05000272/LER-2003-005, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications: Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Fire Damper Found Out of Position
| ML040570060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/2004 |
| From: | Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LRN--04--0070 LER 03-005-00 | |
| Download: ML040570060 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2722003005R00 - NRC Website | |
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PSEG Nuclear LLC ro P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 9
0 PSEG FEB 1 9 2004 NuclearLLC LRN 0070 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
LER 272/03-005-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications: Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Fire Damper Found Out of Position", is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
The attached LER contains no commitments.
Sincere C IFc er Sale Plant Manager Attachment
/HGB C
Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99
I,
Abstract
On January 25, 2004, as part of a troubleshooting activity to determine the Salem I Auxiliary Building, it was identified that two fire dampers, IABFI3 exhaust ductwork were found closed. Additionally, High Energy Break Anal was found closed. Further review indicated that this condition might have E high differential pressure was first noted. This condition is contrary to Tech dampers were subsequently reopened to their normal open position and th There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.
This is being reported under the requirement of IOCFR5O.73(a)(2)(i)(B), an prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications and I OCFR5O.73(a)(2)(v) of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of St mitigate the consequences of an accident cause of high differential pressure in and 1ABFI5, inside the EGGS room ysis (HEBA) excess flow damper IABSB
xisted since December 21, 2003 when nical Specification 3.7.7.1. The above
airfiows were returned to normal.
y operation or condition which was (D), any event or condition that at the time ructures or systems that are needed to NRC FORM 366(7.2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of documenting the late Tech Spec entry and exit, which were made within the LCO time limits of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An 8-hour report was made as an "after-the-facr report at approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on January 26, 2004. (Event Number 40480)
Fire Protection personnel also found fire damper IABFI 5 and High Energy Break Analysis (HEBA) excess flow damper IABS8 closed. NOTE: The fire damper's manual hand quadrant was found in the open position for both IABFI3 and IABFI5 while the dampers were closed. The dampers were subsequently reopened and the airfiows were returned to normal in the Auxiliary Building.
(If more space is required. use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 366A) (17)
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (contd.)
The Carbon adsorber is placed in the exhaust stream only during post LOCA conditions to remove radioactive iodine, which may be introduced to the auxiliary building through ECCS equipment leakage. The exhaust fans are powered from vital buses and are designed for continuous operation. During normal conditions the charcoal adsorber is not in service and filtration of the effluent is provided by the HEPA filter. Monitoring of the effluent is done by the installed radiation instrumentation in the plant vent The following areas were affected by the closure of the Excess Flow HEBA Damper IABS8, fire damper IABFI3, and fire damper IABFI5: Salem Unit I piping penetration area, pipe chase area, RHR Heat exchanger area, and the RHR and Safety Injection pump area's. With Excess Flow HEBA Damper IABS8 fully closed, and fire dampers IABFI3 and IABFI5 closed, the negative pressure of the Auxiliary Building to outside atmosphere was always maintained. Any potential release would have been through the plant vent, and radiation detectors would have monitored the release.
The RHR and Safety Injection pump room coolers were unaffected by this event. If an accident condition had occurred during the time the dampers were failed (December 21, 2003 through January 25, 2004), the area room coolers, along with low outside ambient temperatures would have contributed cooling of the ECCS equipment environment to limit the area temperatures to below their maximum limits.
Closure of the dampers could have resulted in flows from the ECCS areas being below the minimum required by Technical Specifications. The shortfall in filtered flowrate did not present a risk to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event A review of this condition determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
I. Immediate corrective action was to open and reset fire dampers (IABSB, IABFI3 and IABFI 5). Flow through the HEPA Charcoal train was verified to meet Technical Specification acceptance criteria.
- 2. Fire Protection personnel performed a field validation of fire damper positions on both Salem Unit I and Unit 2.
This will continue, on a monthly basis, until evaluation and appropriate corrective actions are complete.
- 3. An evaluation (e.g., intemal inspection of bi-metallic link assembly, micro switch and dampers) to determine the Cause of the dampers failing and lack of annunciation, and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence is not yet complete. If new information is identified that changes the understanding of the event this LER will be supplemented.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.