Similar Documents at Salem |
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LER-2011-002, Regarding Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 2722011002R00 - NRC Website |
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PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 O PSEG Nuclear L.L. C.
APR 2 3 2011 1 0CFR50.73 LR-N11-0119 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555-001 LER 272/2011-002 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 NRC Docket No. 50-272
SUBJECT:
Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing This Licensee Event Report, "Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 0CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), "any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."
The attached LER contains no commitments. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Brian Thomas at 856-339-2022.
Sincereldta rI icker Site Aice President - Salem Attachments (1)
~Th33
Document Control Desk Page 2 A
2 3 2011 LR-N1 1-0119 cc Mr. W. Dean, Administrator, Region I, NRC Mr. R. Ennis, Licensing Project Manager - Salem, NRC Mr. D. Schroeder, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator H. Berrick, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 10-2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 of 4
- 4. TITLE Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SQETAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR EUMENT O
MONTH DAY YEAR DOCKET NUMBER 02-24 2011 2011 0 0 2 0 04 23 2011
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
[1 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
[1E 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
E] 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) the steam generators. This analysis assumes the failure of the turbine driven AFW pump and the steam generator blowdown valves isolate upon an automatic start of the AFW pumps. If the steam generator blowdown valves are not isolated, then the AFW flow entering the steam generators may exit the steam generators through the blowdown lines without being heated to its saturated temperature and without being vaporized. This would reduce the heat removal capability of the AFW injected into the steam generators below the AFW flow required by the accident analysis with only the motor driven AFW pumps running.
This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), "any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of bypassing the AFW pump automatic closure of the steam generator blowdown isolation valves during steam generator blow down radiation monitor functional testing was due to knowledge errors during the preparation and review of procedure 51.IC-FT.RM-0129.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Salem Station dating back to 2007 identified the following previous occurrences.
Salem Unit 1 LER 272/2008-001 was issued for the inadvertent start of the 1A emergency diesel generator during testing. The cause of this event was a technical rigor / human performance error made in the test plan development that was not identified or corrected in subsequent reviews. The corrective actions associated with this event were specific to this event and would not have prevented the current event from occurring.
Salem Unit 1 LER 272/2010-003 was issued for a failure to re-establish the automatic start circuitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the steam generator feedwater pumps. A jumper was installed in accordance with the procedure to disable the function but was not removed prior to mode ascension to re-establish the automatic start circuitry. The cause was attributed to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry. The corrective actions associated with this event were specific to this event and would not have prevented the current event from occurring.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
Failure of the steam generator blowdown system to isolate during a loss of normal feedwater accident would lead to a reduction in heat removal capacity of the AFW system. Based upon a review of logs, there was no actual safety consequence associated with this event. During the performance of quarterly testing of the Unit 1 steam generator blowdown radiation monitors from June 2006 to January 2011, both the motor driven and turbine driven AFW pumps were operable and capable of responding to the loss of normal feedwater accident. The additional capacity of the turbine driven AFW pump would compensate for the AFW flow lost through the unisolated steam generator blowdown line assuming maximum blowdown flow.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, did not occur. This event did not result in a condition that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Personnel involved with this event have been held accountable in accordance with PSEG policies.
- 2. Procedure S1.IC-FT.RM-0129 was voided.
- 3. Procedures $1.IC-FT.RM-0029, S1.IC-FT.RM-0030, S1.IC-FT.RM-0031 and S.IC-FT.RM-0032 were reinstated. These procedures ensure that steam generator blowdown flow is isolated at the start of the functional test.
COMMITMENTS
No commitments are made in this LER.
Document Control Desk APR 2 3 2011 Page 3 LR-N1 1-0119 Bcc:
President and Chief Nuclear Officer Vice President Operations Support Director - Nuclear Oversight Director - Regulatory Affairs Plant Manager - Salem Regulatory Assurance Manager - Salem Licensing Manager NSRB INPO at LEREvents@inpo.org
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| 05000311/LER-2011-001, Regarding 21SW122 Isolation Function Inoperable Greater than Allowed by Technical Specification | Regarding 21SW122 Isolation Function Inoperable Greater than Allowed by Technical Specification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-2011-001, Re Service Water Loop Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | Re Service Water Loop Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-2011-002, Unit 2 Regarding Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.4.5 and 3.4.10.3 | Unit 2 Regarding Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.4.5 and 3.4.10.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-2011-002, Regarding Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing | Regarding Bypass of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Isolation During Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-2011-003, Regarding 11 Component Cooling Water Pump Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | Regarding 11 Component Cooling Water Pump Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-2011-003, Regarding Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded | Regarding Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-2011-004, Regarding 11 Component Cooling Water Pump Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | Regarding 11 Component Cooling Water Pump Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-2011-004, Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Trip of the 23 Reactor Coolant Pump | Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Trip of the 23 Reactor Coolant Pump | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-2011-005, Regarding Incorrect Nis Trip Setpoints Results in TS 3.0.3 Entry | Regarding Incorrect Nis Trip Setpoints Results in TS 3.0.3 Entry | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-2011-005, For Salem, Unit 2, Regarding Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3 | For Salem, Unit 2, Regarding Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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