05000423/LER-1990-025

LER 90-025-00:on 900616,hourly Vice Fire Watch Maintained During Condition That Required Continuous Fire Watch Be Established.Caused by Personnel Error.Continuous Fire Watch Established & Personnel Involved counseled.W/900720 Ltr

ML20055H180
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/20/1990
From:	Freeman P, Scace S NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-025, LER-90-25, MP-90-729, NUDOCS 9007250283
Download: ML20055H180 (4)

LER-2090-025,

Event date:
Report date:
4232090025R00 - NRC Website

text

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6 g General Offices'Selden Street. Berhn Connecticut .

[e:IeNrsYeNttNec compan7 P.O. box 270 En.*a yen .EIc"e c'Eany .

HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06414-0270 >

rartn ast Nue ar trergy company (203)666-6000 July 20, 1990 MP-90-729 Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk

-Washington, D.C. 20555 -

Reference:

Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 >

Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 90-025-00 Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 90-025-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), any operation or condition prohibited t

' by the plant's Technical Specification.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

/  %

Step en E. Scace Director, Millstone Station .

SES/PAF:ljs e

Attachment:

LER 90-025-00 cc: T. T. Martin, Recion 1 Administrator W. J. Raymond,' Senior Resident inspector, Millstone Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3

. D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 i-

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PDR S

ADOCK 05000423 PDC [hM

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TAC Form a% U.6, NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3160-0104 (6-69) E XPIREG ' 4/30192 o*

Estimated buroen per resoonse to compty with this sntormation cotioction recusst: 60.0tvs Forware UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) $Mt!*fla'ndem"e'n% **n%$oI*u*s* 7/1.ar i Regulatory Commission. Washington DC 20666. anc to the Paperwork Raouction pro #ect (3160.01D41. ottice of Management ano Buooet. Washmpton. DC 20603 F AC4LITY NAME tij DOW I NUMBLR (2# HM Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 01 sl of of old 1213 1lOFl0l3 111LE tel Improper Firewatch Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (6) LFA NUMBEA ria AFPOAT DATF (7i OTwF A F ACILITT F INVOL VFD re t MONTF DAY YEAA VEA4 @ MONTH DAY YEAR F ACILIT Y NAME $

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBEA ARE A CODI Pete A. Freeman Engineer, Ext. 5322

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SucptEMENTAL AEPORT EXPECTED f14) MONTH DAY YEAR SJBM SiON DA 06)

YES (11 ves. comoiste EXPECTED SUDM:SSION DATE) M No g g g ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e , apprommateiy fifteen singie-soece typewritten hnes) (16)

On June 20, 1993, at approximately 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, with the plant 100G power (Mode 1), the midnight Shift Supenisor (SS) discovered that an hourly vice continuous firewatch patrol had been maintained in Battery Room no. 2 (located in the West switchgear Room - ea of the Control Building) after a Technical Specification I

fire door had been declared inoperable with its associated fire detectors previously deemed inoperable. Plant Technical Specifications require a continuous firewatch be estabhshed when this Condition exists.

On June 15, 1990, the fire detection zone panel for Battery Room no. 2 had been declared inoperable. At that time, an hourly firewatch patrol was estabhshed. On June 20, 1990, with the associated fire detection still inoperable, the fire door leadmg into Battery Room no. 2 was declared inoperable after a key issued to fire patrol personnel would not function properly. A continuous firewatch should have been posted.

Root cause of the event was personnel error in that the day Shift Supervisor did not properly review the firewatch patrol form for the area.

Immediate corrective action was to estabbsh a continuous firewatch in Battery Room no. 2. As action to prevent recurrence, the SS's involved in the event have been counseled. A copy of this LER will be routed to all shift supenisory personnel.

O orm 366

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!' NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGVLAToRY CoMMIS$lca APPROVED OMB No 3160-0108 (6-69) EXPIRES. 4/30/92

• • . Estimated Duroen per respnrise to Comply with this LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 60f,f',5 ,,',*'n",*;8,,

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.no Reporis uan.nement er in-sam. u.s. Nuew t a wo e o 3 1 off c o MaNpement and Buopet Wannmoton DC 20503 FACLfrY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) t Fn Nuvun to PAGE(31 YEAA N Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 ol 6l 0l 010l4 l2 l3 9l0 0l2l5 0l0 0l 2 OF 0l3 TEXT vi more space m recueroa use poditsonal NRC Form 366A si Oh

1. Deermtion of Event On June 20,1990, at approximatelt 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, with the plant at 100% power (Mode 1), the midnight Shift Supervisor (SS), during his ska turnoser review, discovered that an hourly vice continuous firewatch pauol was established in Nttery Room no. 2 located in the West Switchgear Room area of the Control Buildmg. The event duration was approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

On June 15, 1990, the fire detection zone panel for Battery Room no. 2 was declared inoperable pendmg surveillance completion on the associated fire detection. At that time, an hourly firewatch patrol was established for Battery Room no. 2. as compensatory action to comply with TSchnical Specification 3.3.3.7.b (Fire Detection Instrumentation).

On June 20,1990, at approximately 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />, firewatch patrol personnel (contractor personnel) contacted the SS requesting that tape be placed over the latching mechanism of the door which enten, into Battery Room no. 2 because of a problem with a new key which had been issued to firewatch patrol personnel. The Shift Supervisor was in the process of shift turnover and concluded this was an acceptable condition and entered the information on the applicable hourly firewatch patrol form which also documented that fire detection for the affected area had been previously declared inoperable.

Technical Specification 3.7.13 (Fire Rated Assemblies) requires that when fire detection is inoperable on both sides of an inoperable fire rated assembly a continuous firewatch must be established.

At approximately 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, on June 20, 1990, during his preparation for shift turnover, the midnight SS discovered the firewatch assignment discrepancy. As immediate corrective action, the subject fire door was blocked open and a conunuous firewatch established in Battery Room no. 2. On June 21, 1990, the problemed key was repaired, the subject door closed and latched, and the continuous firewatch replaced with an hourly firewatch patrol.

II. cause of Event The root cause of the event was personnel error. The day Shift Supervisor did not review the applicable firewatch patrol form which documented the uncompleted Technical Specification surveillance as the initial reason for the existing hourly firewatch patrol. Had the applicable firewatch patrol form been properly reviewed prior to adding the subsequent reason (inoperable Fire Rated Assembly) to the hourly firewatch patrol form, it would have been idenufied that a continuous firewatch was required to comply with plant Technical Specification 3.7.13 (Fire Rated Assemblies).

Ill. Anaksic of Event This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i), as an event or condition prohibited by plant Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.7.13 requires that a continuous firewatch be established if fire detection is inoperable on both sides of a fire rated assembly that has been declared inoperable.

Fire suppression for the affected area consists of the unit fire brigade. The fire brigade is required to respond when indication of fire is received at the Control Room. Fire Detection was deemed inoperable

, because administrauve requirements could not be fulfilled, not because of Mechanical / Electrical failure.

On July 16,1990 fire detectors in Battery Room no. 2 were satisfactorily tested and deemed operable.

l Fire detection was full) capable of performing its design function throughout the event. Therefore, the event posed nc significant safety consequences.

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Reguistory Commissson Was'ung1on. De 20555. ano to i the Paperwork Reauction Protect 13160-n104). ottice of s Management and Buocet Wasninoton Dc 20s03 F ACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER G) t FA Nmsprn m PAGE (31 YEAA M N Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 ~ -

ol 5l ol ol ol4 l2 l3 9l0 0l 2l5 0l0 0l 3 OF 0l3 TEXT of more so.c. is r.auer.o. use aoitionai Nnc Form assa > ti73 IV. Corrective Action As immediate corrective action, the subject fire door was blocked open and a continuous firewatch established in Battery Room no. 2. On Atne 21, 1990, the problemed key was repaired, the subject '

i door closed and latched, and the continuous firewatch replaced with an hourly firewatch patrol.

As action to prevent recurrence, this LER will be routed to all Operations Department Supervisory personnel to emphasis the importance of ensunny all pertinent information has been thoroughly reviewed including Technical Specifications prior to establishing firewatches. The incident has been discussed with the Shift Supervisors involved. The importance of properly reviewmg the firewatch patrol form was reemphasized.

V. Additionnt Information Although there have been LERs discussing improperly estabhshed firewatches due to miscommunication, none of these LERs are similar in root rause and underlying concern. LER 90-001 discusses an event in which shift supervisory personnel performed an evolution wnhout consulting the applicable procedure.

Ttus event is similar in that personal recollection of requirements contained in work control documents resulted in improper completion of the evolution. Part of the corrective action for LER 90-021 was to counsel the individual shift supervisor involved with the event to emphasize in-hand procedure use. The corrective action discussed in LER 90-021 would not have prevented the event in this LER. The intent of routing this LER to shift supervisory personnel is to sensitize personnel of the need to consult the t applicable documentation rather than performing non-routine evolutions and referenemp certain Technical Specification requirements by rote.

EIIS Codes System <

Control Buildmp - NA Fire Detection System - IC Comnonents Fire Detector - DET 8

I ofM 3bb

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