05000311/LER-2011-003, Regarding Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Regarding Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded
ML11172A110
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/2011
From: Fricker C
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N11-0172 LER 11-003-00
Download: ML11172A110 (6)


LER-2011-003, Regarding Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
3112011003R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nuclear L.L. C.

JUN 0 6 Z11 1 OCFR50.73 LR-N1 1-0172 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555-001 LER 311/2011-003 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 NRC Docket No. 50-311

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded This Licensee Event Report, "Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

The attached LER contains no commitments. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Brian Thomas at 856-339-2022.

Si ncer Car JFricker Site Vice President - Salem Attachments (1)

Document Control Desk JUN 06 2011 Page 2 LR-N11-0172 cc Mr. W. Dean, Administrator, Region I, NRC Mr. R. Ennis, Licensing Project Manager-Salem, NRC Mr. D. Schroeder, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem (X24)

Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator H. Berrick, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 l10-2O010

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 05000311 1 of 4
4. TITLE Technical Specification Maximum Airflow in the Fuel Handling Building Exceeded
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER__
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR

.R SEQUENTIALu R

REVo ONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.MI DOCKET NUMBER 04 05 2011 2011 0 0

3 0

06 06 2011

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

E2 20.2201(b)

E2 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

- 1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 11 20.2201(d)

[] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

E2 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

C2 20.2203(a)(1) 12 20.2203(a)(4)

C3 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

E1 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

E] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

E2 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 12 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 12 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
- 1 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(x)

E2 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 12 50.36(c)(2) 1] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)"

E2 73.71(a)(4)

- 1 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

E2 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 12 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

E2 73.71(a)(5) 100%

[1 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 12 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

[1 OTHER 12 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 12 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) performed on April 8, 2011 at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> with a measured flow of approximately +15%

still above the TS required flow rate. During this testing, binding of the inlet guide vane for the 22 FHBexhaust fan was identified. The 22 FHB exhaust fan inlet guide vanes were repaired. On April 9, 2011, air flow was measured flow at approximately +9%. On April 10, 2011, additional boundary controls were set in place and the air flow surveillance test was re-performed with satisfactory results for both filtration trains.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the high air flow rate in the Unit 2 FHB is attributed to the air supply balancing damper being out of position; the air pressure regulator on the FHB truck bay roll up door being incorrectly set not allowing the door seal to inflate, and the FHB exhaust fan inlet guide vanes operating in a degraded condition. The cause of the supply air damper being in the near full open position could not be determined. Maintenance was performed on the FHB truck bay door but did not perform any work in the panel that contained the air regulator. The most likely cause is that the air regulator was not properly set prior to maintenance on the FHB truck bay door but was not identified when the door was restored following the recent maintenance. The FHB exhaust fan inlet guide vanes were found to be binding. Periodic lubrication and exercising of the guide vanes is recommended by the vendor; however, no preventive maintenance activities exist.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of LERs at Salem Station dating back to 2008 did not identify any prior similar occurrences.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

The high air flow rate of the FHB ventilation system during movement of irradiated fuel did not result in any safety consequences. The fuel handling accident (FHA) analysis for a dropped fuel assembly does not credit the FHB filtration system to remove any radioactivity from the building effluent prior to release.

For radioactive effluent release following a postulated FHA, the analysis credits the building ventilation to maintain a negative pressure and for release of the effluents from the plant vent which was unaffected by the high air flow rate. The amount of radioactivity released from a postulated FHA is unchanged by the increased air flow rate. A puff release, entire volume of FHB released in one-minute (which exceeds the as-found flow rate) was previously evaluated and determined that the release to the control room, exclusion area boundary, and low population zone were well below regulatory limits.

A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, did not occur. This event did not result in a condition that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The FHB truck bay door air regulator was restored to the proper setting and the door seal inflated properly.
2. The FHB air supply balancing damper was placed in the correct position.
3. The 22 FHB exhaust fan inlet guide fan dampers were repaired.
4. Procedure S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0010, Spent Fuel Manipulations, was revised to verify that the FHB truck bay door seal is operating properly and the supply damper is in the proper position prior to movement of irradiated fuel.
5. Maintenance and Operations to reinforce standards for identification of retest requirements and retest ownership.
6. Engineering to evaluate the necessity of creating a preventive maintenance activity to lubricate and/or exercise the FHB exhaust fan inlet guide vanes.

COMMITMENTS

No commitments are made in this LER.