ML20198Q439
| ML20198Q439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1997 |
| From: | Anhalt P, Danni Smith NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198Q360 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-97-S001, LER-97-S1, NUDOCS 9711120210 | |
| Download: ML20198Q439 (3) | |
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NHC OHM 366 U.S. NUCLE AR HEGUL ATORY COMMISSION APPhovtp aY oms No. 3t604104 EMPints 04/30/9a (s g63 t
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4 17.io'%"lP '!an'.% Po'J1'.*?.%/"Ka'o ' sir LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 4 W,f8 ? 'riffe",','o*a'aar!Pa'a~,^*a*J,a's"ge 5
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(See reverse for required number of digits /charactersfor each block) f ACLf17 NAM 4 til DOCali leUMet fi (2)
PAGE f 'l Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 of 3 i,TL414:
Security Event Report: Vital Area Barrier Gratingsin Main Steam Valve Building Floor Not Fecured EVENT DATF (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR F AciuTV Naut DocLET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 00 11 03 97 S001 10 03 97 97 OPERATING 5
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR lt (Check one of more) (11)
MDDE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aH2Hv) 50.73(aH2H4 50.73(aH2Hvnd POWER 000 20.2203(aH1) 20.2203(aH3H0 50.73'aH2Hid 50.73(a)(2n !
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(aH2H4 20.2203(aH3Hn) 50.73(a)(216 0
- X 73.71 20.2203(aH2Hn) 20.2203(aH4) 50,73(aH2Hav)
OTHER
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20,2203(aH2)Did 50.36(CHI) 50.73(aH2Hv) specify m Abstract below$
20.2203(a)(2Hiv) bO.36(c)(2) 50.73(aH2Hvn)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME YtLIPHONE NUMBtm (mciude Area Codel David A. Smith, MP3 Nuclear Licensing Manager (800)437 5840 Patrick W. Anhalt, Security Supervisor Operations (860)444 5224 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRl8ED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE sYs1tM COMPONENT M ANUF ACTURE R HE PORI ABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUF ACTURER REPORTABLE 1o NP$tDs To NPRDs SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES
~X~ NO SUBMISSION DATE(15)
Uf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEL 8.5STRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately 15 smgle-spacedtypewrittenhnes) (16)
On October 3,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a Security Off,cer identified that several grates in the flooi of the Main Steam Valve Building (MSVB ) tunnel appeared to be missing fasteners resulting in the potential for undetected access into the vital area. The uea was secured and searched for unauthorized persons / activities. None were detected. On October 3,1997, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) an immediate notification was n.ade. It was originally thought that the unsecured MSVB floor grates were the r:sult of an inadequate secunty inspection following completion on October 2,1997, of an Automated Work Order (AWO). The root cause investigation identified that the last AWO performed for the floor area where the fasteners were missing was released by the Control Room on April 22,1996. Therefore, from April 22,1996, until October 3,1997, the MSVB floor gratings may not have been properly secured. This condition is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(d), Appendix G, Section 1.(c), which states,
'Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undeteried access to a.. Vital area.. for which compensatory measures have not been employed" shall be reported.
The cause of this event was an inadequate verificatiorVvalidation process for ensuring vital area boundary integrity.
There were no safety consequences from this event in that unauthorized intrusion into the MSVB vital area has not occurred.
However, this event is significant because of the failure to property control access to a vital area.
Security instructions will be revised - A caution sta ament will be addad to the I.D. for the MSVB in Production Maintenance Management System data base to require Security to L e notified prior to removing or reinstalling vital area barrier floor grating.
Signs will be postea indicating that the gratings are a security boundary. The event will be discussed with maintenance personnel NnC FORM 36e 44 9s) 9711123210 971133 PDR ADOCK 05000423 8 -
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NRC f ORM 366A U.a. NUCLEAR RE;ULAToRY CoMMISloN 41 95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION F ACIL'TY NAME (Il DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR s[QutNilAL Revision Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBE R 2 of 3 00 S001 97
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iiKT (11more spaceis required, use additionalcopies of NRC form 366A) (11l l.
Descrintion of Event On October 3,1997, at 1355 hours0.0157 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.155775e-4 months <br /> with the Unit in Mods 5 (shutdown), a Secunty Officer identified that several grates in the floor of the Main Steam Valve Building (MSVB ) tunnel appeared to be missing fasteners resulting in the potential for undetected access into the vital area. The vital area was secured and searched for unauthorized persons / activities.
None were detected. An immediate (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) notification was made on October 3,1997, at 1643 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.251615e-4 months <br /> pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) reporting this safeguards event pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G,
- Reportable Safeguards Events." It was originally thought that the unsecured MSVB floor grates were the res'ilt of an inadequate inspection following completion on October 2,1997, of an Automated Work Order (AWO). However, during the root cause investigation it was determined that the MSVB floor area where the fasteners were missing (northeast soction), was not the area where the gratings had been removed under the recent AWO (the southeast section). A review of work order hi: tories fcr the MSVB tunnel area determined that the last AWO performed for the floor area where the fasteners were missing was released by the Control Room on April 22,1996, at 0822 hours0.00951 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.12771e-4 months <br />.
Therefore, during the period from April 22,1996, until October 3,1997, it cannot be determined that the MSVB floor grctings were properly secured in violation of 10 CFR 73 requirements as implemented for the unit. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(d), which refers to Apper.Gx G. " Reportable Safeguards Events," Section 1.(c), which requires that, "Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vui,. 7bility in a safeguards system that could cllow unauthorized or undetected access to a.. vital area.. for which comptasatory measures have not been cmployed" be reported.
11.
Cause of Event Th: cause of this event was an inadeouate venfication / validation process for ensuring vital area boundary integrity.
Ill. A_nalysis of Event There were no safety consequences from this event in that unauthorized intrusion into the hSVB vital area has not occurred. During the period no evidence of contraband or sabotage was found within the f ASVB floor area.
However, this event is significant because of the failure to properly control access to a vital area. The major equipment within the MSVB include the main steam lines, feedwater lines, steam generator blowdown lines. Undetected access Could have allowed damage or sabotage of this or other vital plant equipment.
IV. 92r.tetive Action The following immediate corrective actions were taken on October 3,1997:
A Security Guard was posted at the MSVB tunnel area upon discovery of the breach in the vital area barrier. A search of the vital area was conducted to detect unauthorized personnel or activities. None were found. A Secunty Guard was posted until the floor pratings in the Main Steam Valve Building was resecured with the appropriate fasteners reestablishing the vital area barrier. The compensatory measure of posting a Security Guard was canceled on October 3,1997 at 1528 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.81404e-4 months <br />.
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NRC FOEd a66A U.S. NuCLEA*J RE1ULAT oRY CoMMisslON UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) f TEXT CONTINUATION FACK.liY NAME (1) oOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NuMSER (6)
PAOL/3)
YEAR StoVENTIAL REvlSloN Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBE R NUMBf R 3 of 3 00 i
S001 97 TLKT tt!nuo space is required. use additionalcopies of NRC form 366A) (11)
The following corrective actions will be taken:
l 1.
Security instruction (s) will be revised to encompass inspection of the entire MSVB floor (vital area barrier) after reinstallation of floor gratings, by December 15.199E 2.
This event will be discussed with maintenance personnei at the monthly maintenance meeting and expectations for reinstalling fasteners after job completion will be reiterated, by December 15,1997.
- 3. A statsment will be added, by January 15.1998, to the caution field in the Production Maintenance Management System data base for the Main Steam Building 1.D., indicating that a Secunty Guard is required prior to removing vital area barrier floor grating, and that a Secunty Guard is required to verify that the vital area barrier floor grating is bolted down prior to returning the area to normal operation.
4.
Signs will be attached to both sides of the MSVB vital area barrier floor gratings indicating that the gratings a o a security boundary and that Security is to be contacted before removal, by March 12,1998.
V.
Additional Informatio,0 Additionalinformation required for Secunty Events. (Item Number from Regulatory Guide 5.62,
- Reporting of Safeguard Events, provided below.):
5.
Type of Security Force Onsite: Contract 6.
Number and Type of Personnelinvolved: One Security Officer 7.
Method of Discovery: Security Guard Observation 8.
Procedural Errors involved: Failure to follow Security Procedure 5061,' Patrolling," Section 4.3 11 Local, State, or Federallaw enforcement agencies contacted: None
- 12. Description of media interest and press release: None Similar Events None Manuf acturer Data None CC f0RM 366A(4 95)
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