control switches for l 2-Ell-F009.
- 3. Add local control capability for 2-Ell-F007B. A i l
- 4. Modify control circuit to preclude C l spurious operation for 2-Ell-F016B, '
2-Ell-F017B and 2-Ell-F023.
- 5. Add fuses to 2-Ell-C002B and 2-Ell-C002D H control circuit to isolate MCC 2XA.
- 6. Add fuses to RHR A control logic to H isolate 2-Ell-F008.
l 1
'~'
Page 14 of 14 I 1 i - -
a
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400v MCC 49 l , sa . . a . 98 l "s
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. .s
@@+ *
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, g g .. 33 33 33 33 ALVE , > q w'
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- ~
NOTES: (1) THIS CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC REFERS ONLY TO THOSE PORTIONS OF TH E CONTROL CIRCUlT REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. (2) THE ADDITION OF THE RS SWITCH PROVIDES ISOLATION OF PORTIONS OF THE CONTROL CIRCulT ROUTED BACK TO THE CONTROL ROOM. THE RCS SWITCH IS LOCATED AT THE RESPECTIVE MCC COMPARTMENTS AND ALLOWS LOCAL OPERATION OF THE DEVICE. (3) THESE FUSE MODIFICATIONS ACCOMPLISH TWO GOALS: (a) THE FUSE NEAR THE CONTROL TRANSFORMER IS NORMALLY SWITCHED OUT OF THE CONTROL CIRCUlT. THIS FUSE PROVIDES NEW CONTROL POWER TO THE CIRCULI AFTER THE CIRCULI HAS BEEN ISOLATED. (b) THE FUSE LOC AIED BELOWTHE INDICATING LIGHTS WILL PREVENT A HOT SHORT ON THE FUSE SIDE OF THESE LIGHTS FROM DAMAGING THE GROUNDED CONTROL CIRCUlT CONDUCTOR. l THESE FUSES ARE LOCATED AT THE RESPECTIVE MCCs. KEY: MOD TYPE A G FUSE i K AUTO VALVE OPERATION CONTACTS sRuNswicx stepppEcmc PLANT h CE CONTROL SWITCH (CONTROL ROOM) H CAROLINA POWER & LPGHT COMPANY
$ RCS REMOTE CONTROL SWITCH N7
$kPABi SESS
% Rg REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH
- DENOT'ES MODIFICATIONS TYPICAL CIRCult MODIFICATIONS.
ADD ISOLATION SWITCH AND FUSES 9 LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM FIGURE 41 1 1 33 LIMIT SWITCH r
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NOTES: (1) THIS CIRCUlT SCH EM ATIC REFERS ON LY TO THOSE PORTION S OF THE CONTROL CIRCUIT l REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. (2) THESE FUSE MODIFICATIONS ACCOMPLISH TWO GOALS: (a) THE FUSE NEAR THE CONTROL TRANSFORMER IS NORMALLY SWITCHED OUT OF THE CONTROL CIRCUIT. THIS FUSE PROVIDES NEW CONTROL POWER TO THE CIRCUIT AFTER THE CIRCulT HAS BEEN ISOLATED. (b) THE FUSE LOCATED BELOW THE INDICATING LIGHTS WILL PREVENT A HOT SHORT ON THE FUSE SIDE OF THESE LIGHTS FROM DAMAGING THE GROUNDED CONTROL CIRCUIT CONDUCTOR. l l THESE FUSES ARE LOCATED AT THE RESPECTIVE MCCs. KEY: MOD TYPE B FUSE DENOTES MODIFICATIONS
- h. BRUNSWICK STEAM EL ECTRIC PLANT UNITS 14 2 v' @ LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Q Q LIGHT i CYPas"t NkNEYsN j pRg REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH TYPICAL circuli MODIFICATIONS -
A NEW CONTROL POWER FUSES T 33 LIMIT SWITCH l l FIGURE 412
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NOTES: (1) THIS MODIFICATION WILL PREVENT SPURIOUS VALVE MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF A FIRE DAMAGING THE CONTROL CABLE ROUTED FROM THE MCC TO THE DEVICE.THIS IS ACCOM-PLISHED BY MOVING THE LIMIT SWITCH CONTACTS UPSTREAM OF THE NORM ALLY OPEN CONTROL ROOM SWITCH CONTACTS. (2) THIS CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC REFERS ONLY TO THOSE PORTIONS OF TH E CONTROL CIRCulT REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. KEY: MOD TYPE C g%n BRUNSMCK ST OROUE jj .^. DENOTES MODIFICATIONS u { CTAIC PLANT
" O LOCATED IN MCC cAnouNA PowEn a uoHT COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SHUtoowN l
CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT 1 33 LIMIT SWITCH 1 T $ LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM ; 1 E.s CONTROL SWITCH TYPICAL CIRCUlT MODIFICATIONS - I OPEN O LOCAL EQUIPMENT MOVE LIMIT SWITCHES FIGURE 4.13
I l i. I I i EXISTIN G POWER S MCC A CONTROL CONDUCTORS (EXISTING) EXtSTlHG POWER & 4 CONTROL CONOUCTORS
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o ! i TRANSFER MCC 8 SWITCHES ( ALTERNATE) ALTERNATE POWER 8 CCNTRCL CONDUCTORS l .m ;
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NOTES: f (1) THIS MODIFICATION ENSURESTHAT TH E DEVICE WILL STILL BE CAPABLE OF BEING OPERATED " ELECTRICALLY REGARDLESS OF THE LOCATION OF THE FIRE. l (2) THESE MCCs ARE LOCATED IN SEPARATE FIRE AREAS OR COMPLY WITH APPENDIX R SECTION lit.G. l l l l l MOD 1YPE D ; SRUNSwiCK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS t A 2 ]
! v CAROLINA POWER A LIGHT COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SHUTOOWN I
i CAPASILITY ASSESSMENT TYPICAL CIRCUlf MODIFICATIONS-NEW ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE FIGURL 4.14
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I i L_ __ _ ___ _ _ _ . _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ . .J ssa 02/s 6/s 14 Lg A /\ p/s lo /A I %M :,, - l 5 O; ... { ! NOTES: (1) THESE MODIFICATIONS ALLOW PROPER CONVENTIONAL SERVICE WATER PUMP OPERA-
' TION SHOULD THE VALVE INTERLOCK CABLES BE FIRE DAMAGED.
l (2) THIS CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC REFE RS ONLY TO THOSE PORTIONSOF TH E CONTROL CIRCUIT REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. KEY: MOD TYPE E hR g REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH O LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM BRUNSWICK STE AM ELECTRIC PLANT
, C ' FUSE % LOCATED IN SWITCHGEAR OR MCC canot,u,((n g t,GHT COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN
?
CAPABILITY ASSES $WENT
!; DENOTES MODIFICATIONS O LOCAL EQUIPMENT TYPICAL CIRCUlf MODIFICATIONS-ISOLATION OF VALVE INTERLOCKS 1 s3 PRESSURE SWITCH FIGURE 415
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u& nma Minsi'ma l (1) THESE MODIFICATIONS ALLOW PROPER NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUM P OPERATION BY l BYPASSING THE VALVE LIMIT SWITCH CABLE WHICH MAY BE FIRE DAMAGED WHEN OPERATING FROM THE SWITCHGEAR. (2) THIS CIRCULI SCH EMATIC REFERS ONLY TO THOSE PORTIONS OF TH E CONTROL CIRCulT l REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OFTHE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. l l KEY: p' DENOTES MOD TYPE F [Uj MODIFICATION i hR 3 REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH BRuNswogTNI 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY C FUSE ALTERNAYevt SHuToowN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT l @ LOCATED IN CONTROL ROOM TYPICAL circuli MODIFICATIONS - ISOLATION OF VALVE INTERLOCKS l FIGURE 4.15 l SHEET 2 OF 2
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NOTES: (1) THIS MODIFt0ATION PROVIDES NEW CONTROL POWER FOR A 4.16 KV or 480V SWITCHGEAR CUBICLE SHOULD THE NORMAL FUSE BE BLOWN BEFORE THE REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH IS PLAC'iD IN THE LOCAL POSITION. (2) THIS CIACUlT SCHEMATIC REFERS ONL Y TOTHOSE PORTIONS OF THE CONTROL CIRCUlT REQUIRING MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT.
- erg MOD TYPE G g3 DENOTES MODIFICATIONS saWNswicx sTEAu ELEcTaic PLANT FUSE UNITS 1 & 2 CAROLINA POwCR & LIGHT COMPANY R REMOTE / LOCAL SWITCH ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN S cAPAsiufv ASSESSMENT TYPICAL CIRCUlf MODIFICATIONS-ADDITIONAL FUSES FOR 416 KV SWITCHGEAR FIGURE 416
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l 1 NOTES: (1) THIS MODIFICATION ISOLATES A LOCAL DEVICE FROM THE SYSTEM LOGIC TO PREVENT BLOWING THE POWER SUPPLY FUSES FOR THE ENTIRE TRAIN OF LOGIC. l (2) TH IS CIRCUIT SCH E M ATIC ON LY S HOWS TH AT PORTION OF TH E ORIGIN AL CIRCulT WH ICH REQUIRES MODIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT. j l i MOD TYPE H 2* DENOTES MODIFICATIONS SRUNSwtCn STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
# LS LEVEL SWITCH CARot NA R & L GMT COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SMUTDOWN O FUSE cAPAsiury ASSESSMENT TYPICAL CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS .
FUSE ISOLATION OF DEVICE IN SYSTEM LOGIC FibuRE 4.17
- - - - - . . - - . . - . - . - - . . ~ . -. - . . ~ . . . . . . - - . . - . . ~ . - . . _ _
t r TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 5 1 I SECTION PAGE 1 1
- 5. PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS .............. 5-1 5.1 Introduction ........................................ 5 ;
5.2 ' Fire. Suppression .................................... 5-2 l 5.3 Halon Suppression .................................. 5-3 ) 5.4 Hatches ............................................ 5-5 5.5 Doors .............................................. 5-5 5.6 Stairwells ......................................... 5-5 l 5.7 Penetrations ........................................ 5-5 5.8 Raceway Protective System .......................... 5-6 5.9 Fire Stops ......................................... 5-8 5.10 . References ......................................... 5-10 l
+G, w . ~
l , 1 l' I 1 l 2 i 1 l l l l- 4 1. i (~ O f Page 1 of 1 l l l
i j BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA 1 i
- 5. PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS l l
l l 5.1 Introduction This section describes the various fire protection modifications proposed for fire areas containing safe shutdown equipment. These modifications meet one of the following criteria: ) i (1) The separation criteria of Section III.G.2 of Appendix i R;[1] l (2) The alternative shutdown fire protection requirements of Section III.G.3; or (3) Support an exemption application from Section III.G
. .; requirements.
l Automatic suppression system modifications are described in two sections. Subsection 5.2 describes proposed automatic water suppression system modifications and the areas where installation is proposed. Subsection 5.3 includes a description of the Halon suppression system proposed to be installed in Fire Area DG-1 in support of an exemption application. Fire protection modifications to upgrade fire barrier penetrations are discussed in Subsections 5.4 through 5.7. These modifications are intended to provide a fire rating commensurate with the anticipated equivalent fire severity of areas of concern. In general, these requirements are applied to
~
l Page 5-1 i l l 1
BSEP ) REVISION 0 ASCA those fire area barriers containing hatches, doors, stairwells l I and'other penetrations.(piping, electrical and ventilation ducts) l which may contribute to fire propagation between areas. Subsections 5.8 and 5.9 provide a description of raceways to be protected by rated barriers or fire stops. 5.2 Fire Suppression , A description of fire suppression systems to meet the requirements of Appendix R[1] is included in this section. As discussed in Section III.G.2(b) and (c) of Appendix R, fire area suppression in the area is a required feature in order to meet the separation requirements between redundant safe shutdown trains. In conformance with the requirements of Section III.G.1 of Appendix R, CP&L proposes to provide suppression systems in the following BSEP areas: , (1) 5 ft Elevation of the Reactor Building Unit 1 A single line of closed-head sprinklers will be installed above the-HPCI Room running from east to west bounded by the Reactor Building wall and the dryvell. This suppression system, in conjunction with 20 feet of horizontal separation with negligible quantities of exposed fixed intervening combustibles in the separation zone, will provide reasonable assurance that at least one safe shutdown train will remain free of fire damage. 1 (2) 20 ft Elevation of the Reactor Building Unit 1 ; i A single line of closed-head sprinklers will be installed running east to vest from the Reactor Building wall to the drywell. This fire suppression system, in conjunction with 20 feet of horizontal separation with negligible exposed fixed intervening combustibles between the redundant safe shutdown trains, will provide compliance with the separation requirements of Appendix R. s-Page 5-2
BSEP
' REVISION 0 ASCA ,
- x (3) 20 ft Elevation of the Reactor Building Unit 1 A water curtain of close-spaced closed-head sprinklers will-be installed running south to north from the Reactor Building wall to the intersection of the main i steam tunnel and the drywell. This fire suppression system will provide conformance with Appendix R separation requirements between the redundant safe shutdown trains.
, (4) 5 ft Elevation of the Reactor Building Unit 2 l A single line of closed-head sprinklers will be , installed above the HPCI Room running from east to west l bounded by the Reactor Building wall and the drywell. This suppression system, in conjunction with 20 feet of horizontal separation with negligible exposed fixed 1 ( intervening. combustibles in the separation zone, will ! l achieve the goals of the requirements of Section i III.G.1 to Appendix R. ! ( 5) 20 ft Elevation of the Reactor Building Unit 2 A single line of closed-head sprinklers will be l l
s installed running east to west from the Reactor ! ,_/ Building wall to the drywell. This fire suppression i system, in conjunction with 20 feet of horizontal l separation with negligible exposed fixed intervening i combustibles between the redundant safe shutdown trains, will meet the separation requirements of Appendix R.
Furthermore, to improve fire protection capabilities in RB1-6 and RB2-6, CP&L proposes to install one " quick response" sprinkler head between the common RHR suction valve and RCIC steam isolation valve in each area. 5.3 Halon Suppression l l In order to provide rapid fire suppression in the Diesel i DG-1),
- Generator Basement (Fire Area CP&L proposes to install a i
cross-zoned, supervised Halon 1301 suppression system. Utilizing ] NFPA-STD-12A as a guide,[2] this total flooding system will have f. i
,V i Page 5-3 1
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA
-s single shot capability and be designed to achieve and maintain a concentration of 6% by volume for a minimum 10-minute soak period. Required concentrations of Halon gas will be maintained through conventional methods of securing openings. If necessary, an extended discharge feature will also be provided.
To reduce the likelihood of accidental discharge, a cross-zoned detection arrangement will be employed to automatically actuate the suppression system. Either ionization or photoelectric smoke detectors, installed in accordance with NFPA-STD-72E[3] for ="tematic fire detectors, will be arranged such that physically adjacent detectors are in a different zone. Physical attributes of ceiling heights, ventilation, stratification and ceiling configuration will be considered in J detector location to ensure early response. The zones will be arranged such that when the first zone enters an alarm condition, i audible alarms'are actuated in both DG-1 and the Control Room permitting rapid response by plant personnel and the fire brigade. Should the second zone generate an alarm condition, the suppression system will be set to discharge immediately unless personnel in DG-1 (e.g., fire watch, fire brigade, etc.) verify a no-fire condition and manually override the actuation signal. Manual actuation devices will also be provided. Subsection 7.2.5 provides a detailed description of the Diesel Generator Building l Basement exemption request. Page 5-4
BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA
~ ~ ~'
5.4 Hatches All of the access hatches penetrating required fire har<iers at BSEP presently or will meet the fire barrier rating requirements established for the area boundary. 5.5 Doors l There are four door openings that will be upgraded to have a { fire resistance rating commensurate with the fire severity of the l fire areas on either side if determined by analysis to be inadequate. Doors to be upgraded if required are as follows: (1) Two doors between the Fire Area RB1-6 and Fire Area RB1-1 of Unit 1 located at extreme east end of the north and south walls; and (2) Two doors between the Tire Area RB2-6 and Fire Area . l Rc2-1 of Unit 2 located at extreme east end of the
- I north and south walls.
1 5.6 Stairwells Stairwells which connect different fire areas are enclosed on at least one end by three-hour-rated barriers with Class A labelled doors. There are no stairwells at BSEP which require upgrading. 5.7 Penetrations Fire area boundary penetrations in the rated fire barriers shown in the Section 2 Figures will be upgraded if required and/or justified by analysis as being acceptable. 1 l l l s_- Page 5-5 i e
1 BSEP REVIS10N 0 ASCA
.m 5.8 Raceway Protective System Several raceways require installation of fire barriers to meet the requirements of Appendix R. The locations in which fire barriers are proposed are as follows:
(1) 5 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 1 (Zone RB1-1-n L); (2) 20 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 1 2 one RBl-1-g S/W); (' (3) 20 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 1 (Zone RBl-1-g E/C S); (4) 50 ft elevation of Reactor Building Un: 2 1 (Zone RB1-1-h E/C); (5) 5 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 2 (Zone RB2-1-n L); (6) 20 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 2 (Zone RB2-1-g E/C S);
-g l
) (7) 50 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 2 i (Zone RB2-1-h E/C);
(8) 23 ft elevation of Diesel Generator Building ; (Area DG-8); (9) 50 ft elevation of Diesel Generator Building (Zone DG-16); (10) 20 ft elevation of rattle space between the Reactor and Turbine Buildings (Zones CB-Ab and CB-2b). The specific raceways requiring barriers are itemized below: (1) The dc power feeds to de distribution panel 1B and MC2 1XDB. The portion of this route located between the Turbine Building and Reactor Building walls will be enclosed in a three-hour-rated barrier which must be enclosed. The portion of the route which runs from the inside of the Unit 1 Reactor Buil. ding west wall on the 20 ft elevation to the north- auth line of sprinkler heads in the RB1-1 Exemption Request discussed in Section 7 will be enclosed in a ene-hour-rated barrier.
~'s_s Page 5-6 i
. , . .._. . .- - - - - . - - ~__ _ . . - . - . - - . . - . - .- .
I 1 BSEP j REVISION 0 ASCA (2) The de power feeds to de distribution panel 2B and MCC 2XDB. The portion of this route located between the Turbine Building and Reactor Building will be enclosed in a three-hour-rated barrier. The portion of the route which runs from the inside of the Unit 2 Reactor Building vest wall on the 20 ft elevation to the north wall of main steam tunnel will be enclosed in a three-hour-rated barrier. l (3) The power feeds to one service water pump for each unit. These power feeds will be enclosed in a one-hour-rated fire barrier where they run through the basement of the service water structure. (4) Power and control cables to common RHR suction valve and RCIC steam isolation valve in RB1-6. These cables will be enclosed with a one-hour-rated fire barrier. (5) Power and control cables to common RHR suction valve and RCIC steam isolation valve in RB2-6. These cables will be enclosed with a one-hour-rated fire barrier. (6) The new redundant power feeds for certain devices located inside the Reactor Building will be protected
"'S with a one-hour-rated fire barrier where the power feeds are. routed through the separation zones and are %> i required to ensure proper device operation regardless of the location of the fire in the Reactor Building.
Those required power feeds on the opposite train side of the separation zone will be protected with a three-hour-rated fire barrier unless sprinkler protection is provided, in which case a one-hour enclosure will be , installed. These devices are as follows: (a) 1-E51-F007, 2-E51-F007 (b) 1-E41-F002, 2-E41-F002 (c) 1-E51-F062, 2-E51-F062 (d) 1-E41-F079, 2-E41-F079 (e) 1-Ell-F008, 2-Ell-F008 (f) 1-Ell-F009, 2-Ell-F009 (7) Intervening combustibles (e.g., exposed cables within 2u ft separation) located between redundant safe shutdown equipment in DG-8 will be provided with a one-hour-rated enclosure.
'j Page 5-7 l
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA R (8) Conduits for the power and control cables for the diesel generator exhaust fans where routed.through DG-16 will be provided with a three-hour-rated enclosure. (9) All exposed cables within the east separation zone on the 50 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 1 and Unit 2 will be provided with a one-hour-rated enclosure. The material and specific design to be used in enclosing raceways will not be specified until the detailed engineering phase. The design will consider fire protection requirements as well as other issues affecting reactor safety such as structural loads and equipment qualification. 5.9 Fire Stops An issue of concern is the prevention of fire propagation between redundant safe shutdown trains. In lieu of Appendix R separation features in the Reactor Buildings, a configuration is 9s,j employed relying upon a combination of physical separation, automatic suppression and detection, and rated fire barriers. To inhibit fire propagation downward along exposed vertical cable trays and across separation zones, fire stops are proposed. Vertical trays penetrating floor slabs at different elevations of the Reactor Buildings will utilize these stops at either the top or the bottom of the slab in lieu of penetration seals. Horizontal cable trays traversing the west central zone of the 50 ft elevation of the Reactor Buildings will also be equipped with stops. s, ) Page 5-8
. . . . - . - - - - . - - . - ......- - - - . . ... ~ ... . . . .- .
BSEP REVISION 1 ASCA ? m A fire stop will be used for the cable trays in the following areas of BSEP Units 1 and 2: (1) Horizontal trays with exposed cables located in the south central zone of the 50 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 1 (RB1-1); fl
.(2) Vertical' cable trays with exposed cables penetrating the slab between the 50 ft and 80 ft elevations of the Reactor Building Unit 1 (RB1-1), if penetration seals are not provided; (3) Horizontal trays with exposed cables located in the west central zone of the 50 ft elevation of Reactor Building Unit 2 (RB2-1); and (4) Vertical cable trays with exposed cables penetrating the slab between the 50 ft and 80 ft elevations of the Reactor Building Unit 2 (RB2-1), if penetration seals are not provided.
l O, ? ~. I l l l 1 l i i l
. /
Page 5-9
,. ,. , . . _ . , . _ - .- -- -- -- ~ ~ ~ -
. . - - . ~ . - .. . _ _ ~. -_. ....- - .- -
t BSEP , REVIS10N 0 ASCA \ l 5.10 References i
- 1. Code of-Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix R, " Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power l Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." '
Revised as of 1983.
- 2. National Fire Protection Association, "Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems," NFPA-STD-12A-1980.
i l
- 3. National Fire Protection Association, " Automatic Fire Detectors," NFPA-STD-72E-1974.
- 4. National Fire Protection Association, " Fire Doors and Windows," NFPA-STD-80-1981.
t i i
.6 l
i l-l . v9 , i ! I i l 1 1
- j. !
l l l l l ! V Page 5-10
t TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 6 SECTION PAGE
- 6. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ........................ 6-1 6.1 Introduction ........................................... 6-1 6.2 Alternative Shutdown Control Stations .................. 6-3 6.2.1 Designated Alternative Control Stations ................ 6-3 6.2.2 Control Room Alternative Control Station ............... 6-6 6.3 Alternative Shutdown Method ............................ 6-7 6.3.1 Reactivity Control Alternative Shutdown ................ 6-10 6.3.2 Reactor Pressure and Level Control Alternative Shutdown ............................................. 6-11 6.3.3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Alternative Shutdown . . . . 6-12 6.3.4 Residual Heat Removal Cooling Water Alternative Shutdown ............................................. 6-13 6.3.5 Torus Cooling Alternative Shutdown ..................... 6-13 6.3.6 Shutdown Cooling Alternative Shutdown .................. 6-15 6.3.7 Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown ............ 6-16 6.3.8 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation (PMI) Alternative Shutdown ............................................. 6-17 6.4 References ............................................. 6-18 r}
TABLES 6.2-1 Alternative Shutdown Method Summary-Unit 1 SW-1 ........ 1
-Unit 2 SW-1 ........ 2
-Unit 1 TB-1 ........ 3
-Un.t i 2 TB-1 ........ 4
-Unit 1 East Yard ... 5
-Unit 2 East Yard . . . 6
-Unit 1 DG-1 ........ 7
-Unit 2 DG-1 ........ 8
-Unit 1 DG-2 ........ 9
-Unit 2 DG-2 ........ 10
-Unit 1 DG-3 ........ 11
-Unit 2 DG-3 ........ 12
-Unit 1 DG-4 ........ 13
-Unit 2 DG-4 ........ 14
-Unit 1 DG-5 ........ 15
-Unit 2 DG-5 ........ 16
-Unit 1 DG-6 ........ 17
-Unit 2 DG-6 ........ 18 i -Unit 1 DG-7 ........ 19 l
J i Page 1 of 2
. . - - . ~ - . ~ . . . . - - - _ - - . - . . - . . . _ . - - . - - . . . - . . - - . . - ~ - -
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 6 , (continued) m SECTION PAGE i 6.2-1 Alternative Shutdown Method Summary-Unit 2 DG-7 ........ 20
-Unit 1 DG-8 ........ 21
-Unit 2 DG-8 ....... 22
-Unit 1 DG-9 ........ 23
-Unit 2 DG-9 ....... 24 I
-Unit 1 DG-11 ....... 25
-Unit 2 DG-11 ....... 26
-Unit 1 DG-12 ....... 27
-Unit 2 DG-12 ....... 28
-Unit 1 DG-13 ....... 29
-Unit 2 DG-13 ....... 30
-Unit 1 DG-14 ..... , 31
-Unit 2 DG-14 ....... 32
-Unit 1 DG-19 ....... 33
-Unit 2 DG-19 ...... 34
-Unit.1 DG-20 ....... 35
-Unit 2 DG-20 ....... 36
-Unit 1 DG-21 ....... 37
-Unit 2 DG-21 ....... 38
-Unit 1 DG-22 ....... 39
-Unit 2 DG-22 ....... 40
-Unit 1 CB-7 ........ 41
/C'N -Unit 2 CB-7 ........ 42
'u/ -Unit 1 CB-8 ....... 43
-Unit 2 CB-8 ..... .. 44
-Unit 1 CB-9 ....... 45
-Unit 2 CB-9 ........ 46
-Unit 1 CB-10 ....... 47
-Unit 2 CB-10 ...... 48 ,
-Unit 1 CB-23E ...... 49
-Unit 2 CB-23E ...... 50
-Unit 1 RB1-1 A ..... 51 i
-Unit 1 RB1-1 B ..... 52
-Unit 2 RB1-2 A ..... 53
-Unit 2 RB1-2 B ..... 54
-Unit 1 RB1-6 A ..... 55
-Unit 1 RB1-6 B ..... 56 -
-Unit 2 RB2-6 A ..... 57 i
-Unit 2 RB2-6 B ..... 58 i i
t i n J Page 2 of 2 I 1
O BSED REVISION 0 ASCA
- 6. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 6.1 Introduction For the fire areas where the requirements of Section III.G.2 cannot be met, CP&L will expand its existing alternative shutdown capability in ac.nordance with Section III.G.3 to meet the performance goals of Section III.L to Appendix R.[1] This section describes the alternative shutdown capability to be implemented in order to achi' eve compliance at BSEP.
The proposed alternative shutdown capability for the safe s shutdown areas utilizes the safe shutdown systems described in i
- Subsection 3.5 of this report and the modifications described in Section 4 to the existir.g remote shutdown system to ensure the ability to meet Appendix R performance goals. The present remote shutdown capability already provides the ability to meet.much of l the safe shutdown performance goals at BSEP. The modifications proposed in this report are directed primarily at providing enhanced circuit isolation for the remote shutdown capability presently installed at BSEP.
l All equipment and cables associated with alternative shutdown capability will be separated from. the fire areas of concern in accordance with the requirements of Section III.G.2 except for the limited number of cases which are the subject of exemption requests. These exemption requests are provided in
- Section 7.
Page 6-1 i
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA The equipment and systems provided to achieve hot shutdown are capable of maintaining hot shutdown conditions with and without off-site power until cold shutdown can be achieved. The
~
alternative shutdown systems are capable of achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours. The number of qualified operations personnel required to operate such equipment and systems are available on-site at all times. Operations personnel assigned to the fire brigade are considered not available to perform safe shutdown tasks until one hour after initiation of the fire. The alternative shutdown capability will meet the requisite performance goals after implementation of the following features through modifications, rerouting or manual operations:
,~,,
s- ) (1) The capability to isolate electrical circuits of those required for operation of safe shutdown equipment; (2) The ability to remotely operate safe shutdown equipment through the use of local control switches; (3) The addition of new control power fuse circuits as necessary to operate alternative shutdown components; (4) The provision of process and diagnostic instrumentation including circuit isolation and alternative power supplies; (5) The enhancement of fire protection systems to protect these features from a fire; l (6) Mechanical equipment modifications to ensure proper l operation of safe shutdown equipment; and (7) Others as identified. i l l l V Page 6-2
-. - - . -. . . . _ - . . - - , - _ . . = - . - - . - . - - . - .
BSEP ] REVISION 0 l ASCA l Subsection 6.3 presents a function-by-function discussion of l the alternative shutdown operation. Generic Letter 81-12[2] and Clarification of Generic Letter l t
- 81-12[3] request additional information concerning specific l
I aspects of the BSEP alternative shutdown systems. The information provided in response to this request is listed in
' Appendix A of this report.
6.2 Alternative Shutdown Control Stations 1 In the event of an unmitigated fire in any of the areas of concern which has the potential to interfere with normal safe shutdown from the Control Room, operators may be required to operate the safe shutdown systems from the alternative shutdown control stations. i s-6.2.1 Designated Alternative Control Stations The major designa'ed t alternative control stations for BSEP are in the following locations: (1) RCIC and RHR Alternative Control Stations (one per unit) These control stations are located in the southeast quadrant of each Reactor Building at the 20 foot elevation. These consist of the remote. shutdown panel, MCCs, and local control panels in the immediate ; vicinity. (2) Diesel Generator Alternative Control Stations (four stations common to both units) These control stations are located in the Diesel Generator Building in the individual diesel generator i cells, i i
'# Page 6-3 1
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA m (3) 4.16kV Emergency Switchgear Alternative Control Stations (four stations common to both units) These control stations are located at the existing 4.16kV switchgear located in the Diesel Generator Building, on the 50 ft elevation. The BSEP alternative safe shutdown control locations described above have adequate separation to ensure that the control stations will remain operable in the event of a fire in the area of concern. After the modifications listed in Section 4 are completed, the 4.16kV emergency switchgear and the diesel generator alternative control stations are located such that no more than two diesel generators and/or its associated 4.16kV bus would be disabled by any fire. The above requirement was met by the -~ original design by installing each 4.16kV bus and each diesel
~
generator in a separate room. The alternative control locations will be electrically isolated using manual control switches, relays, breakers, fuse-disconnect switches or coordinated fuses. This will provide isolation for all cables which could affect the operation of alternative shutdown components as a result of fire-induced failures (open circuits, short circuits or shorts to grounds). Circuit isolation capability will be provided for control, power and instrumentation cables, as required, to ensure that no electrical connection will exist after manual isolation between the alternative shutdown circuits and those circuits that could v Page 6-4
L BSEP ! ,s. REVISION 0 ASCA l i be affected by a fire in one of the areas of concern. Protection is provided for cases of associated circuits by common enclosure, common power supplies, and spurious operations through a combination of electrical isolation, protective overcurrent l-device coordination, and separation of the alternative shutdown l circuits and cables from the fire area of concern. The re-establishment of safe shutdown. equipment operations, j controls, and monitoring functions at the alternative shutdown control stations requires that control power be made available. l This will be accomplished using breakers, control switches and additional fuses as required. Once the operability of an alternative control station is assured by the protective features l describad sbove, these alternative control stations can be l utilized to control the safe shutdown components associated with each station.
-i The designated alternative shutdown stations at BSEP will have the following characteristics:
(1) RCIC and RHR Alternative Control Stations (a) Transfer switches to isolate potentially damaged control circuits for essential equipment to restore control power through redundant fuses, avoiding the need for fuse replacement. (b) Control switches ~ to operate essential equipment . once control power has been restored. f (c) Transfer switch to isolate the RCIC auxiliary trip ' solenoid for the trip signals f rom the control ' l Room. i l i
%/
l Page 6-5
BSEP , s REVISION 0 ASCA (d) Transfer switches and alternate power supplies for the RCIC turbine and pump diagnostic instrumentation, and RCIC flow controller. (e) Control switches for the required safety / relief valves. (f) Indication of the required plant monitoring instrumentation. (2) Diesel Generator Alternative Control Stations (a) Transfer switches to isolate all Control Room safe shutdown control circuits for diesel generator operation. (b) Control switches for local diesel generator start, stop, speed and voltage control. (c) Diesel generator diagnostic instrumentation. (d) Local control switches at the adjacent MCC for the diesel generator auxiliaries.
~s (3) 4.16kV Emergency Editchgear Alternative Control Stations ;
(a) Transfer switches for control power to provide alternative 125V de power source as required for i control and status indication. (b) Control switches to operate the switchgear once control power has been restored. 6.2.2 Control Room Alternative Control Station The Control Room alternative control station is located on the 49 ft elevation of the Control Building. The Control Room i occupies the majority of this Control Building location. This control location remains operable, to some degree, for any fire located outside this fire area. Some of the circuit modifications described in Section 4 were made to ensure safe shutdown system operation from the Control Room and the descriptions are included in Table 6.2-1. Page 6-6
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA These modifications justify the Control Room as an alternative control station. However, fires may result in sufficient cable damage to force the use of the designated alternative control stations described in Subsection 6.2.1. The Control Room is the preferred location for the control operations which are required. 6.3 Alternative Shutdown Method The alternative shutdown method at BSEP involves the following categories of alternative shutdown activities: (1) Alternative shutdown activities at designated alternative control stations located outside the Control Room. (2) Alternative shutdown activities which are accomplished inside the Control Room.
'N (3) Manual alternative shutdown activities which occur at s- equipment that requires manual operation because of fire damage to the electrical operators or cables for the component.
The following discussions of the alternative shutdown method are based on the guidelines listed below: (1) Overall alternative shutdown activities will be coordinated either by the unit operator in the Control Room or by the operator manning the remote shutdown panel section of the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. (2) Whenever possible, the safe shutdown activities will be controlled from the Control Room. Sometimes this involves alternative shutdown activities taking place in the Control Room. l l (3) Normal safe shutdown activities are not discussed in j this report. l l Page 6-7 l
BSEP REVfSION O ASCA m (4) Because spurious operation candidates were resolved, in some cases, by opening the associated circuit breaker, the following safe shutdown valves must. have their breakers closed prior to use: (a) Unit 1: (1-Ell-F008 or 1-Ell-F009) 1-Ell-F006A, 1-Ell-F006B, 1-Ell-F006C and 1-Ell-F006D. (b) Unit 2: (2-Ell-F008 or 2-Ell-F009) 2-Ell-F006A, 2-Ell-F006B, 2-Ell-F006C and 2-Ell-F006D. Due to the large number of fire areas for which alternative shutdown is provided, it was determined that an area-by-area discussion of the safe shutdown method would be cumbersome and - would not clearly present the important features of the alternative shutdown capability. Table 6.2-1 provides a summary of the alternative control methods which will be utilized for each of the BSEP fire areas. A sample entry for Table 6.2-1 is
,e S provided on the following page.
To utilize Table 6.2-1, the alternative shutdown activities described below must first be reviewed. For the given sample, ; Subsection 6.3.6 would be considered for the portion of the alternative shutdown method addressing the SDC function. Similarly, Subsection 6.3.7 addresses the remaining safe shutdown , function which requires control of the designated alternative t control stations for EPS.
. Note for this sample, the TC and DGCW functions would be ;
fulfilled from the Control Room. Consequently, the normal l operating procedures and equipment would be used. The PMI function would also be unaffected by a fire. s/ Page 6-8 r
_. ._ . . . . . . .....- _._._ ..._ _ _._ . _ .._. _ ___.~ _ -.. _ .._..- _..___..... _ _ _ _ BSEP REVfSTON O ASCA
.m Fire Area: Sample Alternative Shutdown Location Normal Safe Shutdown Designated from.the Alternative l Control Control Control. Local Function Room Stations Room Manual i
Reactor Pressure ' and Level Control t i (RPLC) X X(2) j Diesel Genrrator Cooling Water i (DGCW) . X ! l RHR Cooling l Water (RHRCW) X X(1). l i E Torus Cooling (TC) X i
- Shutdown Cooling l
' '^ 3 (SDC) X
/ 1 Emergency Power System (EPS) X l l
Plant. Monitoring Instrumentation ! (PMI) X l I { . Manual Operations: (1) SW-V117 and SW-V118 must be manually operated. , 1 l Alternative Shutdown l Activities Accomplished (2) Operator to align E51-F031 as ; I [ from the Control Room: required. ! i l l l
Page 6-9 l . _ _ _ _ _ . . , . _ _~.._ .-. _ , _ . . _ _ .._. __ . _ _
. . _ - . - = . . . _ - _ . - -
BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA Although manual alternative shutdown activities are required, all other control activities required by the RHRCW function will be performed from the Control Room using normal operating procedures. The manual activities required are described on the sample entry provided. Alternative safe shutdown activities which are accomplished from the Control Room will be noted in the same way as manual operations in the sample table. The composite alternative shutdown method for this fire area utilizes the methods described in Subsections 6.3.6 and 6.3.7 with two manual valve operations and one valve operation from the Control Room required. The following subsections describe the method for O ,_. alternative safe shutdown operation of each of the BSEP safe ~ shutdown functions identified in Section 3 from the designated alternative control stations. These subsections are used in conjunction with Table 6.2-1 to determine the safe shutdown method for any fire area requiring alternative shutdown methods. 6.3.1 Reactivity Control Alternative Shutdown In the event that the alternative shutdown method is to be used instead of the normal shutdown methods, the operator will assure a reactor scram and MSIV closure before evacuating the Control Room. Reactor scram occurs automatically on loss of offsite power. \/ Page 6-10
BSEP REVIS!ON 0 ASCA m
' 1 6.3.2 Reactor Pressure and Level Control Alternative Shutdown '
1 In the event that the normal control for this function is ! affected by fire, alternate control from the RCIC and RHR 1 alternative control station will commence. The reactor pressure and level control (RPLC) function for alternative shutdown l consists of the operation of RCIC and safety / relief valve (s) to ' control reactor level and pressure. Following reactor trip, the operator will operate the RCIC system of the affected unit to restore and maintain reactor vessel level. The operator will achieve this objective using intermittent operation of the RCIC system at the RCIC and RHR I alternative control station. The RCIC and RHR alternative control station for each unit provides the necessary de control l
.~)/
power, transfer and control switches, diagnostic instrumentation i for the RCIC system, the required safety / relief valve (s), and 3 reactor vessel instrumentation to allow the operator to control reactor pressure and level. The alternative control stations alleviate the need for manual valve operations for most fire . areas of concern; however, any special cases requiring manual operations are identified in Table 6.2-1. RCIC injection flow will be controlled by manually adjusting the set point of the local flow controller, using the RCIC flow signal received from the flow transmitter located at the RCIC l instrument rack. All required valve manipulations for RCIC are l l facilitated by local control at each MCC cubicle which is part of I the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. E Page 6-11
BSEP ,s REVISION 0 ASCA Successful maintenance of pressure boundary integrity for the reactor coolant systems is also necessary for maintaining vessel level and pressure control. Inadvertent opening of boundary valves will be precluded to assure safe shutdown. This j will be achieved using the' compliance actions summarized in j l Tables 3.5-49 and 3.5-50, 6.3.3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Alternative Shutdown Operation of the diesel generators requires at least one service water pump per unit to be running shortly after any diesel generator starts. Priority will be given to starting a service water pump once the diesel generator is started. The , operator will proceed to start the nuclear service water pumps
.s after communicating with the operator in the Service Water Building that service water valve alignment and verification is complete. .
i The service water pumps are controlled (started and stopped) from their respective 4.16kV emergency switchgear alternative control station. The operator at this location will close the 4.16kV breaker for at least one nuclear service water pump shortly after the starting of any diesel generator. This operator action is facilitated by local control switches and indicating lights, mounted in the front door of the 4.16kV switchgear cubicle, for each nuclear service water pump. Once service water operation has begun, no further operator actions will be required to maintain the DGCW function. J Page 6-12
BSEP m REVISION 0 ASCA l 6.3.4 Residual Heat Removal Cooling Water Alternative Shutdown The residual heat removal cooling water (RHRCW) function provides service water to remove heat from the RHR heat exchanger. This involves valve alignments and starting at least , one service water pump per unit. These valves are located in the 1 l Service Water Building and in the Reactor Building. I The valves located in the Service Water Building are aligned l i manually as required. The operator responsible for valve , alignment in the Service Water Building will open the breakers l for all safe shutdown service water valves upon arrival at the Service Water Building. The operator then visually checks valve l i position and manually realigns as required. l The valves located in the Reactor Building have local l 1 controls and indication at the RCIC and RHR alternative control station or will be manually operated. These control switches and l indicating lights are mounted on the MCC cubicle for the ' respective valves. have Once the operators established the RHRCW, the only l l subsequent operator actions occur at the transition from the
- torus. cooling to the shutdown cooling and during the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system.
6.3.5 Torus Cooling Alternative Shutdown The torus cooling (TC) function is fulfilled by the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In the event of a fire affecting normal control of some or all TC safe shutdown
'~'
Page 6-13 l l
l I BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA components from the Control Room, control from the RCIC and RHR alternative control station is available.
The RHR system valves are controlled from the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. The operator at this station will realign valves to put the RHR system into the suppression pool cooling mode. This is accomplished by local control switches and indicating lights located at the individual MCC cubicles for the RHR safe shutdown valves. This MCC is part of the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. The RHR pump is controlled from its respective 4.16kV emergency switchgear alternative control station. The operator at the 4.16kV emergency switchgear alternative control station
~s will close the RHR pump breaker once he is requested to do so by ~
the coordinating operator. This action will not take place until the operator at the RCIC and RHR alternative control station verifies that the RHR system is aligned to start torus cooling operation. The torus cooling function will be initiated following isolation of the reactor vessel. Once this function has been initiated, operator action is not required until the decision is made to change the RHR operating mode to shutdown cooling. Diagnostic instrumentation required to support the proper operation of the TC function is located at the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. Page 6-14
BSEP s REVISION 0 ASCA 6.3.6 Shutdown Cooling Alternative Shutdown l Fulfillment of the shutdown cooling (SDC) function is necessary to achieve cold shutdown conditions. The shutdown cooling function is provided by one train of RHR in the shutdown cooling mode. The RCIC and RHR alternative control station provides l indication and control capability for establishing the necessary valve alignment for SDC. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR can i start as soon as the reactor pressure drops below approximately 1 l 125 psig. l The operator activities required to initiate the SDC function consist of realigning the RHR system valves to terminate l s, torus cooling and begin shutdown cooling. Before the valve
- )
realignment begins, the RHR pump will be tripped by the operator l manning the emergency 4.16kV alternative control stations. Once , the pump is restarted, the only subsequent operator action l , required will be throttling service water flow or RHR flow to the l l RHR heat exchanger to control the reactor cooldown rate, j l During the subsequent cooldown, the operator will maintain reactor water level by shifting the RHR pump suction between the l reactor vessel and the torus to allow injection of torus water directly into the vessel through the RHR loop. Reactor level instrumentation located at the RCIC and RHR alternative control l l station provides sufficient information to control this process. i w/ Page 6-15 l
i BSEP REVISION 0 ASCA , _s 6.3.7 Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown l l The alternative shutdown support systems will be operated from Switchgear Rooms El, E2, E3 and E4. The operators perform and/or verify the correct alignment of all safe shutdown 4.16kV breakers before restoring the necessary on-site 4.16kV ac power. Incoming line 4.16kV breakers will be disabled in order to eliminate spurious operation. One diesel generator alternative control station for each diesel generator is located in the respective diesel generator cell. This control station will have the transfer switches necessary to isolate the diesel generator's centrol circuits from the Main Control Room. Each diesel generator alternative control p- station will allow starting and stopping of its respective diesel
~' generator. Opening and closing of the diesel generator output breakers will be performed at the same control station.
Sufficient diagnostic instrumentation is installed to ensure that the diesel generator is operating at its proper speed and output voltage. After starting the diesel generators, one operator will assure room cooling for the diesel generators by starting the DG exhaust fans. Modifications to the existing power distribution circuit breakers will ensure that the required 4.16kV/480V load centers will be available to feed any necessary diesel generator auxiliary motor control centers and that the load centers will l l ! Page b-16
, BSEP
-s REVISION 0 ASCA perform this task independently of the fire area of concern. As a result, the fuel-oil transfer pumps and the exhaust fans will be available for supporting alternative shutdown.
Battery charging capability for alternative shutdown will be ensured by providing 480V ac power from an alternate source. For both Units 1 and 2, these battery chargers will support operation of the alternative shutdown RCIC system, essential process monitoring instrumentation, alternative shutdown switchgear, safety / relief valve (s) and diesel generator circuits. 6.3.8 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation (PMI) Alternative Shutdown Alternative shutdown of the safe shutdown equipment requires that operators monitor selected process parameters. These
) parameters are reactor water level, reactor pressure, suppression pool level, and suppression pool temperature.
The above parameters have indication at the RCIC and RHR alternative control station. d Page 6-17
I BSEP N REVISION 0 ASCA 6.4 References
- 1. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 50, Appendix R,
" Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." Revised as of 1983.
- 2. Memorandum to All Power Licensees With Plants Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979 from Darrell G. Eisenhut,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) - Generic Letter 81-12," February 20, 1981.
- 3. Memorandum to All Power Licensees With Plants Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979 from Roger J. Mattson,
Subject:
" Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980) -
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12," March 22, 1982. -~, '% d Page 6-18
I O CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: SW-1 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(1,2,3) RHRCW X X(1,2,3) m RPLC X
) ~
SDC X TC X PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually align a maximum of four butterfly valves in the service Water Building. (2) Manually backwash the service water strainers as required. (3) Manually open new valve for service water pump lube water. J Page 1 of 58 f l _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: SW-1 Alternative Shutdown Location-Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from control Control Local Function ,the Control-Room Stations Room Manua1 DGCW X X(1,2,3) RHRCW X X(1,2,3) RPLC X SDC 'X
.- TC X PMI X '
l EPS X g Manual Operations: (1) Manually align a maximum of four butterfly valves in the Service Water Building. (2) Manually backwash the- service water l strainers as required. (3) Manually open new valve for service water pump lube water. . J l Page 2 of 58
.. , _ . _ . . _ , _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ , . . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ .m_.,
.1 1
l CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY- l g m BRUNSWICK. STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT.- UNITS 1 &-2 i ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
. 5 TABLE 6.2-1 1 UNIT:- 1 l FIRE AREA: TB-1 1 1 l \ l Alternative Shutdown Location L l Designated
' Normal Safe Alternative- !
l Shutdown from Control Control Local l Function .the Control Room Stations Room Manua1- ) t l I'i C 4 X l RH;tLW X X(3) RPLC X SDC X XI 2) l
., . .TC 'X l 1 1 PMI X !
l l EPS. X X III Manual OperatiJac. (1) Locally trip- emergency switchgear j incoming breaker. I
.l l
(2) Locally operate 1-Ell-F008 with alternate power supply. (3) Manually operate 1-SW-V102, 1-SW-V105, and 1-SW-V117 as required. l I I i i i 1 8 4 4
~
i Page 3 of 58 l 1 ! 4 _, , . . _ - - . - -l
t i CAROLINA POWER.& LIGHT COMPANY. , BRUNSWICK. STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT . UNITS 1 & 2 ; m ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 ; UNIT: 2 , t 7 IRE AREA: .TB-1 1 Alternative Shutdown Location l Designated I Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local- , Function the Control Room- -Stations Room Manual : i Z DGCW X i RHRCW X X(3) i RPLC X SDC X X(2)
., TC X e 1 ~
i s.- PMI X , EPS X X II) , i Manual Operations: (1) Locally trip emergency switchgear i it oming breaker. > (2) Locally operate 2-Ell-F008 with ! alternate power supply. l (3) Manually operate 2-SW-v102, 2-SW-V105, and 2-SW-V117 as required. e f t t 9 Page 4 of 58 i
+
W - - - _ . m--
- y- --
w .,-m--, - - , . . , , . - -
+-- y -- - - -
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
- j. .
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWR METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6'.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: EAST YARD Alternative Shutdown Location i Designated i Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the-Control Room _ Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X X II) SDC X ! TC X l PMI X l EPS X Manual Operations: NONE Alternative Shutdown Activities Accomplished from the control Room: (1) Operate 1-E51-F010, 1-E51-F029, and 1-E51-F031 as required. r l ! l i i ! ! l i i i i V . Page 5 of 58 ' d 4 i
i CAROLINA POWER'& LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 &-2 ; ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 ! UNIT: 2 i FIRE AREA: EAST YARD l 1 1 Alternative Shutdown Location l i Designated l Normal Safe Alternative i Shutdown from Control Control Local ; Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X , RHRCW X l s RPLC X X(1) SDC X ! i
~,, TC X l I !
'. PMI X :
l EPS X l 1 l Manual Opern.tions: NONE Alternative Shutdown Activities Accomplished j from the Control Room: (1) Operate i-E51-F010, 2-E51-F029, and 2-E51-F031 as required. h l t s/ Page 6 of 58 k
.. . . _ . - . - - - - . . . . . ~ _ = . _ . - - - . . - . - - - - . - - . . .
_ - . . . . .~ - . . CAROLINA POWER & LfGHT COMPANY
,- BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: DG-1 l
, Alternative Shutdown Location j l
Designated i Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X I2) RHRCW X X III RPLC X SDC X X(3)
- TC X
~~~
! PMI X ! EPS X l Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V15, 1-SW-V16, 1-SW-V102, 1-SW-V105, and 1-SW-Vll7 for an "A" train shutdown or 1-SW-V13, 1-SW-V14, 1-SW-V17, 1-SW-V18, 1-SW-V106, and 1-SW-V118 for. a "B" train shutdown as required. (2) Manually operate 1-SW-V15 and 1-SW-V16 for an "A" train shutdown or 1-SW-V13, 1-SW-V14, 1-SW-V17 and 1-SW-V18 for a "B" train shutdown as required. I l (3) Locally operate 1-Ell-F008 or 1-Ell-F009 l with alternate power supply as required. i I
. ~J j Page 7 of 58 i
4 1 I i
l CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2
~
FIRE AREA: DG-1
]
Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(2) l j RHRCW X X III RPLC X SDC X X(3) l TC X PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V15, 2-SW-V16, 2-SW-V102, 2-SW-V105, and 2-SW-V117 for an "A" train shutdown or 2-SW-V13, 2-SW-V14, 2-SW-V17, 2-SW-V18, 2-SW-V106, and 2-SW-V118 for a "B" train shutdown as required. (2) Manually operate 2-SW-V15 and 2 -SW-V16 for an "A" train shutdown or 2-SW-V13, 2-SW-V14, 2-SW-V17 and 2-SW-V18 for a "B" train shutdown as required. (3) Locally operate 2-E11-F008 or 2-E11-F009 with alternate power supply as required. l v Page 8 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 q ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
l- TABLE 6.2-1 j UNIT: 1-l- l FIRE AREA: DG-2 l l l Alternative Shutdown Location l l Designated Normal Safe- Alternative s i Shutdown from Control Control Local ! Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual l DGCW X X I1) RHRCW X X III j RPLC X SDC X , TC X t PMI X j EPS X ; Manual Operations: (1) Manually align 1-SW-V13 or 1-SW-V14 as required. l ? i hJ j-4 Page 9 of 58 l J
.. . . _ . _ _ . . . . _ __ . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ . . - ._m . _ .
4 CAROLIMA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTR?C PLANT - UNZTS l'& 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
i TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-2 ^ Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from control Control Local e Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual , DGCW X RHRCW X X III RPLC X SDC X X I2) . TC 'X 3'
- PMI ,
X EPS. X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V15, 2-SW-3 V16, 2-SW-v105, 2-SW-V102, and 2- :' SW-Vil7 as required. (2) Transfer 2-Ell-F008 to alternate supply and open valve remotely. !
- Page 10 of 58 i
i
. .. . . _ . _ _ . _ - - . . - - _ . . - . - . . . ~ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
l CAROLINA POWER S LIGHT COMPANY l m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 i ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 : FIRE AREA: DG-3
)
Alternative Shutdown Location j l l Designated l Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual t DGCW X RHRCW X l l RPLC X l SDC X TC X , PMI X
~
EPS X l
- Manual Optsat.1 ans
- NONE 1
l i i !' i L U i J Page 11 of 58 l 1
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1& 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-3 Alternative Shutdown Location Des ignat'ed Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(2I RHRCW X X II) RPLC X SDC X X(3) ; TC X
*- PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually align 2-SW-V106, 2-SW-V118, 1 2-SW-V13, and 2-SW-V14 as required.
(2) Manually align 2-SW-V13, 2-SW-VA4 and 2-SW-V118 as required. 1 (3) 2-Ell-F009 - transfer to alternate power supply and operate remotely. t
,, Page 12 of 58 l
l
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY <
._ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC-PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTPnWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 l ; I FIRE AREA:. DG-4 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room _ Stations Room [-[anual ) DGCW X X' I RHRCW X X(1,3) i i i RPLC X
]
1 SDC X X(2) l i . TC X l l i "--' PM1 X EPS X l l j Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V105, 1-SW-V102, and 1-SW-V117 as required. l (2) Transfer 1-Ell-F008 to alternate i supply and open valve remotely. l l (3) Manually operate 1-SW -V17 or 1-SW-j V18 as required. I t 9 i Page 13 of 58 4
?
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY w_ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 : FIRE AREA: DG-4 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local
- Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X i
.m TC X ,
d' PMI X , EPS- X Manual Operations: NONE f t i o-7 ( v , Page 14 of 58 ! i [
CAROLZNA POWER & LfGHT COMPANY m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 - l ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1
- UNIT
- 1 l
l FIRE AREA: DG-5 i f Alternative Shutdown Location
- Designated l Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from control control Local i
Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(2) RHRCW X X III RPLC X SDC X X(3)
- TC X
')
" PMI X l EPS X X I4) l Manual Operations: (1) Manually align 1-SW-V106, 1-SW-Vll8, 1-
- SW-V15, and 1-SW-V16 as required.
l (2) Manually align 1-SW-V15 and 1-SW-V16 as required. (3) 1-Ell-F009 - transfer to alternate power supply and operate remotely. (4) Rack in and close the cross-tie breakers for E2 and E4 as required. i 2 . i ,f Page 15 of 58 I
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY m, BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-5 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X II) RHRCW X X I1) RPLC X SDC X TC X l i'\' ! - PMI X EPS X X(2) i Manual Operations: (1) Manually align 2-SW-V17 or 2-SW-V18 as required. (2) Rack in and close the cross-tie breakers for E2 and E4 as required. Page 16 of 58
CAROLZNA POWER & LZGHT COMPANY , BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2. l i O ALTERNATIVE-SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
- I TABLE 6.2-1 ; UNIT:' 1 FIRE AREA: DG-6 , Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual l DGCW X RHRCW X X I1) I 1 RPLC X SDC X l l- - TC X L PMI X l I EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate valve 1-SW-V106.and 1-SW-118 as required. i l l l l ,
- 4 i <
1 i l 1
- Page 17 of 58 i
CAROLINA POWER &' LIGHT COMPANY m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-6 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe- Alternative Shutdown from Control. Control Local Function the Control Room _ Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X-SDC X TC X v PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE l l l Page 18 of 58 {. .
- . . . _ _ _ _- _ _ ~ . _ . _ . - . - - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ .. ..
i .> I CAROLINA POWER & LfGHT COMPANY l .~ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 l ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: DG-7 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X ;
~RHRCW X X(1)
RPLC X SDC X X(2) x TC X 1 l PMI X 1 EPS X X(3) Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate valves 1-SW-V102, 1-SW-V105 and 1-SW-Vll7 as required. (2) 1-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. (3) Rack in and close the tie breakers to connect E3 to El as required. I l l i j i
. J Page 19 of 58 i
}
j l CAROLTNA POWER & LTGHT COMPANT
-BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC. PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE. SHUTDOWN l METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 ; UNIT: 2
. FIRE AREA: DG Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local-Function the Control Room Stations Room- Manual ,
DGCW X X III RHRCW X X(1) RPLC. X SDC X
,._,, TC X d PMI' X EPS X' X I2)
Manual Operations: (1) Manually align 2-SW-V17 or 2-SW-V18. ; (2) Rack in and close the cross-tie breakers for El and E3 as required. l
,._./
Page 20 of 58
CAROLZNA POWER S LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNZTS 1 & 2 , m l ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 ! i i UNIT: 1 L FIRE AREA: DG-8 l l Alternative Shutdown Location j l Designated ) l Normal Safe Alternative l l Shutdown from Control Control Local l i Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual I DGCW X l RHRCW X l RPLC X SDC X TC X PMI X l EPS X l t l- Manual Operations: NONE 1 k a i Page 21 of 58 t 1 6 4
. , - - - . - - -- . , - , .m . - 6 m-, - o ,-
CAROLINA POWER & LZGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-8 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from control control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(2) RHRCW X X III RPLC X SDC X X(3) ; TC X g PMI X
'EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V15, 2-SW-V16, 2-SW-V102, 2-SW-V105, and 2-SW-V117 for an "A" train shutdown or 2-SW-V106 and 2-SW-V118 for a "B" train shutdown as required.
(2) Manually operate 2-SW-V15 and 2-SW-V16 for an "A" train shutdown as required. (3) Locally operate 2-Ell-F008 or 2-Ell-F009 with alternate power supply as required. s Page 22 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1
.i FIRE AREA: DG-9 Alternative Shutdown Location ,
Designated-Normal Safe Alternative ;
~
Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X i TC X
..g ._ PMI X l
EPS X
^
Manual Operations: NONE l l l i i ! j i I l l I i: l l I i '
~
" Page 23 of 58 l I
i
! l 4
CAROL 2NA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ,s BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 1 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.7 l UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-9 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X X I1) RPLC X SDC X X(2)
. TC X
" PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V102, 2-SW-V105 and 2-SW-V117 as required. (2) 2-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. i
..s Page 24 of 58 .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 l UNIT: 1 i l FIRE AREA: DG-ll < I 1 Alternative Shutdown 1.ocation Designated Normal' Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control' Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X III i l RHRCW X X(1,2) ! RPLC X SDC X X(3)
- '. C X 1
-. PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V15 and 1-SW- 1 V16 as required.
(2) Manually operate 1-SW-V106 and l-SW-Vll8 as required. (3) 1-Ell-F009 switch to alternate power supply and operate as
- required.
l i i 1 1 4
~~'
l Page 25 of 58 t t 1
CAROLZNA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-11 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated ' Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from- Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X III RHRCW X X I1) RPLC X SDC X TC X , es s
'I -s PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V17 and 2-SW-V18 as required, Page 26 of 58 1 _____________b
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDO'4N METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 YIRE AREA: DG-12 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local
. Function the control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X I1)
RHRCW X X(1,2) RPLC X SDC X X(3) TC X (, , PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V17 and 1-SW-V18 as required. (2) Manually operate 1-SW-V102, 1-SW-V105 and 1-SW-V117 as required. (3) 1-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. 6
+
Page 27 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
^. BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-- 12 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Al,frnative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SOC X j
^ . TC X .. s l
PMI X f EPS X Manual Operations: NONE d Page 28 of 58
- _ - _ - -, = . - . _ , _ _ - . . . . _ . ._
I CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 l ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 1 1 FIRE AREA: DG-13 1 1 Alternative Shutdown Location i
"esignated l Normal Safe Alternative '
Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X
)
RHRCW X 1 RPLC X SDC X
, TC X
\
PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE l l l t i Page 29 of 58 t I
l CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY l SRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
I TABLE 6.2-1 ; UNIT: 2 l FIRE AREA: DG-13 l Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X III RHRCW X X(1,2) RPLC X SDC X X(3) : TC X O, PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V13, and 2-SW-V118 as required. 2-SW-V14 l1 (2) Manually operate 2-SW-V106 and 2-SW-Vll8 as required. 1 (3) 2-Ell-F009 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. s/ Page 30 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
- BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: DG-14 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X III RHRCW X X II) RPLC X l 1 SDC X TC X i
/ PMI- X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V13 and 1-SW-V14 as required.
1 i 1 i Page 31 of 58 l
_ _ _ _ . . _ __ _ ... . _ _ _ _ ~ . _ . . . . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . ~ . _ . . . _ _ . _ . _ . 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSW2CK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ] ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 i FIRE AREA: DG-14 Alternative Shutdown Location j Designated . Normal Safe Alternative l Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X II) RHRCW X X(1,2) l RPLC X i SDC X X(3) 1 TC X
)
PMI X EPS X ,. t I Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V15 and 2-SW-V16 as required. , (2) Manually operate 2-SW-V102, 2-SW-V105 and 2-SW-V117 as required. , (3) 2-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate ! power supply and operate as required. r
~
i l l l 4 i .-
~~'
Page 32 of 58 t i
_ . _ _ . _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _.__.__._...._....._._.._____.__m
.CAROLZNA POWER 6 LZGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 m
{
~
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
I i TABLE 6.2-1 I UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: DG-19. , Alternative Shutdown Location l I Designated ) Normal Safe Alternative ' Shutdown from Control Control Local j- Function the Control Room Stations Room Manua1 ; DGCW X l RHRCW X X(1) I l l RPLC X SDC X X I2) i i TC' X ' l v PMI X ! I i j EPS X - i Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V106 and 1-SW-Vll8 as required. (2) 1-Ell-F009 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. - l i I I l l 1 Page 33 of 58
CAROLINA POWER S LIGHT COMPANY
,_ BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-19 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X .. s TC X
\
PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE Page 34 of 58
t CAROLINA POWER S L1GHT COMPANY
, BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 l
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: DG-20 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X X III RPLC X X(2) SDC X X(3)
, TC X I
PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 1-SW-V102, 1-SW-V105 and 1-SW-Vll7 as required. (2) Operate 1-E41-F042 as required. Alternative Shutdown Activities Accomplished from the Control Room: (3) 1-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. l t
~~
Page 35 of 58 l
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY m BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD SUh4ARY TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 ; FIRE AREA: DG-20 [ Alternative Shutdown Location i Designated i Normal Safe Alternative ) Shutdawn from- Control Control Local ; Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual ! P DGCW X , i RHRCW X ; RPLC X l SDC X i TC X i [) ' PMI X i EPS X Manual Operations: NONE ; i i Page 36 of 58 (
. - . . .- _ . . . .._...___._.____..._._._..-.._....___-..__.__mm_._.____. . _ _ . _ . .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2
.m ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1
) '
FIRE AREA: DG-21 l Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control -Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW' X RHRCW X RPLC X
- SDC X TC X
.t g
) PMI X EPS .X Manual Operations: NONE i
i i ! i ,! V Page 37 of 58 4 i l I .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
' BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2
' ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE.6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-21 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X X II) RPLC X SDC X X(2) TC X f, _/ PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V106 -and 2-SW-V118 as required. (2). 2-Ell-F009 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. V Page 38 of 58 f
. . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ . . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . , .._._.m_._. _ . . _ _ . .
I CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ' n LTUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 1 i FIRE AREA: DG-22 ; Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X TC X i l _. PMI X EPS X l Manual Operations: NONE i i i i i s Page 39 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: DG-22 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X X III RPLC X X(2) SDC X X(3) TC X ,m PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate 2-SW-V102, 2-SW-V105 and 2-SW-Vll7 as required. (2) Operate 2-E41-F042 as required. Alternative Shutdown Activities Accomplished from the Control Room: (3) 2-Ell-F008 transfer to alternate power supply and operate as required. v Page 40 of 58
. . - . . - . - - . . - - . . . . . . - . - . . . - . . . . . - . ~ . - - - - - - . . . - .
.....- ._~ - ... ~ .
CAROLINA POWER.& LfGHT COMPANY- '
.m BRUNSWICK. STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 '
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1
- UNIT: 1 l
l FIRE AREA: CB-7 l t i. Alternative Shutdown Location ! I l Designated ; Normal Safe Alternative i Shutdown from control Control Local : Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual i DGCW X : i RHRCW X i RPLC X i SDC X
]
TC X I')
, , , PMI X i
EPS X f Manual Operations: NONE ! s 4 i 1
- '^ Page 41 of 58 4
CAROL 8NA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 m ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: CB-7 Alternative. Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room- Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X TC X PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE l l v Page 42 of 58 l l l' l l
_.~._._ _ . _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ . . . _ - - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . - - . . . _ . _ _ _ . , CAROLINA POWER.& LZGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 : A. t ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
l L TABLE'6.2-1 : l UNIT: 1 i FIRE AREA: CB-8 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control control Local L Function the Control Room' Stations Room Manual' DGCW X l RHRCW X i RPLC X SDC X X III TC X PMI X l l- EPS X i l \ Manual Operations: (1) Transfer 1-Ell-F008 to alternate , power supply and open valve i remotely. l l t I i i - Page 43 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UN1TS 1 & 2 ~. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: CB-8 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X TC X PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE Page 44 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
- BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: CB-9 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X ! RHRCW X RPLC X
\
SDC X , TC X
, n. ,
1 PMI X s.. . EPS X ; I Manual Operations: NONE I Page 45 of 58
.. . . . . . . . . . - ~ . - . . _ . ..
- - . . ~ . . . . - - . ~ .
. . . ~ . _ . . _ ~ . _ . _ _ . . . - . ~ . . . . . ~ . . . - . - . . . _ . - .
d CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
.x BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ;
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
{ TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 2 ! FIRE AREA: CB-9 Alternative Shutdown Location j Designated l Normal Safe Alternative ! Shutdown from Control Control Local { Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X j RHRCW X ! i RPLC X SDC X t 1 TC X '
,] .
" PMI X
)
EPS X i l i Manual Operations: NONE l l ^ J. Page 46 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: CB-10 Alternative Shutdown Location l Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual i DGCW X I RHRCW X RPLC X I SDC X TC X 3 1
. PMI X EPS X Manual Operations: NONE l
l l l I I v' Page 47 of 58
. - . - . - .. -- __-._ _. ..... - _ . . . ~ . . - - . _ - . - . - . - - - . - _ . . - . . - . ~ . .
t i CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY f BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 O ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN-METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 1 UNIT: 2 i FIRE AREA: CB-10 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local < Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual ! I i DGCW X , RHRCW X RPLC X SDC X X II) Q l PMI X EPS X ! Manual Operations: (1) Transfer 2-Ell-F008 to alternate l power supply and operate as ! required. l T I i 1 t l t 6 t a Page 48 of 58 1
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METHOD
SUMMARY
TABLE 6.2-1 UNIT: 1 FIRE AREA: CB-23E & CB-1 i Alternative Shutdown Location Designated Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual DGCW X X(2) RHRCW X X III l l RPLC X t SDC X ,- TC X ry PMI i -
, X i w i EPS X Manual Operations: (1) Manually operate new Lube water valve, 1-SW-V13, 1-SW-V14, 1-SW-v15, 1-SW-V16, 1-SW-V17, 1-SW-V18, 4 1-SW-V106, and 1-SW-V118 as required.
(2) Manually operate 1-SW-V13, 1-SW-V14, new lube water valve, 1-SW-V17 and 1-SW-V18 as required. 1-SW-V15, 1-SW-v16, l 1 / l i l l l l \ l J A Page 49 of 58
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY j BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 l
~
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN' METHOD
SUMMARY
l TABLE 6.2 , UNIT: 2 FIRE AREA: CB-23E'& CB-2 Alternative Shutdown Location Designated i Normal Safe Alternative Shutdown from Control Control Local ; Function the Control Room Stations Room Manual ! I DGCW X X(2) RHRCW X X I1) l 3 RPLC X f SDC X I TC X PMI , X EPS X {
;}}